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Seminarios y jornadas

Regional Cooperationin Central Asia:Obstacles, Incentivesand Proposals

Seminarios y jornadas 63/2010

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Seminario 63 | Table of contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

List of contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

The Pending Challenge: Obstacles and Incentives for Regional

Cooperation in Central Asia

Nicolás de Pedro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Integration in Central Asia: The Changes Required

Rassul Zhumaly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Discourses on Integration in Central Asia: From Rhetoric to Practice

Timur Dadavaeb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Transcription of the debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

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Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Obstacles, Incentives and Proposals

Abad, Gracia

Saint Louis University

Akiner, Shirin

Cambridge University

Azylov, Jyrgalbek

Embassy of Tajikistan in Belgium

Boonstra, Jos

FRIDE

Bulegenov, Yergali

Embassy of Kazakhstan in Spain

Chamorro, Santiago

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain

Dadabaev, TimurTsukuba University

De Pedro, NicolásAlternatives Foundation – OPEX

Esteban, MarioAlternatives Foundation – OPEX

Fernández, NatividadMinistry of Defense of Spain

Mañé, AureliaObservatory of Central Asia

Miñana, GemaREPSOL

Montes, RaquelAlternatives Foundation – OPEX

List of participants

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Seminarios y jornadas 63 2010

Morales, SantiagoEx-World Bank

Nebot, NorbertoEuropean Commission

Oriol, MarioTALGO

Palacio, VicenteAlternatives Foundation - OPEX

Priego, AlbertoComplutense University

Rustamov, SaidMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan

Sartorius, NicolásAlternatives Foundation – OPEX

Usmanov, Ravshan Embassy of Uzbekistan in Spain

Yatimov, SaymuminEmbassy of Kirgizstan in Belgium

Zhakupova, ZarinaEmbassy of Kazakhstan in Spain

Zhangarayev, NurmukhamedEmbassy of Kazakhstan in Spain

Zhumaly, RasulExclusive

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The stability and the development of Central Asia are of increasing interest for theEuropean Union and Spain, which are more and more conscious of the energetic andgeostrategic relevance of the region.

Taken into account the weakness of the Central Asian states and the transnational char-acter of many of the threats they face, the promotion of cooperation and integrationin the region could be very positive to assure its stability and development. The fiveCentral Asian republics consider necessary, in major or minor degree, to enhance re-gional cooperation. However, to date they have failed in its attempts to do it by them-selves, which has increased their dependency with respect to the great powers. In aneffort to revert this situation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Spainand the Observatory of Spain´s Foreign policy of the Alternatives Foundation co-organ-ized a seminar entitled Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Obstacles, Incentives andProposals on 5 March 2010. This event was held within the framework of Spain´s pres-idency of the European Union.

During this seminar, held Alternatives Foundation headquarters, four well-known aca-demics presented their views on this issue, triggering a stimulating debate. The fourscholars who made a presentation were Shirin Akiner, Timur Dadavaeb, Nicolás dePedro and Rassul Zhumaly. Besides those and other experts, Kazak, Uzbek, Tajik andKirgiz diplomats; officials of the European Commission, of the Ministry of ForeignAffairs of Spain and of the Ministry of Defense of Spain; and representative s from theprivate sector all participated in the seminar.

The present document includes three of the four papers (in English) presented during theseminar, as well as the transcription (in Spanish) of the debate triggered by those papers.

Introduction

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The Observatory of Spain´s Foreign policy of the Alternatives Foundation thanks theMinistry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Spain for its collaboration in the organ-ization of this project and all the participants for enriching the debate with their re-marks.

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List Of Contributors

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Timur Dadabaev

Timur Dadabaev (Ph.D. in International

Relations) is an Associate Professor and

Director of Central Asian Studies at the

Graduate School of Humanities and Social

Sciences, University of Tsukuba and concur-

rently Adjunct Associate Professor at the

University of Tokyo. His latest publications

include monographic volumes on local and

regional aspects of international relations

in Central Asia like Uzbekistan in Post-

Socialist Era（Looking at Asia Series

No.110), Tokyo: Institute of Developing

Economies, (2008) (in Japanese), Realities

of Mahalla: Changing Cultures and

Societies of Central Asia, University of

Tokyo Press, (2006) (in Japanese) and

Towards Post-Soviet Central Asian Regional

Integration: A Scheme for Transitional

States (2004) (in English). He also co-edited

(with Takashi Inoguchi, Miguel Basanez,

Akihiko Tanaka) book series on Values and

Life Styles in Urban Asia (three volumes in

English in 2005, 2006, 2007) on various as-

pects of values and regional identity forma-

tion in East and Central Asia.

Nicolás De Pedro

Nicolás de Pedro is the Expert Adviser onCentral Asia of the Observatory of Spain’sForeign Policy at the FundaciónAlternativas. He is also a member of theExpert Working Group of the EU CentralAsia Monitoring Project (EUCAM). He isco-editor of the book Great Powers andRegional Integration in Central Asia: ALocal Perspective and has published nu-merous academic papers on Central Asia,besides working papers and policy briefson Spanish foreign policy in Central Asiafor the MFA. He is a PhD candidate andresearcher in International Relations at theComplutense University and teachesCentral Asian geopolitics in variousSpanish postgraduate programs.

Rasul Zhumaly

Rasul Zhumaly is a political scientist. He isauthor of numerous academic articles andof the book Geopolitics of Central Asia(2006) (in Russian). Currently he is editorof Exclusive and Yaprai magazines and theCoordinator of the Eurasian Club ofBankers. He has a long public and diplo-matic experience. From 1992 to 1994 hewas Attaché of the Middle East

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Department of the Ministry of ForeignAffairs (MFA) of Kazakhstan. In 1995 hewas Kazakhstan Foreign Minister’sAssistant. From 1996 to 1998 was theSecond Secretary of the Kazakh Embassyto Egypt. From 1998 to 1999 Head of theMiddle East Division and Press Secretary ofthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofKazakhstan. From 2000 to 2002 he wasOfficial Spokesman of the Prime Ministerand of the Government of Kazakhstan.From 2002 to 2003 he was Counsellor of

the Embassy of Kazakhstan to Israel.During 2004-2005 he was Consul Generalof Kazakhstan to the United ArabEmirates, Dubai. From 2006 to 2007Charge d’Affairs of Kazakhstan in Libya.

Rasul Zhumaly has a degree in OrientalStudies from the Al-Farabi University(Kazakhstan). He has studied at theDiplomatic Institute of the MFA of Egyptand at the Diplomatic Academy of SaudiArabia.

1. Introduction

Regional cooperation is a pending and ur-gent issue in Central Asia. There are agrowing number of serious challengesand threats to be faced by the CentralAsian states that could bring harmful con-sequences to their internal and regionalstability. Many of these challenges are ofnon–conventional and trans–national na-ture, such as drug trafficking, radicalIslamism, international terrorism, environ-mental degradation, water shortage oreconomical sustainability. Due to their in-nate nature, these phenomena require aregional and cooperative approach, whichis even more needed due to the worsen-ing situation in Afghanistan. However, co-operation amongst the CAS remainsrather poor and ineffective.

Nonetheless, and this is one of the manypost-Soviet paradoxes, a large number of

organizations have been created or re-launched over the last years, in order topromote this regional cooperation. No ex-haustiveness meant, the following organi-zations can be mentioned: theCommonwealth of Independent States,the Collective Security Treaty Organization,the Eurasian Economic Cooperation, theShanghai Cooperation Organization, theConference on Interaction and ConfidenceBuilding Measures in Asia, the EconomicCooperation Organization, the TurkicSummits, the Special Program of theEconomies of Central Asia, the CentralAsia Regional Economic CooperationProgram. Each one of them have differentmembers, characteristics and aims distin-guishing them from each other, but it isimportant to point out that there is notone exclusively composed of Central Asianrepublics. This represents, as we will fur-ther see, a serious impediment for the en-hancement of the intra-regional Central

The Pending Challenge:Obstacles and Incentivesfor Regional Cooperationin Central AsiaNicolás de Pedro

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Asian cooperation. Besides, these multipleinitiatives have caused overlaps, confusionand a serious spaghetti bowl problem, in-stead of the implementation of a realprocess of regional cooperation.

This paper aims to give an overview ofboth obstacles and incentives for regionalcooperation in Central Asia from an intra-regional and inter-state perspective.However some considerations of the influ-ence of external actors cannot be avoidedas they condition the approach towardsintra-regional cooperation amongst theCentral Asian republics.

2. Obstacles for an effectiveintra-regional cooperation

There are several factors that have imped-ed a meaningful cooperation amongst theCentral Asian republics in these twodecades of independence. They can beconsidered under three kinds of cate-gories. First of all, those obstacles relatedto the ongoing nation-building process inthe five republics. Secondly, a set of obsta-cles stemming from the general lack oftrust amongst the republics, the prevailingpolitical mindset and the serious differ-ences between them regarding some cru-cial issues. Last but not least, the obstaclesarising from the institutional structure andthe nature of governance within theCentral Asian countries.

The Central Asian republics are youngstates. They gained independence with theabrupt collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.This unexpected situation provoked somefears due to the lack of previous historicalexperience as independent states, the prob-

lematic Soviet inheritance and their political,economic and military weakness at the mo-ment of independence. Therefore, sincethen, to consolidate as sovereign and inde-pendent states has been a strategic priorityfor the Central Asian republics.

Regarding regional cooperation, this first-ly means that the Central Asian states arestrongly reluctant to share sovereignty,since this is mainly understood as a poten-tial undermining factor to achieve thisconsolidation. Secondly, it must be kept inmind that the ongoing nation-and-State-building processes lay on nationalistic dis-courses. The five republics have adoptedethnonationalism to different degrees as asource of legitimacy for the new states.From a regional perspective, this provokessome tensions. There are many frictionpoints regarding borders or territories andsome incompatibilities about their mythi-cal past and formation of their nationsand modern States. The issue ofSamarkand and Bukhara betweenUzbekistan and Tajikistan is the mostknown example. This situation is part ofthe problematic Soviet inheritance of theregion and contributes to reinforce thelack of trust amongst the republics.However, these suspicions are not onlydue to this ideological factor.

The problematic internal situation of theCentral Asian republics, especially in thecases of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, pro-vokes that they are regarded by theirneighbours more as a source of potentialchallenges and instability than a necessaryor beneficial partners. Therefore deepen-ing the links with the neighbouring coun-tries is rather understood as a risk than anopportunity. Thus, the tendency is more

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towards isolation from them than rap-prochement. For instance, in spite of theactive collaboration from external partnerslike the European Union, it has not beenpossible to establish effective mechanismsof management in the bordering areas.

This mismanagement in the borderingareas is an undermining factor for tradeand economic development in the region,particularly since the Central Asian re-publics are landlocked countries and sur-rounded by such an economic and com-mercially powerful neighbour as China.However, the Central Asian elites seem topay more attention to the obstacles forstrengthening economic cooperationamongst them than to the potential bene-fits. Firstly, it must be considered that theshared perception of having very similareconomies has pushed for pursuing com-petitive commercial strategies. Secondly,the lack of trust and sometimes of politicalwill, has impeded the creation of a com-mon customs area; a first step towards thebuilding of an economic region.Something that according to the main in-ternational financial institutions and fora,like the World Bank and the AsianDevelopment Bank, would be mandatoryto dramatically increase the opportunitiesfor economic development in the region.

Major powers remain as the most influen-tial external actors in the region. Since in-dependence in 1991, the region has at-tracted the interest of a large number ofexternal actors like Russia, China, theUnited States, the European Union, Japan,Turkey and India. Each one has its ownaims and agendas. Stability is a commonheadline goal, but there are strong dis-agreements about how to achieve it. The

need of implementing democratic reformsis the most controversial issue. For actorslike Russia, China or the local regimes, de-mocratization is a source of potential in-stability and threats. For example, that po-litical power might fall in the hands of rad-ical Islamist groups. For others like theUnited States or the European Union, al-though with many nuances, the lack of re-forms is the source of potential instabilityin the mid-to-long term. It must be point-ed out that there is a gap in the under-standing of what stability means betweenthem. For Russia and China stability ispreferably understood as the lack or ab-sence of changes while for Washingtonand Brussels it rather means a predictablechange. However, the strongest competi-tion and rivalry amongst these actors is re-lated to the access and control of the hy-drocarbon resources of the Caspian basinand the geo-strategic domain over the re-gion. Due to the confluence of major pow-ers with competing agendas over the re-gion, the rediscovered label of the ‘newgreat game’ has been widely used to char-acterise the incorporation of the newCentral Asia into World politics. This hasseveral consequences on the intra-regionalcooperation.

Firstly, the ‘new great game lens’ has con-tributed to the wide adoption of a zero-sum game mentality and of a narrow ap-proach to security. Even when interde-pendence of many issues is generally ac-cepted, zero-sum and state-centred ap-proaches prevail. But, how to tackle keyregional challenges like energy security,water management or environmentaldegradation through these approaches re-main unclear. This conceptual framework,added to the lack of trust amongst them,

is yet another considerable obstacle for re-gional cooperation. A wider security ap-proach more inspired by the human secu-rity paradigm is yet to be assumed inCentral Asia. But this is very unlikely be-cause the great game framework is veryuseful for the local regimes, as it increasestheir bargaining capacity when dealingwith the major powers contributing totheir own maintenance.

Secondly, the Central Asian republics usetheir relationship, particularly with Russia,as a tool in their foreign policy towardstheir neighbours. For countries such asTajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, their link withRussia is useful when dealing stronger andsometimes aggressive neighbours, such asUzbekistan. So, the great powers are aninstrument for the small regional countriesto strengthen its intra-regional manoeu-vring capacity. Regarding the biggerCentral Asian countries, Uzbekistan andKazakhstan, their conflicting positions onthe role that Russia should play in the re-gion must be pointed out. For Uzbekistan,the Russian role should be downgradedwhile for Kazakhstan, it should be accept-ed as an inevitable reality. In this sense,the establishment of an exclusively-com-posed Central Asian organization underthe Kazakh leading role is affected by itsclose link with Moscow.

As an overall result of the great game dy-namic, the regional agenda is still de-signed outside the region, which conse-quently deepens their dependency of theCentral Asian states, undermining in thissense its sovereignty.

Finally, the obstacles arising from the in-stitutional structure and the governance

nature within the Central Asian countriesmust be considered. Firstly because someauthors consider that, as it happens inthe Middle East, the authoritarian natureof the Central Asian regimes could beconsidered amongst the most relevantfactors impeding a consistent and mean-ingful regional cooperation. In such a dy-namic, the presidents, who tend to con-centrate all the power in their hands,most likely would have to allow a greaterlevel of pluralism within the decision-making process. In spite of accepting thisthesis, the underdevelopment of theirforeign-policy making seems a bigger ob-stacle to regional cooperation; as this is acomplex process that requires clear rulesand technical abilities. Authoritarianismseems a more relevant factor if it is con-sidered that it is directly linked with cor-ruption. A context of high-spread corrup-tion makes the implementation of anyagreement much more difficult. Regionalcooperation supposes and to an extentdemands agreements and clear rulesmaking more difficult the ‘irregular in-comes’. That is why many Central Asiandecision makers are not very enthusiasticabout reaching compromises with theirneighbours.

The personal competition between presi-dents Karimov and Nazarbayev for theleading role in the region is often includedin the obstacles for a meaningful cooper-ation within Central Asia.

Summarizing there are several obstaclesto regional cooperation ranging from ide-ological factors to institutional ones.Nonetheless, as we will further see in thenext section, many of these factors couldbe called into question.

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3. Incentives for enhancingintra-regional cooperation

As we have seen, there are several factorsconstraining the development of intra-re-gional cooperation in Central Asia.However, there are several incentives forits enhancement as well. In general terms,the volatile regional environment and theimpossibility of addressing the main chal-lenges from a national scale should beenough for pushing them to cooperate.Above all, there is one factor that seemsmore a pure imperative question than anincentive: the landlocked nature ofCentral Asia.

The incentives could be structured underthree kinds of categories considering thearea of potential benefits. In the firstplace, those incentives related to thestrengthening of the regional stability andsecurity. Secondly, a set of incentiveslinked to the geopolitical options for theCentral Asian states within the frameworkof the major powers competitive involve-

ment. Thirdly, the incentives related to theeconomic prospects for Central Asia.

As it has been pointed out earlier, themain challenges that the Central Asianstates must address, such as drug-traffick-ing, radical Islamism, international terror-ism, environmental degradation, watershortage or economical sustainability areof non-conventional and trans-nationalnature. Therefore, tackling them effective-ly requires regional and comprehensiveapproaches. For doing so, trust and confi-dence amongst them is essential.

For the time being, the only multilateralplatforms for addressing these issues arethe ones promoted by Russia and China,the Collective Security Treaty Organizationand the Shanghai Cooperation Organi -zation. Both fora adopt cooperative securi-ty approaches but only with a state andtop-down perspective. Therefore it is un-certain that in the mid-to-long run theywould help effectively to ensure the stabil-ity and development in the complex

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Fuente: Elaboración propia.

Ideological factors Political mindset Institutional structure

Young states Lack of trust Authoritarianism

Ongoing nation-building processes Neighbours as a source Corruptionof problems

Ethnonationalism as a source Zero-sum approaches Informal mechanisms of of legitimacy governance

Friction points regarding borders Divergent approaches on Underdevelopment ofand discourses about the past some crucial issues the foreign-policy ma

king process

Table 1. Obstacles for an effective intra-regional cooperation

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Central Asian scenario. Both fora are main-ly an instrument for Russia and China topromote their interest and agenda.However, for the time being, they could bea first step to encourage trust and confi-dence amongst the Central Asian re-publics. The lack of trust is seriously harm-ing the relationship amongst them.

The Central Asian republics agree whenidentifying the aforementioned challengesand threats. Even there exists an agree-ment on considering them transnationalissues and about the need of common ef-forts. Therefore some ground for dialogueand cooperation does exist. This couldand advisably should be considered as anincentive to strengthen the dialogueamongst the Central Asian republics.

An environment of cooperation and con-fidence would allow them to face thesecomplex regional challenges more effec-tively. Moreover, this would help to easethe growing regional tensions. In recenttimes, there have been some critical andconnected issues that must be addressedurgently. The growing military budget inthe last years must be mentioned in thefirst place. Considering the low level oftotal defence budget (then and now) andthe general weakness in terms of struc-ture and military capabilities, to label it asa regional arms-race could be an exagger-ation. But undoubtedly, in a context oflack of dialogue and growing tensions it isa matter of concern. The Tajik project ofthe Roghun dam and the Uzbek com-plaints about it are potentially the mostdangerous case, as it can provoke anarmed conflict between them. It is doubt-ful that this issue could be resolved posi-tively without peaceful negotiations be-

tween Dushanbe and Tashkent. Besides,the mutual interdependence should ra-tionally encourage their dialogue. Theavailability of fresh water is crucial for thesurvival of the Uzbek agricultural sectorand population, while this is also linked tothe food security of the Tajik population.And obviously the environmental sustain-ability is in the interest of the whole re-gion. Consequently, it would be particu-larly beneficial that this issue could serveas a driving factor for enhancing regionalcooperation in Central Asia.

Generally speaking, in the context ofCentral Asia it seems that cooperationamong neighbours would strengthentheir stability and security. A failed statesuch as the Afghan is one of the mainsources of instability and threats for theCentral Asian republics. The collapse ofone of them would be a serious threat toall. For that reason, a profound and up-graded intra-regional cooperation mustbe accepted by the local ruling leaders asan advisable policy.

A second set of incentives are related topotential benefits from a geopoliticalperspective. The current level of compe-tition and rivalry among great powerscould be of interest to the Central Asianrepublics and its regimes as it strength-ens its bargaining capacity. However, thismodel of relations has clear limits in itsbenefits for the Central Asian states, es-pecially in the case of the most devel-oped ones as Kazakhstan. Besides, itcondemns Central Asia to be an objectrather than a subject of its own destinyand reinforces its peripheral nature. Itmust be kept in mind that while beingstrategically relevant for Russia and

China, both consider Central Asia as anappendix or a subsidiary area useful toreinforce their geopolitical projection to-wards other areas like the EuropeanUnion or the Pacific region. In this sense,both treat the Central Asian republics as‘junior partners’ and at the same timethey exert a great pressure on their eco-nomic and geopolitical independence.Consequently, a more coordinated posi-tion by the Central Asian republics,through an enhanced intra-regional dia-logue, would strengthen their manoeu-vring options and their negotiating ca-pacity with these major powers.

In the previous section, the obstacles de-rived from using ethnonationalistic dis-courses as a source of legitimacy werehighlighted. Nevertheless, in spite of na-tional differences, gradually reinforced bythese discourses, a certain shared region-al identity does exist. Furthermore, theclaim that the five republics compose aspecific regional unity has come fromthem, proving that some ground for dia-logue does exist.

The previously mentioned incentives forenhancing intra-regional cooperation arepolitically complex and could be arguedfor not being straightforwardly connectedwith the desirable results. But this is notthe case when the economic aspects areconsidered. The Central Asian markets aresmall in size, low in level of competitive-ness, poorly interconnected regionallyand remote from the main global flows.Therefore deeper intra-regional integra-tion would increase their commercial andeconomic viability. This would make thearea more attractive for foreign invest-ment beyond the raw materials sector,

which is insufficient for ensuring the de-velopment and economic sustainability ofthe region in the long run.

Economically, the brightest future for theregion largely depends on the develop-ment of the so-called new Silk Road, con-necting Europe and Asia through CentralAsia. In its most visionary sense, this proj-ect or sum of projects would be feasibleonly if the Central Asian republics up-grade their level of cooperation, startingfrom the management of the borderingareas. For the accomplishment of thistask, funds from the main international fi-nancial institutions are available. So again,potential benefits for the five republicsand incentives for implementing this inte-gration do exist.

Besides, the five Central Asian republicsare landlocked countries with difficult ac-cess to open seas and therefore to theglobal flows of merchandise. Apart fromcrossing the territory of the immediateneighbours to reach the oceans, theyneed to cooperate with more powerfulcountries, like Russia and China, or withproblematic neighbours like Afghanistanor Pakistan. A common position of theCentral Asian countries would increasetheir leverage when engaging with thesecountries.

Economic integration has another twoparallel beneficial consequences regard-ing security and stability. Firstly, it is astrong factor for constraining violent con-flicts, at least in the inter-state level.Secondly, it entails general economic de-velopment and this would increase the in-ternal stability of the five republics,strengthening the regional security.

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4. The path ahead

In this current moment Central Asia has atremendous geopolitical relevance, mainlydue to the worsening situation in neigh-bouring Afghanistan. However, thiswould not last forever. Therefore if theCentral Asian republics do not want to bea remote and isolated area again, theymust develop effective strategies for posi-tioning in this globalization era.

From a Spanish and European perspec-tive, intra-regional cooperation seems asa positive development per se. TheEuropean Union process has providedmultiple benefits for the European states

and citizens; and other successful storieslike the ASEAN could be found aroundthe world. The potential benefits for im-plementing such a process in CentralAsia seem enormous and, in some cases,critical for the states and citizens of theregion. Moreover, although the obstaclesare still strong enough to block regionalcooperation, there is some ground foroptimism, as we could find some suc-cessful stories within the region itself,such as the Central Asia NuclearWeapons Free Zone. It is a matter of timethat the Central Asian states would ac-cept the need of enhancing the intra-re-gional cooperation for ensuring a pros-perous future for the region.

Security and stability Geopolitics Economic prospects

Challenges to be faced are of Strengthening options and Easier access to trans-national nature negotiating capacity with worldwide markets

the major powers

Agreement in identifying these Being subject rather that an More feasible develop-challenges exists object ment of the visionary Silk

Road

Need of easing the growing The existence of a certain Making the region more regional tensions shared regional identity attractive for foreign in

vestors

Strengthening its own national Developing bigger and moresecurity through cooperation competitive mar with theneighbours markets

Creating more possibili-ties for dealing with the bigger neighbours

Constraining violentconflicts through interde-pendence

Table 2. Incentives for enhancing the intra-regional cooperation considering thearea of potential benefits

Fuente: Elaboración propia.

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1. Introduction

Speaking about integration in Central Asia,I would not wish to review unduly the his-tory of this question, nor the classical ex-amples of regional integration in the restworld. These issues have been analyzed indetail by numerous experts. Therefore I donot see the point in repeating what is al-ready well known. In my opinion, it is muchmore relevant to focus in the factors whichprevent or stimulate regional cooperationand integration in Central Asia.

Let us discuss first the obstacles for re-gional cooperation and integration inCentral Asia:

2. Political ambitions

In the early 1990s Kazakhstan andKyrgyzstan adhered to a course of con-

structing a secular and democratic society.Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan preferred tokeep secular too, but with an essentiallyauthoritarian style of the state building.Tajikistan was cast into the abyss of civilwar. In the long run, political systems inKazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, al-though keeping outwardly democratic ele-ments, have come nearer to the sample ofother neighbors in region. Why it has hap-pened so is another question. But worldexperience testifies that authoritariancountries are not capable to engage in se-rious integration. This process entails thetransfer of sovereignty to supranationalbodies. The question is whether the re-publics of Central Asia are ready to go forit? They are not willing to follow thiscourse of action at the moment. This is es-pecially the case due to the struggle forleadership in the region between Astanaand Tashkent. As a result, even in case offorce-majeure circumstances, such as war

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Integration in Central Asia:The Changes RequiredRassul Zhumaly

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or ecological disaster, we can not expectmore than temporary compelled alliances.

3. Historical phobias

Besides other problems, the collapse of theSoviet Union led to an ideological vacuumin Central Asia, with the concurrent needto fill this vacuum. Certainly, right after in-dependence there were more factorspulling together rather than separating therepublics of Central Asia. But in their nationbuilding efforts, their local elites have re-sorted to historical figures whose greatnesswas achieved at the expense and enslave-ment of neighbors in region. Kazakhs iden-tified themselves with Abylai and, in widerplan, with the Altyn Orda khans. Uzbeksidentified with Emir Timur, Tadjiks withIsmail Somoni and Kyrgyzs with Manas, alegendary ancestor who has left “sevenprecepts”. The book of the first presidentof Turkmenistan, “Ruhnama”, became anembodiment of greatness of the past andthe present in Turkmenistan. Such historicalreferences, which are taken out of context,only aggravate mutual claims. At the same,other kinds of historical characters, such asscientists as Al-Farabi and Al-Khorezmi, aresubjected to deep controversies. As awhole, today there is no trend towardsconvergence, but towards divergenceamong the Central Asian countries in thecultural-historical arena. It is quite unlikely achange in this scenario in the short term,owing to the absence of preconditions as acommon information space.

4. Economic discords

Since the 1990s the economic structuresof the Central-Asian countries have start-

ed to strongly move away from each otherdue to different factors. They have fol-lowed different paths in their economicreforms. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistanthanks to their richness of raw materialshave increased heir well-being at the ex-pense of their dependency on the interna-tional markets. Uzbekistan and partlyTajikistan have embarked in the construc-tion of a self-sufficient economy thereforehave become more isolated. Kyrgyzstanhas no hydrocarbons reserves to exploitnor has kept total state control of theeconomy and appears in the most defec-tive position among the five republics andis the most dependent on internationalcooperation. Summing up, no country inthe region has been able to establish awell-founded and competitive economy,because of negative phenomena such as ahigh degree of corruption, an ubiquousshadow economy, the prevalence of clanor political interests over economic senseand low transparency.

In addition, the maintenance of closenomenclatures which control commoditiesdoes not promote the growth of mutualtrade, investments, or cooperation be-tween manufactories and businessmenfrom different countries of the region.Moreover, this last factor has caused com-petitive relations with respect to the exit ofthose commodities to the internationalmarkets. The more relevant examples ofthis competition are exports of gas fromKazakhstan and Turkmenistan and of su-perfluous labor from Uzbekistan andKirghizstan. In addition, tariff and tax dis-agreements have led to numerous dis-putes. Under these circumstances, theCentral Asian countries have reduced theeconomic interaction with their neighbors,despite the material cost. Kazakhstan has

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tried to reduce gas dependency onUzbekistan, whereas Tashkent has operat-ed in the same spirit with regard to grainand flour. As a result in the early 2000s thetrade among the countries of central Asiahardly counted for 10 per cent of their totalinternational trade. The basic external eco-nomic priorities of the Central-Asian coun-tries rotate outside of region.

5. Border and watermanagement

Border crossing in Central Asia exemplifiesthe problems that regional integrationfaces in the area as it is illustrated by thecase of Uzbekistan. Tashkent has virtuallyclosed its borders to its neighbors, signifi-cantly hampering flow of trade, goods andpeople. Its leaders cite various reasons forthis action ranging from security to theneed for import substitution and economicself-sufficiency. Moreover, Uzbek authori-ties have mined its borders with Tajikistan.Tashkent also imposes a strict visa regimefor the citizen of other Central Asian coun-tries, appealing to the threat of terrorism,illegal migration and smuggling. As a con-sequence, the petty or shuttle trade whichoffers one of few sources of income andemployment in the region has significantlybeen reduced, driving a large portion of thecountry’s population to poverty or migra-tion to other countries, in particular Russiaand Kazakhstan.

Another challenge for the region is themanagement of its natural resources. Themost present issue with regard to this topicis water management. The mountainouscountries of Central Asia, Tajikistan andKyrgyzstan, control the up streams of thetwo main rivers of the region: the Amu

Darya and the Syr Darya. These two coun-tries have multiple disagreements with thedownstream countries, Kazakhstan, Tur -kmenistan and Uzbekistan, over issuessuch as payment for use of the water re-sources and the maintenance of dams andreservoirs. These disputes are generatinglot of tension in the region, particularly,between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

6. The errors from previousintegration initiatives

Some proposals for regional integrationhave been raised since the early days afterthe independence. The author of the ma-jority of such ideas was the President ofKazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who isknown as a consistent advocate for integration in both the space of theCommonwealth of Independent Statesand in Central Asia. Despite of these ini-tiatives, some factors have made thatnothing tangible has come from them:

a) Lack of proper planning. Most ofthese initiatives do not take into ac-count economic feasibility.

b) Some of these initiatives are meretools to gain leverage with regard toexternal actors.

c) Others are mere public relations ac-tions, oriented to increase the popu-larity of their authors.

d) Desire of Astana as well as other pro-ponents of integration initiatives toobtain the status of leader of CentralAsia, while the rest of Central Asiacountries are expected to play aminor role.

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e) Selfishness of some regional actorswho are only willing to take benefitsfrom integration, giving nothing inexchange.

f) Some of the Central Asian republicsshow low interest in regional integra-tion, since they have other priorities.

g) Great powers, such as the UnitedStates, Russia and China, are not inter-ested in the integration of Central Asia,but in a “divide and rule” scenario.They have therefore pressed against re-gional integration in Central Asia. Theimpact of these external actors is inten-sifying as they manipulate the contra-dictions among Central Asian States inorder to involve them into their sphereof influence. Washington is placing theemphasis on bilateral security agree-ments, China is setting hopes on theShanghai Cooperation Organization,and Russia promotes the Com -monwealth of Independent States andthe Custom Union. At the same timethat they sponsor their own initiatives,these great powers are striving to ham-per the processes promoted by otheractors. An illustrative case was provid-ed by Russia, which joined theOrganization of Central AsianCooperation in 2004 to have this or-ganization merged with the EurasianEconomic Community one year later.

In addition, the Central Asian countriesfound themselves frequently entangled inthe schemes of great powers. For in-stance, the attempts of Russia to shutdown the American military base inKyrgyzstan were not crowned with suc-cess. Based on the contract signed on 22

June 2009, Bishkek agreed to allow thePentagon to utilize the Manas airport, onthe condition that the rent would be 60million US dollars. As compensation forMoscow, President Kurmanbek Bakiyevconsented to set up a Russian militarybase in Kantes which is just 20 kilometersaway from Bishkek. This action causedanxiety in Uzbekistan and president IslamKarimov expressed his discontent with thedeployment of the Russian air-base inKyrgyzstan and publicly complainedabout the “launch of a military contest bythe great powers in Central Asia”. As a re-action to this enhancement of the Russianmilitary presence in Kyrgyzstan, Tashkenthas undertaken a forced rapprochementtowards the United Sates.

Besides, the above mentioned obstaclesthere are also some factors which facili-

tate regional integration in Central Asia:

1. The Central Asian countries facethreats that they can not handlealone.

2.The construction of a strong and pros-perous state in Central Asia is impossi-ble in an infirm and unstable environ-ment. Consequently one’s successfulaccomplishments have to be convert-ed into the successful advancement ofthe entire group and the best way toguarantee that is regional integration.

3. The five republics are striving to in-crease their role in the internationalcommunity and regional integration isa efficient way of doing so.

4. Notwithstanding their differences,the five republics of Central Asia are

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drawn together by a single historical,ethnic and confessional community

In conclusion, the integration of CentralAsia is further now that in the aftermathof independence. Yes, many loud state-ments were made and various regional or-ganizations were created, but none ofthese actions have had any practical value,and have only served to bring disappoint-ment. Today, no country of Central Asia,not even Kazakhstan, counts on regionalintegration to solve its more pressing chal-lenges. Moreover, not only the level of in-tegration, but even such a basic elementas trust between neighbors is much lower,than in the previous two decades. So far,there are no signs pointing to a reversionof this tendency, but there are three sce-narios that could change that:

1. A change of the existing political es-tablishment in the countries ofCentral Asia.

2. Occurrence of extreme conditions, suchas threats calling into question the inde-pendence of the regional states.

3. A radical and unexpected strengthen-ing of one of the two most powerfulcountries of the region: Kazakhstanand Uzbekistan.

As to offers and proposals which are

capable to bolster integration inCentral Asia, here are some prime steps:

1. The proponents of integration initia-tives should not use these initiativesto promote their leadership. If theyunderline the certain special leader-ship position of one country over

other, they will only damage theprospects for regional integration.

2. Despite the known obstacles to createa regional forum to settle the mostpressing challenges of the region(such as water-power questions, ille-gal migration, rational use of a man-power, religious extremism, the inter-national terrorism, etc) a real step for-ward in at least one of those issuescould serve as a catalyst for regionalintegration in Central Asia.

3. Confidence building measures shouldbe promoted in the region, since lackof trust among the Central Asiancountries is one of the main obstaclesfor regional integration. In this senseit is expedient to turn special atten-tion to prospects of expansion of cul-tural-humanitarian cooperation andthe creation of a uniform common in-formation field for the five republics.

4. External powers must be persuadedthat the unification of the CentralAsia is not only a question of long-term interests of the local countries,but also for the key world players. Theintegration of Central Asia would notpose a threat to any of the third coun-tries, but would serve as a powerfulelement of stability for the wholeEurasian continent, since it would re-duce the risks related with great pow-ers rivalry for the control of CentralAsia and would avoid the collapse ofany of the five Central Asia republics.


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1. Introduction

The dissolution of the Soviet Union grantedindependence to the former Soviet con-stituencies and at the same time has servedas starting point of debates on the schemesfor preserving economic, social ties as wellas infrastructure between and among post-Soviet independent states. These discus-sions were framed within the debates onhow to guarantee sovereignty of newly in-dependent states, while pursuing integra-tion among them. The logic behind suchdiscussions was that for these Central Asianstates, with their similarly sized economies,shared security concerns and common chal-lenges, it is economically and politicallymore beneficial to integrate efforts towardpolitical stability and economic sustainabili-ty than it is to deal with these issues individ-ually. Furthermore, in the conditions of in-

dependence, the creation of individualgoods and labor markets, separate (non-convertible) currencies, fiscal and monetarysystems, national security schemes and iso-lated transport networks would have re-quired resources that these states were notable to afford, naturally resulting in largerburdens for Central Asian economies andtheir citizens.

While these arguments are well under-stood and in most cases accepted by bothleadership and public of Central Asiancountries, the process of integrating theirpolitical, economic and social systems hasnot progressed much from the time of thedissolution of the Soviet Union. Althoughthe discourse of integration in CentralAsian region is mostly supported in theserepublics, paradoxically the domestic andforeign policies of these states favor deal-

Discourses on Integrationin Central Asia: From Rhetoricto PracticeTimur Dadabaev


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ing with most of the issues either unilater-ally or bilaterally at best. What kind of co-operation and integration, if any, is themost desired by Central Asian states?What are likely to be the factors, whichmake regional integration among thestates of Central Asian effective? Whatare the sectors that can serve as the exam-ples and pilot cases for such regional co-operation and how? The goal of this arti-cle is to address these questions and stim-ulate debate on these issues.

2. Conceptualizing integrationin Central Asia

Post-Soviet Central Asian states canchoose among several models in pursuitof cooperation and integration in their re-gion. Numerous scholars identify nationalinterests and the gains achieved throughintegration as the most important factorsfor the prospects of such schemes. Othersanalyze such integration and cooperationschemes from an economic point of view,signaling enhanced economic relations,intensified trade between and among re-gional countries, eventual customsunions, free trade areas, common mar-kets, and a developed economic commu-nity as steps towards intensifying eco-nomic integration1. A third group of schol-ars focuses on the socio-cultural aspectsof interstate relations, the issues of valuesand identities2.

The functionalist approach to regional in-tegration is gaining popularity among the

Central Asian governments. This theorypresupposes that one can separate social,technical and humanitarian matters frompolitical matters and then concentrate onsolving them. Basically, it suggests thatpolitical factors are not necessarily impor-tant for cooperation and integrationschemes, unless there are social, technicaland humanitarian grounds for the latter.Accordingly, advanced cooperation, policycoordination and integration can beachieved by indirectly seeking out areas ofmutual interests and binding togetherthose interests which are common, wherethey are common, to the extent to whichthey are common. The emphasis is on apragmatic approach to solving the prob-lems. Functionalists also seek an escapefrom the vertical divisions of the world(nation-states) by developing, instead, ahorizontal approach to common prob-lems. The functionalists also (quite logical-ly) entertain the hope that integration ineconomic and social fields may spill overinto the political field as well. The habit ofcooperation and the accumulated agen-das of constructive work may well eventu-ally bring about integration, even federal-ism, by installments.

Following this logic, economic integrationdoes not necessarily need to include allfactors of production at once, in order tobe characterized as ‘integration.’ For in-stance, removal of barriers to the ex-change of goods alone would be suffi-cient to create a ‘free trade area3.’Erection of common external tariffs addedto a free trade agreement would consti-

1 Spruyt Hendrik, “Prospects for Neo-Imperial and Non-Imperial Outcomes in the former Soviet Space”, in Karen Dawisha andBruce Parrott, eds. The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective, (New York: M.E. Sharpe,1997), pp. 315-337, especially p. 319.

2 For instance, see McSweeby, Bill, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations, (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1999).

3 See Peter Smith, The Challenge of Integration, p. 4.


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tute a ‘customs union4.’ A partial loweringof commercial tariffs might be enough tocomprise a regional zone, for example, solong as the resulting internal barriers areclearly and considerably lower than fornon-members of the group. At the end ofthe process, when all members are ready,“political units cede much of their auton-omy to centralized authorities that havethe capacity to carry out transfer pay-ments among these entities5”. It is the in-terpretation of integration along theselines that seems to reflect the processesthat have taken and are currently takingplace in Central Asia.

3. Central Asian integrationrevisited

In the aftermath of the collapse of theSoviet Union, the idea of creating a com-munity or union of Central Asian stateswas promoted by applying the simplelogic that integration of these states (withtheir weak economies, shared securityconcerns and common challenges), waseconomically and politically more efficientthan dealing with these issues individually.The history of regional integration was de-veloped through series of summits.

Initially, the idea of creating a communityof Central Asian states was fueled bysuch factors as the dissolution of theSoviet Union and the break-up of eco-nomic ties, trade deficiencies, the unilater-alism of Russian domination of theCommonwealth of Independent Statesand the localization of Tajik and Afghanconflicts.

In January 1993, Central Asian states signedthe “Protocol of Five Central Asian Stateson a Common Market” in Tashkent. Yet assome analysts noted “the Tashkent summitproduced more words than deeds”.

Despite all the negative outcomes of themeeting, the immediate task of currencycoordination served as one uniting fac-tor for Central Asian states. Therefore,an agreement was signed betweenUzbe kistan and Kazakhstan in 1993 oncoordination of the process of national-currency introduction. While the meet-ing and consequent agreement wereembellished with various plans for coor-dination between the two states, theoutcomes were not convincing enoughto persuade regional watchers that thesestates were determined to move fromwords to actions.

The history of regional integration summitswas continued with the Tashkent Summiton January 10, 1994. The Central AsianCommon Economic Space was initially cre-ated between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstanduring that meeting, to promote the freemovement of goods across borders and thesimplification of procedures for such move-ment. Kyrgyzstan expressed its intention tojoin only a few days after the announce-ment of the creation of the new regionalgrouping on January 16, 1994 and eventu-ally did at the end of that month. There wasan outpouring of predictions among bothscholars and politicians about the eventualunification of Central Asian into one state,a new Turkestan, which existed in the re-gion prior to the Russian Revolution. Someeven suggested that the Turkistani identity

4 Ibid.5 Spruyt, “Prospects for Neo-Imperial and Non-Imperial Outcomes”, p. 319.

in the region always prevailed over otheridentities, which is not exactly true. Overtime, pan-Turkistan ideas have vanishedinto obscurity due to a lack of popular andpolitical support behind such a unifying ide-ology. Central Asian states have chosen adifferent pattern of integration.

The summit on April 29-30, 1994 inCholpon-Ata on Lake Issyuk Kul stressedthe need for increased cooperation in thepolitical, cultural and especially economicspheres among Central Asian states. TheCentral Asian Common Economic Spacewas declared open for membership to allCommonwealth of Independent Statesmember-states, which were willing to joinand to adhere to the purposes of the or-ganization.

On July 8, 1994, the leaders of Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan agreed at asummit in Almaty to form a comprehensivedefense and economic union. Under theterms of the agreement, a new Council ofHeads of States and a Council of Heads ofGovernments were formed to oversee thestandardization of laws and the implemen-tation of decisions. It was also decided toform a similar Committee of Foreign andDefense Ministers to coordinate the threecountries’ foreign policies and work on im-proving regional security.

During the meeting of the Council ofHeads of Governments in August 1994 inBishkek, the Central Asian Bank forCooperation and Development was alsoestablished, based on the contributions ofmember-states of the Union. The PrimeMinisters’ Council was also given the re-sponsibility of coordinating finance andeconomic planning issues.

It was decided that member-states wouldchair the inter-state committees in rotation.During the Almaty Summit it was an-nounced that Kazakhstan was to chair allcommittees for a period of a year, and thenKyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan would chair inturn for one year each. The chair of thesummit, Kazakh President Nazarbaev, em-phasized that the structure of the Unionoutlined in the summit documents was onlythe beginning of the process of integrationin the region, and he suggested that mem-bership in the Union was open to all mem-ber-states of the Commonwealth ofIndependent States. The summits were heldon a regular basis, focusing on the econom-ic and security issues of the region.

On April 24, 1995, a meeting of the Headsof Governments in Bishkek approved a five-year integration plan. According to manyanalysts, the institutional dimension of re-gional integration was finally established atthis submit: the Executive Committee of theInterstate Council, the Council of Ministersof Defense, the ‘Centralazbat’ peacekeep-ing force, the Assembly of Central AsianCulture and so on.

Another significant document – the Treatyon Eternal Friendship between theRepublic of Uzbekistan, the Republic ofKazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic – wasalso signed in Bishkek on May 30, 1996.

From the next meeting, the focus of theHeads of States moved on to particularproblems of concern. Although summits onthe Aral Sea problem had also been heldbefore (Kazakhstan, 1993, Uzbekistan,1994 and Turkmenistan, 1995), theFebruary 28, 1997 meeting of the Heads ofStates was the latest devoted to the prob-


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lems of the Aral Sea. Consequently, theAlmaty Declaration of the leaders of theCentral Asian states pronounced 1998 ayear of protection of the environment inCentral Asian, under the aegis of the UN.The meeting also declared the non-nuclearstatus of Central Asia.

During the December 1997 meeting inAkmola (later re-named Astana), theHeads of States of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz -stan and Uzbekistan discussed the processof implementation of the Agreement on aCommon Economic Space as well as theissue of establishing water, food, commu-nication and raw-mineral resource consor-tiums within the region, as had been ini-tially planned. During this meeting theCentral Asian leaders showed some con-cern because most decisions included inthe initial agreement had not been imple-mented.

In January 1998, the Heads of States metin Ashgabat and signed a joint declarationon regional cooperation, specifically refer-ring to certain areas of special relevance.Again, the presidents opted to send aclear political signal of political support forregional integration, because they realizedthat the integration process in the regionwas slowing down.

On March 26, 1998, the presidents offour Central Asian states (includingTajikistan, which was not a member ofthe Union) held the Tashkent Summit.The presidents again focused on the dis-cussion of issues of cooperation withinthe framework of the Agreement onCommon Economic. The four presidentsdefined their priorities and spheres ofparticular concern, such as cooperation in

agricultural sectors, water and energysupplies, in the field of transport and themutual payment arrears settlement.Although this meeting achieved geopolit-ical significance because it was joined byTajikistan, the Union entered a phase ofstagnation. Its inefficiency was illustratedby its change of name in 2002 to theCentral Asian Cooperation Organization,further downsizing the ambitions and ex-pectations of member-states.

In 2004, symbolizing the changing geopo-litical environment in the region, Russiajoined the Central Asian CooperationOrganization. A year later, with then entryof Uzbekistan’s into the Russia-led EurasianEconomic Community, the Central AsianCooperation Organization was effectivelymerged into the Eurasian EconomicCommunity, putting the idea of CentralAsian regional community on hold for thetime being.

4. Pros and cons of regionalintegration

In addition to the issue of lack of econom-ic compatibility of the regional states,heavy reliance on trade in raw materialsand perceived or real regional rivalry be-tween the regional powerhouses ofUzbekistan and Kazakhstan, there aresome conceptual problems which need tobe dealt in order to promote common vi-sion and goals for cooperation and inte-gration in the region.

The first factor leading to the failure of theinitiatives towards integration in the re-gion is that they have been launched bypolitical leaders who are questioned and


30

suspected of various hidden agendas. It isalso a case demonstrating lack of mutualconfidence in the region.

Secondly, numerous terms and conceptsrelated with integration are used withoutclarifying their meaning and without sug-gesting realistic mechanisms for their im-plementation. This results in the situationwhen ideas are articulated by the leadersin a similar wording, but with a complete-ly different meaning. For example, whenpresident of Kazakhstan Nazarbaevstrongly endorses integration initiatives, hetends to refer to both economic and polit-ical integration and to the creation of atransnational entity. On the contrary, whenthe Uzbek president talks about regionalintegration, he refers to mostly economicintegration which does not imply delega-tion of sovereignty to a third party or to atransnational authority. In real terms, forUzbekistan the notion of integration main-ly implies opening of the markets of neigh-boring countries for its agricultural and in-dustrial goods, without having to openUzbek market to excessive capital flow ofKazakhstan or goods and labor fromTajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The same con-tradiction and mutual exclusion exists inrelation to the notion of consortiums inCentral Asian. When Kyrgyz and Tajik pres-idents refer to the creation of consortiums,they mostly refer to creation of schemeswhich would facilitate water and energyswaps in Central Asian, while forUzbekistan, creation of water consortiumis a tool to ensure maintenance of status-quo of water consumption in the region. Asimilar difference also exists in the usageof the terms related with free traderegimes and zones. For agricultural pro-ducers like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, this

only implies the creation of markets fortheir goods, while Kazakhstan focuses onthe penetration of the markets of thesecountries.

The third conceptual problem with regardto the promotion of integration is the mis-usage of the term “integration” by exter-nal states. Very often, when the ideas onregional integration are forwarded byRussia or China, in real terms these ideasmainly imply access to raw and mineral re-sources of the region. When it comes toKorea/Japan or the EU, these ideas oftenimply “giving” (provision of official devel-opment aid or other type of economic as-sistance) and “preaching” (offering know-how on how to achieve certain goalsusing the examples of the EU) to the re-gional leadership. Naturally, both ap-proaches have little to do with a genuineattempt to promote regional integrationbut rather use the notion of integration inorder to enhance ones’ standing in the re-gion. This often results not only in the un-dermining of the image of those externalpowers in the region, but also of the no-tion of cooperation and integration pro-moted by these states.

5. Sovereignty and cooperation:prospects for water (energy)consortium

One of the cornerstones for setting up ef-fective cooperation and integration is theissue of the sovereignty of each member-state. Integration schemes tend to involveconcessions of operational and formal sov-ereignty. While some states, likeKazakhstan, partly adopt the concept ofvoluntarily limiting their sovereignty, oth-


31

ers, such as Uzbekistan, do not considerthis as an option. As suggested by theUzbek President, Karimov, “the matter ofimportance for us is not to choose betweensovereignty and integration, but to harmo-nize these two concepts6”. Therefore, heargues that at this stage, Uzbekistan andother Central Asian states should opt forintegration that will not imply significantsacrifices of the sovereignty of the partici-pating member-states.

But at the same time, there is no need toconsider the questions of sovereignty as azero-sum game in the process of integra-tion. The smaller states might receive equalstatus with bigger states in integrationunits by partly sacrificing their sovereignty.For instance, smaller states have an oppor-tunity to register their opinions and achievetheir foreign policy objectives through theinstitutions of collective decision making.At the same time, bigger states are uneasyabout reducing their own sovereignty, sincein arrangements like the economic union,economically larger countries would haveto be tied to economically weaker statesand eventually bear their burden. Thus, fol-lowing this logic, ‘small’ states would gainaccess to important economic and politicalleverage previously denied them in view oftheir status7.

In this regard, the notion of common orshared sovereignty (implying self-limita-tion of operation sovereignty) can be con-sidered a compromise between sovereign-

ty and integration. The common chal-lenges of Central Asian states includewater and energy supplies, populationgrowth and migration, the environment,border delimitation, and other issues. Inthese areas, problem solving at nationallevels is less and less effective8. Integrationdoes not necessarily imply that states areobliged to either offer full access to theirinternal affairs or withdraw from the inte-gration process.

One example is water management, inwhich Central Asian states cannot practiceand apply absolute sovereignty, as their in-ternal policies would make an impact onall the states in the region. In this regard,they can apply only limited sovereignty inwater policies as opposed to absolute ter-ritorial sovereignty. Unfortunately, at thisstage, this is not understood by the rele-vant actors. In many cases, upstreamstates, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, frustrat-ed by the lack of economic support andenergy supplies from downstream coun-tries, apply individualist water policieswithin their territories. As payback, down-stream states utilize all measures at theirdisposal to pre-empt and retaliate againstupstream states, which creates all kinds oftensions. Instead, limited (operational) ter-ritorial sovereignty can be considered to beapplied by all states in Central Asian,which would provide opportunities foreach riparian state to make use of waterwithout interfering with the reasonableuses of the other states. Accordingly, for

6 Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan na poroge XXI veka: Ugroza bezopasnosti, uslovia i garantii progressa (Moskva: Drofa, 1992),ss. 302-303.

7 Ibid., p. 341.8 As Guerra-Borges notes, “the sovereignty issue should not be seen as a zero-sum game, especially when used in the pur-

suit of collective self-interest. The pursuit of regional interests is often the best way to address national concerns, since in-tegration can optimize the use of each member’s potential resources,” Guerra-Borges quoted by Wolf Grabendorf, “The Priceof Integration: Reducing or Redefining State Sovereginty?” in Peter Smith, The Challenge of Integration, p. 353.

these states, it is important to accept thatthe individual sovereignty of each stateshould be voluntarily limited and trans-muted into regional sovereignty, underwhich all issues regarding inter-state waterconsumption would become a subject forcollective decision making.

While a collective regional decision-mak-ing process shows some signs of emerg-ing, collective actions that enforce and im-plement those collective decisions seem tobe lacking. In many cases, these states di-vide water-management issues into thosethat fall under domestic water-manage-ment policy and those that require inter-state coordination. However, the inter-de-pendence of these states suggests thatconsidering domestic water consumptionas a subject of regional jurisdiction andthe creation of a regional water consor-tium would enforce and protect the indi-vidual sovereignty of each state from im-balances and one-sided decisions.Therefore, the foundation of a CentralAsian water consortium, if successfully re-alized, might serve as a case of regionalsovereignty application.

The basic document for the formation ofthe consortium consists of the decision ofthe heads of States of Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which wasmade on March 17, 1998 in Bishkek. Theparticipation of Tajikistan in the consor-tium was agreed upon on May 7, 1999.The consortium brought together statesforming the delta of the Syrdarya River toform a system of water and energy swapsbetween these states.

This 1998 agreement stipulates watersupply and consumption coordination be-

tween Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan andUzbekistan in the Syrdarya River Basin. Itis one of the most prominent agreementsto date on water and energy exchangebetween these parties. Article 2 of theagreement states that the parties accedeto make joint decisions regarding the mu-tual amounts of water and energy supply,as well as about the amount of energy tobe delivered to upstream countries ascompensation for water supply to down-stream countries. Importantly, thesecountries agreed to strictly follow theseagreements and to not undertake anymeasures that would prevent the transitof the water into downstream states,thereby damaging the rights of the latter.Another remarkable point is that the par-ties agreed that the energy produced bythe Toktokul Dam, which exceeds theneeds of the Kyrgyz Republic, should besold to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In ex-change, the Kyrgyz Republic can eitherreceive financial compensation or deliver-ies of other energy resources such ascoal, gas, or services. What makes thisagreement specifically prominent is that“instead of just water nomenklaturamanaging the distribution and allocationof water resources, this agreement calledfor cooperation between the energy dis-patch center and the regional water sup-ply and distribution organization for theSyrdarya river”.

This agreement also had a stimulating ef-fect on its member-states to conclude bilat-eral agreements on a number of smallstreams, which do not have regional im-pact. In particular, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistanconcluded an agreement according towhich Kyrgyzstan would supply irrigationwater to the farmlands in Tajikistan and in

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return receive water from the KayrakkumReservoir of Tajikistan for irrigation of itsBatken region. The agreement of 1998 hada further encouraging impact on water dis-putes between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhs -tan. These two states concluded agree-ments in January 2000 and May 2001 thatprovide a basis for joint utilization andmaintenance of water structures, canalsand reservoirs.

What remains to be done is to make theseinstitutional arrangements efficient andtransform them into productive mecha-nisms for coordinating the policies of allmember-states, in order to secure watersupplies and environmental sustainabilityin the region. This task cannot beachieved simply by creating a bureaucrat-ic institutional base. National legislation inmany cases contradicts inter-state agree-ments – a situation that needs to be ad-dressed. A consensus existed through thepost-independence years in the region onthe importance of preserving the statusquo with regard to stable water supply,which has led to a relatively successful in-stitutionalization process. However, in-creasingly, the positions of various statesin the region do not coincide on a numberof issues. These points of contradictionshould be dealt with at the regional level.Otherwise, they will lead again to crises.

The potential areas of cooperation in thisissue can be divided into two: interstatecooperation and confidence buildingmeasures and inner-state water demandreduction. In terms of inter-state coopera-tion on water management, working to-wards mutual confidence measures, de-veloping common language and mecha-nism of cooperation in this area, clearly

defining sectors from which to start coop-eration and providing impartial arbitrationin issues needing such arbitration are theissues which require immediate action. Interms of water-demand reduction, provi-sion of support for developing water con-sumers associations can be a crucial pillarfor providing relief and improving the sit-uation with the water management.

These areas in particular are considered toimpact the long-term economic sustain-ability of the region and inter-state securi-ty in Central Asia.

6. Conclusion

The hesitation of the Central Asian coun-tries with regard to closer policy coordina-tion, cooperation and eventual integra-tion is mainly attributable to their percep-tion that integration will limit their sover-eignty and will interfere in their internalaffairs. Therefore, efforts to radicalize andaccelerate the level of cooperation andintegration, without first preparing theground, might result in the failure of theentire process. Defining clear objectivesand policies is crucial for any regional in-tegration process. It is essential that theseobjectives are realistic and achievable.

The most important message here is thatregional integration, following the func-tionalist perspective, should first focus onone or two particular areas (for instanceborders and water management). Whensuccess in these areas is achieved, integra-tion can expand and move on to the next,taking on new tasks and responsibilities.Closer integration in these areas wouldimply some kind of voluntary deferral of

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national sovereignty in favor of “regionalsovereignty”, through the forming ofconsortiums and mechanisms.

As mentioned above, this needs to be ap-proached at both national and sub-na-tional level projects. While at the nationallevel, there is a need to facilitate creationof common “language” tools and mech-anisms of regional water-consumption, atthe local level, such projects may focusaround support towards local water-con-sumer associations.

As indicated in this paper, the efficient co-operation on consumption of water doesrequire new systems of monitoring andadvanced systems of irrigation, but localwater consumers associations demon-strate that human efforts at the local levelmay prove efficient and cost-effectivesubstitutes to the policy of technical mod-ernization. This is especially true when the

financial resources to invest in such tech-nology are not available. Above all, as dis-cussed above, the task of achieving effi-cient water consumption requires an evo-lution in thinking; a change of mentalityand an understanding of the urgency ofthe problem, as well as the developmentof environmental education programs. Inthis respect, support towards local initia-tives, at the level of local water consumersassociations, are instrumental in carryingout this task.

If and when the smaller cooperation andintegration arrangements, paired at thenational and local level, prove themselveseffective in dealing with regional prob-lems, it will send a clear signal to regionalstates that regionally-based solutions arepossible. If it fails to do so, Central Asianrisks falling back into the century-old tra-dition of being manipulated and takenadvantage of by external powers.

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Nicolás Sartorius

Estimados embajadores, queridosamigos, bienvenidos todos a la

Fundación Alternativas. Este seminario,que está coorganizado por el Observatoriode Política Exterior Española de laFundación Alter nativas y por la Secretaríade Estado de Asuntos Exteriores, es frutodel gran interés de estas instituciones porAsia Central y se enmarca dentro de las ac-tividades de la presidencia española de laUnión Europea. En el caso de la FundaciónAlternativas, hemos publicado anterior-mente diversos documentos de trabajo ymemorandos, además de un libro, sobreesta región.

Dentro de la globalización estamos asistien-do a diversos procesos de cooperación e in-tegración regional por todo el mundo. Yo

quiero decirles desde el principio que nues-tra idea de estos procesos es la siguiente. Enprimer lugar, estamos convencidos de quecada cual debe encontrar su propio caminosegún sus condiciones, su historia, su eco-nomía, su cultura y sus intereses. Hay queevitar, por lo tanto, pretender dirigir estosprocesos desde el exterior. No hay que darlecciones, sino compartir experiencias.

La experiencia de integración española enla Unión Europea es muy significativa.Cuando España entró en la ComunidadEconómica Europea era uno de los paísesmás atrasados de Europa Occidental y salíade una dictadura de cuarenta años. Sin em-bargo, en relativamente poco tiempo estepaís ha alcanzado notables cotas de des-arrollo en muchos sentidos. Y esto ha sidoen parte gracias a nuestra integración en laUnión Europea, hasta el punto de que

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Transcription of the debate

dicha integración ha sido el mejor negocioque ha hecho España en toda su historia.

Creo que el procedimiento que se ha segui-do en el proceso de cooperación e integra-ción regional en Europa ha sido muy inteli-gente. Europa venía de una historia traumá-tica de guerras y, tras la Segunda GuerraMundial, los procesos de cooperación y deintegración en Europa no empezaron porgrandes cuestiones políticas. Empezaronpor el carbón y el acero. Podría haber sidoel agua u otras cuestiones. En el caso deEuropa eran muy importantes el carbón y elacero. Al cabo de unos años ese procesocondujo a un mercado común y, tiempodespués, los países europeos se dieroncuenta de que no era funcional tener unmercado único y mantener cada uno supropia moneda nacional. Por eso fue muypositiva la creación del euro. La crisis actual,especialmente con el caso de Grecia, hapuesto de manifiesto la dificultad de teneruna moneda única y carecer de una políticaeconómica común. Esta idea se está impul-sando desde la presidencia española de laUnión Europea y ha sido alabada por el pre-sidente Barroso. De cara al futuro probable-mente habrá que ir más allá e incluso, habráque alcanzar una cierta armonización fiscal,y todo ello acabará conduciendo a una po-lítica exterior y de defensa común, que yaestán recogidas en el Tratado de Lisboa.Este es el proceso que estamos haciendo enEuropa y que nos está dando buenos resul-tados, hasta ahora.

En todos estos procesos de regionaliza-ción suele surgir el temor a perder sobera-nía a medida que se avanza en la integra-ción. Pero ¿se pierde soberanía cuandonos integramos en estos procesos regio-nales? La experiencia española es que se

gana soberanía. Por explicarlo con unejemplo. Había un temor cuando se creóel euro porque perdíamos nuestra mone-da. Sin embargo, antes de la creación deleuro, el precio del dinero en Europa lomarcaba el Banco Central Alemán y losdemás seguíamos. Hoy, con el BancoCentral Europeo, donde todos los paísesestamos representados, tenemos voz a lahora de decidir el precio del dinero. La so-beranía de la peseta era una ficción, por-que no decidíamos nosotros. Esta mismadinámica se ha dado en muchos ámbitos.En un mundo global, sólo los actores glo-bales tienen voz propia. Para ser un actorglobal hace falta unirse, porque, de locontrario, se acaba dependiendo de unoso de otros.

Vicente Palacio

En esta primera sesión vamos a de-batir sobre los obstáculos e incenti-

vos para la cooperación regional en AsiaCentral. Nuestro primer ponente esNicolás de Pedro.

Nicolás de Pedro

Presenta su trabajo titulado “ThePending Challenge: Obstacles and

Incentives for Regional Cooperation inCentral Asia”, que está reproducido ínte-gramente en la primera parte de este do-cumento.

Vicente Palacio

Doy ahora la palabra a RasulZhumaly, cuyo artículo se centra en

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analizar qué cambios deberían darse enAsia Central para favorecer su integraciónregional.

Rassul Zhumaly

Presenta su trabajo titulado “Inte -gration in Central Asia: The

Changes Required”, que está reproducidoíntegramente en la primera parte de estedocumento.

Vicente Palacio

Excelente intervención, señorZhumaly. Me ha llamado especial-

mente la atención su reflexión sobre elpapel fragmentador que juegan la mayo-ría de las grandes potencias en AsiaCentral y las dificultades que impone la ju-ventud de las repúblicas centroasiáticas,que está en pleno proceso de construc-ción nacional, a los procesos de integra-ción en la zona. El debate queda abiertopara quien quiera solicitar la palabra.

Santiago Ruiz

Quiero felicitar a los organizadoresde este acto por apoyar este tipo

de iniciativas, que hace apenas unos añoseran impensables, y que evidencian la cre-ciente importancia que confiere España aAsia Central.

Shirin Akiner

Estamos hablando de integraciónregional como un proceso lógico

para Asia Central, pero habría que proble-matizar esto, porque pueden pasar otrascosas. Pueden darse otros escenarios. Eneste sentido, yo creo que la Organizaciónde Cooperación de Shanghái es un mode-lo muy válido para la región, porque esuna organización muy resolutiva paraafrontar los problemas que preocupan a laregión, como la construcción de infraes-tructuras, y lo hacen sin injerir en los asun-tos internos de los países.

También quiero destacar la larga historiade convivencia que tienen los pueblos deAsia Central, que pone de manifiesto supotencial para resolver de forma conjuntalos problemas a los que se enfrentan.

Gracia Abad

Considero que no tenemos que darpor sentado que el hecho de que los

países de Asia Central estén en pleno pro-ceso de construcción nacional sea necesa-riamente un obstáculo para impulsar proce-sos de integración en la región. El procesoASEAN nos muestra cómo las élites políticaspueden utilizar los procesos de cooperacióne integración regional como un activo en elproceso de construcción nacional que vivensus países. En el Sudeste asiático no es raroque las élites utilicen los procesos de inte-gración regional en los que participan suspaíses para justificar políticas internas quepretenden imponer, pero que pueden resul-tar impopulares. Este ejemplo podría versecomo un incentivo para las elites de AsiaCentral a la hora de intensificar la coopera-ción y la integración con sus vecinos.

Por último, quiero llamar la atención sobreel activo que supone para una mayor inte-

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gración en Asia Central la existencia deuna cierta identidad común entre la po-blación de estos países, que se reconocenmayoritariamente a sí mismos como cen-troasiáticos frente a las personas de otrasregiones del mundo.

Vicente Palacio

Yo quería cuestionar la idea de quela Organización de Cooperación de

Shanghái es la respuesta a los problemasde Asia Central, ya que no se ocupa decuestiones básicas para el desarrollo de lospaíses de la región, como puedan ser laeducación, el transporte, el agua, etc.

Rassul Zhumaly

Siguiendo con la Organización deCooperación de Shanghái, hay que

subrayar que, al igual que sucede conotras organizaciones en las que participanlos países centroasiáticos, éstos tienen unpapel secundario en su seno. De ahí la im-portancia de hablar sobre procesos queincluyan exclusivamente a estos países.

Además, quiero remarcar que los líderes deAsia Central hacen numerosas declaracio-nes sobre la cooperación y la integraciónde la zona, pero sus palabras no se mate-rializan en hechos. La aproximación paraavanzar en este asunto debería pasar pordar menos importancia a las grandes decla-raciones políticas y enfatizar la búsquedade proyectos concretos, que pudiesen ma-terializar paso a paso la cooperación entrelos países de la región. Un ejemplo de pro-yecto podría ser la puesta en marcha dealgún medio de comunicación conjunto.

Shirin Akiner

Creo que hay que diferenciar másclaramente entre cooperación e in-

tegración, porque en la región ya se dauna estrecha cooperación en diferentesáreas, como la lucha contra el narcotráfico.

También quiero identificar otro obstáculopara la integración regional, y es la prefe-rencia de los países de la región por em-plear mecanismos bilaterales para resolversus problemas, frente a los mecanismosmultilaterales. Un caso claro es de la pro-blemática del mar Caspio. Tampocopuede obviarse que en la zona la políticala deciden las élites, no la población.

Saymumin Yatimov

En primer lugar quiero expresar misatisfacción, porque ésta es la pri-

mera vez en la que veo a España tomar unpapel tan activo en relación con AsiaCentral.

Yo quiero enfatizar la existencia de facto-res que favorecen la integración en nues-tra región. Por ejemplo, contamos conuna base cultural y lingüística común, dela que se carece en Europa, que puede fa-vorecer una mayor integración económicay política. En la arena económica existe unpotencial enorme, en cuestiones tan rele-vantes como el agua o el transporte. Elagua es particularmente importante enuna región con notable escasez de agua yque tiene concentrados más de la mitadde sus recursos hídricos en Kirguistán yTayikistán. Éste es un recurso común quenos obliga a evitar conflictos y que puedeser la base de una mayor integración.

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Cambiando de tema, las extensas fronte-ras de Tayikistán con Afganistán son moti-vo de inestabilidad, con amenazas tangraves como el narcotráfico o el terroris-mo. Tayikistán no puede enfrentarse sóloa estas amenazas y agradece la ayuda deotros países en esta tarea. Éste es otro delos factores que obligan a nuestra integra-ción. Agradecemos especialmente aKazajistán que sus soldados hayan patru-llado esta frontera, lo que ha costado lavida a 23 de ellos.

A pesar de lo dicho hasta ahora, tengo lasensación de que en algunos aspectos es-tamos retrocediendo en nuestra integra-ción. Es lamentable y absurdo que seestén minando las fronteras y que tenga-mos 500.000 minas separando nuestrospaíses. También ha disminuido el númerode vuelos entre nuestros países. Esto sedebe en gran parte a un problema de au-tocracia y personalismo. No puede serque una sola persona controle la políticaexterior de un país, porque esto hace quelas relaciones entre nuestros países seanmuy dependientes de los caprichos de de-terminados líderes. Ésta es la principalcuestión política que debemos resolver, ytenemos que resolverla ahora, no pode-mos limitarnos a dejar que sean las futu-ras generaciones quienes se encarguende ello. Estamos en una situación dondese obvian la voluntad de nuestros pue-blos, que se benefician de unas relacionesfluidas entre los diferentes Estados. Estollega hasta el punto de que hay familiasque no pueden visitarse porque no se lesconceden visados para cruzar al otro ladode la frontera.

Creo que la parte europea tiene un papelimportante que desempeñar para ayudar-

nos a convencernos de que nuestros paí-ses tienen que buscar una mayor integra-ción entre sí.

Aurelia Mañé

En mis investigaciones sobreArgelia he aprendido que los pro-

cesos de construcción nacional a partir dela identidad nacional suelen ser contrariosa los procesos de integración con sus veci-nos. Para superar esta dificultad, aquí sehan planteado dos opciones. Una sería elenfoque más funcional de la CECA. Unadiferencia fundamental entre la CECA y lasituación actual en Asia Central es que losintereses externos que existen hoy en díasobre los recursos de Asia Central sonmucho mayores que los que existían sobreEuropa a inicios de los años cincuenta.Esto dificulta la integración económica enAsia Central y hace que sea la existenciade amenazas comunes el vector más pro-metedor a la hora de impulsar la integra-ción en la zona. Sin embargo, para queesto sea realmente posible es necesarioque las grandes potencias de fuera de laregión acepten tratar con una AsiaCentral integrada y perciban esta relaciónen términos de todos ganan y no como unjuego de suma cero.

En este sentido, el agua es un asunto deinterés común y que podría ser percibidodesde fuera en términos de todos ganan.Sin embargo, hasta ahora este asunto seplantea en términos de agua por hidrocar-buros, lo que está dificultando que se lle-gue a un acuerdo, ya que esos hidrocar-buros tienen más valor fuera de la regiónque dentro y, por consiguiente, los paísesproveedores tienen más incentivos para

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vender sus hidrocarburos en el mercadointernacional. De ahí que, para desatascaresta situación, podría ser positivo desvin-cular el tema del agua de las transferen-cias de hidrocarburos y centrarse en pro-yectos de promoción de energías alterna-tivas en los países proveedores de agua.Esto no sólo ayudaría a satisfacer las nece-sidades energéticas de Kirguistán yTayikistán, sino que también contribuiría adinamizar su sector industrial.

Otro asunto que podría articular la inte-gración regional sería el corredor de trans-porte, siempre que éste se entienda dedos maneras. Una, que da acceso a todoslos países de la zona al mar, o a donde aellos les interese. Dos, que conecte EuropaOccidental con China.

Nicolás de Pedro

Me gustaría profundizar un pocomás en dos de los asuntos que ya

se han planteado: la Organización deCooperación de Shanghái (OCS) y el agua.Coincido con Shirin en que la OCS es unaorganización muy dinámica y con gran po-tencial de desarrollo, pero, como apuntabaRassul, sigue siendo necesario que se esta-blezca una organización que sólo aglutinea las repúblicas de Asia Central. No convie-ne perder de vista que la OCS es la plata-forma que utiliza China para proyectarseen Asia Central y para dirimir su potencialrivalidad con Rusia en esta región.

No debe obviarse que existe una rivalidadentre Rusia y China y que, al igual que su-cedió con la rivalidad entre Gran Bretaña yFrancia a inicios del siglo XIX, esta rivali-dad podría dirimirse fuera de sus fronte-

ras. Como comprobó España entonces,no hay nada peor que las dos potenciasdel momento se enfrenten en tu territorio.Yo no digo que éste vaya a ser el caso enAsia Central, pero de crecer la rivalidadentre Pekín y Moscú, desaparecerían lasventajas que hoy perciben las élites deAsia Central en que exista competenciaentre China y Rusia.

Con respecto al agua, quiero enfatizar la di-ficultad que supone el que este asunto seapercibido en la región como un juego desuma cero y que no se asuma que es im-prescindible tomar en consideración los in-tereses nacionales de todas las partes impli-cadas para dar una solución duradera aeste problema. Un ejemplo ilustrativo deesta problemática es la presa y posteriorcentral hidroeléctrica de Rogun. Esta presaes considerada a la vez como un proyectoprioritario de interés nacional en Tayikistány como una amenaza en Uzbekistán. Si nose pone en marcha un mecanismo quepueda gestionar estas discrepancias, se in-crementará la tensión en la zona y nos po-dríamos encontrar con escenarios muy peli-grosos para la región. Esto nos muestra queuna mayor cooperación entre sí para los pa-íses de Asia Central es más un imperativopara evitar conflictos que una mera opcióncon potenciales efectos beneficiosos.

Jyrgalbek Azylov

Quiero subrayar que el asunto delagua no puede separarse de la

energía, ya que para Kirguistán y Tayikistánel agua no es vital sólo para la irrigación,también para proveer energía en invierno.Las repúblicas de Asia Central seguimossiendo rehenes de la herencia de la Unión

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Soviética. Por ejemplo, el sistema de ener-gía que se estableció entonces sigue jugan-do en contra de las repúblicas centroasiáti-cas y debemos ponernos de acuerdo entrenosotros para superar estas dificultades.

Shirin Akiner

No creo que haya que exagerar lasimilitud de las mentalidades en

Asia Central. Sirva de ejemplo las diferen-tes actitudes que existen en la región antela firma de un contrato. Los kazajos fir-man rápidamente el contrato y luego dis-cuten el contrato. Los uzbecos leen dete-nidamente el contrato y consensuan hastala última coma antes de firmarlo. Por suparte, los turkmenos no firman absoluta-mente nada.

También quería poner sobre la mesa queaquí estamos hablando de asuntos comoel del agua y el del clima en Asia Central,pero también debemos reconocer quenosotros no podemos resolver estos asun-tos, como ha quedado constatado en lacumbre de Copenhague.

Santiago Ruiz

No deberíamos exagerar la capaci-dad de la lengua como aglutinan-

te, como evidencia el caso de AméricaLatina y el de los países árabes, que no secaracterizan precisamente por avanzar ensus procesos de integración, a pesar decontar con un idioma común.

También quería preguntar si el ferrocarrilseguía funcionando como un elementointegrador en la región.

Rassul Zhumaly

El trasporte terrestre, y el ferrocarrilen concreto, sigue desempeñando

un papel clave para los intercambios entrelos países de la región. Lamentablementeno se están modernizando a la velocidadque sería deseable, pero está habiendoavances.

Quiero volver de nuevo a un asunto queconsidero central y es que las repúblicascentroasiáticas están siguiendo políticas decierres de fronteras y de autosuficiencia queles aíslan de sus vecinos. Esto contrasta conlos intereses de la población por comerciar yrelacionarse más allá de las fronteras delEstado en el que viven. Esta dinámica aisla-cionista es negativa para todos, porque cer-cena posibilidades de riqueza y favorece eldesarrollo de la economía sumergida, con elconsiguiente menoscabo para la haciendapública de estos países. Si los líderes localesfuesen más proclives a favorecer los inter-cambios con sus vecinos, podrían incremen-tar sustancialmente la riqueza de sus paísesregularizando estas actividades económicas.

Raquel Montes

Se ha mencionado en varias inter-venciones que grandes potencias

como Rusia y China tienen interés en frus-trar una mayor cooperación entre las re-públicas centroasiáticas. A mí me gustaríapreguntar a los especialistas qué factorespodrían empujar a estas potencias a teneruna actitud más positiva hacia un eventualproceso de integración entre los paísescentroasiáticos. ¿Qué incentivos podríantener estas potencias para que se materia-lizase este proceso?

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Shirin Akiner

Yo no veo confrontación entreChina y Rusia, sino cooperación

entre estos dos países dentro y fuera deAsia Central. China y Rusia se necesitan,igual que China necesita a EstadosUnidos, por lo que no veo confrontaciónentre estos países.

En cuanto a los corredores de transporte,no sólo hay que mencionar los que pue-dan cruzar Asia Central con destino aEuropa Occidental y Asia Oriental, sinotambién los que pueden comunicar a AsiaCentral con el Océano Índico, con el puer-to de Gwadar en Pakistán. La importanciade este puerto podría llegar a provocaruna guerra entre China y Estados Unidos.Tampoco hay que olvidar los que pasanpor Irán. Estas nuevas infraestructuras, engran parte financiadas por China, cambia-rán la geoestrategia de la región.

Aurelia Mañé

Parece que ha podido haber ciertaconfusión con lo que dije anterior-

mente, así que quiero aclarar que no hequerido sugerir que la cuestión del aguadeba resolverse en Asia Central al margende la energía, sino que esta vinculación nodebería hacerse con los hidrocarburos,sino con energías alternativas.

Nicolás Sartorius

Desearía hacer un comentariopara cerrar esta sesión. En Europa

el primer paso para la integración se hizoabordando un tema que era central para

los países involucrados. En Asia Central,dado que el idioma no es suficiente, ha-bría que buscar cuáles son los interesescomunes que pueden poner en marchael proceso de integración. En el caso deAsia Central, este punto de interés co -mún podría ser el agua.

En Europa también hemos tenido el proble-ma de tener que conciliar el distinto pesoque tienen los países grandes y los paísespequeños en el proceso de integración. Noes realista pretender que todos los paísestengan la misma influencia en estos proce-sos. Lo importante es que todos los paísessalgan ganando con dichos procesos y que,en ciertos temas sensibles, los acuerdos setomen por consenso. Igualmente, enEuropa el proceso de integración regionalha sido impulsado fundamentalmente porlas elites políticas. De hecho, en muchasocasiones se ha comentado el déficit demo-crático del que adolece el proceso de inte-gración europeo.

En cuanto a la relación de Europa con otrasregiones y su actitud hacia los procesos deintegración regional en otras partes delmundo, a diferencia de Estados Unid os,China y Rusia, la Unión Europea prefiere re-lacionarse con otras regiones como conjun-to en vez de relacionarse bilateralmentecon los Estados que las componen. Peropara que la Unión Europa pueda establecereste tipo de relaciones birregionales, dichasregiones deben estar constituidas comotales, de lo contrario, hay que recurrir a lasrelaciones bilaterales con los países de lazona. Por consiguiente, un incentivo parala integración regional en Asia Central po-dría ser la mayor fuerza que tendrían las re-públicas de la zona a la hora de negociarcon las grandes potencias, si lo hiciesen de


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forma conjunta en vez de por separado.Además, la Unión Europea tiene un graninterés en el éxito de estos procesos de re-gionalización, porque la gobernanza globalsolamente sería posible con grandes unida-des regionales que puedan relacionarseentre ellas. Europa está dispuesta, portanto, a intervenir en este proceso, pero sininjerir ni imponer, ya que cada uno debeencontrar su propio camino.

Timur Dadabaev

Presenta su artículo titulado“Discourses on Integration in

Central Asia: From Rhetoric to Practice”,que está reproducido íntegramente en laprimera parte de este documento.

Shirin Akiner

Ahora quiero hablar de la UniónEuropea más que de Asia Central,

porque debemos tener una visión másrea lista de lo que es la Unión Europa. LaUnión Europea debe cambiar su actitudhacia Asia Central para aproximarse a laregión como un socio, no como un men-tor. A inicios de los años noventa habíagrandes expectativas tanto en Europacomo en Asia Central sobre la relaciónentre estas dos regiones; sin embargo, di-chas expectativas no se han materializadoy tenemos que preguntarnos la razón.Unos de los motivos ha sido la diferenciade percepciones. Asia Central se ve exclu-sivamente como una región problemáticaen Europa, donde no se reconocen sus lo-gros. En segundo lugar, hay que recono-cer la gran dificultad de las amenazas queenfrentamos. El terrorismo, el narcotráfi-

co, no se solucionan exclusivamente conintegración. Es más, la intervención occi-dental en Afganistán ha intensificadoestos problemas. En tercer lugar, existe unresto de espíritu colonial en Europa.Buscamos sus recursos naturales y quere-mos mostrarnos superiores a ellos. Encuarto lugar, la intervención de la UniónEuropa está fuertemente ideologizada ysus inversiones son insuficientes. La esca-sez de estas inversiones hace que la UniónEuropea deba tener objetivos más realis-tas, porque hay un fuerte contraste entresus objetivos y los medios invertidos paraalcanzarlos. Por último, no se ha genera-do un espíritu de confianza, porque hayquien considera en Asia Central que laUnión Europea promueve los intereses dealgunos países de la región, especialmen-te de Kazajistán, en detrimento del resto.

Yergali Bulegenov

Es de gran importancia que estareunión se esté celebrando en

Madrid, ahora que España asume la presi-dencia de la Unión Europea.

La problemática que aborda esta reuniónes de interés mundial por la atracción in-ternacional que generan los recursosenergéticos de Asia Central y por el po-tencial de sus redes de transporte, quehistóricamente se materializó en la Rutade la Seda.

El temor de las élites locales a perder so-beranía se ha mencionado como posibleobstáculo a la integración regional en AsiaCentral. Creo que estos temores son exa-gerados, pues la soberanía de las repúbli-cas centroasiáticas ya está consolidada.


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A mediados de los años noventa se senta-ron unas bases perfectas para la integra-ción regional en Asia Central y estuvimosa un paso de lograr un acuerdo económi-co que hubiese sido muy beneficioso paratodos nuestros países. Nuestro presidentefue quien promovió está unión económicaentre nuestros países, que nos habría per-mitido competir de manera más eficientecon otros bloques económicos. Esto se ha-bría logrado sin perder soberanía, comoevidencia el hecho de que Kazajistán trataestos asuntos con Rusia y China sin perderun ápice de su soberanía. Esta falta de in-tegración económica entre nosotros haceque comerciemos mucho más con actoresde fuera de la región que entre nosotros,y eso que el potencial comercial entre nos-otros es prácticamente ilimitado. En 2008nuestros intercambios con Rusia alcanza-ron los 20.000 millones de dólares y conChina los 12.000, mientras que conUzbekistán no llegaron ni a los 1.000 mi-llones de dólares.

Otros problemas que debemos resolverconjuntamente son la migración irregular,los recursos hídricos y la delimitación ygestión de fronteras. Este último tema esde gran relevancia para nuestro país, yaque es el noveno más extenso del mundoy comparte extensas fronteras con gran-des potencias como Rusia y China.Kazajistán ha encarado de forma decididaeste asunto y uno de sus logros más im-portantes es la Unión Aduanera entreBielorrusia, Rusia y Kazajistán.

No hay que olvidar que hay temas sobrelos que existe un gran entendimientoentre las repúblicas centroasiáticas. Uncaso claro es el de la seguridad nuclear. Alindependizarse, Kazajistán tenía el cuarto

mayor arsenal nuclear del mundo y el po-lígono de Semipalatinsk, que fue la princi-pal instalación de pruebas nucleares de laUnión Soviética. Kazajistán renunció aesta herencia y este polígono de pruebasfue cerrado. En la misma línea, AsiaCentral en su conjunto ha suscrito unacuerdo declarándose zona desnucleariza-da, que entró en vigor en marzo de 2009.

Otro problema común, esta vez de toda lacomunidad internacional, es la situación enAfganistán. Kazajistán ha puesto en marchaun programa de 50 millones de dólarespara que jóvenes afganos puedan estudiaren nuestro país. Además, Kaza jistán presidela OSCE en 2010 y esto es un logro de lascinco repúblicas centroasiáticas. Esperamosque está presidencia sirva para impulsar laagenda de la OSCE y para que la comuni-dad internacional sea más sensible a la pro-blemática de nuestra región. Para ello, elpresidente Nazarbayev ha propuesto la ce-lebración de una cumbre de jefes de Estadode la OSCE, que lleva 11 años sin reunirse.

Sería de agradecer que todas estas ideasfueran trasladadas a la Presidencia de laUnión Europea, que es España.

Quiero finalizar volviendo al concepto desoberanía, que nosotros entendemos demanera distinta. La visión de Kazajistán espoder llegar a contar con un órgano su-pranacional para nuestra unión regional.Ello nos permitiría afrontar eficazmentelas amenazas comunes que enfrentamos.

Norberto Nebot

Me gustaría aclarar que la UniónEuropea nunca ha pretendido ser


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el mentor de ningún país de Asia Central.La relación entre la Unión Europea y la re-gión siempre se ha basado en el respetomutuo, como queda recogido en numero-sos documentos oficiales. Este principiodel respeto mutuo es seguido por la UniónEuropea en todas sus relaciones, aunqueesto le haya valido algún reproche desdeel otro lado del Atlántico.

Cuando la Unión Europa comparte su ex-periencia de integración no lo hace con laintención de imponer su liderazgo o unavisión del mundo unilateral, sino desde lacerteza de que cada caso es diferente yque ello no implica que sea inútil inter-cambiar experiencias y puntos de vista.Sólo queremos mostrar que una integra-ción ambiciosa es posible y que ello no im-plica renunciar a la soberanía.

La Unión Europa siempre se ha caracteri-zado por felicitar los avances que se pue-dan producir en ámbitos como el de la go-bernanza y los derechos humanos, por loque no me parece preciso decir que AsiaCentral es vista sólo como un problemapor la Unión Europea.

No cabe duda de que existe corrupción enEuropa, pero los estándares de gobernan-za pública en Europa son de los más altosdel mundo y, aunque siempre se puedemejorar, no creo que deba distorsionarseel contexto.

Una vez aclarados estos puntos, quería re-pasar la estrategia de relación que tiene laUnión Europea con los países centroasiáti-cos. El documento más reciente y relevan-te es La Unión Europea y Asia Central: unaestrategia para una nueva asociación, queha logrado asegurar intereses comunes en

derechos humanos, democracia y bienes-tar social. La Unión Europea refuerza sucompromiso con Asia Central desde enerode 2009, cuando las relaciones entre dospaíses ajenos a la Unión Europea pusieronen riesgo el suministro energético enEuropa. El hecho de que la Unión Europeatenga interés en diversificar su suministroenergético no significa que éste sea elúnico punto relevante. Desde la amplia-ción a 27 Estados, la Unión Europea estámucho más cerca de Asia Central a todoslos niveles. En este sentido, hay que subra-yar el valor de la presidencia alemana en2007 para estrechar las relaciones entreambas regiones y la extensión del manda-to del Banco Europeo de Inversiones a AsiaCentral para que pueda financiar grandesoperaciones de infraestructuras en la re-gión. Todo ello es prueba de que se conci-be la relación en términos de todos ganan.

Esta relación basada en el respeto mutuoy el beneficio mutuo es positiva y Europadebe aprender a transmitir su experienciade integración, basada en la dimensióneconómica, sin dar sensación de tener unamentalidad neocolonial o de pretenderimponer su modelo.

Rassul Zhumaly

Quiero seguir hablando del papelde Europa, porque la participación

de Europa tiene que estar presente en AsiaCentral para atajar los múltiples problemasque tenemos en Asia Central. Lamen -tablemente, por la parte europea hay mu-chas declaraciones solemnes, pero éstasno llegan a concretarse sobre el terreno.Por ejemplo, cuando el presidente deFrancia, Nicolás Sarkozy, visitó Kazajistán


45

en octubre de 2009 se le preguntó por larelación de la Unión Europea con AsiaCentral, y su respuesta fue que las priori-dades de Europa en la región son “econo-mía y energía, y lo secundario nos preocu-pa mucho menos”. Creo que esto nosmuestra que, aunque algunos países de laUnión Europea tienen intereses en AsiaCentral, la Unión Europea no tiene una es-trategia consensuada para la región.

Además, la Unión Europea ha estado de-masiado pendiente de las repercusiones desu actuación en la región sobre su relacióncon Estados Unidos y Rusia, lo que le ha lle-vado a perder la iniciativa en la zona. Estoha hecho que, a pesar de que el modelo deliderazgo flexible y tolerante de la UniónEuropea sea atractivo para la región, hayansido otras potencias las que han ganadomás influencia en la zona. Esta pasividadeuropea nos ha defraudado. La UniónEuropea debe aclararse sobre cuál es su vi-sión de Asia Central, que debería ser la deun socio de largo recorrido, y sentar unasbases duraderas sobre las que articular larelación bilateral. Si Europa quiere recupe-rar el tiempo perdido, debe darse prisa yadaptar su estrategia a la creciente influen-cia de Rusia y China en la región.

Natividad Fernández

A mí no me agrada el papel de laUnión Europea como mentora, ni

siquiera como actor que tenga que darejemplo de nada, porque nuestra expe-riencia no tiene por qué ser extrapolable aotros contextos.

Aquí se ha dicho que las inversiones euro-peas en Asia Central son escasas, lo que

es cierto si se compara con las inversionesrusas o chinas, pero no con las de otrosactores. Además, igual o más importanteque el monto de la inversión es la elecciónadecuada de proyectos que tengan unelevado interés estratégico para las partesinvolucradas. Creo que ésta debe ser lagran prioridad de la Unión Europea, en-contrar este tipo de proyectos.

Rusia y China tienen intereses nacionalesen la región, pero también los tiene laUnión Europea, en el ámbito comercial,en el energético y en el de la seguridad(especialmente en relación con la situa-ción en Afganistán). El hecho de que unpaís como España, que no tiene especialesintereses económicos y energéticos enAsia Central, esté impulsando las relacio-nes con esta región durante su presiden-cia de la Unión Europea, es un ejemplosintomático de cómo los intereses deEuropa en Asia Central se van diversifican-do e intensificando.

Timur Dadabaev

Quiero hace un apunte en referen-cia al tema de la soberanía para su-

brayar que mientras Kazajistán sí contem-pla positivamente la creación de estructu-ras supranacionales que impulsen el proce-so de integración regional en Asia Central,Uzbekistán no quiere oír hablar de esta po-sibilidad. En este sentido, no creo que seaobligatorio que todos los paí ses de AsiaCentral participen en los procesos de inte-gración que puedan darse en la región.Una determinada iniciativa puede estar im-pulsada por un determinado número depaíses, y si tiene éxito puede que otros sevayan uniendo a ella. Un caso claro que


46

ilustra esta idea fue la incorporación deUzbekistán en 2001 a la Organización deCooperación de Shanghái.

Jyrgalbek Azylov

En este mundo global, los paísesde Asia Central y la Unión Europea

se necesitan mutuamente. Un escenarioque evidencia esta necesidad mutua esAfganistán. Igualmente importante es eldeseo de la Unión Europea de diversificarsu suministro energético.

Pero, siendo importante esta relación conotros actores de fuera de Asia Central,esto no es suficiente. ¿Qué va a pasar unavez que la OTAN abandone Afganistán? Silas repúblicas centroasiáticas no termina-mos por integrarnos en un único estadofracasaremos. Es imprescindible que nosintegremos en el medio plazo si queremoshacer frente eficazmente a los retos quese nos plantean.

Shirin Akiner

La Unión Europea podría realizarinversiones en Asia Central equiva-

lente a las de China, pero para ello tendríaque actuar de forma coordinada y nocomo lo hace en la actualidad.

Discrepo con los que piensan que AsiaCentral es vista por China como unafuente de recursos. La política de Chinaen la región debe entenderse como unanueva política de buena vecindad orienta-da a buscar aliados en la comunidad in-ternacional. China no sólo busca hidro-carburos y mercados en la región, sino

también votos y apoyos en los organis-mos internacionales.

Ravshan Usmanov

Coincido en que originalmente lasrepúblicas centroasiáticas teníamos

grandes esperanzas en la Unión Europa,que se han moderado con el tiempo. Porejemplo, la mayor parte de los fondos quedestina la Unión Europea a la cooperacióncon Asia Central están destinados a sufra-gar los gastos de los trabajadores de laUnión Europea en la región. Sólo un 5%de dichos fondos llegan al país en cues-tión. Por eso, nosotros preferimos las in-versiones directas en nuestra región, yasea desde el ámbito público o desde laempresa privada. China es el actor quemejor entiende esto.

Quiero matizar lo dicho antes por la seño-ra Akiner: fue la Unión Europea, noUzbekistán, quien propuso el incrementode la cooperación entre la Unión Europeay la Organización de Cooperación deShanghái. Paradójicamente, este asuntono se ha concretado y parece que es porlas propias dudas de la Unión Europea.

Coincido en que afrontamos tremendosproblemas ecológicos, como el del mar deAral, que conllevan un gravoso coste paranuestros países. Sólo Uzbekistán ha inver-tido 1.000 millones de dólares en esteasunto. En este problema de escasez deagua, provocado en gran parte por los pa-íses que controlan la cuenca alta de losríos que desembocan en el mar de Aral,Rusia y la Unión Europea podrían colabo-rar con una labor de investigación y peri-taje imparcial. Nos interesa especialmente


47

la experiencia de España y Portugal eneste campo.

Uzbekistán apoya totalmente la integra-ción en Asia Central como un proceso in-evitable, pero tiene que ser sobre unabase práctica. Ya existen muchas organi-zaciones sobre el papel, lo que hay quehacer es pasar a la acción.

Saymumin Yatimov

No hay que interpretar la soberaníaen términos absolutos, porque

todos somos interdependientes y nos ne-cesitamos mutuamente para prosperar.Tenemos que reconocer públicamenteque tenemos intereses de carácter econó-mico, energético, de seguridad, que nosimpulsan a estrechar nuestros lazos. Y yaque todos tenemos intereses en esta rela-ción, la misma debe establecerse en térmi-nos de igualdad.

Tampoco debemos olvidar que la pobrezaes la base de muchos conflictos y la UniónEuropea debería ayudar a combatirla coninversiones. Si no conseguimos incremen-tar el nivel de vida de nuestra población,no habrá estabilidad.

Nicolás de Pedro

Estoy de acuerdo con Shirin en quela Organización de Cooperación de

Shanghái represente una potencial fuentede cooperación para Asia Central, pero nodebemos olvidar que también es utilizadapor China para hacer valer sus interesesen la región. Por ejemplo, en este marcoChina ha propuesto varias veces la crea-

ción de un área de libre comercio en lazona, que es rechazada por Kazajistán,porque considera que sería perjudicialpara su economía.

En cuanto a la relación entre Rusia yChina, me gustaría remarcar que estállena de contradicciones y problemas. Noes coincidencia que Putin propusiese lacreación del Club Energético justo cuandoKazajistán comenzó a bombear petróleo aChina. De hecho, su amistad se define entérminos negativos. Es decir, lo que lesune es su rechazo común a la presencia deEstados Unidos en la región.

Respecto a las raíces del terrorismo, coin-cido con que muchas veces está vinculadoa la pobreza, pero también debemostener presente que la institucionalizacióndel pluralismo político ayuda a preveniresta amenaza. Un ejemplo claro es el delPartido del Renacimiento Islámico enTayikistán.

Nicolás Sartorius

Estoy seguro de que la UniónEuropea puede reforzar su presen-

cia en Asia Central y que será un socio im-portante para la región, pero no debemosolvidar que la Unión Europea no funcionacomo un Estado.

Claro que la Unión Europea tiene intere-ses de diversa índole en Asia Central, loimportante es que esos intereses conflu-yan con los de los actores locales. Y estoúltimo es más fácil si las repúblicas cen-troasiáticas se integran y no tienen queinteractuar con Europa una por una deforma aislada.


48

Santiago Chamorro

El Ministerio de Asuntos Exterioresquiere agradecer a la Fundación

Alternativas por la celebración de este se-minario, que se ocupa de un asunto degran importancia para nosotros. AsiaCentral está bajo la competencia de lapresidencia rotatoria española de la UniónEuropea en gran parte gracias al impor-tante capital humano con el que conta-mos. Su majestad, el Rey Don Juan Carlos,es probablemente el jefe de Estado euro-peo que más ha viajado a la región y quemejores contactos tiene allí. Asimismo, elministro Moratinos es un gran conocedorde la zona y la ha visitado en diferentesocasiones.

En cuanto a la Organización de Coope -ración de Shanghái, quiero decir que te-nemos el proyecto de que la Unión estépor primera vez representada en la reu-nión que se celebrará en Tashkent del 10al 13 de mayo de 2010.

Aquí se ha hablado tanto de la coopera-ción regional interna como de la externa y,en este último sentido, creo que tambiénes importante que se promueva con másénfasis desde la región una política debuena vecindad.

Coincido plenamente con lo dicho ante-riormente por Nicolás Sartorius respecto aque Europa ni puede ni debe dar lecciones,pero sí compartir experiencias. Tambiéncomparto que el proceso de integración deEspaña en la Unión Europea es el mejornegocio que ha hecho este país en su his-toria y que este proceso demuestra que nose cede soberanía, sino que se comparte, yen ese proceso se gana soberanía.

¿Cuál es la situación del proceso de inte-gración regional en Asia Central? No esuna situación muy boyante debido a losproblemas que se han señalado anterior-mente (conflicto de Afganistán, rivalida-des personales entre líderes, rivalidades in-terestatales, el narcotráfico, el terrorismo,la mala gestión del agua, el mal reparto dela energía, disputas fronterizas, el malfuncionamiento de pasos fronterizos,aduanas y redes de transporte), pero la si-tuación tampoco es muy mala. En primerlugar, porque desde la guerra civil tayikano ha habido ninguna otra guerra en laregión. En segundo lugar, porque no hayfuertes tensiones interétnicas o interreli-giosas. En tercer lugar, porque, a pesar dela mano de Stalin al dibujar el mapa de laregión, los Estados creados no son artifi-ciales y tienen vida propia. En cuartolugar, porque no hay un riesgo inminentede que triunfe el islamismo radical en laregión. En quinto lugar, porque el des-montaje de la Unión Soviética fue suave ygradual, incluyendo el reparto de activosentre los países de la región.

En cuanto a los incentivos para la integra-ción, está el reforzamiento de la sobera-nía, el incremento de la capacidad nego-ciadora frente a países de fuera de la re-gión y la mejora del clima de inversión.

Respecto a las propuestas, yo destacaría amodo de extracto:

1. Seguir un modelo funcionalista e ir ha-ciendo las cosas de forma gradual apartir de temas como la gestión defronteras, la gestión del agua, la educa-ción. En cualquier caso, son los paísesde la región los que deben decidir cuá-les podrían ser estos temas.


49

2. Promover el comercio intrarregional enAsia Central, que apenas supone el 10%del comercio exterior de las cinco repúbli-cas centroasiáticas.

3. Mirar al corto plazo, no sólo al largo plazo.

4. Desarrollar la cooperación regional ex-terna con la Unión Europea, con Rusia,con China. Desde Europa no se consi-dera que los intereses de Moscú y Pekínen la región entren en conflicto con losnuestros, de ahí que se busque unamayor relación con la Organización deCooperación de Shanghái.

5. No se debe pretender que Asia Centraladopte todos los valores europeos, pero

sí que adopte valores universales como

los derechos humanos, las libertades fun-

damentales y el Estado de Derecho.

Otra idea que quiero comentar es que la

estrategia de la Unión Europea sobre la co-

operación y la integración regional en Asia

Central va a ser revisada. A la luz de esa re-

visión deben establecerse objetivos realis-

tas y alcanzables. La cooperación y la inte-

gración regional son la mejor manera de

asegurar la estabilidad, la independencia y

la prosperidad de los Estados centroasiáti-

cos. Y estamos dispuestos para acompañar

en este proceso, evitando cualquier prota-

gonismo.


50

Cuadernos publicados

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3/2004. La temporalidad en la perspectiva de las relaciones laborales.

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5/2004. Alternativas para la educación.

6/2004. Alternativas para el cambio social. Zaragoza, 26 de noviembre 2004

7/2005. Las bases y los límites del consenso en la política exterior española.

8/2005. Los mecanismos de cohesión territorial en España: análisis y propuestas.

9/2005. La inversión de la empresa española en el exterior: nuevos aspectos económicos, políticos y sociales.

10/2005. El futuro de RTVE y EFE.

11/2005. El recurso de amparo constitucional: una propuesta de reforma.

12/2005. Guerra de Irak y elecciones del 14 M: un año después.

13/2005. Azaña y Ortega: dos ideas de España.

14/2005. El aborto en la legislación española: una reforma necesaria.

15/2005. Los objetivos políticos del Presupuesto de Defensa español.

16/2005. Alternativas para la España plural.

17/2005. Reformas para revitalizar el Parlamento español.

18/2005. Las nuevas tecnologías aplicadas a la agroalimentación. Entre la preocupación y la urgencia.

19/2005. El crecimiento del sistema español de I+D. De la teoría a la realidad.

20/2005. La Agencia Europea de Defensa y la construcción europea: la participación española.


22/2006. La crisis energética y la energía nuclear.

23/2006. Unión Europea y América Latina: retos comunes para la cohesión social.


25/2006. Una financiación autonómica equitativa y solidaria.

26/2006. Solución de conflictos por medios no jurisdiccionales.

27/2006. El sistema de servicios sociales español y las necesidades derivadas de la atención a la dependencia.

28/2006. El modelo social europeo. Laboratorio Alternativas-Policy Network.


30/2006. Inmigración e integración: un reto europeo.

31/2006. La intervención médica y la buena muerte.

32/2006. La frontera entre el sistema público de I+D+i y las empresas. Un obstáculo capital para el desarrollo.

33/2006. Retos del modelo social y económico europeo.


35/2006. Sanidad y cohesión social.

36/2006. La identidad europea: unidad en la diversidad. Sevilla, 16 de noviembre de 2006.

37/2006. Un espacio de seguridad compartido en el Magreb: la contribución franco-española. 13 de noviembre de 2006.

38/2006. Justicia de las víctimas y reconciliación en el País Vasco.

39/2007. Servicios sociales y atención a las necesidades de dependencia.

40/2007. Hacia un Espacio Europeo de Educación Superior. Murcia, 5 de febrero de 2007.

41/2007. La cooperación en cultura-comunicación, vista desde Iberoámerica.

42/2007. Misiones de paz de las Fuerzas Armadas españolas. Zaragoza, 7 de junio de 2007.

43/2007. El papel de la financiación público-privada de los servicios sanitarios: modelos de gestión. Toledo, 29 de marzo de

2007.

44/2007. Soluciones para la crisis constitucional europea. Oviedo, 29 de junio de 2007.

45/2007. ¿Qué hoja de ruta para la política de defensa europea? Quel agenda pour la politique de défense européenne?

46/2007. Los partidos políticos marroquíes: elecciones legislativas y política exterior. El Sáhara Occidental.

47/2007. Los fondos de cohesión como instrumento de cooperación al desarrollo en Mercosur. Buenos Aires, 1 y 2 de octu-

bre de 2007.

48/2008. La potenciación del sistema de I+D+i en España. Primer balance.

49/2008. El futuro energético europeo: ¿común, seguro, sostenible? Tarragona, 30 de enero de 2008.

50/2008. La visibilidad o invisibilidad de la víctima. Madrid, 29 de febrero de 2008.

51/2008. La Unión para el Mediterráneo y el reforzamiento del núcleo euromediterráneo.

52/2008. Los asuntos pendientes en la regulación del sector eléctrico. Madrid, 25 de junio de 2008.

53/2008. Los retos de la Unión Europea y la agenda política española para la Presidencia del 2010. Madrid, 23 de junio de

2008.

54/2008. Sistema Nacional de Salud 2008: nueva etapa, nuevos retos.

55/2008. El papel de las Fuerzas Armadas en misiones de respuesta a catástrofes en el exterior.

56/2008. Hablamos de Europa. ¿Qué Europa queremos?

57/2009. El sindicalismo en España.

58/2009. Políticas públicas de integración en el sistema educativo

59/2008. Fondo de cohesión eurolatinoamericana: seminario de discusión

60/2009. La crisis económica española en un contexto global

61/2010. El vehículo eléctrico: desafíos y oportunidades

62/2010. Fuerzas Armadas y Ciencia

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