consti commander.docx

8/21/2019 CONSTI COMMANDER.docx

1/18

CADC AUF SOL CONSTI 1

Powers as commander-in-chief

* Powers as Commander-in-Chief:

a. He may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress

lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.(calibrated

response)

b. He may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeascorpus, (explain to the court the reason for detention, 3

days, either you file a formal charge or release him)

c. He may proclaim martial law over the entire Philippines

or any part thereof.

> Subject to judicial review to determine whether or not

there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction (par. 2, Sec 1, Art VIII)

a. Call out the AFP to prevent lawless violence - This is

merely a police measure meant to quell disorder. As such,

the Constitution does not regulate its exercise radically

b. Suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus - A

"writ of habeas corpus" is an order from the court

commanding a detaining officer to inform the court

(i) if he has the person in custody, and

(ii) what his basis in detaining that person.

The "privilege of the writ" is that portion of the writ

requiring the detaining officer to show cause why he should

not be tested. Note that it is the privilege that is suspended,not the writ itself.

Requisites:

1) There must be an invasion or rebellion, and

2) The public safety requires the suspension.

Effects of the suspension of the privilege:

1) The suspension of the privilege of the writ applies only to

persons "judicially charged" for rebellion or offenses

inherent in or directly connected with invasion (Art. VII, Sec.18, par. 5).

>Such persons suspected of the above crimes can be

arrested and detained without a warrant of arrest.

> The suspension of the privilege does not make the arrest

without warrant legal. But the military is, in effect, enabled

to make the arrest, anyway since, with the suspension of

the privilege, there is no remedy available against such

unlawful arrest (arbitrary detention).

>The arrest without warrant is justified by the emergency

situation and the difficulty in applying for a warrant

considering the time and the number of persons to be

arrested.

>the crime for which he is arrested must be one related torebellion or the invasion. As to other crimes, the suspension

of the privilege does not apply.

2) During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any

person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged

within 3 days, or otherwise he shall be released. (Art. VII,

Sec. 18, par. 6).

> The effect of the suspension of the privilege, therefore, is

only to extend the periods during which he can be detained

without a warrant. When the privilege is suspended, the

period is extended to 72 hours.

> What happens if he is not judicially charged nor released

after 72 hours? The public officer becomes liable under Art.

125 for "delay in the delivery of detained persons."

3) The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. (Art. III,

Sec. 13)

c. Proclaim Martial Law

Requisites:

1) There must be an invasion or rebellion, and

2) Public safety requires the proclamation of martial law all

over the Philippines or any part thereof.

Effects of the proclamation of martial law:

The President can:

1) Legislate

2) Order the arrest of people who obstruct the war

effort.

But the following cannot be done (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 4)

a.Suspend the operation of the Constitution.

b.Supplant the functioning of the civil courts and the

legislative assemblies.> martial law is proclaimed

only because the courts and other civil institutions

like Congress have been shut down. It should not


2/18

happen that martial law is declared in order to shut

down the civil institutions.

c. Confer jurisdiction upon military courts and agencies

over civilians, where civil courts are able to

function.

"open court" doctrineholds that civilians cannot be tried

holds that civilians cannot be tried by military courts if thecivil courts are open and functioning.

if the civil courts are not functioning, then civilians can be

tried by the military courts.

Martial laws usually contemplates a case where the courts

are already closed and the civil institutions have already

crumbled, that is a expressly.

"theater of war." If the courts are still open, the President

can just suspend the privilege and achieve the same effect.

Automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus.

> The President must suspend the privilege

The Role of Congress

a. Congress may revoke the proclamation of martial law or

suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus

before the lapse of 60 days from the date of suspension or

proclamation

b. Upon such proclamation or suspension, Congress shallconvene at once. If it is not in session, it shall convene in

accordance with its rules without need of a call within 24

hours following the proclamation or suspension.

c. Within 48 hours from the proclamation or the

suspension, the President shall submit a report, in person or

in writing, to the Congress (meeting in joint session of the

action he has taken).

d. The Congress shall then vote jointly, by an absolute

majority. It has two options:

(i) To revoke such proclamation or suspension.

>When it so revokes, the President cannot set aside (or

veto) the revocation as he normally would do in the case of

bills.

(ii) To extend it beyond the 60-day period of its validity.

Congress can only so extend the proclamation or

suspension upon the initiative of the President. The period

need not be 60 days; it could be more, as Con- gress would

determine, based on the persistence of the emergency. If

Congress fails to act before the measure expires, it can no

longer extend it until the President again redeclares the

measure.

* Congress cannot "validate" the proclamation or

suspension, because it is already valid.* If Congress

extends the measure, but before the period of extension

lapses, the requirements for the proclamation or sus-pension no longer exist, Congress can lift the extension,

since the power to confer implies the power to take back.

* If Congress does not review or lift the order, this can be

reviewed by the Supreme Court pursuant to the next

section.

The Role of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate

proceeding filled by any citizen, the sufficiency of the

factual basis of:

(a) the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the

privilege of the writ, or

(b) the extension thereof. It must promulgate its decision

thereon within 30 days from its filing. (Sec 18 (3), Art. VII)

* The jurisdiction of the SC may be invoked in a proper case.

> A petition for habeas corpus

- When a person is arrested without a warrant for

complicity in the rebellion or invasion, he or someone else

in his behalf has the standing to question the validity of theproclamation or suspension.

- before the SC can decide on the legality of his detention, it

must first pass upon the validity of the proclamation or

suspension.

* Test of Artbitrariness:>test to be used by the Supreme

Court in so reviewingthe act of the President in proclaiming

or suspending, or the act of Congress in extending

seeks to determine the sufficiency of the factual

basis of the measure.

The question is not whether the President orCongress acted correctly, but whether he acted

arbitrarily in that the action had no basis in fact.

amounts to a determination of whether or not

there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction Sec 1(2) Art. VIII.

IBP VS ZAMORA

FACTS:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18,


3/18


Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal

directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to

coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and

campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned

the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines

to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity

of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.

2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint

visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions on

civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1,

Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme

Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to

settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally

demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or

not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or

instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the

Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the

following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the

existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal

and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional

question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the

earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is

the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a

breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of theMarines in this case constitutes permissible use of military

assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the

Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is

appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to

direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is,

likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to

the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In

view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that

military authority is supreme over civilian

authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist

the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police

force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of

the military in the task of law enforcement in violation ofSection 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

SANLAKAS VS EXEC SEC

FACTS: July 27, 2003-Oakwood mutiny -Pres GMAissued Proclamation no 47 declaring a "state ofrebellion" & General Order No. 4 directing AFP & PNP

to supress the rebellion. -by evening, soldiers agreedto return to barracks. GMA, however, did notimmediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion,only doing so on August 1, 2003 thru Proc NO. 435.

Petitioners:1. Sanlakas & PM; standing as "petitioners committedto assert, defend, protect, uphold, and promote therights, interests, and welfare of the people, especiallythe poor and marginalized classes and sectors ofPhilippine society. Petitioners are committed to defendand assert human rights, including political and civilrights, of the citizens freedom of speech and ofexpression under Section 4, Article III of the 1987Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly ventilate theirgrievances and legitimate demands and to mobilizepublic opinion to support the same; assert that S18,Art7 of the Consti does not require the declaration ofstate of rebellion to call out AFP;assert further thatthere exists no factual basis for the declaration, mutinyhaving ceased.2. SJS; standing as "Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law

profs & bar reviewers"; assert that S18, Art7 of theConsti does not require the declaration of the state ofrebellion, declaration a "constitutional anomaly" thatmisleads because "overzealous public officers, actingpursuant to such proclamation or general order, areliable to violate the constitutional right of privatecitizens"; proclamation is a circumvention of the reportrequirement under the same S18, Art7, commandingthe President to submit a report to Congress within 48hours from the proclamation of martial law; presidentialissuances cannot be construed as an exercise ofemergency powers as Congress has not delegated anysuch power to the President

3. members of House; standing as citizens and asMembers of the House of Representatives whoserights, powers and functions were allegedly affected bythe declaration of a state of rebellion; the declaration ofa state of rebellion is a "superfluity," and is actually anexercise of emergency powers, such exercise, it iscontended, amounts to a usurpation of the power ofCongress granted by S23 (2), Art6 of the Constitution4. Pimentel; standing as Senator; assails the subjectpresidential issuances as "an unwarranted, illegal andabusive exercise of a martial law power that has nobasis under the Constitution; petitioner fears that thedeclaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the

unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests"for the crime of rebellion

Respondents: SolGen; petitions have been renderedmoot by the lifitng of the proclamation; questionsstanding of petitioners

ISSUES:1. whether or not petitioners have standing2. whether or not case has been rendered moot by the


4/18

lifting of the proclamation 3. whether or not theproclamation calling the state of rebellion is proper

RULING: 1. NOT EVERY PETITIONER. only membersof the House and Sen Pimentel have standing.Sanlakas & PM have no standing by analogy with LDPin Lacson v Perez " petitioner has not demonstratedany injury to itself which would justify the resort to theCourt. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject toarrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by awarrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders,members, and supporters are being threatened withwarrantless arrest and detention for the crime ofrebellion." At best they seek for declaratory relief,which is not in the original jurisdiction of SC. Evenassuming that Sanlakas & PM are "people'sorganizations" in the language of Ss15-16, Art13 of theConsti, they are still not endowed with standing for asin Kilosbayan v Morato "These provisions have notchanged the traditional rule that only real parties ininterest or those with standing, as the case may be,may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this

Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions,is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement ofS5,Art8. This requirement lies at the very heart of thejudicial function." SJS, though alleging to be taxpayers,is not endowed with standing since "A taxpayer maybring suit where the act complained of directly involvesthe illegal disbursement of public funds derived fromtaxation.No such illegal disbursement is alleged." Courthas ruled out the doctrine of "transcendentalimportance" regarding constitutional questions in thisparticular case. Only members of Congress, who's (?)powers as provided in the Consti on giving the Presemergency powers are allegedly being impaired, can

question the legality of the proclamation of the state ofrebellion.

2. YES. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases,judicial power being limited to the determination of"actual controversies." Nevertheless, courts will decidea question, otherwise moot, if it is "capable of repetitionyet evading review."19 The case at bar is one suchcase, since prior events (the May 1, 2001 incidentwhen the Pres also declared a state of rebellion) provethat it can be repeated. 3. YES. S18, Art 7grants thePresident, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of"graduated power[s]." From the most to the least

benign, these are: the calling out power, the power tosuspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, andthe power to declare martial law. In the exercise of thelatter two powers, the Constitution requires theconcurrence of two conditions, namely, an actualinvasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires theexercise of such power. However, as we observed inIntegrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, "[t]heseconditions are not required in the exercise of the callingout power. The only criterion is that 'whenever itbecomes necessary,' the President may call the armedforces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence,

invasion or rebellion.'"Nevertheless, it is equally truethat S18, Art7 does not expressly prohibit the Presidentfrom declaring a state of rebellion. Note that theConstitution vests the President not only withCommander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost,with Executive powers. The ponencia then traced theevolution of executive power in the US (Jackson andthe South Carolina situation, Lincoln and teh 'warpowers', Cleveland in In re: Eugene Debs) in an effortto show that "the Commander-in-Chief powers arebroad enough as it is and become more so when takentogether with the provision on executive power and thepresidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of thepowers of the presidency equips the occupant with themeans to address exigencies or threats whichundermine the very existence of government or theintegrity of the State." This, plus Marcos v Manglapuson residual powers, the Rev Admin Code S4, Ch2, Bk3on the executive power of the Pres to declare a certainstatus, argue towards the validity of the proclamation.However, the Court maintains that the declaration isdevoid of any legal significance for being superflous.

Also, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannotdiminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. if astate of martial law does not suspend the operation ofthe Constitution or automatically suspend the privilegeof the writ of habeas corpus,61 then it is with morereason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellioncould not bring about these conditions. Apprehensionsthat the military and police authorities may resort towarrantless arrests are likewise unfounded. In Lacsonvs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held that "[i]nquelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authoritiesmay only resort to warrantless arrests of personssuspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5,

Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,63 if the circumstancesso warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitionersis, thus, not based on the declaration of a 'state ofrebellion.'"64 In other words, a person may besubjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime ofrebellion whether or not the President has declared astate of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a validwarrantless arrest are present. The argument that thedeclaration of a state of rebellion amounts to adeclaration of martial law and, therefore, is acircumvention of the report requirement, is a leap oflogic. There is no illustration that the President hasattempted to exercise or has exercised martial law

powers. Finally, Nor by any stretch of the imaginationcan the declaration constitute an indirect exercise ofemergency powers, which exercise depends upon agrant of Congress pursuant to S23 (2), Art6 of theConstitution. The petitions do not cite a specificinstance where the President has attempted to or hasexercised powers beyond her powers as ChiefExecutive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, indeclaring a state of rebellion and in calling out thearmed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of herChief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers.These are purely executive powers, vested on the


5/18


President by S1 & 18, Art7, as opposed to thedelegated legislative powers contemplated by Section23 (2), Article VI.

OLAQUEER VS MC NO 4

Olaguer vs Military Commission No. 34The Aquino vs.

Military Commission No. 2 decision was reversed. (In that

case, the SC upheld the power of the President to create

military tribunals authorized to try not only militarypersonnel but civilians even if civil courts were open).

According to the SC, civilians who are placed on trial for civil

offenses under general law are entitled to trial by judicial

process. Since we are not enemy- occupied territory nor are

we under a military govt. and even on the premise that

martial law continues in force, the military tribunals cannot

try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses

committed by them which are properly cognizable by the

civil courts that have remained open and have been

regularly functioning. The assertion of military authority

over civilians cannot rest on the President's power as

Commander in Chief or on any theory of martial law. As

long as civil courts remain open and are regularly

functioning, military tribunals cannot try and exercise

jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them

and which are properly cognizable by civil courts. To hold

otherwise is a violation of the right to due process.

IT DEPENDS WHAT WILL BE CHARGED, IF REBELLION

MILITARY IF CRIMINAL RTC.

NAVALES VS ABAYA

n G.R. No. 162341, Roberto Rafael Pulido, alawyer, filed with this Court a Petition for HabeasCorpus seeking the release of his clients, junior officersand enlisted men of the AFP, who are allegedly beingunlawfully detained by virtue of the CommitmentOrder[1] dated August 2, 2003 issued by GeneralNarciso L. Abaya, Chief of Staff of the AFP, pursuant toArticle 70 of the Articles of War. Under the saidcommitment order, all the Major Service Commandersand the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the ArmedForces of the Philippines (ISAFP) were directed to takecustodial responsibility of all the military personnelinvolved in the 27 July 2003 mutiny belonging to theirrespective commands. This included all the juniorofficers and enlisted men (hereinafter referred to asCapt. Reaso,[2] et al.) who are subject of the instantpetition for habeas corpus. The commitment order,however, expressly stated that LtSG. Antonio F.Trillanes, LtSG. James A. Layug, Capt. Garry C.Alejano, Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, Capt. GerardoO. Gambala, and Capt. Nicanor E. Faeldon wouldremain under the custody of the Chief of the ISAFP.

The writs of prohibition (G.R. No. 162318) andhabeas corpus (G.R. No. 162341) prayed for by thepetitioners must perforce fail. As a general rule, thewrit of habeas corpuswill not issue where the personalleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custodyof an officer under a process issued by the court whichhas jurisdiction to do so.[33] Further, the writ of habeascorpusshould not be allowed after the party sought tobe released had been charged before any court orquasi-judicial body.[34] The term court necessarilyincludes the General Court-Martial. These rules applyto Capt. Reaso, et al., as they are under detentionpursuant to the Commitment Order dated August 2,2003 issued by respondent Chief of Staff of the AFPpursuant to Article 70[35] of the Articles of War.

On the other hand, the office of the writ ofprohibition is to prevent inferior courts, corporations,boards or persons from usurping or exercising ajurisdiction or power with which they have not beenvested by law.[36] As earlier discussed, the GeneralCourt-Martial has jurisdiction over the charges filed

against petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. under Rep. ActNo. 7055. A writ of prohibition cannot be issued toprevent it from exercising its jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, thepetitions are here

LANSANG VS GARCIA

> The issue there raised was whether in suspending the

privilege of the writ in 1971, Marcos had a basis for doing

so. The SC, in considering the fact that the President based

his decision on (a) the Senate report on the condition inCentral Luzon and (b) a closed door briefing by the military

showing the extent of subversion, concluded that the

President did not act arbitrarily. One may disagree with his

appreciation of the facts, but one cannot say that it is

without basis.

>2 conditions must concur for the valid exercise of authority

to suspend the privilege:

a) there must be an actual invasion, insurrection, rebellion

or imminent danger and

(b) public safety must require the suspension of theprivilege. This holding of the SC is now found in Art. VII, Sec.

18, par. 3.] The function of the court is to check and not

supplant the executive or to ascertain merely whether he

has gone beyond the constitutional limits of jurisdiction.

The proper standard is not correctness but arbitrariness.

There are 4 ways, then, for the proclamation or suspension


6/18

to be lifted:1) Lifting by the President himself2)

Revocation by Congress

3) Nullification by the Supreme Court 4) Operation of law

after 60 days

IN RE DE VILLALacking the requisites set by Feria,petition for

writ of habeas corpus unavailing as a collateral attackto a final judgment.

Aileen Mendoza, 12, was raped by her uncle,Reynaldo de Villa in her home in Pasig. Her pregnancyprompted the filing of charges by her parents againstde Villa.

De Villa:1. sickness, old age of 67 rendered me

incapable of erection

2. Mendozas bear a grudge against me3. Alibi: in hometown of San Luis, Laguna attime of crime

RTC: de Villa guilty beyond reasonable doubtof qualified rape, sentenced to death.

Case automatically elevated to SC forautomatic review due to penalty imposed.

SC: affirmed RTC decision, modified byawarding moral damages. SC found date of birth ofAileens child, Leahlyn medically consistent with time ofrape.

June de Villa, son of accused, alleged thatdefense counsel only learned of DNA testing to resolvepaternity issue at time of pendency of SC automaticreview. His 2 MRs of the case praying for DNA tests tobe conducted were denied. DNA tests obtained fromBilly de Villa, grandson of Reynaldo, and Leahlynshowed that de Villa could not have sired the latter.

June thus filed petition for writ of habeascorpus for his father.

Issue: WON writ of habeas corpus a proper

remedy in the instant case.

Held: No.

Ratio of the Court.

1. On the issue of writ of habeas corpus asproper remedy:

a. individual is illegally deprived of hisfreedom of movement or placedunder some form of illegal restraint

b. however, cannot be used to

directly assail a judgment renderedby a competent court or tribunalwhich, having duly acquiredjurisdiction, was not deprived orousted of this jurisdiction

c. It is the nullity of an assailedjudgment of conviction due to saidlack of jurisdiction which makes itsusceptible to collateral attackthrough HC

d. Feria v. CA doctrine allowed HCas post-conviction remedy onlywhen there exists:

i. deprivation of aconstitutional rightresulting in the restraint

ii. court had no jurisdictioniii. penalty being excessive, is

voidede. June did not allege any of the

three conditions in Feria to avail ofHC

2. Proper remedy should have been certiorarior appeal

3. *On the issue of denial of de Villaseffective aid of counsel who left for the USin the middle of appeal

a. SC did not find negligenceamounting to denial ofconstitutional right

4. *On the issue of the relevance of the DNAtest as to de Villas guilt

a. Pregnancy not an essentialelement of crime of rape

b. Results of DNA test could not

conclusively determine de Villasguilt for the crime of rape

5. *On the issue of remedy of motion for newtrial

a. Rule 121 of Revised Rules ofCriminal Procedure:

SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial.The courtshall grant a new trial on any of the followinggrounds:

(a) That errors of law orirregularities prejudicial to the

substantial rights of the accused havebeen committed during the trial;

(b) That new and materialevidence has been discoveredwhich the accused could not withreasonable diligence have discoveredand produced at the trial and which ifintroduced and admitted wouldprobably change the judgment.

b. Requisites for motion for new trial:


7/18


(a) that the evidence wasdiscovered after trial;

(b) that said evidence couldnot have been discovered andproduced at the trial even with theexercise of reasonable diligence;

(c) that it is material, notmerely cumulative, corroborativeor impeaching; and

(d) that the evidence is of suchweight that that, if admitted, itwould probably change thejudgment

c. Lack of knowledge of DNA testingattributable to negligence ofcounsel, and the same is bindingupon de Villa

d. Other means to determinepaternity were previously availableto de Villa anyway.

Dispositive. Petition for habeas corpus and

motion for new trial dismissed.

DAVID VS ARROYOruary 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members

and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate

the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

(GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and

is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The

said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the

connivance of extremists to bring down the government.

Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate

EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for

rallies and other public organization/meeting.Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit,

Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded

to rally which led to his arrest.

Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is

the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and

confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still,

another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided

and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was

also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant

of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against

Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the

current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.

In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the stateof national emergency ceased to exist. David and some

opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is

unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be

validly declared by the president for such power is reposed

in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration

of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the

emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of

natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners

claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches

upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued

that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of

the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP

1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the

presidents calling out power, take care power and take over

power.

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly

constitutional and partly unconstitutional.

The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by

reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact

operative because there are parties still affected due to the

alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take

cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is

constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions

of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following

way;

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no

factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the

Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and

Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the eventsleading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports

forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the

Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-

Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the

Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the

communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the

Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine

Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and

the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such

events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is

convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017

calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of

the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold herarms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she

believed was lawless violence, invasion or

rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty

must not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical

tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in free

speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not

primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of

PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or

even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the

AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence.

Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended fortesting the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state

interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,

constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless

violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful

and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of

facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes

which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words

and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have

been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws


8/18

that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the

incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a

spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly

subject to state regulation.

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA

declared PP 1017. The SC considered the Presidents

calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in

his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an

examination of whether such power was exercised within

permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised

in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC

ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the

Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a

sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least

benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to

suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the

power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the

exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it

becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces

to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or

rebellion. And such criterion has been met.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care DoctrinePursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the

Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully

executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al

averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the

Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the

President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the

clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all

decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me

personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such

provision is similar to the power that granted former

President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP

1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is

unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority topromulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within

the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6

categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be

vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist

of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure,

neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of

emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power

by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the

carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private

corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune

without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, theword emergency contemplated in the constitution is not

limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes

rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can

declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of

emergency powers does not come automatically after it for

such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority

from Congress must be based on the following:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the

Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a

national policy declared by Congress.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial

Law Declaration

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration

and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling

out power of the president by the president

1. calling out power

2. take care power3. emergency power

Contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans

Requisites for contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans:

1. With the concurrence of the monetary board (Sec 20, Art

VII)

2. subject to limitations as may be provided by law (Sec 21,

Art XII)

3. information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed

shall be made available to the public (sec 21, Art XII)

> Cf Republic Act 4860

>> An Act Authorizing The President Of The Philippines To

Obtain Such Foreign Loans And Credits, Or To Incur Such

Foreign Indebtedness, As May Be Necessary To Finance

Approved Economic Development Purposes Or Projects,

And To Guarantee, In Behalf Of The Republic Of The

Philippines, Foreign Loans Obtained Or Bonds Issued By

Corporations Owned Or Controlled By The Government Of

The Philippines For Economic Development Purposes

Including Those Incurred For Purposes Of Re-Lending To The

Private Sector, Appropriating The Necessary Funds

Therefore, And For Other Purposes

>> Approved, September 8, 1966.

Role of Congress:

1.The President does not need prior approval by the

Congress

Because the Constitution places the power tocheck the Presidents power on the monetary

Board

Congress may provide guidelines and have them

enforced through the Monetary Board

CONSTANTINO VS CUISIADuring the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a

scheme to reduce the countrys external debt. The solution

resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring

programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign


9/18


debts they are basically buyback programs & bond-

conversion programs). Constantino as a taxpayer and in

behalf of his minor children who are Filipino citizens,

together w/ FFDC averred that the buyback and bond-

conversion schemes are onerous and they do not constitute

the loan contract or guarantee contemplated in Sec. 20,

Art. 7 of the Constitution. And assuming that thePresident

has such power unlike other powers which may be validly

delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts

is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the

President. They argue that the gravity by which the exercise

of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the

President alone must exercise this power. They argue that

the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically

named by the Constitutionthe Monetary Boardreinforces

the submission that not respondents but the President alone

and personally can validly bind the country. Hence, they

would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president can validly delegate

her debt power to the respondents.

HELD: There is no question that the president has

borrowing powers and that the president may contract or

guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country w/ priorconcurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction

whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous

is irrelevant. On the other hand, the president can delegate

this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency

of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of

the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made

manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and

executing a strategy for managing the governments debt is

deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of

Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of

funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any

other sovereign debt management goals. If the President

were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreignborrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running

the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-

consuming detailed activitiesthe propriety of

incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among

the many methods that may be taken toward this end,

meeting countless times with creditor representatives to

negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board,

explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public,

and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of

execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional

interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet

positions and the respective expertise which the holders

thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper thePresidents effectivity in running the government. The act of

the respondents are not unconstitutional.

ExceptionThere are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be

validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the

President. There are certain constitutional powers and

prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which

must be exercised by him in person and no amount of

approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of

those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his

power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim

martial law and the exercise by him of the benign

prerogative of pardon (mercy).

There are certain presidential powers which arise out of

exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve

the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for

the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those

exercised by co-equal branches of government. The

declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of

habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power

notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the

accused, all fall within this special class that demands the

exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally

vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there

must be a showing that the executive power in question is of

similar gravitas and exceptional import.

Powers over foreign affairs

(a) Treaty-making power

* No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and

effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the

members of the Senate. (Sec 21, Art VII)

Treaty distinguished from executive agreements

a. Executive agreements

entered into by the President

need no concurrence.

Nature of Executive Agreements :

There are 2 classes :

(1) agreements made purely as executive acts affecting

external relations and independent of or without legislative

authorization, which may be termed as presidential

agreements, and

(2) agreements entered into in pursuance of acts of

Congress, or Congressional-Executive Agreements.

NICOLAS VS ROMULO

On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the

crime of rape against Nicole. He was convicted of the said

crime and was ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment.

Smith was a US serviceman convicted of a crime against our

penal laws and the crime was committed within the


10/18

countrys jurisdiction. But pursuant to the VFA, a treaty

between the US and Philippines, the US embassy was

granted custody over Smith. Nicole, together with the other

petitioners appealed before the SC assailing the validity of

the VFA. Their contention is that the VFA was not ratified

by the US senate in the same way our senate ratified the

VFA.

ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or

not it is self-executing.

HELD: The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the

parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely

because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations and

undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a

matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed,

with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to

produce Smith before the court during the trial.

The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch

as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that

executive agreements registered under this Act within 60

days from their ratification be immediately implemented.

The SC noted that the VFA is not like other treaties that need

implementing legislation such as the Vienna Convention. As

regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual DefenseTreaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and

this can only be done through implementing legislation. The

VFA itself is another form of implementation of its

provisions.

VINUYA VS ROMULO

This is an original Petition for Certiorari underRule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application

for the issuance of a writ of preliminarymandatory injunction against the Office of theExecutive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA,the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYALOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organizationregistered with the SEC, established for thepurpose of providing aid to the victims of rapeby Japanese military forces in the Philippinesduring the Second World War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they haveapproached the Executive Department throughthe DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistancein filing a claim against the Japanese officialsand military officers who ordered theestablishment of the comfort women stationsin the Philippines. But officials of the ExecutiveDepartment declined to assist the petitioners,and took the position that the individual claimsof the comfort women for compensation hadalready been fully satisfied by Japans

compliance with the Peace Treaty between thePhilippines and Japan.

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray forthis court to (a) declare that respondentscommitted grave abuse of discretion amountingto lack or excess of discretion in refusing toespouse their claims for the crimes against

humanity and war crimes committed againstthem; and (b) compel the respondents toespouse their claims for official apology andother forms of reparations against Japan beforethe International Court of Justice (ICJ) andother international tribunals.

Respondents maintain that all claims of thePhilippines and its nationals relative to the warwere dealt with in the San Francisco PeaceTreaty of 1951 and the bilateral ReparationsAgreement of 1956.

On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fundand the Philippine government signed aMemorandum of Understanding for medical andwelfare support programs for former comfortwomen. Over the next five years, these wereimplemented by the Department of SocialWelfare and Development.

ISSUE:

WON the Executive Department committed

grave abuse of discretion in not espousingpetitioners claims for official apology and otherforms of reparations against Japan.

RULING:

Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic LawPerspective, the Executive Department has theexclusive prerogative to determine whether toespouse petitioners claims against Japan.

Political questions refer to those questions

which, under the Constitution, are to be decidedby the people in their sovereign capacity, or inregard to which full discretionary authority hasbeen delegated to the legislative or executivebranch of the government. It is concerned withissues dependent upon the wisdom, not legalityof a particular measure.

One type of case of political questions involvesquestions of foreign relations. It is well-established that the conduct of the foreign


11/18


relations of our government is committed by theConstitution to the executive and legislativethe politicaldepartments of the government,and the propriety of what may be done in theexercise of this political power is not subject tojudicial inquiry or decision. are delicate,

complex, and involve large elements ofprophecy. They are and should be undertaken

only by those directly responsible to the peoplewhose welfare they advance or imperil.

But not all cases implicating foreign relationspresent political questions, and courts certainlypossess the authority to construe or invalidatetreaties and executive agreements. However,the question whether the Philippine governmentshould espouse claims of its nationals against aforeign government is a foreign relationsmatter, the authority for which is demonstrablycommitted by our Constitution not to the courts

but to the political branches. In this case, theExecutive Department has already decided thatit is to the best interest of the country to waiveall claims of its nationals for reparations againstJapan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. Thewisdom of such decision is not for the courts toquestion.

The President, not Congress, has the betteropportunity of knowing the conditions whichprevail in foreign countries, and especially isthis true in time of war. He has his confidentialsources of information. He has his agents in the

form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.

The Executive Department has determined thattaking up petitioners cause would be inimical to

our countrys foreign policy interests, and could

disrupt our relations with Japan, therebycreating serious implications for stability in thisregion. For the to overturn the ExecutiveDepartments determination would mean an

assessment of the foreign policy judgments by acoordinate political branch to which authority tomake that judgment has been constitutionally

committed.

From a municipal law perspective, certiorari willnot lie. As a general principle, where such anextraordinary length of time has lapsed betweenthe treatys conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion toassess the foreign policy considerations of

espousing a claim against Japan, from thestandpoint of both the interests of thepetitioners and those of the Republic, anddecide on that basis if apologies are sufficient,and whether further steps are appropriate ornecessary.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the

only means available for individuals to bring aclaim within the international legal system hasbeen when the individual is able to persuade agovernment to bring a claim on the individuals

behalf. By taking up the case of one of itssubjects and by resorting to diplomatic action orinternational judicial proceedings on his behalf,a State is in reality asserting its own right toensure, in the person of its subjects, respect forthe rules of international law.

Within the limits prescribed by international law,

a State may exercise diplomatic protection bywhatever means and to whatever extent itthinks fit, for it is its own right that the State isasserting. Should the natural or legal person onwhose behalf it is acting consider that theirrights are not adequately protected, they haveno remedy in international law. All they can dois resort to national law, if means are available,with a view to furthering their cause orobtaining redress. All these questions remainwithin the province of municipal law and do notaffect the position internationally.

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms anderga omnes obligations will not alter thisanalysis. Petitioners have not shown that thecrimes committed by the Japanese armyviolated jus cogens prohibitions at the time theTreaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty toprosecute perpetrators of international crimes isan erga omnes obligation or has attained thestatus of jus cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation toeveryone) in international law has been used as

a legal term describing obligations owed byStates towards the community of states as awhole. Essential distinction should be drawnbetween the obligations of a State towards theinternational community as a whole, and thosearising vis--vis another State in the field ofdiplomatic protection. By their very nature, theformer are the concern of all States. In view of


12/18

the importance of the rights involved, all Statescan be held to have a legal interest in theirprotection; they are obligations erga omnes.

The term jus cogens (literally, compelling

law) refers to norms that commandperemptory authority, superseding conflictingtreaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are

considered peremptory in the sense that theyare mandatory, do not admit derogation, andcan be modified only by general internationalnorms of equivalent authority

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

PEOPLES MOVEMENT FOR PRESS FREEDOM VS HON

RAUL MANGLAPUShe privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been

recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing validlimitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez

v. PCGG held that information on inter-government

exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive

agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the

sake of national interest.[23] Even earlier, the same

privilege was upheld in Peoples Movement for Press

Freedom (PMPF) v. Manglapus[24] wherein the Court

discussed the reasons for the privilege in more precise terms.

In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were

seeking information from the Presidents representatives on

the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US

Military Bases Agreement.[25] The Court denied the

petition, stressing that secrecy of negotiations with

foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional

provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the

freedom of access to information. The Resolution went

on to state, thus:

The nature of diplomacy

requires centralization of

authority and expedition of

decision which are inherent in

executive action. Another

essential characteristic of

diplomacy is its confidential

nature. Although much has beensaid about open and secret

diplomacy, with disparagement of

the latter, Secretaries of State

Hughes and Stimson have clearly

analyzed and justified the

practice. In the words of Mr.

Stimson:

A

complicated

negotiation .

. . cannot be

carried

through

without

many, many

private

talks and

discussion,

man to

man; many

tentative

suggestions

and

proposals.

Delegates

from other

countries

come and

tell you in

confidence

of their

troubles at

home and oftheir

differences

with other

countries

and with

other

delegates;

they tell you

of what they

would do

under

certain

circumstances and

would not

do under

other

circumstanc

es. . . If

these

reports . . .

should

become

public . . .

who would

ever trustAmerican

Delegations

in another

conference?(United

States

Department

of State,

Press

Releases,

June 7, 1930,


13/18


pp. 282-

284.).

x x x x

There is frequent criticism

of the secrecy in which negotiation

with foreign powers on nearly all

subjects is concerned. This, it is

claimed, is incompatible with the

substance of democracy. As

expressed by one writer, It can be

said that there is no more rigid

system of silence anywhere in the

world. (E.J. Young, Looking

Behind the Censorship, J. B.

Lippincott Co., 1938) President

Wilson in starting his efforts for the

conclusion of the World War

declared that we must have open

covenants, openly arrived at. He

quickly abandoned his thought.

No one who has studied the

question believes that such a method

of publicity is possible. In the

moment that negotiations are

started, pressure groups attempt

to muscle in. An ill-timed

speech by one of the parties or a

frank declaration of the concession

which are exacted or offered on

both sides would quickly lead to

widespread propaganda to block

the negotiations. After a treaty

has been drafted and its terms arefully published, there is ample

opportunity for discussion before

it is approved.(The New American

Government and Its Works, James T.

Young, 4th Edition, p.

194) (Emphasis and underscoring

supplied)

Still in PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court adopted

the doctrine in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.[26]that

the President is the sole organ of the nation in its

negotiations with foreign countries, viz:

x x x In this vast external

realm, with its important,

complicated, delicate and manifold

problems, the President alone has the

power to speak or listen as a

representative of the nation. He

makes treaties with the advice and

consent of the Senate; but he alone

negotiates. Into the field of

negotiation the Senate cannot

intrude; and Congress itself is

powerless to invade it. As Marshall

said in his great argument of March

7, 1800, in the House of

Representatives, The President is

the sole organ of the nation in its

external relations, and its sole

representative with foreign

nations. Annals, 6th Cong., col.

613. . . (Emphasis supplied;

underscoring in the original)

Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v.

Manglapus,it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA

may not be kept perpetually confidentialsince there should

be ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is

approved the offers exchanged by the parties during the

negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA

is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese

representatives submitted their offers with the understandingthat historic confidentiality[27] would govern the

same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the

Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other

foreign governments in futurenegotiations.

A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations

should now be open to public scrutiny would discourage

future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing

their views during negotiations. While, on first impression,

it appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from

entering into compromises, it bears noting that treaty

negotiations, or any negotiation for that matter, normally

involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimesnegotiators have to be willing to grant concessions in an

area of lesser importance in order to obtain more

favorable terms in an area of greater national

interest. Apropos are the following observations of

Benjamin S. Duval, Jr.:

x x x [T]hose involved in

the practice of negotiations appear

to be in agreement that publicity

leads to grandstanding, tends to

freeze negotiating positions, and

inhibits the give-and-take essential

to successful negotiation. AsSissela Bok points out, if

negotiators have more to gain from

being approved by their own sides

than by making a reasoned

agreement with competitors or

adversaries, then they are inclined to

'play to the gallery . . .'' In fact, the

public reaction may leave them

little option. It would be a brave, or


14/18

foolish, Arab leader who expressed

publicly a willingness for peace with

Israel that did not involve the return

of the entire West Bank, or Israeli

leader who stated publicly a

willingness to remove Israel's

existing settlements from Judea and

Samaria in return for peace.[28]

(Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, by hampering the ability of our

representatives to compromise, we may be jeopardizing

higher national goals for the sake of securing less critical

ones.

Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as

privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations

constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that

such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita

holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does

not mean that it will be considered privileged in all

instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which

the claim is made may it be determined if there is a publicinterest that calls for the disclosure of the desired

information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally

privileged status.

Whether petitioners have established the presence of

such a public interest shall be discussed later. For now, the

Court shall first pass upon the arguments raised by

petitioners against the application ofPMPF v. Manglapusto

the present case.

Arguments proffered by petitioners against the

application of PMPF v. Manglapus

Petitioners argue thatPMPF v. Manglapuscannot be

applied in toto to the present case, there being substantial

factual distinctions between the two.

To petitioners, the first and most fundamental

distinction lies in the nature of the treaty involved. They

stress that PMPF v. Manglapusinvolved the Military Bases

Agreement which necessarily pertained to matters affecting

national security; whereas the present case involves an

economic treaty that seeks to regulate trade and commerce

between the Philippines and Japan, matters which, unlike

those covered by the Military Bases Agreement, are not sovital to national security to disallow their disclosure.

Petitioners argument betrays a faulty assumption that

information, to be considered privileged, must involve

national security. The recognition in Senate v. Ermita[29]

that executive privilege has encompassed claims of varying

kinds, such that it may even be more accurate to speak of

executive privileges, cautions against such generalization.

While there certainly are privileges grounded on the

necessity of safeguarding national security such as those

involving military secrets, not all are founded thereon. One

example is the informers privilege, or the privilege of

the Government not to disclose the identity of a person or

persons who furnish information of violations of law to

officers charged with the enforcement of that law.[30] The

suspect involved need not be so notorious as to be a threat to

national security for this privilege to apply in any given

instance. Otherwise, the privilege would be inapplicable in

all but the most high-profile cases, in which case not only

would this be contrary to long-standing practice. It would

also be highly prejudicial to law enforcement efforts in

general.

Also illustrative is the privilege accorded to

presidential communications, which are presumed

privileged without distinguishing between those which

involve matters of national security and those which do not,

the rationale for the privilege being that

x x x [a] frank exchangeof

exploratory ideas and assessments,

free from the glare of publicity and

pressure by interested parties, isessential to protect the

independence of decision-makingof those tasked to exercise

Presidential, Legislative and Judicial

power. x x x[31] (Emphasis

supplied)

In the same way that the privilege for judicial

deliberations does not depend on the nature of the case

deliberated upon, so presidential communications are

privileged whether they involve matters of national security.

It bears emphasis, however, that the privilege accordedto presidential communications is not absolute, one

significant qualification being that the Executive cannot,

any more than the other branches of government, invoke a

general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and

employees from investigations by the proper governmental

institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing.[32] This

qualification applies whether the privilege is being invoked

in the context of a judicial trial or a congressional

investigation conducted in aid of legislation.[33]

Closely related to the presidential communications

privilege is the deliberative process privilege recognized in

the United States. As discussed by the U.S. Supreme Courtin NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co,[34] deliberative processcovers documents reflecting advisory opinions,

recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a

process by which governmental decisions and policies are

formulated. Notably, the privileged status of such

documents rests, not on the need to protect national

securitybut, on the obvious realization that officials will

not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark

is a potential item of discovery and front page news, the

objective of the privilege being to enhance the quality of

agency decisions. [35]


15/18


The diplomatic negotiations privilegebears a close

resemblance to the deliberative process and presidential

communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that

the rationale for the confidential character of diplomatic

negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential

communications is similar, if not identical.

The earlier discussion on PMPF v. Manglapus[36]

shows that the privilege for diplomatic negotiations is meant

to encourage a frank exchange of exploratory ideas between

the negotiating parties by shielding such negotiations from

public view. Similar to the privilege for presidential

communications, the diplomatic negotiations privilege seeks,

through the same means, to protect the independence in

decision-making of the President, particularly in its capacity

as the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and

its sole representative with foreign nations. And, as with

the deliberative process privilege, the privilege accorded to

diplomatic negotiations arises, not on account of the content

of the informationper se, but because the information is part

of a process of deliberation which, in pursuit of the public

interest, must be presumed confidential.

COMM OF CUSTOMS VS EASTERN TRADINGEastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which

imports from Japan onion and garlic into the Philippines. In

1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and

forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to

comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said

circulars were pursuant to Executive Order 328. On the other

hand, EO 328 was the implementing law of the Trades and

Financial Agreements, an executive agreement, entered into

between the Philippines and Japan. The said executive

agreement states, among others, that all import transactionsbetween Japan and the Philippines should be invoiced in

dollar. In this case, the said items imported by EST from

Japan were not invoiced in dollar.

EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the

executive agreement that the EO was implementing was

never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated

to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of

EST. The Commissioner appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject

to the concurrence by the Senate.

HELD: No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties

which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the

members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by thePresident which fall short of treaties are commonly referred

to as executive agreements and are no less common in our

scheme of government than are the more formal instruments

treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form

of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal

documents denominated agreements or protocols.

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and

other governments ends and agreements whether

denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or

otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready

ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss

here the large variety of executive agreements as such,

concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive

agreements, other than those entered into under the trade-

agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign

governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to

show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not

anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that

they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to

certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the

Executive without the approval of the Senate.

They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels,

navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the

admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial

relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the

registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of

them were concluded not by specific congressional

authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts

of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such

as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with

respect to the settlement of claims against foreigngovernments, were concluded independently of any

legislation.

GO TEK VS DEPORTATION BOARD

1. The Deportation Board can entertain deportation based

on grounds not specified in Sec 37 of the Immigration Law.

The Board has jurisdiction to investigate Go Tek even if he

had not been convicted yet.

2. The Presidents power to deport aliens and to investigate

them subject to deportation are provided in the Revised

Admin Code.

3. The State has inherent power to deport undesirable

aliens. This power is exercised by the Pres. There is no legal

nor constitutional provision defining the power to deport

aliens because the intention of the law is to grant the Chief

Executive the full discretion to determine whether an aliens

residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect the

security, welfare or interest of the state. The Chief

Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of

facts which would warrant the deportation of aliens.

Power over legislation

(a) Message to Congress

>The President shall address the Congress at the opening of

its regular session. He may also appear before it at any

other time. (Sec 23, Art VII)


16/18

> Every 4th Monday of July, the President delivers the State

of the Nation Address, which contains his proposals for

legislation. Through this speech, he can influence the course

of legislation that Congress can take during the regular

session.

(b) Prepare and submit the budget

The President shall submit to Congress within thirty daysfrom the opening of every regular session, as the basis of

the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures

and sources of financing, including receipts from existing

and proposed revenue measures. (Sec 22, Art VII)

*The budget is the plan indicating the(a) expenditures of

the government,

(b) sources of financing, and

(c) receipts

from revenue-raising measures.

This budget is the upper limit of the appropriations bill to be

passed by Congress. Through the budget, therefore, the

President reveals the priorities of the government.

(c) Veto power

As a general rule, all bills must be approved by the President

before they become law, except when(i) the veto of the

President is overridden by 2/3 vote, and(ii) the bill passed

is the special law to elect the President and Vice- President.

This gives the President an actual hand in legislation.

However, his course of action is only to approve it or veto it

as a whole. (See Legislative Power of Congress)

(d) Emergency Power

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the

Congress, may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited

period, and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe,

to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a

declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by

resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon

the next adjournment thereof. (Sec 23, Art VI see discussion

above)

Immunity from suit

BELTRAN VS MACASIARLuis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He,

together with others, was charged with libel by the then

president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-

affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory

cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat

her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the

principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a

president would sue then the president would allow herself

to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she

would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the

functions of a president, the president may not be able to

appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be

liable for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by

Beltran, a person other than the president.

HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of

the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise

of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance

or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of

the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the

office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the

President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by

the holder of the office; not by any other person in the

Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a

criminal case in which the President is the complainant

cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent

the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent

the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded

the President may shed the protection afforded by the

privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice

of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely

the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot beassumed and imposed by any other person.

The SC held that the privilege of immunity from suit,

pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be

invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other

person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a

criminal case where the President is a complainant cannot

raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the

case from proceeding against the accused. Moreover, there

is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President

from waiving the privilege. The President may shed the

protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the

court's jurisdiction.

The Presidents immunity from suit extends beyond his

term so long as the act in question was done during his

term.

VICE PRESIDENT

(1) Qualifications, election, term and oath

a. Qualifications Sec. 3, Art VII.

* natural-born citizen of the Philippines * a registered voter

* able to read and write* at least forty years of age on the

day of the election

* a resident of the Philippines for at

least ten years

immediately preceding such election.

* The candidate must be qualified on the day of the

elections.

TERMS AND ELECTION


17/18


* elected by direct vote of the people

* unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for

President and Vice-President shall be held on the second

Monday of May.

* term of six years beginning at noon on the 30th

day of

June next following the day of the election and ending at

noon of the same date six years after

* no vice-president shall serve for more than two successive

terms

Privilege and salary

* The salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be

determined by law and shall not be decreased during their

tenure.

>No increase in said compensation shall take effect until

after the expiration of the term of the incumbent duringwhich such increase was approved.

> xxx the Vice-President, xxx P240,000 (Sec 17, Art XVIII)

Prohibitions Art. VII, Sec. 13.

* Prohibited acts:

1. unless

Constitution, hold any other office or employment

during their tenure.

2. directly or indirectly practice any other profession

business

3. directly or indirectly participate in any

4. be financially interested in any contract with, or in any

franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or

any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,

including government-owned or controlled corporations or

their subsidiaries.

5. spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within

the fourth civil degree of the President shall not be

appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions,

or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,

Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,

including government-owned or controlled corporations

and their subsidiaries.

* Xxx The Vice-President may be appointed as member of

the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.

(Sec 3, Art VII)

Succession

Art. VI, Sec. 9.

Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-

President during the term for which he was elected,

> the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among

the members of the Senate and the House ofRepresentatives

> candidate shall assume office upon confirmation by a

majority vote of all the members of both houses, voting

separately.

(5) RemovalImpeachment Process Art. XI, Sec. 3. (1) Who

may initiate:

The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive

power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

(2) Verified Complaint

a. A verified complaint for

impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of

Representatives or by any citizen upon resolution of

endorsement by any Member thereofb. Verified Complaint

shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session

days, and referred to the proper Committee within three

session days thereafter.

c. The Committee, after hearing,

and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its

report to the House within sixty session days from such

referral, together with the corresponding resolution.d. The

resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the

House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) Number of votes necessaryA vote of at least one-third

of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to

affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of

Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary

resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of

impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the

Members of the House, the same shall constitute the

Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall

forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated againstthe same official more than once within a period of one

year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide

all cases of impeachment. No person shall be convicted

without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members

of the Senate.


18/18

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend

further than removal from office and disqualification to

hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but

the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject

to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.

(6) Functions

(a) Right of succession

The Vice-President shall assume the functions of the

president in case of1. death, permanent disability, removal

from office, or resignation of the President(Sec 8, Art VII)

2. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the

Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his

written declaration that he is unable to discharge the

powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to

them a written declaration to the contrary (Sec 11, Art VII)

3. Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet

transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker

of the House of Representatives their written declaration

that the President is unable to discharge the powers and

duties of his office

(b) Membership in Cabinet

xxx The Vice-President may be appointed as member of the

Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation. (sec 3,

Art VII)

consti commander.docx

Documents