consti cases 13

7/28/2019 Consti Cases 13

1/52

VALMONTE v. DE VILLA

[GR 83988, 24 May 1990]

FACTS: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command(NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the PhilippineGeneral Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operationswithin its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of

establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, andproviding an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and politicaldevelopment of the National Capital Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintainpeace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts ofValenzuela, Metro Manila. Ricardo C. Valmonte and the Union of Lawyers andAdvocates for Peoples Right (ULAP) filed a petition for prohibition withpreliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order witht the SupremeCourt, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila orelsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or,in the alternative, to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in theimplementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the people. They aver that,because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela areworried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,

capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints,considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searchesand check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a searchwarrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, atdawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality ofValenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the membersof the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta,Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint andfor continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Valmonte alsoclaims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where hewas stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court order orsearch warrant. They further contend that the said checkpoints give Gen. Renatode Villa and the National Capital Region District Command a blanket authority tomake searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violationof the Constitution. In the Supreme Courts decision dated 29 September 1989,Valmontes and ULAPs petition for prohibition, seeking the declaration of thecheckpoints as unconstitutional and their dismantling and/or banning, wasdismissed. Valmonte and ULAP filed the motion and supplemental motion forreconsideration of said decision.

ISSUE: Whether checkpoints serve as a blanket authority for governmentofficials for warrantless search and seizure and, thus, are violative of theConstitution.

HELD:Nowhere in the Supreme Courts decision of 24 May 1990 did the Courtlegalize all checkpoints, i.e. at all times and under all circumstances. What the

Court declared is, that checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptionalcircumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the balance,

or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may beallowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is, that whenthe situation clears and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will haveabsolutely no reason to remain. Recent and on-going events have pointed to thecontinuing validity and need for checkpoints manned by either military or policeforces. Although no one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to sharewith the present government its ideological beliefs and practices, or commend itspolitical, social and economic policies or performance; one must concede to it thebasic right to defend itself from its enemies and, while in power, to pursue its

program of government intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of thoseobjectives, the government has the equal right, under its police power, to selectthe reasonable means and methods for best achieving them. The checkpoint isevidently one of such means it has selected. Admittedly, the routine checkpointstop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists right to free passage withoutinterruption, but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a briefdetention of travellers during which the vehicles occupants are required toanswer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched norits occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle islimited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative ofan individuals right against unreasonable search. These routine checks, whenconducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. Further, vehicles are generallyallowed to pass these checkpoints after a routine inspection and a few questions.If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched, it is because of some probablecause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that eitherthe motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have beeninstruments of some offense. By the same token, a warrantless search ofincoming and outgoing passengers, at the arrival and departure areas of aninternational airport, is a practice not constitutionally objectionable because it isfounded on public interest, safety, and necessity. Lastly, the Courts decision oncheckpoints does not, in any way, validate nor condone abuses committed by themilitary manning the checkpoints. The Courts decision was concerned withpower, i.e. whether the government employing the military has the power toinstall said checkpoints. Once that power is acknowledged, the Courts inquiryceases. True, power implies the possibility of its abuse. But whether there is

abuse in a particular situation is a different ball game to be resolved in theconstitutional arena. In any situation, where abuse marks the operation of acheckpoint, the citizen is not helpless. For the military is not above but subject tothe law. And the courts exist to see that the law is supreme. Soldiers, includingthose who man checkpoints, who abuse their authority act beyond the scope oftheir authority and are, therefore, liable criminally and civilly for their abusiveacts.


2/52

Papa vs. Mago

Facts:

Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of theManila Police Department, acting upon a reliable information received onNovember 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects,allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day

from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and uponorders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputizedagent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of thecustoms zone.

When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon ofNovember 4, 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucksand intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the twotrucks, consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized oninstructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimedownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receiptsof Duties Collected on Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau ofCustoms in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.

The respondent Mago, filed a petition for mandamus and certioraribefore the CFI Manila contending that the search and seizure is illegal for lack ofa valid warrant. Moreover, she also contends that such articles sought from her isnot included by the law for prohibited importation and that it no longer under thecontrol of the Tariff and Customs code for it (articles) were already sold to thepetitioner.

She also contends that the search seizure conducted by therespondents are illegally being made outside the jurisdiction of the BOC and thatthe subsequent search warrant issued by the collector of customs is not validbeing not issued by a judge.

The respondent Mago filed an ex-parte motion to release the confiscatedarticles upon her posting a bond. This motion was then granted by therespondent Judge Jarencio.

Issue:

Was the seizure of the goods unlawful? And that the BOC has nojurisdiction over the articles sought?

Held:

No. it is a valid seizure.

The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, havingbeen deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for thepurposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches,seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of anycargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to

forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. He couldlawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container whereverfound when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiablearticles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop,search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected ofholding or conveying such article as aforesaid. It cannot be doubted, therefore,that petitioner Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect thesearch and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Codeauthorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect said search

and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. This waswhat happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit,made the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales ofgoods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief ofPolice to make the interception of the cargo.

Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority toeffect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court.

The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in theinstant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land,inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also toinspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, boxor envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine anyvehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable orprohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, withoutmentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases.

It is our considered view, therefore, that except in the case of the searchof a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs lawmay effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement ofcustoms laws.

Note:

The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, amongothers, (1) to assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, andall other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing under the tariff andcustoms laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon thecustoms; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws.

The goods in question were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry." As long as theimportation has not been terminated the imported goods remain under thejurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs.

Importation is deemed terminated only upon the payment of the duties,taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port ofentry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted.


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PEOPLE v. MALMSTEDT

[GR 91107, 19 June 1991]

FACTS: Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines forthe 3rd time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the countrysometime in 1982 and 1985. In the evening of 7 May 1989, Malmstedt left forBaguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he

took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for 2 days. On 11 May 1989,Capt. Alen Vasco of NARCOM, stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his mento set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, MountainProvince, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the CordilleraRegion. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was promptedby persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transportingmarijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received bythe Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasiancoming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. At about 1:30pm, the bus where Malmstedt was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CICGalutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of theNARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. During the inspection,

CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on Malmstedts waist. Suspecting the bulge onMalmstedts waist to be a gun, the officerasked for Malmstedts passport andother identification papers. When Malmstedt failed to comply, the officerrequired him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist, whichwas a pouch bag. When Malmstedt opened the same bag, as ordered, theofficer noticed 4 suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape,which turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana, when opened.Malmstedt stopped to get 2 travelling bags from the luggage carrier, eachcontaining a teddy bear, when he was invited outside the bus for questioning.It was observed that there were also bulges inside the teddy bears which didnot feel like foam stuffing. Malmstedt was then brought to the headquartersof the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa for further investigation. At theinvestigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were foundto also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from thehashish found among the personal effects of Malmstedt and the same werebrought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis, which establishedthe objects examined as hashish. Malmstedt claimed that the hashish wasplanted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the 2 travellingbags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an

Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that theAustralian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because therewere no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next rideand asked Malmstedt to take charge of the bags, and that they would meeteach other at the Dangwa Station. An information was filed againstMalmstedt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. During the arraignment,Malmstedt entered a plea of not guilty. After trial and on 12 October 1989,

the trial court found Malmstedt guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation ofSection 4, Article II of RA 6425 and sentenced him to life imprisonment andto pay a fine of P20,000. Malmstedt sought reversal of the decision of thetrial court.

ISSUE: Whether the personal effects of Malmstedt may be searched withoutan issued warrant.

HELD: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searchesand seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawfularrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without awarrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under thefollowing circumstances. Section 5 provides that a peace officer or a privateperson may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) When, in his presence,the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or isattempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just beencommitted, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that theperson to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to bearrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or placewhere he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is

pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement toanother. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the personarrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest policestation or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule112, Section 7. Herein, Malmstedt was caught in flagrante delicto, when hewas transporting prohibited drugs. Thus, the search made upon his personaleffects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law,which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.


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Caballes vs. Court of Appeals [GR 136292, 15 January 2002]First Division, Puno (J): 4 concur

Facts: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex deCastro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna,spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with kakawati leaves. Suspectingthat the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flaggeddown the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes y Taio. When askedwhat was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, but he appeared pale andnervous. With Caballes consent, the police officers checked the cargo and theydiscovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusivelyowned by National Power Corporation (NAOCOR). The conductor wires weighed700 kilos and valued at P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where the wirescame from and Caballes answered that they came from Cavinti, a townapproximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes and thevehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station.Danilo Cabale took pictures of Caballes and the jeep loaded with the wires whichwere turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna.Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail. Caballes was chargedwith the crime of theft in an information dated 16 October 1989. During thearraignment, Caballes pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued.

On 27 April 1993, Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna renderedjudgment, finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft.In a resolution dated 9 November 1998, the trial court denied Caballes motionfor reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision on 15September 1998. Caballes appealed the decision by certiorari.

Issue: Whether Caballes passive submission to the statement of Sgt. Nocejathat the latter will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in thepositive be considered as waiver on Caballes part on warrantless search andseizure.

Held: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to besecure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches andseizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof. The exclusionary ruleunder Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of evidenceobtained in violation of such right. The constitutional proscription againstwarrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certainexceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrestrecognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailingjurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of movingvehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop andfrisk situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. Incases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution andreiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional eventswhere warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the

latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes areasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,

determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including thepurpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause,the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thingsearched and the character of the articles procured. It is not controverted that thesearch and seizure conducted by the police officers was not authorized by asearch warrant. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give thepolice officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches withoutwarrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probablecause. Herein, the police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual

inspection of Caballes vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift thekakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cablewires. It thus cannot be considered a simple routine check. Also, Caballesvehicle was flagged down because the police officers who were on routine patrolbecame suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered withkakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon. The factthat the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to becovered with kakawati leaves does not constitute probable cause as wouldjustify the conduct of a search without a warrant. In addition, the policeauthorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or tippedinformation that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle whichcould otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Philippine jurisprudence isreplete with cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probablecause to effect a warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists inthe present case. Further, the evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionallysurrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The manner by which thetwo police officers allegedly obtained the consent of Caballes for them to conductthe search leaves much to be desired. When Caballes vehicle was flaggeddown, Sgt. Noceja approached Caballes and told him I will look at the contentsof his vehicle and he answered in the positive. By uttering those words, it cannotbe said the police officers were asking or requesting for permission that they beallowed to search the vehicle of Caballes. For all intents and purposes, they wereinforming, nay, imposing upon Caballes that they will search his vehicle. Theconsent given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent withinthe purview of the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases where the Court

upheld the validity of consented search, it will be noted that the police authoritiesexpressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to besearched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positiveproof. Neither can Caballes passive submission be construed as an impliedacquiescence to the warrantless search. Casting aside the cable wires asevidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to sustain Caballesconviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the constitutionalright of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.


5/52

De Garcia vs. Locsin

Facts:

Mariano Almeda, an agent of Anti-usury Board applied for a searchwarrant before the respondent judge against the petitioner, believing thatthere is a probable cause that the petitioner, Leona De Garcia, keeps andconseals in her house and store at Victoria Tarlac certain books, lists, chits,

receipts and documents relating to her activities as usurer, contrary to law.

The search warrant was granted and with officers of the law, Almedaet al search the person and house/store of the petitioner to seized evidencerelated to usury.

The search proceeded without the presence of the petitioner, andthus, packages of records were confiscated, turned over to the fiscal by the

Anti-Usury Board and was later filed six separate complaint against thepetitioner for violation of the Anti-usury law.

Thus, a motion was filed by the petitioner demanding the respondentBoard to return the articles seized in the search in the ground of its invalidity.

The respondent judge denied such motion and contends that even thoughthe search warrant is invalid, the articles are still admissible as evidencesince there is a waiver of right on the part of the petitioner.

Issue:

Was there a waiver of right?

If there is, would it make the search valid and therefore articlesseized are admissible evidence?

Held:No. There is no waiver of right and that the articles are inadmissible

evidence.

The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches andseizures is a personal right which may be waived.The waiver may be eitherexpress or implied.

In the case at bar, no express waiver has been made. It is urged,however, that there has been a waiver by implication. It is well-settled that toconstitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear,

(1) First, that the right exists;

(2) Secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, either actualor constructive, of the existence of such right; and,

(3) Lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish theright.

It is true that the petitioner did not object to the legality of the searchwhen it was made. She could not have objected because she was sick andwas not present when the warrant was served upon Alfredo Salas. Certainly,the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being

a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rightsare invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.

Of course, the petitioner came to know later of the seizure of some ofher papers and documents. But this was precisely the reason why she senther attorneys to the office of the Anti-Usury Board to demand the return ofthe documents seized. In any event, the failure on the part of the petitionerand her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant doesnot constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right.

As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmativeact of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of eithercontesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights;but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is nota consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard forthe supremacy of the law.

Moreover, the invalidity of the search warrant not only anchored inthe mentioned ground, but also, the respondent judge did not follow theconstitutional requirement in determining probable cause to issue warrants,such that, it is the applicant that determines the probable cause in the caseat bar. In 35 constitution, it mandated the judge to personally determine th eexistence of probable cause and no other.


6/52

POSADAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS [188 SCRA 288; G.R.NO. 89139; 2 AUG 1990]

Facts:

Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the DavaoMetrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, Pat.

Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar conducted surveillancealong Magallanes Street, Davao City. While in the vicinity ofRizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri"bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. Theyapproached the petitioner and identified themselves asmembers of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attemptto get away was unsuccessful. They then checked the "buri"bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith& Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196, two (2) rounds oflive ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas)

grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun.They brought the petitioner to the police station for furtherinvestigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner wasasked to show the necessary license or authority to possessfirearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failedto do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom officeand the prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed toM/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted forillegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the RegionalTrial Court of Davao City.

Issue:

Whether or not the warantless search is valid.

Held:

In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carriedby the petitioner, argues that under Section 12, Rule 136 of theRules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be searched fordangerous weapons or anything used as proof of a commissionof an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged that

the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful underthe circumstances.

in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it isreasonable considering that it was effected on the basis of aprobable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioneracted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag therewas a probable cause that he was concealing something illegalin the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers toinspect the same.

It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search thebag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall haveobtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercisemay prove to be useless, futile and much too late.

Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained underthe exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, theconstitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and

seizures has not been violated.
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7/52

PEOPLE v. MUSA

G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993

Facts: The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks the reversal of the decision of the RTC of ZamboangaCity finding him guilty of selling (2) wrappers containing dried marijuana leaves in violation ofR.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).

_______________________

Prosecution evidence shows that in the morning of December 13, 1989, T/Sgt. Belarga, leaderof a NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct surveillance andtest buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City.

Sgt. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P 10.00. Sgt. Belargainspected the stuff turned over to him and found it to be marijuana.

The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Sgt. Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer forwhich purpose he was given P20.00.

Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari Musa, while the rest of theNARCOM group positioned themselves at strategic places about 90 to 100 meters from MariMusa's house.

T/Sgt. Belarga could see what went on between Ani and suspect Mari Musa from where he was.Ani approached Mari Musa, who came out of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani saidhe wanted some more stuff. Ani gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked money. After receiving the

money, Mari Musa went back to his house and came back and gave Amado Ani two newspaperwrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two wrappers and inspected the contents.Convinced that the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards his companions andraised his right hand. The two NARCOM teams, riding the two civilian vehicles, sped towardsSgt. Ani. Ani joined Belarga's team and returned to the house.

At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were four persons inside his house: MariMusa, another boy, and two women, one of whom Ani and Belarga later came to know to beMari Musa's wife. The second time, Ani with the NARCOM team returned to Mari Musa's house,the woman, who was later known as Mari Musa's wife, slipped away from the house. Sgt.Belarga frisked Mari Musa but could not find the P20.00 marked money with him. Mari Musa wasthen asked where the P20.00 was and he told the NARCOM team he has given the money to hiswife (who had slipped away).

Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside it somewhere inthe kitchen. Mari Musa was then placed under arrest and brought to the NARCOM office.

All submitted specimens were examined and gave positive results for the presence of marijuana.

_________________________

According to the version of the defense, on December 14, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon,Mari Musa was in his house at Suterville, Zamboanga City. With him were his wife Ara, his one-year old child, a woman manicurist, and a male cousin named Abdul Musa. About 1:30 thatafternoon, while he was being manicured at one hand, his wife was inside the one room of theirhouse, putting their child to sleep.

Three NARCOM agents, who introduced themselves as NARCOM agents, dressed in civilianclothes, got inside Mari Musa's house whose door was open. The NARCOM agents did not askpermission to enter the house but simply announced that they were NARCOM agents. TheNARCOM agents searched Mari Musa's house and Mari Musa asked them if they had asearch warrant. The NARCOM agents were just silent. The NARCOM agents found a red

plastic bag whose contents, Mari Musa said, he did not know. Mari Musa, then, washandcuffed and when Mari Musa asked why, the NARCOM agents told him for clarification.

Inside the NARCOM Office, Mari Musa was investigated by one NARCOM agent whichinvestigation was reduced into writing. The document stated that the marijuana belonged to MariMusa and Mari Musa was asked to sign it. But Mari Musa refused to sign because the marijuanadid not belong to him. Mari Musa said he was not told that he was entitled to the assistance ofcounsel, although he himself told the NARCOM agents he wanted to be assisted by counsel.

Mari Musa said four bullets were then placed between the fingers of his right hand and hisfingers were pressed which felt very painful. The NARCOM agents boxed him and Mari Musalost consciousness. The fiscal asked him if the marijuana was owned by him and he said "not."

After that single question, Mari Musa was brought to the City Jail. Mari Musa said he did not tellthe fiscal that he had been maltreated by the NARCOM agents because he was afraid he might

be maltreated in the fiscal's office.

Mari Musa denied the NARCOM agents' charge that he had sold two wrappers of marijuana tothem; that he had received from them a P20.00 bill which he had given to his wife. He did notsell marijuana because he was afraid that was against the law and that the person sellingmarijuana was caught by the authorities; and he had a wife and a very small child to support.Mari Musa said he had not been arrested for selling marijuana before.

_____________________

After trial, the trial court found the accused Musa guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

In this appeal, the appellant contends that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubtand impugns the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

1st Argument: The appellant claims that the testimony of Sgt. Ani is not credible because: (1)prior to the buy-bust operation, neither Sgt. Ani nor the other NARCOM agents were personallyknown by the appellant or vice-versa; and (2) there was no witness to the alleged giving of thetwo wrappers of marijuana by the appellant to Sgt. Ani.

The Court finds the testimony of Sgt. Ani regarding the buy-bust operation, which resulted in theapprehension, prosecution and subsequent conviction of the appellant, to be direct, lucid andforthright.

The contention that the appellant could not have transacted with Sgt. Ani because they do notknow each other is without merit. The day before the buy-bust operation, Sgt. Ani conducted atest-buy and he successfully bought a wrapper of marijuana from the appellant. Through thisprevious transaction, Sgt. Ani was able to gain the appellant's confidence for the latter to sellmore marijuana to Sgt. Ani the following day, during the buy-bust operation. Moreover, the Courthas held that what matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, forquite often, the parties to the transaction may be strangers, but their agreement and the acts

constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana.

2nd Argument: The appellant argues that it was impossible for the appellant to sell marijuanawhile his wife, cousin and manicurist were present.

But the place of the commission of the crime of selling prohibited drugs has been held to be notcrucial and the presence of other people apart from the buyer and seller will not necessarilyprevent the consummation of the illegal sale. As the Court observed in People v. Paco, thesefactors may sometimes camouflage the commission of the crime. In the instant case, the factthat the other people inside the appellant's house are known to the appellant may have givenhim some assurance that these people will not report him to the authorities.

3rd Argument: The appellant submits that since T/Sgt. Belarga admitted that he was about 90

meters away from Sgt. Ani and the appellant, he could not have possibly witnessed the sale.The appellant invokes People v.Ale where the Court observed that from a distance of 10-15


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meters, a policeman cannot distinguish between marijuana cigarette from ordinary ones by thetype of rolling done on the cigarette sticks. And since T/Sgt. Belarga allegedly did not see thesale, the appellant contends that the uncorroborated testimony of Sgt. Ani cannot stand as basisfor his conviction.

People v. Ale does not apply here because the policeman in that case testified that he and hiscompanion were certain that the appellant therein handed marijuana cigarettes to the poseur-buyer based on the appearance of the cigarette sticks. The Court rejected this claim, statingthat: This Court cannot give full credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses marked asthey are with contradictions and tainted with inaccuracies.

In the case at bar, however, T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively claim that he saw the appellanthand over marijuana to Sgt. Ani. What he said was that there was an exchange of certainarticles between the two.

Contrary to the contention of the appellant, it was not impossible for T/Sgt. Belarga to haveseen, from a distance of 90-100 meters, Sgt. Ani hand to the appellant "something" and for thelatter to give to the former "something."

Notwithstanding the fact that T/Sgt. Belarga could not have been certain that what Sgt. Anireceived from the appellant was marijuana because of the distance, his testimony, nevertheless,corroborated the direct evidence, which the Court earlier ruled to be convincing, presented bySgt. Ani on the following material points: (1) T/Sgt. Belarga instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct asurveillance and test-buy operation on the appellant (2) later that same day, Sgt. Ani went backto their office and reported a successful operation and turned over to T/Sgt. Belarga onewrapper of marijuana; (3) T/Sgt. Belarga then organized a team to conduct a buy-bust operationthe following day; (4) on December 14, 1989, T/Sgt. Belarga led a team of NARCOM agents

who went to Suterville, Zamboanga City; (5) T/Sgt. Belarga gave a P20.00 marked bill to Sgt.Ani which was to be used in the buy-bust operation; (6) upon the arrival of the NARCOM agentsin Suterville, Zamboanga City, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of the appellant while someagents stayed in the vehicles and others positioned themselves in strategic places; the appellantmet Sgt. Ani and an exchange of articles took place.

The testimony of the poseur-buyer is sufficient to prove the consummation of the sale of theprohibited drug.

MOST RELEVANT FACTS

4th Argument: Finally, the appellant assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plasticbag containing marijuana which the NARCOM agents found in the appellant's kitchen. It appearsthat after Sgt. Ani gave the pre-arranged signal to the other NARCOM agents, the latter movedin and arrested the appellant inside the house. They searched him to retrieve the marked money

but didn't find it. Upon being questioned, the appellant said that he gave the marked money tohis wife. Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and noticed what T/Sgt.Belarga described as a "cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of thekitchen." They asked the appellant about its contents but failing to get a response, they openedit and found. At the trial, the appellant questioned the admissibility of the plastic bag and themarijuana it contains but the trial court issued an Order ruling that these are admissible inevidence.

Issues:

1) Is the trial court correct in ruling that the red plastic bag containing dried marijuana leaves wasadmissible in evidence?

2) If No, does the inadmissibility have any effect on the innocence of Musa?

Held:

1) No. The Constitution declares inadmissible, any evidence obtained in violation of the freedomfrom unreasonable searches and seizures.

Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search andseizure incident to a lawful arrest, but the "plain view" doctrine, which states that objects in theplain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject toseizure without warrant or search and seizure and may be presented in evidence, does notapply under the circumstances of the case.

(Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for

dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,without a search warrant.)

The plastic bag was not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify itsseizure. The marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presentedin evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution because unlike in Ker v.California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents inthis case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had theynot forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came acrossthe plastic bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their"plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana.

It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidenceof a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and

indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidenceof defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is notsearching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across anincriminating object. It may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one objectto another until something incriminating at last emerges.

In Ker v. California 42 police officers, the admissibility of the package was challenged before theU.S. Supreme Court, which held, after observing that it was not unreasonable for the officer towalk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen on seeing the defendant wife emerge therefrom, that"the discovery of the brick of marijuana did not constitute a search, since the officer merely sawwhat was placed before him in full view. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the warrantlessseizure of the marijuana was legal on the basis of the "plain view" doctrine and upheld theadmissibility of the seized drugs as part of the prosecution's evidence.

The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before they sightedthe plastic bag. Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner

of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bagcontained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana.

The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent fromthe "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed itscontents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transprarency, or otherwise, that its contentsare obvious to an observer.

2) None. The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, thedamaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that theappellant sold marijuana, in violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

The Court holds that by virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the twowrappings of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, theguilt of the appellant of the crime charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Appeal was dismissed.


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PEOPLE v DORIA

301 SCRA 668

PUNO; January 22, 1999

FACTS

- Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom), receivedinformation from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegaldrug activities in Mandaluyong City. They decided to entrap him via a buy-bustoperation.

-The poseur-buyer, PO2 Manlangit set aside 1600 pesos as marked money for theentrapment operation, which was then handed to Jun upon transaction. Jun returnedan hour later bringing marijuana where he and his associates subsequently arrestedJun but did not find the marked bills on him. Jun said he left the bills to hisassociate Neneth. Jun led the police to Neneths house.

- The police went to Neneths house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed acarton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open andinside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contentsappeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicionaroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He

peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared tobe dried marijuana leaves. They also found the marked bills. They arrested Jun andNeneth and brought them to headquarters. It was only then that the police learnedthat "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama.

- The trial court found them guilty.

ISSUES

1. WON the warrantless arrest of Doria and Gaddao, the search of the latters personand house, and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom is valid

2. WON the marijuana was seized validly for being in plain view of the police officers

HELD

1. YES

- We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful.Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a privateperson may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actuallycommitting, or is attempting to commit an offense;

- Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant ifhe "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."

- In the case, Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accusedis apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police arenot only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.

- However, the warrantless arrest, search and seizure of Gaddao is invalid

- Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bustoperation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She wasnot committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was nooccasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest

in "hot pursuit." 114 In fact, she was going about her daily chores when thepolicemen pounced on her.

- Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the secondinstance of Rule 113. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrantunder Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" whichmeans an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." In case, there was noreasonable suspicion especially as she was arrested solely on the basis of thealleged identification made by her co-accused

- Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, butas the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does notnecessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs as Doria may have left the money in her house, with orwithout her knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellantDoria 's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that shewas engaged in drug pushing.

- As the arrest was illegal, the search and seizure is not incidental to the arrest

2. NO

- The marijuana was not in plain view of the police officers and its seizure without therequisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution as thecontents of the box where the marijuana was partially hidden was not readilyapparent to PO Manlangit, one of the arresting officers.

- As a general rule, objects in plain view of arresting officers may be seized without asearch warrant but must follow these requisites: (a) the law enforcement officer insearch of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from

which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view isinadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes maybe evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

- However, if it is not plain view of the police officers, it may not be seized without awarrant except if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctiveconfiguration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then thecontents are in plain view and may be seized.

- The fact that the box containing about six (6) ki los of marijuana 137 was found in thehouse of accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guiltyof the crime charged.


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SANCHEZ V. DEMETRIOU November 3, 1993 Cruz, J.

FACTS:

-Crime Commission requested the filing ofappropriate charges against several persons, including the petitioner, inconnection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of

Allan Gomez.

Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department ofJustice conducted a preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993. PetitionerSanchez was not present but was represented by his counsel, Atty. MarcianoBrion, Jr.

93, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" tothe petitioner requesting him to appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Limin Canlubang, Laguna. It was served on Sanchez in the morning of August13,1993, and he was immediately taken to the said camp.

Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both executedconfessions implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and

the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest status" andtaken to the Department of Justice in Manila.

arrival, with Atty. Salvador Panelo as his counsel.

ved on Sanchez. This warrantwas issued in connection with Criminal Cases for violation of Section 8, inrelation to Section 1, of R.A. No. 6713. Sanchez was forthwith taken to theCIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, where he remains confined.

nt prosecutors filed with the Regional Trial Court ofCalamba, Laguna, seven informations charging Antonio L. Sanchez, LuisCorcolon, Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., GeorgeMedialdea and Zoilo Ama with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta.

arrest of all the accused, including the petitioner, in connection with the saidcrime.

apprehension that the trial of the said cases might result in a miscarriage ofjustice. SC thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of the seven cases toPasig, Metro Manila, where they were raffled to respondent Judge HarrietDemetriou.

seven informations were amended to includethe killing of Allan Gomez as an aggravating circumstance.

substantially on the grounds now raised in this petition. On September 13,1993, after oral arguments, the respondent judge denied the motion.Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant petition for certiorari andprohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order/writ of injunction.

ISSUES: WON Sanchez was unlawfully withheld of his right to PreliminaryInvestigation - NO

WON the arrest of Sanchez was legal - YES (by virtue of the jurisdictionsubsequently acquired) The Preliminary Investigation.

HELD:

thepetitioner's contention that he was not accorded the right to present counter-affidavits.

manifestation that his counsel, Atty. Brion, was not notified of the inquestheld on August 13, 1993, and that he was not furnished with the affidavitssworn to on that date by Vivencio Malabanan and Aurelio Centeno, or withtheir supplemental affidavits

Panelo as his counsel. During the entire proceedings, he remained quiet andlet this counsel speak and argue on his behalf. It was only in his tardy Replythat he has suddenly bestirred himself and would now question hisrepresentation by this lawyer as unauthorized and inofficious.

the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not submitcounter-affidavits, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on theevidence presented by the complainant.

preliminary investigation 5, so may he waive the right to present counter-affidavits or any other evidence in his defense.

of a preliminary investigationdoes not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render the samedefective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the caseor constitute a ground for quashing the information. 6

iminary investigation has been held, or if it is flawed, the trial courtmay, on motion of the accused, order an investigation or reinvestigation and


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hold the proceedings in the criminal case in abeyance. 7 In the case at bar,however, the respondent judge saw no reason or need for such a step.Finding no arbitrariness in her factual conclusions, we shall defer to her

judgment.

The Arrest

taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for

the commission of an offense. Under Section 2 of the same Rule, an arrest iseffected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his voluntarysubmission to the custody of the person making the arrest.

ication of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraintor a formal declaration of arrest is not, required. It is enough that there be anintent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent onthepart of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission isnecessary. 12 The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang,Laguna, by virtue of a letter-invitation issued by PNP Commander Rex Piadrequesting him to appear at the said camp for investigation.

-ranking military officialand the investigation of Sanchez was to be made at a military camp.

Although in the guise of a request, it was obviously a command or an orderof arrest that the petitioner could hardly he expected to defy. In fact,apparently cowed by the "invitation," he went without protest (and in informalclothes and slippers only) with the officers who had come to fetch him. It maynot be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. 7438, the requisites of a"custodial investigation" are applicable even to a person not formally arrestedbut merely "invited" for questioning.

placed on "arrest status" after he was pointed to by Centeno and Malabananas the person who first raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Respondent Zuo

himself acknowledged during the August 13, 1993 hearing that, on the basisof the sworn statements of the two state witnesses, petitioner had been"arrested." His arrest did not come under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules ofCourt,

petitioner allegedly participated in the killing of Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Neither did they have any personal knowledgethat the petitioner was responsible therefor because the basis of the arrestwas the sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover, as therape and killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place on June 28-June 29, 1993,or forty-six days before the date of the arrest, it cannot be said that the

offense had "in fact just been committed" when the petitioner was arrested.

Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over theperson of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on August26, 1993 against him and the other accused in connection with the rape-slaycases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal. Applicable byanalogy to the case at bar is Rule 102 Section 4 of the Rules of Court that:

If it appearsthat the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an

officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment ororder of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issuethe process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not beallowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the personshall not be discharged by reason of

any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall,anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person chargedwith or convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person sufferingimprisonment under lawful judgment.


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BLAS F. OPLE, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES et al[G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998]

FACTS:

President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order (A.O.) 308 onDecember 12, 1996 entitled Adoption of National ComputerizedIdentification Reference System or commonly known as Natioanal IDSystem. Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition before the Supreme

Court questioning the constitutionality of the said executive issuanceon two important grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power ofCongress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on ourcitizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for therights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriersagainst further erosion.

ISSUE:DOES A.0 308 VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY?

HELD:

Yes. Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subjectof a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrativelegislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. A.O. 308 isso vague. The vagueness, the over breadth of A.O. No. 308 which ifimplemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and presentdanger. There are no vital safeguards .A.O. No. 308 should also raiseour antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whetherencoding of data is limited to biological information alone foridentification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that theadoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the"generation of population data for development planning." 54 This is

an admission that the Population Reference Number (PRN) will not beused solely for identification but for the generation of other data withremote relation to the a vowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, theindefiniteness of A.O. No. 308can give the government the rovingauthority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than theidentification of the individual through his PRN .The potential formisuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308cannot beunderplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrativeorder, an individual must present his PRN every time he deals with agovernment agency to avail of basic services and security. Histransactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded

-- whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the

agency. The individual's file may include his transactions for loanavailments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities,reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The morefrequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a hugeand formidable information base through the electronic linkage of thefiles. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful governmentpurposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personalinformation constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that

may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. We can evengrant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to thename, address and other basic personal information about theindividual. Even that hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No. 308from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us inclear and categorical terms how these information gathered shall behandled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data,under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors areessential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of theinformation. Well to note, the computer linkage gives othergovernment agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no

controls to guard against leakage of information. When the accesscode of the control programs of the particular computer system isbroken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make useof the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the datastored within the system. It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 fallsshort of assuring that personal information which will be gatheredabout our people will only be processed for unequivocally specifiedpurposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No.308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel byenabling authorities to track-down his movement; it may also enableunscrupulous persons to access confidential information and

circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for"fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the rightagainst unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities ofabuse and misuse of the PRN,biometrics and computer technologyare accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks controlover what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify thecorrectness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses thatthe Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.

Excerpts from the concurring opinion of the Supreme Court justices:


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Justice Romero, concur: So terrifying are the possibilities of a lawsuch as Administrative Order No. 308 in making inroads into theprivate lives of the citizens, a virtual Big Brother looking over ourshoulders, that it must, without delay, be slain upon sight" before oursociety turns totalitarian with each of us, amindless robot.

Justice Vitug, concur: Administrative Order No. 308 appears to beso extensively drawn that could, indeed, allow unbridled options to

become available to it implementers beyond the reasonable comfortof the citizens and of residents alike.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY RECOGNIZED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

Hereunder are the provisions in the 1987 Constitution whichrecognize our Right to Privacy: Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights: "Sec.3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall beinviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safetyororder requires otherwise as prescribed by law." Other facets of theright to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights,

viz: 34 "Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or propertywithout due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equalprotection of the laws. Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure intheir persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonablesearches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shallbe inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issueexcept upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judgeafter examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and thewitnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to besearched and the persons or things to be seized. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 6.The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits

prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order ofthe court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in theinterest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may beprovided bylaw. xxx xxx xxx. Sec.8. The right of the people, includingthose employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not beabridged. Sec.17. No person shall be compelled to be a witnessagainst himself.

Personal Analysis: A.O. 308 was declared unconstitutional by theSupreme Court en banc for reasons above stated. It bears stressing

that the bulk of discussion in the case focused more on the issue of

infringement of the right to privacy. As can be gleaned from A.O. 308,the provisions were so general that there were no clear and vitalguidelines to safeguard the information stored in the IdentificationCard. Had President Fidel V. Ramos issued a more complete anddetailed guidelines providing for the metes and bounds of the IDSystem, the decision could have been otherwise. Even the argumentof the respondents that rules and regulations would be issued by thecommittee later, the court still rejects the same. The court said: The

rules and regulations to be drawn by the IACC cannot remedy thisfatal defect. Rules and regulations merely implement the policy of thelaw or order. On its face, A.O. No. 308 gives the Inter-AgencyCoordinating Committee (IACC) virtually unfettered discretion todetermine the metes and bounds of the ID System. In one pressconference last month, Presidential Spokesperson Ignacio Bunye saidthat there is really no need to pass a law to push through with the planof the National ID System. An executive issuance by the Presidentwould suffice provided this time the said order will now be detailed,comprehensive and contains all the vital safeguards. From hisstatement, it can be deduced therefrom that the reservation and

backlash by the supreme court on the on the Ople case (A.O 308)have been taken into consideration by Malacanang.


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UMIL v. RAMOS

[GR 81567, 9 July 1990]

Facts: On 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unitof the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidentialinformation about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidationsquad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital inRoosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that

the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as RonnieJavelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidationsquad, responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the daybefore, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio,Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Dural was transferred to theRegional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons.While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Dural was positivelyidentified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of thehood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the 2 CAPCOMsoldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon andCIC Renato Manligot. As a consequence of this positive identification,

Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted aninquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of CaloocanCity an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon withthe crime of Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in

Authority. (Criminal Case C-30112; no bail recommended). On 15February 1988, the information was amended to include, asdefendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the originalinformation, was still unidentified. Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, apetition for habeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Court on behalfof Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Courtissued the writ of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and Fidel V.

Ramos, Maj. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montano, andBrig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February 1988. On 26February 1988, however, Umil and Villanueva posted bail before theRegional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the

Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them, and they wereaccordingly released.

Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested without any warrant ofarrest for the crime of rebellion.

Held: Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in theact of shooting the 2 CAPCOM soldiers nor was he arrested just afterthe commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after thesaid shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant isunjustified. However, Dural was arrested for being a member of theNew Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization.Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Duralwithout warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an

offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion,conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offensescommitted in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitutedirect assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuingcrimes. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as itsfighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but infurtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in thecourse of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purposeof immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. Thearrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in theprosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of

the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicialwarrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable.Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment toarresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violenceagainst government forces, or any other milder acts but equally inpursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thusimpelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the verysurvival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities.


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GO v CA (PELAYO)

206 SCRA 138

FELICIANO; February 11, 1992

FACTS

- July 2, 1991 Eldon Maguan entered a one-way street (Wilson St.) from theopposite direction (counterflow), heading towards P. Guevarra St. In so doing, henearly collided with the car of accused Rolito Go. Go got out of his car and shotMaguan.

- A security guard of a nearby bake shop witnessed the event and was able to notethe plate number of the petitioner. The car was eventually traced to an Elisa Ang Go,wife of the accused.

- The police were informed that the petitioner had a meal at the bake shop where hiscredit card was used to pay for the transaction. Police were able to identify the cardowner as the accused Go and when his picture was shown to the security guard whopositively identified him as the supposed assailant. Police then launched a manhuntfor Go.

- July 8, 1991 Go presented himself in the San Juan police station with his twolawyers in tow to verify reports that he was being hunted down by the police.

1. The police detained Go and a COMPLAINT for FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE wasfiled against him.

2. Asst. Prov. Prosecutor Villa Ignacio informed Go, in the presence of his lawyers,of his right to avail of preliminary investigation but in so doing, Go had to waive theprovisions in Art. 125, RPC. Go refused.

- July 9, 1991 Maguan died as a result of his gunshot wounds before anINFORMATION could be filed.

- July 11, 1991:

3. The prosecutor filed an INFORMATION for murder, instead of an information forfrustrated homicide. The prosecutor stated that no preliminary investigation wasconducted because Go refused to waive provisions of Art. 125, RPC.

4. Gos counsel filed an OMNIBUS MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE ANDPROPER PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION with the allegations that an illegalwarrantless arrest had been effected and that no preliminary investigation had beenconducted and prayed that Go be released on bail.

- July 12, 1991:

5. Go filed an urgent EX-PARTE MOTION FOR SPECIAL RAFFLE in order toexpedite action on the bail recommendation. The cash bond was approved and Gowas released from jail.

- July 16, 1991:

6. Prosecutor filed a MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARYINVESTIGATION and prayed that the court proceedings be suspendedmomentarily.

7. The trial court granted LEAVE to conduct preliminary investigation and cancelledthe arraignment scheduled on August 15, 1991.

- July 19, 1991:

8. Go contended through a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION ANDMANDAMUS that the information was null and void because no preliminary

investigation had been conducted.

- July 23, 1991 Go surrendered to the police and the judge set the arraignment onAugust 23.

- August 23, 1991:

9. Respondent judge issued a commitment order for Go. Upon arraignment, a pleaof not guilty was entered because Go refused to enter a plea.

10. Go filed a PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS and the CA issued the writ. Thepetition for habeas corpus was consolidated with the petition for certiorari,prohibition and mandamus.

- September 19, 1991 The trial started and the prosecution presented its first

witness. This was followed by three more witnesses on October 3, 1991.- September 23, 1991 The CA dismissed the petition for habeas corpus and thepetition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus on the following grounds, amongothers:

a) Validity of the warrantless arrest because the crime had been freshlycommitted. He was positively identified by the witness and his identity had beenestablished when he came to the police station.

b) Waiver of the right to preliminary investigation when he did not invoke it properlyand waiver of any irregularity in his arrest when accused posted bail.

c) Validity of the information against the accused precluded the grant of the petitionfor habeas corpus

Petitioners Claim: Go contends that the crime had not been just committedbecause of the 6-day disparity.

- None of the police officers who arrested him had any personal knowledge of thecrime.

Respondents Comments: Go had been validly arrested because the crime hadbeen committed 6 days before he was arrested.

- Invoking Umali vs. Ramos where the Court upheld that a warrantless arrest wasvalid 14 days after the crime was committed.

- The prosecutor proceeded under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 ofthe Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation.

Go was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have beenaccorded him without any conditions.


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ISSUES

1. WON the warrantless arrest was lawful

2. WON the accused Go had waived his right to preliminary investigation

HELD

1. NO, the warrantless arrest was not lawfulRatioRule 112, Sec. 7 states that a complaint for information can be filed sanspreliminary investigation when a person has been lawfully arrested without a warrantexcept than an affidavit should be executed by the person who was responsible forthe arrest. But the person arrested can ask for preliminary investigation by the properofficer before the complaint or information can be filed. In this case, the personarrested must waive the provisions of A125, RPC with the assistance of counsel (alawyer or another person of his choice if a lawyer is not available). He may also applyfor bail despite the waiver and the investigation must terminate within 15 days.

Reasoning

- Umil vs. Ramos only applies to continuing crimes so it does not apply in the case atbar. Murder is not a continuing crime because it happens in one place at a particular

point in time and ends there as well.

- The warrantless arrest does not follow the requisites in Rule 113, Sec. 5 because:

>The arrest took place 6 days after Maguan was shot whereas the RoC providethat the crime should have been just committed, is about to be committed or isbeing committed.

>None of the arresting officers had personal knowledge of the facts indicating thatGo was the gunman as required in the RoC. The information that the police hadwas derived from eyewitness accounts.

- When Go walked into the police station 6 days after Maguan was shot, he did notsurrender (so as not to imply that he committed the crime) nor was he arrested but heplaced himself in the disposal of the police authorities.

2. NO, Go had not waived his right to preliminary investigation.

RatioThe rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when theaccused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.

Reasoning

- The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over totrial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some otherpenalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right.

- The nature of the crime demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted.Go did ask for a preliminary investigation from the start. On the day the informationfor murder was filed, he also filed an OMNIBUS MOTION for IMMEDIATE RELEASEand PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. The Court is not ready to ignore that act by Go

and consider it as a waiver based simply on the contention of the SolGen that themotion should have been filed with the trial court and not the prosecutor.

- According to Crespo vs. Mogul: The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscalfor the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting theprosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in theproper court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case,at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigationthe finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court forappropriate action.

- However, in the case at bar, Gos omnibus motion asked for a PRELIMINARYINVESTIGATION not REINVESTIGATION as discussed in Crespo vs. Mogul. TheProsecutor also filed a MOTION for LEAVE TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARYINVESTIGATION so the omnibus motion of Go was, in effect, filed in the trial court.Go did ask for a preliminary investigation on the very day that the information wasfiled without such preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was 5 days laterapprised of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary investigation.

- There was no waiver of the right to preliminary investigation because Go hadvigorously insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment. Atthe time of his arraignment, petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals oncertiorari, prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary investigationbefore being forced to stand trial.

- Gos act of posting bail cannot be deemed to be a waiver of his right to preliminaryinvestigation. Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminaryinvestigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminaryinvestigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitionerand ordered his release.

Obiter

- However, contrary to petitioner's contention, the failure to accord preliminaryinvestigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of thestatutory process of criminal justice, did not impair the validity of the information formurder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court.

- In the case at bar, a trial for merits had already commenced and the prosecutionhad already presented 4 witnesses.

> This, however, still entitles the accused to preliminary investigation. Trial on themerits should be suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigationshould accorded to petitioner, even if eventually, the prosecutor may or may notfind probable cause. The point is that Go was not accorded his proper rights.

> As for bail, Go is still entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. Shouldthe evidence against the accused be strong, the bail can then be cancelled.

> To hold that the rights of Go were obliterated by the presentation of evidence inthe proceedings in the trial court would be to legitimize the deprivation of dueprocess.


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 170180 November 23, 2007

ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ, Petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J. :

The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is not onlyancient. It is also zealously safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the right of thepeople to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonablesearches and seizures.1 Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall beinadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Indeed, while the power to search andseize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and thelaw implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of the citizens, for theenforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basicprinciples of government.2

On appeal is the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals dated 28 July 2005, affirming the

Judgment4

of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Agoo, La Union dated 31 March2004 finding petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violatingSection 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165)5 and sentencing him to suffer thepenalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day ofprision mayormedium as minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium as maximum andordering him to pay a fine of P350,000.00.6

I.

On 26 June 2003, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, par. 2(2) of R.A. No.9165 in an Information7which reads:

That on or about the 17th day of March 2003, in the Municipality of Aringay, Province of LaUnion, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-namedaccused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,control and custody dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper page,weighing more or less twenty-five (25) grams, without first securing the necessary permit,license or prescription from the proper government agency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued withthe prosecution presenting the three (3) barangay tanods of San Benito Norte, Aringay, LaUnion namely, Rogelio Bautista (Bautista), Nestor Aratas (Aratas) and Eduardo Ordoo(Ordoo), who arrested petitioner.

Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was conducting theroutine patrol along the National Highway in Barangay San Benito Norte, Aringay, LaUnion together with Aratas and Ordoo when they noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alightfrom a mini-bus. The tanods observed that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them,seemed to be looking for something. They thus approached him but the latter purportedly

attempted to run away. They chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought himto the house of Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where he, as averred by

Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his bag. Petitioners bag allegedly contained apair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped innewspaper and cellophane. It was then that petitioner was taken to the police station forfurther investigation.9

Aratas and Ordoo corroborated Bautistas testimony on most ma terial points. On cross-examination, however, Aratas admitted that he himself brought out the contents ofpetitioners bag before petitioner was taken to the house of Mercado .

10Nonetheless, heclaimed that at Mercados house, it was petitioner himself who brought out the contents ofhis bag upon orders from Mercado. For his part, Ordoo testified that it was he who wasordered by Mercado to open petitioners bag and that it was then that they saw thepurported contents thereof.11

The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector Valeriano Laya II (Laya), the forensicchemist who conducted the examination of the marijuana allegedly confiscated frompetitioner. Laya maintained that the specimen submitted to him for analysis, a sachet ofthe substance weighing 23.10 grams and contained in a plastic bag, tested positive ofmarijuana. He disclosed on cross-examination, however, that he had knowledge neither ofhow the marijuana was taken from petitioner nor of how the said substance reached thepolice officers. Moreover, he could not identify whose marking was on the inside of thecellophane wrapping the marijuana leaves.12

The charges were denied by petitioner. As the defenses sole witness, he testified that ataround 8:30 p.m. on 17 March 2003, he arrived in Aringay from his place in Curro-oy,Santol, La Union. After alighting from the bus, petitioner claimed that he went to the houseof a friend to drink water and then proceeded to walk to his brothers house. As he was

walking, prosecution witness Ordoo, a cousin of his brothers wife, allegedly approachedhim and asked where he was going. Petitioner replied that he was going to his brothershouse. Ordoo then purportedly requested to see the contents of his bag and appellantacceded. It was at this point that Bautista and Aratas joined them. After inspecting all thecontents of his bag, petitioner testified that he was restrained by the tanodand taken to thehouse of Mercado. It was Aratas who carried the bag until they reached their destination.13

Petitioner maintained that at Mercados house, his bag was opened by the tanod andMercado himself. They took out an item wrapped in newspaper, which later turned out tobe marijuana leaves. Petitioner denied ownership thereof. He claimed to have beenthreatened with imprisonment by his arrestors if he did not give the prohibited drugs tosomeone from the east in order for them to apprehend such person. As petitioner declined,he was brought to the police station and charged with the instant offense. Althoughpetitioner divulged that it was he who opened and took out the contents of his bag at his

friends house, h

consti cases 13

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