cuerpo y alma en aristoteles

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Aristotle and the Mind-Body Problem

Author(s): Robert HeinamanReviewed work(s):Source: Phronesis, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1990), pp. 83-102Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182348.

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2/21

Aristotle

and

the

Mind-Body

Problem

ROBERT

HEINAMAN

In

this

paper

I will

argue

hat

Aristotle's

position

on

the

mind-body roblem

is probablybestcharacterized sdualism.The

question

of whetherdualism

is true

divides

into

three

questions: Are there

immaterial,

non-physical

substances?Are

therenon-physical

mentalevents?

Are there

non-physical

mental

properties?Since

Aristotle's

position

is

clearerwith

regard

o the

first

wo issuesthan

the

third,

I will

confine he

discussion

o

an

examination

of

Aristotle's

position

on

those

questions.

Section

I

deals with

Aristotle's

commitments n

relation to

the questionabout

substance and

section II

deals with the issue

in relation o

events. An

alternativeaccount

of

Aristot-

le's

positionon

the second

issue is

examinedandrejectedin section

III.

I will arguethat, with reservations, t is plausibleto say that Aristotle

accepts he

existenceof

non-physicalubstances.

On the

question

of

mental

events,

I will

arguethat Aristotle's

position s at

odds with

both the

dualist

and

the

physicalist

iews,

but since

in this case too it

is

plausible

o

say that

Aristotleaccepts he

existenceof

non-physical

vents,his overall

position

s

best

classified as

dualist. The

evidence drawn on

occurs

largely

in

the

comparatively

neglected

first book

of De Anima.

Many have

thought, correctly,

that Aristotle's

views on

the intellect

commit him to

some sort

of dualism

with regard

o

the

rational

soul, but

rejectthis as an accuraterepresentation f his positionfor other typesof

soul

-

sensitive,

nutritive,

etc. My

argument n section

1

rests on no

assumptions

about

the soul peculiar

to the intellect.

Aristotle's

dualism

regarding he soul

holds for any kind

of soul, including

he

souls of plants.

However,section II

deals onlywith

psychicevents

whichhave

the soulas a

subject. Digestion

and other

actualizations

of the nutritive

soul are not

mental events

becausethe

proper

subject of digestion,

forexample, is

the

body

alone.

Phronesis

1990.

Vol.

XXXVII

(AcceptedAugust 1989)

83


3/21

I

Whatmust Aristotle

believe in orderto hold a dualistview of the soul?

Of

course, he must believe

that.

(1) the soul is an

immaterial ntity,

but clearlymore is

required.A materialistmightbelieve that the structure

or shape of some

wooden object is an immaterial ntity

-

it is not madeout

of matter without

abandoninghis materialism.

The

shape,

like

weightor

velocity, will count as a physicalproperty,and this the materialist s happy

to

accept. Similarly,even if Aristotle accepted(1), he might think of the

soul as a kindof physicalattribute f the body andso not be whatwe would

want to call a dualist.

More is needed.

Belief in the

possibilityof the soul's existenceseparately rom the body

suffices to make one a

dualist,but Aristotle rejectsthat belief for at least

most

types of soul. If

Aristotle is committed to dualism, he

must be

committed o a weakerversionof it whichadmits hat the soul cannot

exist

apart rom the body.

The question of

whether Aristotle had some Cartesian oncept

of

con-

sciousness is irrelevant to the

issue,

as Robinson has

pointed

out.' A

materialistmight acceptsuch a concept while a dualistmight rejectit.

Nowadays the mind-body problem revolves around

the

question of

whether psychological

ntities and laws are reducible o physicalentities

and

laws (or eliminable

altogether). There is

no

question

of Aristotle's

wishing o reduce

psychic aws to physical aws (or eliminateanything),

so the relevant

question

with

regard

o Aristotle s:

does

he reduce

psychic

entities

(suchas souls andmentalevents)to material ntities(such

as bodies

and

physicalchanges)?

The fact that Aristotle

considered he soul

to be an

immaterial ntity

irreducible o matter sput beyonddoubtby his argumentsn De Anima

I 3

and 4

whichpurport o

prove that the soul is changeless.2

In

I.2, 403b25-27,

Aristotlehad said

that

the living

have

been

thought

o

differ from the non-living n virtueof two characteristics

movementand

perception.

Since it is the

presence

of a soul that

distinguishes

he

living

fromthe

non-living, he

soul of a

living hing

should

explainwhy

t is able

to

move. And it was

thought

hatthis

explanation

would irsthave

to

posit

that

the

soul

moves, andthensay

that

he

body

of a

living hing

s caused

o move

I

H.M. Robinson, MindandBody in Aristotle , ClassicalQuarterly, 8 (1978), p. 106.

2

Cf.

Dc

An.

411a24-26, De

Gen. et

Corr.

334al-15.

84


4/21

by the soul's

motion.

This account entails

materialism,

or the soul can

move only if it is a materialobject.3

Thus, for example,

Democritusheld the

soul to be

composed

of

fine

spherical atoms

which

move, bump

into coarser atoms

constituting

the

body, and thereby

cause it

to

move.

And, of course,

since

Democritus'

atoms were material

objects he

had to

say that

the soul was

a

material

object.

Aristotleagreesthat the

soul

of a

living

thing explainswhy

it

moves

as

it

does, but he rejects

the suggestionthat the

soul moves

the

body

in

the

manner proposedby Democritusby arguing,

n I.3 and 4, that

the

soul

cannotchange at all.

Whydoes Aristotle

reject he possibility f

a

soul undergoing

hange?As

Alexander pointsout,4 it is because the soul

is a form, and all forms are

immaterial,and hence

changeless.5

The soul, being a

form, is not a body6 ndhence has no magnitude7

nd s

not

divisible into parts

with magnitude.According o De Anima

409al-3

3Although

Aristotle says that some of

his

predecessorscharacterized

he soul as

&ac-

gaurov

405bll), this does not mean

that they

considered it to be immaterial

but rather

that they

considered it to be

constitutedby a fine

and

rarifiedsort of stuff such as

fire as

opposed to earth

(409bl9-21;

cf. Phys.

215b5, 10).

Cf.

R.D.

Hicks,

Aristotle,DeAnima

(New

York, 1976), p. 227.

4

Alexander of Aphrodisias,

DeAnima, ed. I.

Bruns(Berlin, 1887), p.

17, 9-11;

pp. 21,

22-22, 12;

In

Aristotelis Topicorum, ed.

M. Wallies

(Berlin, 1891), pp. 162,

25-163,

2;

pp.

164,

24-165, 3.

Cf.

Simplicius,In Aristotelis

Physicorum,ed. H.

Diels (Berlin,

1895),

p. 964,

14-17; p. 1250,

16-18; In Libros

Aristotelis De Anima

Commentaria,

ed.

M.

Hayduck

(Berlin, 1882), p.

56, 26-28;

G. Rodier, Traittde

l'dme(Paris, 1900),

p.

136;

H.M.

Robinson,

AristotelianDualism, in J.

Annas (ed.), Oxford

Studies

n

Ancient

Philosophy I

(Oxford, 1983),

p. 131.

5 Meta.

1032b14, 1035a28-29,

1037al-2, 1044b21-24,27-29,

1075al-2; Phys.

224bl-13,

25.

The

fact that the

soul's

changelessness rules out the

possibility of its being

a

material

object

has now been pointed

out by C. Shields

( Soul and

Body in Aristotle ,

Oxford

Studies in Ancient

Philsophy VI (1988),

pp. 114-18), and

section

I of

the present

paper

can

be

read as an attempt

to

strengthen his first argument

for ascribing dualism

to

Aristotle

by adding the

following points. (i)

There is an

explanationof why

an

object

lacking magnitude

cannot

change based on the

requirements for a

subject

of

change

found in

Phys. VI.4 and 10.

It is this rather than

the arguments

ound in De

Anima 1.3

that

provides the basic

explanation of

why the soul is

changeless. (ii) For

reasons to be

mentioned shortly,

establishing hat the soul is not

a material

substancedoes not

by itself

warrantthe

conclusion that

Aristotle is a dualist.

A strongerclaim

should, andcan, be

established.

6

De An.

412a17,

414a20-21, Parva

Nat. 467b14; cf. De

Part. Anim. 652b7-9.

7

De An.

407a2-22, De Motu

Anim.

703al-3;

cf.

De An.

424a26-28, Meta.

1075a6-7,

Phys. 212b7-12,

28-29.

85


5/21

and the arguments f PhysicsVI.4 and 10, this excludes the possibilityof

the soul's changing.8

The conclusion hatthe soul is changelesswas an important evelopment

in Aristotle'sviewswhich s linked o otherchangesof position,for example

in his accountof pleasure.PreviouslyAristotlehadnot hesitated o speakof

the

soul

as

the subjectof change.In the Categorieshe soul is the substance

which is the propersubjectfor differentkinds of qualities la25-26, 9b33-

35), and

a

distinguishing eature of

a

substance s

its

capacity

to

persist

througha change between contraries

4alb19).

Similarly, he Protrepti-

cus thinksof living as a changeundergoneby the soul (B80, 83

-

During),

and the Topics oo speaksof the soul'schanging 120b21-26,123al5-17).9

At this

stage Aristotle apparently s willingto say that

if F

and

G are

qualities

whose

proper ubject

s

the soul, then the soul's

ransition etween

F and G is a change n the soul.

By the time he wrote Physics VII, Aristotle was no longer willing

to

accept this. There we find a rather strange intermediateposition where

some but

not

all

transitions

between different

qualities

of

the

soul

are

changes.The intellectualpartof the soul both acquiresanduses knowledge

but neither

s

an

alteration

a

qualitative hange

in

the

intellect.

But

this

s

notdueto any differencebetweensouland matter, ortheperceptive oul

does undergoalterations 244b10-12, 47a4-17,248a6-9)1I

nd

some

transi-

8

This

is also required by

Aristotle's

view that a self-mover

must be divisible

into the

changing subject

of motion

-

the

body, and

an unchanging mover

-

the soul

(Phys.

VIII.5;

cf. 266b28-29).

Note

too that Aristotle

says that

alteration the only

species of change

which the

soul

could possibly

undergo

-

has a perceptibleobject

as its proper subject

(De Gen.

et Corr.

319bl-15) and that

the subject of a quality

is divisible

(Phys. 236b7-8,

De

Caelo

299bl9-24).

Nevertheless,

in manypassagesfrom

what I take to

be mature

works

Aristotle

ascribes

change to the soul. While he doubtless often uses

'x(vYjaoL'

n a broad sense, this

doesn't seem to

account for Phys.

IV. 11 where

'change'must be

used in a strict sense

in

the

definition

of time but

is still ascribedto the

soul.

Likewise

Aristotle

ascribeschange

to

points

(Phys. 219b6-19,

227b14-17)

despitethe fact

that they have no magnitude and

Phys.

VI. 10 explicitly

denies that

they can change.

I

H. Cherniss akes Top.

111b4-8and 121a30-39

o show that the

Topicsasserts

he view

that pleasure

is not a change

and

the

soul does

not undergo change

(Aristotle's

Criticism

of

Plato

and the

Academy

(New York, 1962),

p. 589). But there

is no reason to

believe

that

Aristotlewishes to use

the arguments here

presented

as illustrations o derive

those

conclusions.

For example,

Aristotle

says that if the soul

changes, then it

must undergo

one

of

the species of change

-

alteration,

locomotion

etc. But he does not

deny that any

species of change does characterize he soul and then concludethat the genus change

does

not applyto it either.

10

Cf.

De

An.

406b10-11,

An. Post.

1.29,

Rhet. 1369b33-1370al.

86


6/21

tions of state in material

objects

are not alterations

but

completions

(or

tXcr6oEL5).

What Aristotle wishes to prove in VII.3 is that alteration

occurs n

a

subject soul

or matter

only

with

respect

o

qualities

which

are

perceptible.

If the

qualities

n

question

are

not

of

that kind but are

rather

conditions,states

or

shapes,

then

the

subject

- soul or matter

transiting

betweenthem is

not

thereby

altered.

If

the

qualities

are

perceptible,

then

the subject body or soul

-

is altered. Since the intellect

s not affected

by

sensible

qualities,

it is

only

the

perceptive part

of

the

soul

that

suffers

alteration.

Aristotle's

ascription

of

change

to the soul

in

these earlier

phases

does

not mean that he was then a materialist,anymore thanin Plato's case.1'

Rather, by

the time he

wrote De

Anima he

had more

clearly thought

out

what was requiredof a proper subject of

change and had concludedthat

such a subject could

not

lack

magnitude.Believing

that

souls lack magni-

tude

he had to concludethat soulsare changeless.

But why did he

come to believe that a subject of change must possess

magnitude?The answer

can be

found

in PhysicsVI.4,

234blO-20.12

In any

change there is a subject, starting-point nd

end-pointof the change. The

end-pointof the change is the newly acquired

eature; he starting-points

the feature lost

in the change; and the subject s what persists hroughout

the change,

what begins with the starting-pointand finishes with the

end-point.

Suppose that

a subject is changing rom A to B, where B is what the

subject first changes into ratherthan an

extreme (et;

6

tETafriXEX

6

7QwOCoV).

or

example, if A is white, take B to be grey rather than black.

Suppose hesubject s now engaged n the

process

of

changing rom

A

to

B.

Then, Aristotle

argues, the subjectcannot be

in A as a whole for then the

subject would

be

at

the starting-point f the change rather han changing.

Nor

can the

subject be in B as a whole for thenit would be true that it has

But

note that

already

n Phys. VII

Aristotle thinks

that a subject of

change

is

divisible

(242a40, 47-48).

How this is to be

reconciled

with

VII's ascriptionof

alteration

o

the

soul

is

unclear.

On

attempts to

construe the

earlyAristotle

as

a

materialistwho

identified

the soul

with

the fifth

element,

see Cherniss,

Aristotle's

Criticism f Plato

and the

Academy,

appendix

VIII.

12

Cf.

the similar

argument n

VI. 10,

240b8-241a26,

and225a31,

242a40,

47-48,

257a33-

bl,

258b25,

267a22-23. Note that

theargument

n VI.4

is intended only

to establish that

a

subject of

change is

divisible

into parts, not

that it is infinitely

divisible(Phys.

235b4-5).

By

'change' I

mean

x(v1aL;

as defined in

Phys. III and

contrasted with

bviELa

(activity) in

Meta. IX.6 and EN

X.4.

When

'WQ0yELa'

overs both

change

and

activity I

translate

it as

'acutality'.

87


7/21

become B,

not that t isbecomingB. Since

the subjectcannotas a whole

be

in

both A

and

B

or in neither, partof the

subjectmustbe in A and part

n

B.13But that

means the

subjectof change,any subject

of change, mustbe

divisible ntoparts.Since

the soul, like anyform, is not

divisible nto

parts,

it

cannot

change.Therefore t is

immaterial, ince forAristotleall

matter s

changeable

and divisible.

And since thereis no question

but thatAristotle

considered he soul to be a

substance, 4hesoul is an

immaterial

ubstance.

But before

we

can

secure

the claim thatAristotleis a

dualist, a further

question must

be addressed:does

Aristotle consider

the soul to be the

organization

f the body? 5or those who

thinkthatbeing an

organization

conflicts

with

being

a

substance, his

possibility

s

ruled

out.

But MetaH.2

makes it

doubtful that

Aristotle agrees. And if

artifactsare substances,

their

forms are substances,

but in many

cases such a form

will

be the

organization

of the artifact'smaterial

parts. So

the

interpretation

which

understandsAristotle's soul to

be

the

organization

of

the

body

which

enables

an

organism

o

engage

n certain

ypes

of

behavior

annotbe

clearly

ruledout on this

basis. And

if the soul were

simply

he

organization

f the

body,then

it

wouldbe

far

from

clear

hatthe soul

is

a

non-physical ntity.

The

characterization f Aristotleas

a

dualist

would be

very

dubious.

But there s a

conclusiveobjection

o

this

nterpretation:

n

DeAnima

I.4

Aristotle

argues hat the soul is

not the

organization

f

the

body.

If

Aristotle

were

to

expressthe

view

that the soul

is the

organization

f

the body,

what Greek word would

serve for

'organization'?

The

possibil-

Cf. 230b29-231al,

240a19-29.

14

Meta. 1017b1O-16,

4-26, 1035bl4-16,

1037a5,28-29,

1043a29-36,

1077b31-34;

DeAn.

410a13-22, 412al9-21,

blO-13, 415bll-14,

De Part.

Anim.

64la25-29,

De

Gen.

Anim.

738b26-27.

I do not understandwhy Richard

Sorabji Body

and Soul

in

Aristotle ,

in J.

Barnes,

M. Schofield and

R. Sorabji

(eds.),

Articles

on

Artistotle,

vol. 4 (London, 1979),

p.

48)

and Terry

Irwin (Aristotle's

First

Principles

(Oxford,

1988),

p. 291) think that Meta

1041bll-33

shows

that an immaterial

soul could not

be a component of

a composite

living thing of form

and matter. Whatever

they may

mean by 'component',

what the

passage does show

is that the

form is not another

element

(GooXrtov)

n

the

composi-

te. Since

the passage

defines an element

as a material component (1041b31-33;

cf.

1088bl4-16,

De Caelo 302al5-19),

all 1041b31-33

proves

is that the form is not

a

material

component

of the composite,

not that it is not an

immaterial

component. Aristotle

repeatedlyspeaks

of the composite as being

composed of

((x)

form and

matter (e.g.

Meta. 1035al7-20,

b32-33, 1037a29-30).

s

Thus

A. Edel, Aristotle and

His Philosophy (London,

1982), pp.

144-45;

M.

Nuss-

baum,Aristotle's

De Motu Animalium(Princeton,

1978),

pp. 71, 73, 149,

and Aristote-

lian Dualism , pp.

200-1; M.

Frede, Substance in

Aristotle's Metaphysics ,

in

A.

Gotthelf

(ed.), Aristotle on Nature

and Living Things

(Bristol,

1988), p. 21.

88


8/21

ities seem

to be:

Td~tL

(arrangement),

xQaot;

or

RtLL

(mixture), X6yo;

(proportion),

ol5vOrLg

(combination),

&IMOml;

state) or

E;tg

(condi-

tion).

The first

word

does not

occur

n

DeAnima,

butthe next four

do,

in

I.4

where

Aristotle argues

that

the soul

is

not

a

mixture

or

proportion

or

combination

of

bodily parts.

TMere re three

things

o be

distinguished

ere.A combinationof

bodies

is

a

juxtaposition

of

particles

of the bodies which

eaves

the nature

of

the

original particles

intact. For

example,

I

might

throw sand and

sawdust

together

in

such

a way that

particles

of

sand

and sawdust ie

next

to

each

other and are still

particles

of

sand

and sawdust.

But when

two

bodies are

mixed theyacton one another nsuchawaythatthenaturesof the original

bodies are

altered

to

a

different

nature a kind of

chemicalreaction akes

place.

16

And

the

proportion

s

simply he ratio

of

the

amounts

of

the mixed

or

combinedbodies.

If, asAristotle argues,

he soul is notanykindof

combination

r

mixture

or

proportion, hen itcannotbe an

organization

f

bodilyparts.It

is useless

to

appealto

the notionsof

arrangement r state orconditionand

ascribe o

Aristotle

the view thatone of

these ermsexpresses

he type of organization

of

bodily

parts with which the soul is

to be identified. For in

De An. 1.4

(408al-3)

Aristotle saysthat, unlike

the soul, it

wouldbe correct o identify

healthor

the

other

bodilyvirtueswitha harmony f

bodilyparts.And

Meta.

E.19 and

20, after

defining

a

state (b60mEaL;)

s an

arrangement

-T(zLg)

of

whathas

parts, saysthat a condition

(EtLg)

s

a

kind

of

state,

and

gives

health as an

example. 7

So health is

an

arrangement of bodily parts, a

conditionand

a state ofthe body;and

givenDeAn.

408al-3'scontrastof the

soul

with

health, theconclusionmust

be that, forAristotle, the

soul is none

of

these. For

every

term

X that might

express he

concept

of

organizationn

Greek,

Aristotle denies

that the soul is an

X

of

bodily parts.

The

view

that

Aristotle

considers he

soul to be

some organization f the body

is false.

Further

evidence that Aristotle

rejects the

view that the soul is the

organizationof the

body is suppliedby the fact

that although

Aristotle

defines

the

soul as

the form of

the body, he at

times suggests that

an

animal's

soul

is

located primarily

n the heart.18This would

make no

16

De Gen. et

Corr.

1.10.

17

Cf.

Phys.

246b3-10;

Top.

116b17-22;

Fragmenta

ed. Ross),

pp.

19-20;

Alexander,

De

Anima, p. 25,

4-7.

Contrast Top.

145a33-bll.

18

ParvaNat.

450a28-29,

467b13-16,

469a4-b6,

478b32-479al;

De

Part.Anim.

665al-13,

667b19-22;

De Motu

Anim.

702bl5-21, 703a36-b2; Meta.

1035b25-28;

cf. Parva Nat.

438b8-10.

On

this

issue see T.

Tracy,

Heartand

Soul in

Aristotle ,

in J.

Anton and

A. Preus

89


9/21

sense if the soul

were the body's

organization: body's

organization s not

locatedprimarily

n anybodily part.

The point is put

beyondquestionby

Aristotle's

insistence(408b20-29)

that

the soul is unaffectedby

(non-fatal)

damage to the body of

a living

thing.'9 f the

soul

were the organization

f the bodythat

constitutes he

living

thing'scapacity o

engage in certainkindsof

behavior, henthe part

of the

soul which s ananimal's

apacity o

see wouldhave to

comprise he

organization f the

animal's yes. In which

case thedestruction r

crippling

of

theeyes of an

animalwouldat the same

time destroy

hatpartofthe soul,

since

the relevantorganization

would be destroyed.

But this is

just what

Aristotlerejects:

an old man,he says, could

see as wellas a young

man f he

were given a new

eye. The damage to

the physicaleye leaves

the soul

unaffected.So the

relevantpartof

the soulcontinues o

exist even

whenthe

bodily

organization

s gone, andhence the

soul cannotbethat

organization.

Thesoul of a

living hing s

not anorganization f

bodilyparts,but rather

somethingwhich

supervenes

on

bodily parts

when

they

have been

orga-

nized

in a certain

way (408a20-21:

[&AAov

rE(6v

TL

o1oa (xoi5

X6yov)

tW(VEaL

ro';

i5XEoLv;).

The point

is made with

great

clarity by

Alexander.20

Aristotlecertainlybelieves that

the

soul

of

a

livingthing

is

dependent

or

its

own

existenceontheexistence

of

bodilyparts

arranged

n

a

certain

way.2'But the

fact

that this

organization

s

a

necessary

condition

for

the

soul's

existence does not require

us

to

identify

it with the soul.

Rather the soul is

a dynamis that

supervenes

(biny(yvETac)

on the

body

when the

organizationof

matter has reached certain evel.

From the

ac-

countwe

find

n

De

GenerationeAnimalium

735al4-17,736a35-b4)

we

can

see that

different

oul-constituting apacities

will

supervene

on

the

material

organization

at different

stages

of the

living thing's

development.

The

soul

is

a form

and

all

formsare immaterial

ntities.

But

forms

can

be

relatedto

matter n

three ways:

(1)

A

form

which

s

a

structural

r

physical

eature

of

matter,e.g.,

the

form

of an

artifact uch as a

house,

or

a

color,

or a certain

arrangement

f

bodily partssuch

as

health.

(eds.), Essays in Ancient

Greek Philosophy

II

(Albany, 1983), pp. 321-29. As

is well

known,

Franqois

Nuyens' mistakenbelief that this view

about the soul's location

conflicts

with the definition of the

soul as the form of the body led him to some now discredited

hypotheses regardingAristotle's

development

(L'Ovolution

e lapsychologie d'Aristote

(Louvain, 1948) ).

19 Cf. H.M. Robinson,

Mind and Body in

Aristotle ,

p.

120.

2 Alexander, De Anima,

pp. 24, 18-26, 30.

21 De An. 403b2-3 413a3-5, 414al9-20, 427a26-27;Parva

Nat. 453a2-6, 14-15;

De

Gen.

Anim. 736b21-29;EN

1128bl3-15;

Dc Caelo

278bl-3.

90


10/21

(2)

A form which

is not

an immediate

structural

or

physical

feature

of

matterbut is supervenient nddependent oritsexistenceon immedi-

ate

physical

eatures

of matter

such

as the

power

of

a

drug,

according

to

Alexander,andthe

soul, according o

Aristotle.

(3) A form which

does not

depend

on matter

or

material

eatures

for

its

existence.

If

Aristotle held

the

soul

to

be

a

form of the third

sort he would

be

a

Cartesiandualist.At most he thinks

he intellect

s such

a

form.

If

Aristotle

held

the

soul

to

fall

into

(1),

then

there

would

be

at

least

some

plausibilityn

labellinghim a

materialist,

despite

the

fact

that

the soul wouldstill

be

an

immaterial ubstance.I haveargued hat Aristotlebelieves the soul to fall

into

the

second class

of forms.Since

this makes

his

position

very

ike

that

of

presentday

emergent

dualists ,

t

is,

I

think,

best to

classify

Aristotle

as

a

dualist.

So:

on

the

standard

account

of

the

dualist-physicalist istinction

the

former

accepts he

existenceof

non-physical ntitiesand

the

latter

does

not.

Non-physical

ntities

are

explained

asbeing

entities

rreducible

o

physical

entities.

On this

understanding f

the

issue,

Aristotleis a

dualist.

But

there is a

complication

n that

this

account

of the

physical-non-

physical distinction, and hence of the physicalist-dualist istinction, is

inadequate.

Philosophers

disagreeas to

whether

a

dispositional

property

such

as

fragility

should

be

considered

a real

property

distinct

from

its

physicalbase

-

say, the

molecular

tructure f

glass.

Suppose

Jones

believes

dispositions

are real

properties

but

rejects

the

identification

of them

with

their

physical

bases.Then

Jones

might

consider

ragility o

be

an

emergent

property hat

superveneson

certain

physical

tates

but is

irreducible o any

of

these

material

bases.

That in

no way

commitsJones

to

denyingthat

fragility s a

physical

property.

Likewise,

the

irreducibility

f a

formof

kind(2)

need not

show

thatit is

non-physical.

Given

this

unclarity, t

also

becomes

unclear

whether

dualist'

is the

correct

abel to

applyto

Aristotle's

position.

Furthermore,

Alexander'

compares

he soul

with

the

power of a

drug

which is

not

identicalto

the

matter t is

found

in or to

the

matter's

orga-

nization.The

comparison

uggests

hat

Alexanderdoes

not see any

radical

break

with

the

physical

whenthe

soul

supervenes,and

there is no

evidence

to

suggestthat

Aristotle

dideither.

Hence, the

interpretation f

Aristotle as

a dualist

remains

problematic

for

two

reasons:

(i) at

least as far

as I know,

there is no

account

available

'2

See n.

20.

91


11/21

enabling

us to

draw

a clear

distinction

between

non-physical

ndphysical

emergententities or, hence, betweenthe dualist

and the

physicalist;

ii)

even if such

an account

of the

physical-non-physical

istinction

were or

is

available,

here s

no

reason o believe

that t or anythingike it entered

nto

Aristotle'sthinking

about

the

soul.

II

Aristotle

explains

whathe

considers

a psychological

vent

to be at the

end

of

De

Anima I.1,

403a3-bl9.

He

begins

by asking

whether

psychic

events

(~z&q)

belong onlyto thesoulof theliving hingor also

have

the body as

a

subject.

And

from

thesucceeding

inesit is apparent

hat Aristotle

equates

this question

to

the following

one:

Is it true

that,

for any

appropriate

predicate

F,

the soul

(of

the living

thing)

is

F entails

the

body

is

changing?

Aristotle

goes

on to claim

that

with the possible exception

of

thinking,

the

entailment

always

holds. So,

apart,

possibly,

from

thought,

anypsychic

event

involves

a bodilychange.

Aristotle

then

(403a24-bl9)

proceeds

o say

thatfor at least

most

psychic

events, there

will

be a bodily

change

which

s not merely necessary

or

its

occurrencebut servesas

thematterof

the psychological

vent which, ike

a

material

substance,

s a composite

of form

and

matter.

If so,

what

is

the

form

of

a psychic

event?

The

matter

s

a

change

n

the body.

Theform

will

be something

rue

of the

soul

sinceAristotle

has justexplained

hat

psychic

events

are common

o body

andsoul.

It cannot

be

a change

giventhat

that

s

the

material

partof

a psychic

event

and

a soulcannot

change.

Since

the

formal

aspect

of

a

psychic

vent

is

a

feature

of

the

soul and

must

also be

an

occurrence

nd

not

a

power

or condition

of

the soul,

the only

alternative

among he

menagerie

of Aristotelian

beings

s

an

activity

n

the

sense contrasted

withchange

nMeta

IX.6

and ENX.4.

So

a psychic

event,

for

Aristotle,

is

a composite

of activity

and

change.

The activity

(form)

takes place

in the

soulof

a living

hing

and

the change

(matter)

occurs

n

its

body.

The

compositepsychic

event

is

not

an activity

any

morethan

the

composite

human

beingis

a

soul.

The

end

of De

An. I.1

showsthat

there

are only

two

possibilities:

an

activity

such

as seeingred

must

be

either

the

form

of a

psychological

vent

or a composite

of

form

and

matter

where

the

matter

s a

bodily

change.

But

the second

alternative

s

not

possible.

Aristotle believes

that a change

necessarily

occupies

a

period

of

time

(Phys. 234a24-31)becauseit is itself divisibleinto temporalparts with

magnitude .

This structure

of

a

change

is

determined

by

the analogous

92


12/21

structure

f

itspath

and

in

turn

determines he time

occupiedby

the

change

to have an analogousstructure Phys. 207b21-25,219al-14, 235al5-17).

We must,

of

course,

distinguish

he

divisibility

f the change tselffrom the

divisibility

f thetime it occupies,justas we mustdistinguish

he

divisibility

of a

play

into the three acts constituting t from the divisibility

of the time

occupied

by the playinto three

hours. The fact that a

play

is

composed

of

parts

with

a temporal

magnitude

meansthat the

play

cannot be squeezed

into

a moment

but

is

itself

spread

out over time and so must exist for a

period

of

time. Likewise

the

fact

that

a

change

is

composed

of

temporal

parts

with

size

means hat

t

is

spread

out

over

a

period

of time andcannot

be squeezedinto a moment.

On

the other

hand,

an

activity

does

not divide nto

temporalparts

but

like

a pointis a whole all

of

which

exists whenever

t exists

(EN

1174b9-14).

Just as

a point has no spatial parts

so an activity

has no temporalparts.

Because t

is temporally

ndivisibleanactivity wholly

xists in a moment

(EN 1174al4-19,b7-9).

So even if it lasts for a period

of time, thiswill not

consist in

furthertemporalphases

of the activityrevealing hemselves

as

different

partsof the timeoccupied

by a changedisclosedifferent

tages of

the changeitself.

If

an

activityexistsat the present

momenttheneven if it

lastsfor

10 seconds all of it is present

at that firstmomentand

t is not the

case that

more of it will come into

existence in the future.

The time

following

thatfirstmomentwill not

reveal further

partsof the activitybut

only further

phases of

time occupiedby the activity.

Since

a

changenot onlyoccupiesa

periodof timebut s itself

divisible nto

differenttemporalparts,

whereasanactivity s not

divisible nto temporal

parts, it is as absurdto

suppose that an activity

could be composedof a

change

as it

is

to suppose

that

a

spatially

ndivisiblepoint

could be com-

posed

of a spatiallydivisiblemagnitude.

For the same

reason t is absurd o

suppose hatthe same

thingcouldbean activityunder

one description nd

a

change

under a different

description.

This fundamentaldifferencebetween

activityand

changeexplainsother

temporal

differencesbetween them

that rule out

the possibilitythat an

activitycould be made

out of'

a change. (1) An activity

exists in a

moment

but

a

change

doesnot. Sowhen

anactivity

xists

n

a

moment

here

then

exists

no

change hat

could constitute

heactivity. 2)

The same

result

follows

if

Aristotle allows(as

I

believe

he does)

that anactivity

an exist

for

one

andonly one moment.

(3)

There

is

a first

moment whenan activityA

existsbut thereis no first

momentor time whena changeC exists(Phys. 236a7-27).On the proposal

under

consideration, heactivity

A

-

is a composite

he matterof which s

93


13/21

a bodily

change

C. Thenthere

aretwo possibilities.

Suppose

t is the first

momentof activityA. Either(1) t is a limitof the time occupiedby C- at t

and prior o t C

does notexist

but for

a

period

of time

of

which

is the

first

limit it does exist;

or (2)

C beginsto

existbefore

t.

On (1), all

of the temporally

ndivisible

activityA exists

at t but C

does

not. Therefore

C couldnot constitute

A.

On (2),

since

C existsbefore

t andmoments

arenot next

to one

another,

there

will be a period

of time occupied

by C

prior

to t. Now if C is

the

material artof the

activity, hen

the

time needed

for thechange

o cometo

be fromthelast

moment

of theperiod

of restuntil

t will also

be timeneeded

for the activity'scomingto be. If the changeconstitutes he activity n

the

way Socrates'

flesh and

bones

constitute

Socrates,then

the stagesof

the

change's

coming

to

be'

up until

t willbe stages

of the activity's

oming

to

be, just

as

stages

of

Socrates'

body coming

to

be are stages

of Socrates'

coming

o be. And the time

necessary or

the stagesof

the changeprior

o

t

to pass by

will also be

time necessaryfor

the activityto come

to be. So

contrary

o

EN 1174b9-14,

here

will be

no

difference

on

this

score

between

change

and

activity.

Since, then,

an activity

cannot be

a

composite

the

matter

of which

is

a

bodilychange,theonlyalternativesthatanactivity

s

the

formal

aspect

of

a

psychological

occurrence,

.e.

it is that part

of

a

psychological

occurrence

the

propersubject

of which

s

the

soul.

Not only

do activities

occur

n souls, they

occur

onlyin

souls. This

claim

receives

support

romthe examples

of activities

isted

by

Aristotle

which

are all

psychic

occurrences:

hinking,perceiving,

iving,living

well, plea-

sure.2?

And the

clear implication

of

EN 1173b7-13

s

that

the soul

is

the

subject

even

of

activities

hat

are

bodily pleasures.

Further,

a soul has

no

magnitude

nd

t

is

certain

at

least

thatthe

nature

of

an

activity

s

notsuch

as

to demand hat its

proper

subject

be an

entity

possessing

magnitude.

Phys.

VI.4's

argument

hat the

subject

of

a

change

possesses

magnitude

estson

a

distinctive

eature

of

change:

t has a

path

with

starting-point

nd

end-point

(andintermediate

points)

which

are

specifically

different.

And

it is conse-

quently

argued

hat

-

if

A and

B are

two such

features

on

a

path

of

change

then

since

a

changing

ubject

cannot

be

A

as a

whole

or

B

as

a

whole, part

of

23

'Stages

of the change

coming

to be' is used

in the sense in

which

fluting

the

columns

and

fitting

the stones

together

are stages

in temple-building's

coming

to

be .

Help

in

understanding

EN

1174bl2-14's

implication

that there is generation

of

change

is

provi-

ded by Phys. 206a21-25,29-33, 219b9-1O.

'

Cf.

R.

Polansky,

Energeia

n Aristotle's

MetaphysicsIX ,

Ancient

Philosophy,

3

(1983), p.

165.

94


14/21

the subject

must be

A

and

anotherpart

B. But

an

activity

has no

path.

Thereis no distance romone quality,quantityorplaceto anothercovered

by the

subject

of

an

activity.So VI.4's

argument

annot

be

applied

o

derive

the

conclusion

hat the

subject

of an

activitypossesses

magnitude.'

Furthermore,he

indivisibility

f the

subject

of

an

activitymay

be

neces-

sary

given

Aristotle's

view that a

change,

its

subject

and

time

areall

alike

divisibleor

indivisible Phys..

235al3-b5),

whereasthe

time of

an

activity

may

be indivisible

(EN

1174al4-19,

b7-14).

For

this

may

imply

that

the

subjectof

an

activitycannotbe

necessarily

divisible,

as

any

material

object

is.

Manywill

object that

activitiescannot be restricted o

psychic

events

because, e.g.,

walking

and

housebuilding

must

(or can) be

counted

as

activities.One

motivation for

this

view

is the

tense-test

according o

which Xing

is an

activity if A

is

Xing entails

A

has

Xed . But

on

Aristotle's

ownview

(Phys.

VI.6) A is

walking

ntails

A

has

walked .

Again,

activitiesare

ends,but

peoplemaywalk

for its

ownsake,

and nthat

case it is

an

activity.

I

cannot

fully reply

to

this objection

here, but it

restson a

misunder-

standingof

Aristotle's

distinction,

ncluding he

failureto

appreciate

hat

activities

and

changes

fall

under

hierarchiesof

species

andgenera

just as

itemsin

other

categoriesdo

(Phys..

V.4).

Aristotle s

drawinga

distinction

between

mutually

exclusive

classes of

beings,not

betweenverbs or

verb-

phrases.

Nor is

the

distinctionbased on

a

grammatical

ifference.

In

Phys.

Vl 6

Aristotleargues

hat tmaybe

simultaneously

ruethatA is

changingand A

haschanged,

but

thisdoes not

meanat all

that a

change s

an

activity.

SupposeA

changes

placefrom B

to E in

time

t,

to

t4.

B

C

D

E

tq

t

2

t

3

t

4

I _

Aristotle

thinks

that

there

areinfinitely

many

points(or

places)

along the

path

B-E

to

whichA

can be said to

be changing

n

the courseof

t1-t4.VI.6's

claim

is

that if

we pickout

one of these,

say

the change

from B to D,

then

5 Likewisethe considerations

brought

forward

at

Phys.

236a27-35and

240a19-29

which

require

the

divisibility

of

the

subject

of

change

will

not

apply

to the

subjectof

an

activity.

95


15/21

when A

is changing romB to

D, A has changedadifferent hange,say

from

B to C (and infinitelymany

others).

This does not

show thatchange s an activity

or two reasons. (i) In the

tense-test t must be the

same change that is referred o by the

present

and the

perfect (Phys.

231b28-232al),

but in

VI.6 differentchanges

are

referred o by the present

and perfect. (ii) The

tense-test, properlyunder-

stood,

does not

statethatthetruthof one statement

s or is not simultaneous

with the truth of another

statement. Rather it asserts that

non-linguistic

states of affairs (or events)

are

or

are not simultaneous.In VI.6

A is

changing and A has

changed may be simultaneously rue

statements,

but the

relevantpoint is that the state of affairs

referred o by the second

is earlier han the event

referred

o

by the first(236b34,237bS).

Here it

is

also

essential o

bear n mind hat ust as A'swalking and A's

walking

rom

B

to

D denotethe same being, so

A is walking and

A is

walking

rom B to D bothrefer to the same

being.

And

we

have

already

seen

that it is impossible or the same thingto be an

activity

and a

change.

Note too that

housebuilding or walking), ike

changes

and unlike activ-

ities, (1) can be fastor slow,

andso (2) mustoccupy

ime; (3)

is divisible

nto

partsspecificallydifferent

rom each other and the whole (cf. Phys.

VI.4,

ENX.4); (4)

has a

divisiblepath

with

different

tarting-

nd

end-points; 5)

ends with

an old feature ost and a new feature

deposited

n the

subject

of

change;(6) has

an

end

-

the house

-

distinct rom itself and so

(7)

is

not

indefinitely ontinuable; 8) depends or itsspecieson what

happens

ater:

if no

house results it wasn'thousebuildingafter all.

Furthermore,

hese

characteristics f

housebuilding or walking)

are

unrelated

o the

question

of whether

he housebuilder

ngaged

n

housebuilding

or

its own

sake or as

a means to an

end. For example,Jones'

housebuilding

or its own sake

cannot

bring

it

about that his housebuildingneed

not

occupy

time

or is

indivisible

nto

specifically

different tages.6

As Aristotle

explains

n Meta.

IX.6,

the end (in the relevantsense)

of

walking

s a

limitof the

walk.Since

'

Some believe that moral

actions are activities, but I argue against such an

inter-

pretation in Aristotle and

the Identity of

Actions , Historyof Philosophy Quarterly,4

(1987), pp.

307-28.

Although

I will not address them here,

problems arise

for

Aristotle's

position in the

case of psychological

events

such as learning, and even

for practical and theoretical

thinking (De An. 407a23-31,

EN 1142b26-28).

I believe that the case

of leaming leaves

Aristotle with an unresolved ncoherence n

his views but that the case of thinking

can be

dealt with: thinking a proposition

s not an activitybut a succession

of discrete

activities

(Cat. 4b22-23, 32-37; De Int. 16al3-16;

Meta. 1020a7-11;

De An. 407a6-10,

430a27-28,

b14-15, 432all-12).

96


16/21

walking

andhousebuilding annot

be theirown

limits heycannotbe ends n

the relevantsense.

Now in order to see

that the above

interpretation f a psychicevent fits

Aristotle's

text,

one has

to take

into

considerationan

ambiguity

n

terms

referring o

psychic

events.

This

ambiguity

orresponds

o

the

ambiguity f

terms

referring

o

substanceswhich

are

composites

of

form and

matter.In

the Metaphysics erms

such

as 'man'and

'horse'are usedeither

to refer

to

the formon

its

own,

i.e.,

in

thesecases,thesoul,

or

to the

compositeof form

and matter.27

imilarly

or

psychological

erms such as

'perception'

and

'anger': heyrefer

to

composites

of form

(activity)

and

matter

change)

but

can alsobe understoodo refer o the activityalone. And this swhat anger'

denotes

when the dialectician

defines angeras

the desireto returnpain for

pain

(403a30-31).Omitted

s

any reference

o the matterof the

composite

a

bodily

change

-

which must be taken into

considerationby the natural

scientist

who studies

anger. (The same

ambiguitywill applyto 'desire').?8

2'

Meta.

1032al7-19,

22-25,

1033a24-33,

b14-18,

1034bl1,

1035a6-9,

1036al6-19,

1037a7-

10,

1043a29-b4,

1069b35-1070a4;

f. De Gen. et

Corr.

321b19-22.

Note

that

Meta.

1043a33-34

proves

that

Aristotle does

not

think the

ambiguity

holds

only for

the

names of

composites of

form

and matter which

are

substances.

Also,

1043a34-35

and

1037a5-10

prove

that in the

case

of

substance

terms

the

ambiguity

s

not

that they

can

denote

either

the

individual

composite or the

universal

species.

'

Given

the

ambiguityof

terms

referring

to

psychic

events,

we

can meet

a

possible

objection

to

my

claim that

the soul

alone

rather

han the

composite of soul and

body

is

the

proper

subject of

activities. In a well

known

passage

at De

An.

408b13-15

Aristotle

says:

For

perhaps

t is

better

not to say

thatthe

soul

pities or

learnsor

thinks,

but that

the

man

does so

with

the soul.

This

naturally

uggests that

the

proper

subject

of

an activity

such

as anger

is

not the

soul but

the

composite.

However,

the

sense of

this

claim

becomes

clearer

when we

see that

it

occurs

in

a

context

(408a34-b8)

where

Aristotle

is

arguingthat

the soul

does

not

change

while

conceding that

psychic

states

like

anger are

changes in

the

body

(408b5-11). If

anger

is

understood

as

being a

change in the

body,

then

in thepresentcontext'anger'refersto the

composite of

form (in

the soul)

and

change

inthe

body.

Hence,

when Aristotle

says that

we

should

not say

thatthe

soul

is angry

but

ratherascribe

the

predicate to the

composite

man, he is

saying

that the

composite

psychic

event

should be

ascribed to the

composite

substance.

For if

we

ascribed he

composite

psychic

event

-

form and

bodily

change

-

to

the soul

alone, we

would

mistakenly

ascribechange

to the

soul.

So

Aristotle is

saying

that

the

proper

subject

of the

composite

psychic

event is

the

composite

substance,and

that

is

entirely

consistentwith

the

view that

the

propersubject

of the

form

of the

psychic

event is

the soul

alone;

just as

it is

consistent

with the

view

that

the

proper

subject of

the

matter

of the

psychic

event

(the

bodily

change) is the

body

alone.

And

the fact is

that

even after

408b13-15

Aristotle

repeatedly

refers

to the

soul as

the

subject

of

mental

events

(402a7-10,

blO-14,

403a3-16,

409bl5-16, 411a24-28,

429al-11,

17-18,

22-24,

31-b4,

23-24,

29,

430b5-6;

Parva

Nat.

445b16,

447b7,

24,

449a5-6,

8-9).

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At

the end

of Book

II

(424b16-18)Aristotle

says that smelling s

some-

thing over

and

above

undergoing

a

change

(na3tXdLv

TL), i.e. over

and

above the

matter

of

smelling, viz.

perceiving

(T6

REv

V.RL&Oa

xaiL

atoOdvEoOac).

Perceiving'

here

refers

to the

formal

aspect

of the

per-

ception

apart rom

the change

n the body

of the smeller.

It mustdo so if

it

statesthe

formal

aspect

of the

perception.

Forif 'perception'

here

denoted

a composite,

thenperception

ouldnot

be

what smelling s over

and

above

(ncaQd)

bodily

change.

So a typical

psychological

event

is a changein

the

body

as

well as

an

activity,

just

as Socrates

s flesh

andbones

as well

as a soul.

Perception,

recollection,

anger,fear

and

shame (e.g.)

arebodily

(aw[tatxL6v)

vents

(De

An.

427a27,

ParvaNat.

453al4-15,

26,

EN

1128bl3-15),

unlike

think-

ing

which is

not

a bodily

actuality

(De

An.

427a26-27,

De

Gen. Anim.

736b21-29,

EN 1117b28-31),

ven

if it requires

one (viz.

imagination)

n

order

to

occur

in human

beings.29

o while Aristotle

disagrees

with

the

materialist

n

holding

a psychological

vent

to be

not reducible

o

a

bodily

change,he also

disagrees

with

he

dualist

nholding

a

psychological

vent

to

be

a

bodily event,

for

the

matter

of such

an event is a physical

change.

The relation

between

the

change

and

activity

composing

a psychic

event

can

be causal.

Which

way

the causal

relation

runs

will vary

withthe type

of

the

psychic

event.

Thus,

at De

An. 408b15-18

Aristotlesays

that n the

case

of

recollection

hechange

occurring

nthe

bodymay

be caused

by

the soul,

i.e.,

I

suggest,

bythe

form

of recollection,

an

activity

occurring

n the

soul.

On

the other hand,

in the

case

of

perception

he causal

chain

must

proceed

in

the opposite

direction

a

sequence

of changes

n the

body

leads

to

the

occurrence

f anactivity

nthe soul. Similarly,

ParvaNat. 436b6-7

ays

that

perception

comes

to

be in the

soul via

the body.?'

It is in

this

waythat,

in

the

case

of

psychic

events,

the soul

is an

efficient

cause

of

bodily

events.

David

Charles3

as

objected

hatthe

soul cannot

be

an

efficient

cause of physicalevents becauseany such cause must have

extension

and

magnitude

and

be

divisible.

A movermoves

anotherthing

only

if it

comes

into

contact

with

the moved object.

Given

Aristotle's

definition

of contact,32

nly

a

material

object

can

have

contact,

and

that

29

Note how

the alternativesare distinguished

at

De An.

403a8-9.

3

I do not

wish to

dispute

the

suggestion

hat in at least some

cases activities

supervene

on

changes

ratherthan

being efficiently

caused

by

them.

We know

from

EN

X.

1-5 that

the activity

of pleasure

supervenes

(bntyyvE?aL)

on other activities,

but

I am

not

certain

that

Aristotle

distinguishes

his relation from

efficient

causation

in this

type

of

case.

31

D. Charles,

Aristotle's

Philosophy

of

Action (London,

1984), p.

218.

98


18/21

with

another

material

object. So

a

mover, like

a

moved

object,

must

have

extension and magnitude.The soul lacks magnitudeand extension, and

therefore t cannot be a

mover,

or at

least

can

be

one

only

incidentally n

virtueof

existing n

matter

which

is,

properly,

a

mover.

But Aristotle

believes

only

that

whatever

moves

an

object

naturally

(VpuoLxdg)

must

do so

by

coming

nto

contact

with

t

and

hence tself

suffers

a

reaction

rom

the moved

object

(Phys.

201a24-25,

198a27-29,

02a3-9,

De

Gen.

Anim.

768bl5-25).

And as

Aristotle

points

out in De

Anima

(406b24-

25), it is

preciselynot

in this

way

that

the

soul

moves

the

body

but

through

choice

and

thought .

Aristotle

does

not

elaborate,

but since

he

is

explicitly

rulingout

the soul's

changing

being

a

cause

of theanimal'smotion, 'choice'

and

thought'

anonly

refer

o

activities or

perhaps

equencesof

activities):

choice

and

thought

mustbe

actualitiesand

there s

no

other

kindof

actuality

that

is an

occurrence

available

in

Aristotle's

ontology.33

Further,

De Gen. et.

Corr.

distinguishes

wo types

of

efficient

cause. In

everycase

the moved

object will

be a

physical

magnitude,but

only certain

movers

properly

ouch the

moved

object,viz.

those

which

hemselves

have

position and

magnitude

(322b32-323al, 5,

10-12; cf. De

Gen. Anim.

768bl5-25). In

these

casesthe

moverwill

be a

moved

mover

because t will

in turn

be acted

onby

themoved

object.So if

A moves

B inthis

way,both A

andB

have

magnitude,and A

will

touchB

and

B will

touchA,

and A

will

move B

and B

will

move

A.

But

sometimes

the

mover

A is

without

magnitude,and

then A

will

touch

B but

not

be

touched or,

hence,

moved

by B

in return

(la' 6U

LoleL

5unaOfv-ra

-

328a22;

cf.

323al3-34, De

An.

406a3-4,

Phys.

258a18-

259a3).3 This

describes

he

relation

betweensoul

and

body

demandedby

Aristotle's

accountof

self-motion

n Phys.

VIII.5.

The soul

is

immaterial

and

without

magnitudeand

hence

cannot be

touchedby

the

body

which t

moves. And

so

it

cannotbe

moved

in

return,and

hence is an

unmoved

mover.

So

it is

clear

that

Aristotledoes

notbelieve

thatonly

material

bodies can

be

efficientcauses

of

change.

3

Phys.

V-3;

231a21-23.

3

Cf.

Alexander,

DeAnima

Libri

Mantissa, n

Bruns

(ed.),

op.

cit., p.

106,

5-17.

Choice

and

thought

are,

of

course,

efficient

causesof

action

(EN

1139a31-33).

3 Cf.

Alexander, De

Anima,

pp.

21,

22-22,

12;

Simplicius,In

Aristotelis

Physicorum,

p.

1243,

25f.

99


19/21

III

To close

I will consider

a

possibleobjection

to

my conclusion

hat

whata

psychic

event is over

and

above a

physicalchange

is an activity.

For

according

o one popular

view Aristotle

s afunctionalist,35

ndon this

view

a mentalevent

is, in addition

to a

material

change,

a certainfunctional

characteristic;

r perhaps

rather

he material

change which

is

(alone)

the

mental

eventhas sucha characteristic.

According

o functionalism

certain

type

of

mental

event s to

be defined n

terms

of itscausal

role,specifically

n

terms

of

itscausalrelations

o sensory

nput,

behavioral

utput,

andother

mentalstates. ThiswouldallowAristotleto give a materialistaccountof

psychological

vents for

a physicalevent

may have

sucha causalrole.

But

whether he causal

role is

counted

asa physical

or non-physical

roperty,

t

willbe adisposition

of thematerial

hange

which sthe

matter

of thepsychic

event

and

not,

as

I

claimed,an

activity.Hence,

the

formof a

psychicevent

is not

an activitypossibly

causingor

caused by the bodily change

but

the

causalrole

of

that

change.

It shouldbe noted,

to begin

with, that

there is

no evidence

that

Aristotle

shares

he belief

which s

one

of the main

motivations

f functionalism,

iz.

the belief that the same mental state can have different physicalreal-

izations.

For

example,

different

species

of animalcan,

it is said,

have

the

same

mental state even though

its physical

realization

will differ in

the

differentspecies.

And then it

is concluded

that a type

of mental event

cannot

be

identified

with a

type

of physical

event.

On

the other

hand,

functionalism

asily

handles

this

possibility

of

multiple

realizations.

It is

true that Aristotle

allows that

the

same

psychological

vent

may

be

found

in

different

species

of animal(Hist.

Anim.

588al5f.;

cf. De

Part.

Anim. 639al5-22,

645b3-6)

but nothing

he

says

suggests

that he

believes

that the physicalbasisof the samepsychological tatewillvary.It maybe

that he

thought,e.g.,

that

boiling

blood

is

the

physical

basis

of

anger

in

every

species

of animal

hat

can

experience

anger.

There

are

good

reasons

o

reject

the

view thatAristotle

s a

functionalist.

To

begin

with,

for the

functionalist

he

only

essential

features

of a

psycho-

logical

event are its functional

eatures. Thus,

while

brain matter

may

in

I

See,

e.g.,

N. Block,

Introduction:

What is Functionalism?

n N. Block (ed.),

Readings

n

the

Philosophy

of

Psychology

(London,

1980), pp. 171, 177;

M. Nussbaum,

Aristotle's

De

Motu Animalium,

p. 146;

E. Hartman,

Substance,Body and

Soul

(Prin-

ceton, 1977),pp. 197-98,211;S. MarcCohen. The Credibilityof Aristotle'sPhilosophy

of

Mind ,

in M.

Matthen

(ed.), Aristotle

Today

(Alberta, 1986), pp.

103-21.

100


20/21

fact realize pain

in

man,

it is

possible

that

eventually

some

synthetic

material houldcometo playthecausalrole of pain,andthen thesynthetic

material

wouldrealize

pain.

Generally,

t

is an essential eature

of

function-

alism that

it

allows the same

psychological

tate

to be realized

n

different

types of matterorevent.Aristotle

rejects

his. At

the close

of

De

An. 1.1 he

saysthat t ispartof the definition

f

anger

hat

t is

boiling

blood.' He

does

not say that it is inpartmatterwhichmust

have

features

enabling

t

to

play

the causal

role of

anger.Similarly, ear

is

defined

as refrigeration De

Part.

Anim.

667al2-19, 692a24-25,Rhet. 1389b32), .e. as being that

pecific ype

of change, not merely as

whatever type

of

change has certain causal

features.

Further, upposeone accepts,as

I

do, RichardSorabji's nterpretation37

according o which

he

visionof a

red objectconsists n,

as

faras its

matter

s

concerned,the eye-jelly

becoming

red.

Could this specifictype

of

change

not be necessary or theperceptionof red? Couldthe matterof

seeing red,

for

Aristotle, be a change to yellow, greenor any other sensible

quality?

No, because Aristotle

thinks that the perception of a sensible

quality

involves the sense organ

becoming like the perceived quality (De An.

418a3-6,422a7, b14-16,423b27-424a2, 24a7-10,17-18, 425b22-24).If

so,

the

specificchangeof

becomingred is necessary or the perceptionof red,

and

a

similar

point applies

to the rest of the five senses: the organ must

acquire

the

specific quality

perceived. Contrary o a functionalistview,

Aristotle

considers pecifictypes of perception o be tied down to

specific

types

of

bodily change.

Secondly,Aristotleallows hat

one's bodycanbe in the sameconditionas

it is

when one is

in a certainpsychological tate but not be in that

psycholog-

ical

state (De An.

403a21-22).This is incompatiblewith a materialistic

functionalism

or a

physical state

which

realizes a certain

psychological

state

in

human

beings

cannot fail

to

have the

functionalfeatures

which

make t

therealization f that

psychological tate when

it

exists

n

a

person.

Thirdly,

if we

look

at some

of the formal definitions

of

psychological

events

given by Aristotle,

they

often fail to conform to

the functionalist

style

of

definition.

For

example,

n Rhet.

11.3

Aristotle

irst

defines

growing

calm as

the

quieting

of

anger

and

then

explains

what can

cause

it.

Consider he

psychologicaloccurrenceof theoretical

contemplation.A

typical

cause of

this event

will

be the

theoreticalknowledgewhich

is

the

3'

403a21-22,

31; cf. De Part.

Anim.

650b35-651a3.

It is

not clear

whether

Aristotle

is

thinkingof

anger in

general or

anger in

human

beings

alone. But

either

way

Aristotle's

definitionrules

out a

functionalist

nterpretation.

3

Body

and Soul in

Aristotle ,

pp.

49-50.

101


21/21

potentiality

or

that actuality, ust as

knowledgeof the artof housebuilding

is a cause of its actualityof housebuilding Meta. 1032b21-23,De Gen.

Anim.

730b15-19,De Gen. et Corr.

324a35-bl, 335b32-33).But Aristotle

rulesout

defining

he actuality n termsof thepotentiality Meta. 1049b12-

17,DeAn.

415al8-20).

So not all of the typical

causesof contemplation re

used to define

it, and a parallelpoint holds

for any psychologicaloccur-

rence. Again, when Aristotle says at EN

1177b2 hat nothingcomes to be

from

contemplation part romthecontemplationtself, this meansat least

that the definition of contemplationwill not

incorporateany statement

asserting hat it

causes certain effects. Nor could any final causes be re-

ferred to in a definitionof contemplation.So the psychological vent of

contemplation s

not functionallydefined by Aristotle, and therefore he

cannot

have wanted, in general,

to

give a

functional

account of mental

events.

Finally,

a

functional haracteristic

s a

quality

a

disposition

whereas

a

psychological

vent is an

event, falling

nto the

category

of

doing(nIoLEiV)

or

suffering

tnadXELv).

Aristotle can no more allow an

event

to be

consti-

tuted

by

a

quality

than he

can allow a substance o be

constitutedout

of

qualities (De

An

410a13-22;

Meta.

1038b23-27,1039a30-32, 1070b2-4,

1073a36,

1086b37-1087a4, 088b2-4;

f.

Phys.265al5-16).

The

form of an

event must be an

event, just

as the form of a substance

must be

a

substance.A8

UniversityCollege

London

3

I

would like to thank

MalcolmSchofield

for his

helpful

commentson an earlier

draft

of

this

paper.

102

cuerpo y alma en aristoteles

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