consti support 3

7/28/2019 Consti Support 3

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ARNAULT V NAZARENO

OZAETA; July 18, 1950

FACTS

- This refers to two land deals entered into by the Philippine government asfollows:

1. BUENAVISTAESTATE

- The Philippine government leased from San Juan de Dios Hospital fortwenty five years the Buenavista estate and had an option to purchase thesame for P 3.0 million. This purchase option was exercised by the thenoccupation republic by tendering the owner the sum of P 3.0 million and, onits rejection, depositing the said funds in Court on June 21, 1944 togetherwith the accrued rentals of P 324,000.

- San Juan de Dios on June 29, 1946 sold this same property to Ernest H.Burt, an non-resident American for P 5,000,000 with the initial downpaymentof P 10,000 with the balance payable under very favorable terms. Burt wasunable to comply with the terms agreed.

2. TAMBOBONG ESTATE

- On May of 1946, the same Burt purchase from Philippine Trust Corporation,the Tambobong estate for P 1.2 million with a downpayment of P 10,000.00and terms which are as generuous as those from San Juan de Dios. Therewas however no other payment received from Burt.

- The Philippine government, through the Rural Progress Administration,acquired this same property from its original owner for the sum of P 750,000and subsequently instituted a notarial demand upon Burt for the resolutionand cancellation of his contract of purchase with Philippine Trust for nonpayment. The Court of First Instance in this case ordered the cancellation of

Burts title and the issuance ofa new one under the name of Rural ProgressAdministration.

- For one reason or another, despite the fact the Philippine governmentalready owned both the above estate, it again bought the same from Burt fora total consideration of P 5,000,000 (P 4.5 million for Buenavista and P500,000 for Tambobong). The government paid initially P 1,000,000 forBuenavista and the full amount of P 500,000 for the Tambobong estatethrough two corporations acting as Burts attorneys-in-fact. These two wererepresented in the trasaction by one and the same person, Jean L. Arnault.

- It was also brought out that the Rural Progress Administration was headedat that time by the Justice secretary who was at the same time Chairman of

the Philippine National Bank, the institution that lent the funds to RuralProgress.

- The transactions resulted into a public outcry which led into the PhilippineSenate adopting Resolution 8 which created a special committee toinvestigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal.

- The committee was tasked, among others, with determining:

a. the validity, honesty, propriety of the purchase

b. the fairness of the purchase price

c. the parties involved/responsible for the deal- During the public hearings of the Committee, various witnesses were called.

Among them and apparently the most important was Jean Arnault, theperson who represented Burt in the transactions.

- During the said hearing, Arnault confirmed receiving the money from thegovernment and withdrawing, in cash, P 440,000 which he gave to someoneon instruction of Burt. When asked to identify the person he gave the moneyto, he replied that he did not know his name despite the fact that he met theperson on many occasions. When pressed to answer, he also said thatanswering the question might incriminate him. Based on this refusal, thesenate approved a resolution on May 15, 1950 arraigning him for contempt

and subsequently found him guilty of the charge. He was committed to thecustody of the Senate Sergeant at arms until he reveals the name of theperson he gave the money to. The Senate adjourned three days later. Thework of the Committee however was extended via Resolution 16.

- Arnault filed an original action for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpuswith the Supreme Court to obtain his release cited the following grounds:

a. the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt since the requestedinformation is not material to the intended legislation and his refusal toanswer has not impeded or obstructed the legislated process. The Senatehas already approved bills related to the transactions.

b. the Senate lacks the authority to commit him in contempt for a term

beyond its legislative session.

c. the information sought will be self -incriminating

- rior to discussing the issues, the Supreme Court went into the generalprinciples of law with regard the power of either house of Congress to punisha person not a member for contempt as this case is the first of its kind to betried under the Philippine constitution. In so doing, the Supreme Court had todraw from American precedents in recognition of the fact that theConstitution of the Philippines were patterned after largely Americaninstitutions and practices. The discussions were as follows:

a. There is no expressed provisions in the constitution which grant power

to either House to investigate or exact testimonies to exercise legislativefunction. However, this power of inquiry, and the process to enforce it, is a


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necessary element to enable the body to wisely and effectively performtheir respective legislative functions. In the absence of information that itrequires, Congress has no other recourse but to get the same from otherswho have them. At times, the information required are not entirely accurateor complete. Given this, Congress has the implied coercive to obtain suchinformation.

b. The power to compel is limited to information required in a matter intowhich Congress has jurisdiction to inquire.

ISSUES

WON the writ of Habeas Corpus should be granted

HELD

a. The requested information is needed to comply with the direction of thesenate as contained in Resolution Nos. 8 & 16 to secure the names of thepersons responsible for the transaction. The materiality of the question askedin the public hearing should be determined by its direct relation to the matter

being inquired into and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possiblelegislation. The only time that the Supreme Court may interfere with theSenate is when a petitioner is being forced to answer questions which arenot pertinent to the matter inquiry. In this case and citing McGrain vsDaugherty, Congress would be guilty of a clear abuse of authority in theexercise of its power. As to whether the information sought to be elicited ismaterial to an proposed legislation, the Court could not say as this is notwithin their scope.

- Citing the case Re: Chapman, where the petitioner was jailed for contemptof the US Senate for refusing to answer questions with regard accounts ofSenators in his company, the Supreme Court held that the Philippine Senate

has the authority to compel Arnault and if he so refuses to give theinformation, also the power find him in contempt and to imprison him until hecomplies with said requirement.

b. The power of the Senate to commit Arnault to prison does not end with thetermination of the legislative session. The opinion of Justice Malcolm wascited with regard the Candido Lopez case where he opines that theimprisonment of Lopez terminates when the House of Representativesadjourns. Citing however the McGrain case again, the Court said that, unlikethe House of Representatives which losses all its members every four years(hence its term is only four years), the Senate is deemed as a continuingbody whose members are elected for a six year term and are so divided thatonly a third of the seats become vacant every two years. Hence, the power of

the Senate to hold Arnault is a continuing power. The only caveat of the

Supreme Court in this case is that if the Senate disregards the properlimitation to jail parties in contempt, the remedy is with the Court.

c. Arnaults claim to self incrimination cannot be sustained citing Mason vsUS as a precedent. The Court must be given the chance to determine fromall the facts and circumstances whether the witness is justified in refusing toanswer any question which could incriminate him. Arnaults testimony wasobviously false. He obviously knew the name of the person he gave themoney to. His refusal to testify truthfully is punishable with contempt.

Decis ionPetition is denied


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BENGZON V SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE

PADILLA; November 20, 1991

FACTS

- Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Senate Blue RibbonCommittee

- 7/30/1987: RP, represented by the Presidential Commission on GoodGovernment (PCGG), filed w/ the Sandiganbayan the civil case no. 0035, RP vs.Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez, et al.

-The complaint alleges that defendants Benjamin and Juliette Romualdez tookadvantage of their relationship w/ Defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos toengage in schemes to enrich themselves at the expense of the

Plaintiff and the Filipino People, among others:

-obtaining control over Meralco, Benguet Mining Co., Shell, PCI Bank, etc.,selling interests to PNI Holdings, Inc. (corporators, Bengzon Law Offices), theconcealment of the assets subject to the complaint from the PCGG under the veilof corporate identity, etc.

8/2-6/1988: reports circulate of the sale of the Romualdez companies for 5M (farbelow market value) without PCGG approval to the Ricardo Lopa Group, ownedby Pres. Aquinos brother-in-law, Ricardo Lopa

Sen. Enrile called upon the Senate to investigate a possible violation of S5 ofRA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Actw/c prohibits any relative ofthe President by affinity or consanguinity up to the 3

rdcivil degree, to intervene in

any transaction w/ the government

-the matter was referred to the Senate Committee on Accountability of PublicOfficers (Blue Ribbon Committee)

-the Committee subpoenaed the petitioners and Ricardo Lopa to testify on whatthey know about the sale of the 36 Romualdez corporations

-at the hearing, Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify, the former invoking thedue process clause, and both averring that such testimonies would undulyprejudice the defendants of civil case no.0035

-petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition, praying for a temporaryrestraining order and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the Committee acted inexcess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose

-the Committee claims that the Court cannot enjoin the Congress or itscommittees from making inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrine ofseparation of powers (quotingAngara v. Comelec)

-the Court finds this contention untenable and is of the view that it has the

jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries and determine the scope andextent of the power of the Blue Ribbon Committee

ISSUES

1. WON the Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is in aid of legislation.

2. WON Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch ofgovernment.

3.WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process.

HELD

1. NO Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is not in aid of legislation

- Sen. Enriles inquiry merely intended to find out WON Ricardo Lopa had anypart in the alleged sale of the Romualdez corporationsthere was no intendedlegislation as required by A6 S21 of the constitution. As held in Jean L. Arnault v.Leon Nazareno et al., the inquiry must be material or necessary to the exerciseof a power vested in the Committee by the Constitution. In Watkins v. US it washeld that Congress power of inquiry is broad but limited, that is, it may not pryinto private affairs if such actions are not in furtherance of a legitimate task ofcongressno inquiry is an end in itself.

2. YES Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch ofgovernment

- Since the issue had been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan, any furtherinvestigation by Congress would only serve to complicate matters and produceconflicting opinionsas held in Baremblatt v. US, Congress cannot inquire intomatters w/c are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary.

3. YES the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process

- It has been held that a congressional committees right to inquire is subject toall relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,includingthe Bill of Rights. As held in Hutcheson v. US, it cant be assumedthat legislative purpose is always justified by public need; Congress cannot tread

on private rights. The doctrine in Cabal v. Kapunan states that the Constitutionalright against self-incrimination extends to all proceedings sanctioned by law andin cases in w/c the witness is an accused.

Disposi t ion the petitioners may not be compelled by the Committee to appear,testify, and produce evidence before it because such inquiries would not be in aidof legislation and if pursued, would be violative of the principle separation ofpowers between the legislative and the judicial departments, as ordained by theConstitution. The petition is GRANTED.


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STANDARD CHARTERED BANK vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS

FACTS:Before us is a Petition for Prohibition (With Prayer for Issuance ofTemporary Restraining Order and/or Injunction) dated and filed on March 11,2005 by petitioners against respondent Senate Committee on Banks,Financial Institutions and Currencies, as represented by Edgardo Angara.

Petitioner SCB is a bank instituted in England. Petitioners are

Executive officers of said. Respondent is is one of the permanent committeesof the Senate of the Philippines. The petition seeks the issuance of atemporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin respondent from (1) proceedingwith its inquiry pursuant to Philippine Senate (P.S.) Resolution No. 166; (2)compelling petitioners who are officers of petitioner SCB-Philippines to attendand testify before any further hearing to be conducted by respondent,particularly that set on March 15, 2005; and (3) enforcing any hold-departureorder (HDO) and/or putting the petitioners on the Watch List. It also praysthat judgment be rendered (1) annulling the subpoenaead testificandum andduces tecum issued to petitioners, and (2) prohibiting the respondent fromcompelling petitioners to appear and testify in the inquiry being conductedpursuant to P.S. Resolution No. 166.

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent,delivered a privilege speech entitled Arrogance of Wealthbefore the Senatebased on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo denouncing SCB-Philippines forselling unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities RegulationCode (R.A. No. 8799) and urging the Senate to immediately conduct aninquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulentactivity in the future. Upon motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, the speechwas referred to respondent. Prior to the privilege speech, Senator Enrile hadintroduced P.S. Resolution No. 166, DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ONBANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, TO CONDUCT

AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, INTO THE ILLEGAL SALE OFUNREGISTERED AND HIGH-RISK SECURITIES BY STANDARDCHARTERED BANK, WHICH RESULTED IN BILLIONS OF PESOS OFLOSSES TO THE INVESTING PUBLIC.

Acting on the referral, respondent, through its Chairperson, SenatorEdgardo J. Angara, set the initial hearing on February 28, 2005 toinvestigate, in aid of legislation, the subject matter of the speech andresolution filed by Senator Enrile.

Respondent invited petitioners to attend the hearing, requesting themto submit their written position paper. Petitioners, through counsel, submittedto respondent a letter dated February 24, 2005 presenting their position,particularly stressing that there were cases pending in court allegedlyinvolving the same issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby posing achallenge to the jurisdiction of respondent to continue with the inquiry.

On February 28, 2005, respondent commenced theinvestigation. Senator Enrile inquired who among those invited as resourcepersons were present and who were absent. Thereafter, Senator Enrilemoved that subpoenae be issued to those who did not attend the hearingand that the Senate request the Department of Justice, through the Bureauof Immigration and Deportation, to issue an HDO against them and/or includethem in the Bureaus Watch List. Senator Juan Flavier seconded the motionand the motion was approved.

Respondent then proceeded with the investigation proper. Towardsthe end of the hearing, petitioners, through counsel, made an OpeningStatement that brought to the attention of respondent the lack of properauthorization from affected clients for the bank to make disclosures of theiraccounts and the lack of copies of the accusing documents mentioned inSenator Enrile's privilege speech, and reiterated that there were pendingcourt cases regarding the alleged sale in the Philippines by SCB-Philippinesof unregistered foreign securities.

ISSUE: petitioners claim that since the issue of whether or not SCB-Philippines illegally sold unregistered foreign securities is already preempted

by the courts that took cognizance of the foregoing cases, the respondent, bythis investigation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely inthese courts.

RULING:Contention is UNTENABLE.

P.S. Resolution No. 166 is explicit on the subject and nature of theinquiry to be (and already being) conducted by the respondent Committee,as found in the last three Whereas clauses thereof.

The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in thesaid resolution, exposes the error in petitioners allegation that the inquiry, as

initiated in a privilege speech by the very same Senator Enrile, was simplyto denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank in sellingunregistered foreign securities x x x. This fallacy is made more glaring whenwe consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege speech, Senator Enrileurged the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid oflegislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulentactivity in the future.

Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaintbefore a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar theconduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy tosubvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy ofinstituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise ofsovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an


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essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or anadministrative investigation.

In Arnault vs. Nazareno, the power of inquiry with process toenforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislativefunction. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in theabsence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation isintended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itselfpossess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse

must be had to others who possess it.

The Court has already expounded on the essence of the contemptpower of Congress and its committees in this wise

The principle that Congress or any of its bodies hasthe power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded uponreason and policy. Said power must be considered impliedor incidental to the exercise of legislative power. How coulda legislative body obtain the knowledge and information onwhich to base intended legislation if it cannot require andcompel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, ifit is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and

authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted theprinciple of separation of powers, making each branchsupreme within the realm of its respective authority, it musthave intended each departments authority to be full andcomplete, independently of each others authority orpower. And how could the authority and power becomecomplete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance,every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body mustresort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy,because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith,with affronts committed against its authority or dignity.

The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the powerto punish contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation. As thebranch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently ofthe judicial branch, it can assert its authority and punish contumacious actsagainst it. Such power is sui generis, as it attaches not to the discharge oflegislative functions per se, but to the sovereign character of the legislatureas one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government.

In this case, petitioners imputation that the investigation was in aidof collection is a direct challenge against the authority of the Senate

Committee, as it ascribes ill motive to the latter. In this light, we find thecontempt citation against the petitioners reasonable and justified.

The power of legislative investigation includes the power to compelthe attendance of witnesses. Corollary to the power to compel theattendance of witnesses is the power to ensure that said witnesses would beavailable to testify in the legislative investigation. In the case at bench,considering that most of the officers of SCB-Philippines are not Filipinonationals who may easily evade the compulsive character of respondentssummons by leaving the country, it was reasonable for the respondent torequest the assistance of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation toprevent said witnesses from evading the inquiry and defeating itspurpose. In any event, no HDO was issued by a court. The BID insteadincluded them only in the Watch List, which had the effect of merely delayingpetitioners intended travel abroad for five (5) days, provided no HDO isissued against them.


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SENATE V ERMITA

CARPIO-MORALES;

FACTS

- this is a consolidation of various petitions for certiorari and prohibitionchallenging the constitutionality of E.O. no. 4641 issued Sept. 28, 2005

- Consti Provisions allegedly violated: Art. VI Sec. 1, 21, 22,; Art. III Sec. 4, 7; Art.II Sec. 28; Art. XI Sec 1; Art. XIII Sec. 16

- Between Sept. of 2005 to Feb. 2006, various Senate Investigation Committeesissued invitations to various officials of the Executive Dept. including the AFP andPNP for them to appear in public hearings on inquiries concerning mainly: (A)The alleged overpricing in the NorthRail Project (B) the Wire-Tapping activity (C)the Fertilizer scam (D) the Venable contract

- The respective officials of the Executive Dept. filed requests for postponementof hearings for varying reasons such as existence of urgent operational matters,more time to prepare a more comprehensive report, etc. Sen. Drilon, however,did not accede to their requests because the requests were sent belatedly andthat preparations and arrangements have already been completed.

- On Sept. 28, 2005, Pres. Arroyo issued E.O. 464 which took effect immediately.Citing E.O. 464, the Executive Dept. officials subject to Senate investigationsclaimed that they were not allowed to appear before any Senate orCongressional hearings without consent (written approval) from the President,which had not been granted unto them; their inability to attend due to lack ofappropriate clearance from the Pres. pursuant to E.O. 464. Thereafter, severalcases were filed challenging E.O. 464 and praying for the issuance of a TROenjoining respondents from implementing, enforcing, and observing the assailedorder. Respondent Executive Secretary Ermita et al., prayed for dismissal ofpetitions for lack of merit.

ISSUES

Primary Issue

1. WON E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in the Congress

Secondary Issues

2. Justiciability of the case:

a. Legal standing of petitioners:

G.R. 169777 Senate of the Phils.

G.R. 169659 BAYANMUNA, COURAGE, CODAL

1E.O. 464 Ensuring observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of publicofficials appearing in legislative inquiries in aid of legislation under the Constitution, and for other purposes.

G.R. 169660 Francisco Chavez

G.R. 169667 Alternative Law Groups (ALG)

G.R. 169834 PDP-Laban

G.R. 121246 Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP)

b. Actual Case or Controversy

3. WON E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of

public concern.4. WON respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when theyimplemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of generalcirculation.

HELD

Primary Issue

1. RatioIt is impermissible to allow the executive branch to withhold informationsought by the Congress in aid of legislation, without it asserting a right to do so,and without stating reasons therefor.

-Although the executive Dept. enjoys the power of executive privilege, Congressnonetheless has the right to know why the executive dept. considers requestedinformation privileged. E.O. 464 allows the executive branch to evadecongressional requests for information without the need of clearly asserting aright to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By mere expedient ofinvoking provisions of E.O. 464, the power of Congress is frustrated. Resort toany means by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulgeinformation cannot be presumed to be valid.

Reasoning

Executive Privilege

-The power of the President and other high-level executive branch officers to

withhold certain types of information of a sensitive character from Congress, thecourts and the public.

- The Power of Inquiry (in aid of legislation) Art. VI Sec.21

This is the power of the Legislature to make investigations and exact testimonythat it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively. It gives theCongress the power to compel the appearance of executive officials to complywith its demands for information.

- Inquiry in Art. VI Sec. 22 (question hour)

As determined from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, thisprovision was intended to be distinguished from inquiries in aid of legislation, in

that attendance here is merely discretionary on the part of the department heads.


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- Sec. 1 of E.O. 464

Its requirement to secure presidential consent, limited only to executive dept.heads and to appearances in the question hour (because of its specific referenceto sec. 22 of art VI) makes it valid on its face.

- Sec. 2 (a) of E.O. 464

It merely provides guidelines binding only on the heads of office mentioned insection 2(b), on what is covered by the executive privilege. It does not purport to

be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may be construed as amere expression of opinion by the Pres. regarding the nature and scope ofexecutive privilege.

- Sec. 2 (b) of E.O. 464

Provides that once the head of office determines that a certain info. is privileged,such determination is presumed to bear the Presidents authority and has theeffect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, only to theexpress pronouncement of the Pres. that it is allowing the appearance of suchofficial. It allows the Pres. to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence, andsuch presumptive authorization is contrary to the exceptional nature of theprivilege. Due to the fact that executive privilege is of extraordinary power, thePres. may not authorize its subordinates to exercise it. Such power must be

wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy.

- Sec. 3 of E.O. 464

Requires all public officials enumerated in section 2(b) to secure the consent ofthe President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. Theenumeration is broad. It is invalid per se. In so far as it does not assert butmerely implies the claim of executive privilege. It does not provide precise andcertain reasons for the claim. Mere invocation of E.O. 464 coupled with anannouncement that the President has not given her consent, is woefullyinsufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information isjustified under the circumstances of each case, severely frustrating its power ofinquiry.

Secondary Issues

2. a. Regarding Legal Standing of petitioners:

Rule 1: Legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative,powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and areallowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claiminfringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

Rule 2: To be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importancethere must be a showing of: 1. the character of the funds (public)/assetsinvolved 2. a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutoryprohibition 3. lack of a party with a more direct and specific interest in raisingthe questions raised.

The Senate of the Philippines

- The Senate, including its individual members, by virtue of their fundamentalright for intelligent public decision-making and sound legislation is the properparty to assail an executive order which allegedly stifles the ability of themembers of Congress to access information crucial to law-making. It has asubstantial and direct interest over the outcome of such a controversy.

Party List (BayanMuna, COURAGE, CODAL)- The party-list representatives have standing, it is sufficient that a claim is madethat E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and duties as members ofCongress to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and conduct oversightfunctions in the implementation of laws.

IBP, Chavez, ALG (invoking right to info. on matters of public concern)

- When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing theconstitutionality of laws must be direct and personal. The Court held in Franciscov. Francisco that when a proceeding involves assertion of a public right, the merefact that the person filing is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personalinterest.

PDP-Laban (claiming standing due to the transcendental importance of issue)

- There being no public funds involved and there being parties with more directand specific interest in the controversy (the Senate and BayanMuna), gives PDP-Laban no standing.

b. Actual case or controversy (was not taken up by the Court)

- A challenged order which has already produced results consequent to itsimplementation and where such results are the subject of questions ofconstitutionality, is ripe for adjudication.

- The implementation of E.O. 464 has resulted in the officials excusingthemselves from attending the Senate hearings. It would be sheer abandonment

of duty if the Court would refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of E.O.464.

3. Yes. Congressional investigations in aid of legislation are presumed to be amatter of public concern, therefore, it follows that any executive issuance tendingto unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations deprives thepeople of information.

4. Yes. Although E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it hasa direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of publicconcern therefore it is not exempt from the need of publication. Due processrequires that the people should have been apprised of the issuance of E.O. 464before it was implemented.

Decision Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464are declared void while sections 1 and 2(a) are VALID.


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Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and

Investigations

Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J.

Petition for Certiorari assailing the Show Cause Letter (Nov. 22, 2007) andContempt Order (Jan. 30, 2008) issued by respondent Senate Committeeagainst petitioner Neri (former Director General of NEDA)

April 21, 2007 DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply ofequipment and services for the NBN Project amounting to P16 Billion. Theproject was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China

Petitioner was summoned by respondents to appear and testify in theinvestigation on the NBN Project on a number of dates, however, he

attended only on the Sept. 26 hearing.

Sept. 18, 2007 businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several highexecutive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push theapproval of the Project initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transferproject, but on March 29, 2007, NEDA acquiesced to convert it into agovernment-to-government project to be financed through a loan from theChinese government.

Sept. 26, 2007 petitioner testified before respondent Committees for 11

hours. He disclosed that COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered himP200 Million in exchange for his approval of the project, and he informedPresident Arroyo about the bribery attempt. When probed further on whatthey discussed, petitioner refused to answer 3 questions, invoking executiveprivilege:

- WON President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project

- WON she directed him to prioritize it

- WON she directed him to approve

Respondents issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum, requiring petitioner to

appear and testify on Nov. 20, 2007. However, a Letter (Nov. 15, 2007) byExecutive Secretary Ermita requested respondents to dispense with

petitioners testimony on the ground of executive privilege that coversabove questions, maintaining that the confidentiality of conversations of thePresident is necessary in the exercise of her executive and policy decisionmaking process and for the protection of the public interest disclosure ofinformation might impair our diplomatic and economic relations with China.

Nov. 22, 2007 respondents issued the Show Cause Letter requiring him toexplain why he should not be cited in contempt.

On Nov. 29, petitioner replied that it was not his intention to ignore thehearing and he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimedto be covered by executive privilege. He further requested to be furnished inadvance as to what else he needs to clarify. In a letter by his counsel, it wasstated that it was upon the order of the President that he did not appear, andthat the conversation with the president dealt with delicate and sensitivenational security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the briberyscandal.

Jan. 30, 2008 respondents found petitioners explanations unsatisfactory,and without responding to his reply, issued the Order citing him in contemptand ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-

Arms until he gives his testimony.

The parties were directed to manifest to the Court if they were amenable tothe Courts proposal of allowing petitioner to immediately resume histestimony before the respondents to answer other questions withoutprejudice to the decisions on the merits of this petition Senate disagreed.

OSG Motion for Leave to Intervene:

- Communications between petitioner and President are covered by theexecutive privilege.

- Petitioner was not summoned by respondent in accordance with the powerto inquiries in aid of legislation as laid down in Sec. 21, Art. 6, Constitutionand Senate v. Ermita

March 6, 2008 President Arroyo issued Memorandum Ciruclar No. 151,revoking EO 464 and Memorandum Circular N. 108, advising officials andemployees to abide by the Consitution, existing laws and jurisprudence


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(Senate v. Ermita) when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid oflegislation.

*Sec. 21, Art. 6 of Constitution Legislative powers of Congress relates tothe power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation aim is to elicit informationthat may be used for legislation can compel the appearance of executiveofficials

*Sec. 22, Art. 6 of Constitution Oversight powers of Congress relates tothe power to conduct a question hour to obtain information in pursuit ofCongress oversight function cannot compel the appearance of executiveofficials

*Principle of Separation of Powers

- executive branch cannot frustrate power of Congress to legislate byrefusing to comply with its demands of information

- power of judicial review is available right of Congress to conduct inquiriesin aid of legislation is susceptible to abuse subject to certiorari (Sec. 1, Art.

8, Constitution)

Issues and Ratio:

1. WON the communications elicited by the 3 questions are covered byExecutive Privilege. (YES. 2 reasons)

*Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation broad legislative cannot legislate wisely/effectively in the absence of information

respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect/changecompulsory process to enforce it limitations validity: done in accordancewith the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and the rights ofpersons appearing/affected be respected. Such power extends to executiveofficials and exemption can only be through a valid claim of executiveprivilege.

a. There is a recognized claim of executive privilege despite revocation ofEO 464.

Concept of executive privilege has constitutional underpinnings.

US v. Nixon public interest: preserve confidentiality of conversations thattake place in the Presidents performance of his official duties (presidentialcommunications privilege)Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality

provide him and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternativesin the process of shaping policies and making decisions.

In Re: Sealed Case 2 kinds of executive privilege: (1) Presidentialcommunications privilege communications, documents or other materialsthat reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations which President

believes should remain confidential decision making of the President(separation of powers) (2) Deliberative process privilege advisory opinions,recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by whichgovernmental decisions and policies are formulated decision-making of theExecutive Officials (common law privilege). The officials covered by theformer are those functions that form the core of presidential authority that arequintessential and non-delegable Presidential power (commander in chiefpower, appointment/removal power, power to grant pardons/reprieves, etc)

Courts ruled that Executive has a right to withhold documents that mightreveal military/state secrets, identity of government informers, informationrelated to pending information and foreign relations. Chavez v. PCGG secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters. Chavez v.PEA Presidential conversations, correspondences in closed-door Cabinetmeetings

SC: Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege onthe ground that the communications elicited by the 3 questions fall under theconversation and correspondence between the President and public officialsnecessary in her executive and policy decision-making process disclosuremight impair diplomatic & economic relations with Peoples Republic of China(Presidential Communications Privilege and Executive Privilege on mattersrelating to Diplomacy or Foreign Relations)

-communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power (enterinto an executive agreement w/ other countries w/o concurrence w/Legislature)

- communications are received by a close advisor of the President(operational proximity test petitioner is a member of the cabinet)

- no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitationof the privilege. No categorical explanation from respondents to show acompelling need for the answers to the questions, and veer more towardsexercise of legislative oversight function (Sec. 22, Art. 6)

Respondents: a claim of executive privilege does not guard against apossible disclosure of a crime/wrongdoing (US v Nixon specific need for


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evidence in pending criminal trial outweighs Presidents interest inconfidentiality)

SC: information in this case is elicited not in a criminal proceeding but alegislative inquiry. The validity of exectuve privilege depends not only on theground invoked but also on the procedural setting/context which the claim ismade.

Respondent: the grant of executive privilege violates constitutional provisionson the right of the people to information on matters of public concern (Sec. 7,

Art. 3, Constitution)

SC: Petitioner made himself available to them during the Sept. 26 hearing,questioned for 11 hours, and expressly manifested willingness to answermore questions except the 3 covered by executive privilege. Peoples right toinformation is limited by law (RA 6713, Sec. 7; RPC, Art. 229; RA 3019, Sec.3(k); and Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 24 (e)). The information in this caseis classified as confidential wherein there is public interest in itsconfidentiality. Not every legislative inquiry is an exercise of peoples right toinformation.

b. The claim of executive privilege is properly invoked.

The letter (Nov. 17, 2007) of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies therequirement for a formal claim of executive privilege (a precise and certainreason for preserving confidentiality). It serves as the formal claim ofprivilege: this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executiveprivilege (Secretary v. Ermita), and the Office of the President has advisedSec. Neri accordingly The information if disclosed might impair diplomaticand economic relations with Peoples Republic of China. The grounds werespecific enough so as not to leave respondent in the dark on how therequested information could be classified as privileged. Congress must notrequire the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularityas to compel disclosure of information which the privilege sought to protectrespect to a co-equal department.

2. WON respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion inissuing the Contempt Order.

YES. 5 reasons:

-There was a legitimate claim of executive privilege therefore the Ordersuffers from constitutional infirmity

- Committees did not comply with the requirement (Senate v. Ermita) that theinvitations should contain the possible needed statute which prompted theinquiry, the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questionsrelative to and in furtherance thereof. Compliance is imperative, bothunder Sec. 21 and 22 of Art. 6 of Constitution, to ensure rights of personsappearing and affected by the inquiry are respected.

- It is revealed in the transcript that the proceeding on Jan. 30, 2008 had onlya minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee present

during the deliberation (7 only). Sec. 18 of the Rules of ProcedureGoverning Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that a vote of majority ofits members may punish any witness for contempt. Members who did notactually participate in the deliberation were made to sign the contemptOrder, and its validity is doubted. Sen. Pimentel insisted that the quorum ofthe committee was only 2 and that the will of the lead committee prevailsover all the other.

- The Court finds merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent violatedSec. 21, Art. 6 of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be inaccordance with the duly published rules of procedure, which therespondents failed to meet therefore its hearings were procedurally infirm.

-Respondents issuance of the contempt Order were arbitrary andprecipitate because it did not pass upon the claim of executive privilege andinform the petitioner of their ruling, curtly dismissed his explanation asunsatisfactory and simultaneously issued the Order. Petitioner was not anunwilling witness and manifested his willingness to testify. Respondentsdenied him due process of law.

Court was also accused of attempting to abandon its constitutional duty whenit required parties to consider a proposal that would lead to a possiblecompromise it was only to test a tool that other jurisdictions find to beeffective in settling similar cases to avoid a piecemeal consideration of the

questions for review. Much of this spirit of compromise is reflected in thegenerality of language foundi n the Constitution (US v. American Tel. & TelCo.).

Judgment: Petition Granted. Contempt Order Nullified.


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In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus ofCAMILO L. SABIO v. HON. SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON, et al. G.R.Nos. 174340, 174318 and 174177, 17 October 2006, Sandoval-Gutierrez,

J. (En Banc)

The Congress power of inquiry encompasses everything that concerns the administration ofexisting laws as well as proposed or possibly needed legislation. It even extends togovernment agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the powerof Congress to regulate or even abolish. So long as the constitutional rights of witnesses willbe respected by the investigating committees, it is the duty of the former to cooperate with thelatter in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremittingobligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congressand its Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of properinvestigation.

Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Philippine Senate ResolutionNo. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455) directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on theanomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas TelecommunicationsCorporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to thealleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board ofDirectors. The Senate invited Presidential Commission on Good Governance(PCGG) Chairman Camilo L. Sabio to be the resource person in a publicmeeting that would deliberate on the issues presented in Senate Res. No.455.

Chairman Sabio, however, declined the invitation, invoking Section 4,paragraph (b) of Executive Order No. 1, which provides: No member or staffof the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any

judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within itsofficial cognizance. Senator Richard J. Gordon issued a subpoena adtestificandum, requiring Chairman Sabio and the four PCGG Commissionersto appear in the public hearing scheduled on August 23, 2006 and testify onwhat they know relative to the matters specified in Senate Res. No. 455.

Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. Another notice was sent toChairman Sabio requiring him to appear and testify on the same subjectmatter set on September 6, 2006, but Chairman Sabio still did not comply.Eventually, Chairman Sabio and the PCGG Commissioners were arrested forcontempt of the Senate and brought to the Senate premises where they weredetained.

Chairman Sabio filed the present petition for habeas corpus (G.R. No.174340) and, together with the four PCGG Commissioners and the PCGGsnominees to PHC, petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 174318).They allege that the investigating committees concerned disregarded Sec.4(b) of E.O. No. 1 without any justifiable reason, the inquiries conducted bythe said committees are not in aid of legislation, the inquiries were conductedin the absence of duly published Senate Rules of Procedure GoverningInquiries in Aid of Legislation, and the said committees are not vested withthe power of contempt. In G.R. No. 174177, another petition for certiorari andprohibition, PHC and its officers and directors contend that the saidcommittees have no jurisdiction over the subject matter stated in SenateRes. No. 455, the same inquiry is not in accordance with the Senates Rulesof Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, the subpoenae issuedby Senator Gordon are void for having been issued without authority, theconduct of legislative inquiry pursuant to Senate Res. No. 455 constitutesundue encroachment by the Senate into justiciable controversies over whichseveral courts and tribunals have already acquired jurisdiction, and thesubpoenae violated their rights to privacy and against self-incrimination.

The respondents countered that the issues raised in the petitions involvepolitical questions over which the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction; thatSec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution; that theinvestigating committees are vested with contempt power; that the SenatesRules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation have been dulypublished; that they have not violated any civil right of the PHC officers anddirectors, such as their right to privacy and right against self-incrimination;and that the inquiry does not constitute undue encroachment into justiciablecontroversies.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by theConstitution;

2.) Whether or not the investigating committees are vested with contemptpower;

3.) Whether or not the rights to privacy and against self-incrimination of thePHC officers and directors have been violated

HELD: The petitions are DISMISSED.

Sec. 4(b) of E.O. 1 has been repealed by the Co nst i tut io n because it isinconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the Congress power


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of inquiry , the princ iple of publ ic accountabi l i ty , the pol icy of ful l

disc losu re, and the right of access to public information .

Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it isinconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the Congress power ofinquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle of public accountability (Art. XI, Sec.1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of access topublic information (Art. III, Sec. 7). The Constitution is the highest law of theland and all provisions of laws against it are invalid no matter how noble theirintentions may be.

The Congress power of inquiry encompasses everything that concerns theadministration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly neededlegislation. It even extends to government agencies created by Congressand officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate oreven abolish, to which class the PCGG belongs. Sec. 4(b) exempts thePCGG members and staff from the Congress power of inquiry. This can notbe countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting suchexemption.

Sec. 4(b) places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts,Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging publicaccountability, it only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-accountability.

The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation is not only intended to benefitCongress but also the citizenry. The Constitution seeks to promotetransparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government, aswell as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to exerciseeffectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizenscan participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government

policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essentialto the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. Sec. 4(b) limits orobstructs the power of Congress to secure from PCGG members and staffinformation and other data in aid of its power to legislate. Again, this can notbe countenanced.

The invest igat ing comm ittees are vested with contemp t power

The 1987 Constitution, in Section 21 of its Article VI, recognizes the power ofinvestigation, not just of Congress, but also of any of its committees.

Significantly, this constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power uponthe committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can

take in order to effectively perform the investigative function are alsoavailable to the committees, like the power of contempt. Otherwise, Sec. 21of Art. VI would be meaningless.

The subject inquiry do es not v iolate r ights to privacy and against self-

inc r im inat ion

In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court mustdetermine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation ofprivacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated byunreasonable government intrusion. The subject inquiry focuses on the actscommitted by the PHC officers and directors in the discharge of their dutiesas such. The latter have no reasonable expectation of privacy over mattersinvolving their offices in a corporation where the government has interest,which matters are of public concern and over which the people have the rightto information. Indeed, the right to privacy is not absolute where there is anoverriding compelling state interest. The alleged anomalies in thePHILCOMSAT, PHC and POTC, ranging in millions of pesos, and theconspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its officials are compellingreasons for the Senate to exact vital information from the PHC officers anddirectors, as well as from Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it incrafting the necessary legislation to prevent corruption and formulateremedial measures and policy determination regarding PCGGs efficacy.

Anent the right against self -incrimination, this may be invoked by the PHCofficers and directors only when the incriminating question is being asked,since they have no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of thequestions to be asked of them. That this right may possibly be violated orabused is no ground for denying the investigating committees their power ofinquiry.

So long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and hisCommissioners, will be respected by the investigating committees, it is theduty of the former to cooperate with the latter in their efforts to obtain thefacts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation ofevery citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of theCongress and its Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matterswithin the realm of proper investigation.


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Garcillano v. House of Representatives

Facts: The Hello Garci tapes came out. They allegedly contained thePresidents instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano tomanipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. Theserecordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearingsconducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.

On June 8, 2005, House Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escuderodelivered a privilege speech, setting in motion a congressional investigation

jointly conducted by respondent House Committees. NBI Director ReynaldoWycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy DirectorSamuel Ong submitted to the House Committees seven alleged original taperecordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolongedand impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility andauthenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in thechambers of the House.

On August 3, 2005, the hearings were suspended indefinitely. Nevertheless,they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said recordings andthe testimonies of the resource persons.

Garcillano then filed a petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for aTRO (the first of the two petitions in this case), asking that the respondentHouse Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings. He alsoasked that they be stricken off the record of and that the House desist fromGarci case then stopped.

Two years after, Sen. Lacson delivered a privilege speech reviving the issue.The speech was referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense andSecurity. The following day, in plenary session, a lengthy debate ensuedwhen Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possibletransgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42002(An Act to Prohibit andPenalize Wire-Tapping) if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry onthe matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagodelivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that theConstitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication ofthe contents of the Hello Garci tapes. However, she recommended alegislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP(ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government entities in thealleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.

On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed a Petition for Prohibition withPrayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of

2[8]An Act to Prohibit and Pena lize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations o f thePrivacy of Communications and for Other Purposes.

Preliminary Injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar theSenate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in themain that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section3, Article III of the Constitution.

The Court didnt issue the injunctive writ and Senate hearings took place.

Issues:

1. WON Garcillanos petition for prohibition should be granted.

2. WON The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of thequestioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, inclear derogation of the constitutional requirement.

Held:

1. NO.

2. NO

Ratio:

1. Its already moot and academic. The recordings were already played in theHouse and heard by its members. There is also the widely publicized factthat the committee reports on the Hello Garci inquiry were completed andsubmitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees.

2. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that theSenate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committeesmay conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly

published rules of procedure. The requisite of publication of the rules isintended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication isindeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwiseburden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had nonotice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publicationis set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that laws shall takeeffect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in theOfficial Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

The Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation hadbeen published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14

thCongress, however, of

which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no

effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they firstopened their session.


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The Senate Rules simply state said Rules shall take effect seven (7)days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.They dontexplicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rulesuntil they are amended or repealed. It cannot be presumed that theRules would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the nextCongress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquirieswhich come within the rule on unfinished business.

It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative

inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rulesclearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequentCongresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently putpublic on notice.

Also, publication of the rules via a booklet form available to anyone for free,and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page is insufficientto comply with the publication requirement. R.A. 8792 (The E-Commerce

Act) considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as thefunctional equivalent of a written document only forevidentiary purposes. Inother words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for theirbeing the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules andregulations.

The Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution,use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of theseconsolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by theSenate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of therules, because it can do so only in accordance with its duly published rules of

procedure.

Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules ofProcedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of thisfact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to

be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases areconcerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not beundertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no publishedrules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.

consti support 3

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