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I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION

A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982

BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,vs.HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.

MAKASIAR,J:

In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B.Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with "actsunbecoming a judge."

The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of then Associate Justice Cecilia MuozPalma of the Court of Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this case wasreferred on October 28, 1968 for investigation, thus:

Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint for partition filed bySinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, andPriscilla Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant, concerning the propertiesleft by the deceased Francisco Reyes, the common father of the plaintiff and defendant.

In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola alleged among other things that;a) plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter of the deceased Francisco Reyes; b) the onlylegal heirs of the deceased were defendant Macariola, she being the only offspring of the firstmarriage of Francisco Reyes with Felisa Espiras, and the remaining plaintiffs who were thechildren of the deceased by his second marriage with Irene Ondez; c) the properties left by thedeceased were all the conjugal properties of the latter and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and noproperties were acquired by the deceased during his second marriage; d) if there was any

partition to be made, those conjugal properties should first be partitioned into two parts, andone part is to be adjudicated solely to defendant it being the share of the latter's deceasedmother, Felisa Espiras, and the other half which is the share of the deceased Francisco Reyes

was to be divided equally among his children by his two marriages.

On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, thedispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon apreponderance of evidence, finds and so holds, and hereby renders judgment (1)Declaring the plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, AdelaReyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only children legitimated by the subsequent

marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene Ondez; (2) Declaring the plaintiffSinforosa R. Bales to have been an illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3)Declaring Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot1145 as belonging to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Francisco Reyes Diazand Felisa Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No. 3416 as

belonging to the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in commonpartnership; (5) Declaring that 1/2 of Lot No. 1184 as belonging exclusively to thedeceased Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the defendant Bernardita R.Macariola, being the only legal and forced heir of her mother Felisa Espiras, asthe exclusive owner of one-half of each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265,4803, 4581, 4506; and the remaining one-half (1/2) of each of said Lots Nos.4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4)


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of Lot No. 1154 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7) DeclaringIrene Ondez to be the exclusive owner of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416; the remaining one-half (1/2) of Lot2304 and the remaining one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as

belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (8) Directing the division orpartition of the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz in such a manner as to give orgrant to Irene Ondez, as surviving widow of Francisco Reyes Diaz, a hereditaryshare of. one-twelfth (1/12) of the whole estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996in relation to Art. 892, par 2, New Civil Code), and the remaining portion of the

estate to be divided among the plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa,Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and defendantBernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that the extent of the total share ofplaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the equivalentof two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or each of the other plaintiffs and thedefendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code), each of the latter to receive equal sharesfrom the hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishopof Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33); (9) Directing the parties, within thirty days afterthis judgment shall have become final to submit to this court, for approval aproject of partition of the hereditary estate in the proportion above indicated, andin such manner as the parties may, by agreement, deemed convenient andequitable to them taking into consideration the location, kind, quality, nature and

value of the properties involved; (10) Directing the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Balesand defendant Bernardita R. Macariola to pay the costs of this suit, in theproportion of one-third (1/3) by the first named and two-thirds (2/3) by thesecond named; and (I 1) Dismissing all other claims of the parties [pp 27-29 ofExh. C].

The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on October 16, 1963, aproject of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which is marked Exh. A. Notwithstandingthe fact that the project of partition was not signed by the parties themselves but only by therespective counsel of plaintiffs and defendant, Judge Asuncion approved it in his Order datedOctober 23, 1963, which for convenience is quoted hereunder in full:

The parties, through their respective counsels, presented to this Court forapproval the following project of partition:

COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the above-entitled case, to thisHonorable Court respectfully submit the following Project of Partition:

l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong exclusively toBernardita Reyes Macariola;

2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49 square meters along theeastern part of the lot shall be awarded likewise to Bernardita R. Macariola;

3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales;

4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55 square meters along thewestern part of the lot shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes-Bales;

5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally among Luz Reyes Bakunawa,Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares;

6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 after taking theportions awarded under item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz ReyesBakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in


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equal shares, provided, however that the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 shallbelong exclusively to Priscilla Reyes.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project of Partition indicatedabove which is made in accordance with the decision of the Honorable Court beapproved.

Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.

(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant Tacloban City

(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff Tacloban City

While the Court thought it more desirable for all the parties to have signed thisProject of Partition, nevertheless, upon assurance of both counsels of therespective parties to this Court that the Project of Partition, as above- quoted, had

been made after a conference and agreement of the plaintiffs and the defendantapproving the above Project of Partition, and that both lawyers had representedto the Court that they are given full authority to sign by themselves the Project ofPartition, the Court, therefore, finding the above-quoted Project of Partition to be

in accordance with law, hereby approves the same. The parties, therefore, aredirected to execute such papers, documents or instrument sufficient in form andsubstance for the vesting of the rights, interests and participations which wereadjudicated to the respective parties, as outlined in the Project of Partition andthe delivery of the respective properties adjudicated to each one in view of saidProject of Partition, and to perform such other acts as are legal and necessary toeffectuate the said Project of Partition.

SO ORDERED.

Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963.

(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge

EXH. B.

The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on November 11, 1963, only for the purposeof giving authority to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte to issue the correspondingtransfer certificates of title to the respective adjudicatees in conformity with the project ofpartition (see Exh. U).

One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-halfthereof with an area of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which according to the decision was theexclusive property of the deceased Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of partition

to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal shares,and when the project of partition was approved by the trial court the adjudicatees caused Lot1184 to be subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V).

Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in Judge Asuncion's court(Exhs. F, F-1 and V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had an area of 2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold onJuly 31, 1964 to Dr. Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued transfer certificate of title No.2338 of the Register of Deeds of the city of Tacloban (Exh. 12).

On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an area ofaround 1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), whichparticular portion was declared by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh. F).


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On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective sharesand interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc." (Exit 15& 16). At the time of said sale the stockholders of the corporation were Dominador Arigpa Tan,Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan, Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S.

Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs. Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4to E-7). The Articles of Incorporation of "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,Inc." which we shall henceforth refer to as "TRADERS" were registered with the Securities andExchange Commission only on January 9, 1967 (Exh. E) [pp. 378-385, rec.].

Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated August 6, 1968alleging four causes of action, to wit: [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, ofthe New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those propertiesinvolved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 ofthe Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics,

by associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and aranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty ofcoddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with a certainDominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth andin fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar; and [4]that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by respondent Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).

Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to which a reply was filed on October 16,1968 by herein complainant. In Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred this case to then JusticeCecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, thesaid Investigating Justice submitted her report dated May 27, 1971 recommending that respondent Judgeshould be reprimanded or warned in connection with the first cause of action alleged in the complaint, and forthe second cause of action, respondent should be warned in case of a finding that he is prohibited under the lawto engage in business. On the third and fourth causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that respondentJudge be exonerated.

The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, rec.), complainant hereininstituted an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff,

versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., defendants," which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking theannulment of the project of partition made pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two ordersissued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequentconveyances with damages. It appears, however, that some defendants were dropped from the civil case. Forone, the case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was dismissed because he was no longer a real party in interest whenCivil Case No. 4234 was filed, having already conveyed on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondentJudge and on August 31, 1966 the remainder was sold to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,Inc. Similarly, the case against defendant Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the ground that she was nolonger a real party in interest at the time the aforesaid Civil Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184acquired by her and respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio Galapon was already sold on August 31, 1966 to theTraders Manufacturing and Fishing industries, Inc. Likewise, the cases against defendants Serafin P. Ramento,Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez, Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., Alfredo R.

Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and Enriqueta Anota andAtty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed with the conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and hercounsel.

On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, who was directedand authorized on June 2, 1969 by the then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and now Minister of NationalDefense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case No. 4234, rendered a decision, the dispositive portionof which reads as follows:

A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION


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(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction to takecognizance of the issue of the legality and validity of the Project of Partition [Exhibit "B"] andthe two Orders [Exhibits "C" and "C- 3"] approving the partition;

(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;

(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola to pay defendant Judge Elias B.Asuncion,

(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P400,000.00] for moraldamages;

(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P200,000.001 forexemplary damages;

(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS [P50,000.00] for nominal damages;and

(d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.

B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FORHERSELF AND FOR THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED GERARDO VILLASIN

(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of thedeceased Gerardo Villasin;

(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of GerardoVillasin the cost of the suit.

C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL.,WHO WERE PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010

(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R.Solis, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto O. Reyes.

D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO RAMO

(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;

(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]

It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals uponperfection of the appeal on February 22, 1971.

I

WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first causeof action, that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code inacquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No.3010. 'That Article provides:

Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicialaction, either in person or through the mediation of another:


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(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and otherofficers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights inlitigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory theyexercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignmentand shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object ofany litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession [emphasis supplied].

The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is thesubject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that "... for the prohibition tooperate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involvingthe property" (The Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519 [1979], Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Courtof Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]).

In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased onMarch 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, thedecision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered onJune 8, 1963was already final because none of theparties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer subjectof the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order dated October 23,1963 and the amended order datedNovember 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partitionmade pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from said orders.

Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs inCivil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased onJuly 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E fromthree of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of thedecision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more specifically one-half thereof wasadjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyesin the project of partition, and the same was subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. Asaforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by theRegister of Deeds of Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to respondent Judge andhis wife who declared the same for taxation purposes only. The subsequent sale onAugust 31, 1966by spouses

Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the TradersManufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in which respondent was the president and his wife was the

secretary, took place long after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent twoaforesaid orders therein approving the project of partition.

While it appears that complainant herein filed on or aboutNovember 9 or 11, 1968 an action before the Courtof First Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of partition and the twoorders approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances, the same,however, is of no moment.

The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. ArcadioGalapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 andhis two questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was nolonger subject of litigation.

The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234 can no longer alter, change or affectthe aforesaid facts that the questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was effectedand consummated long after the finality of the aforesaid decision or orders.

Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year afterthe finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition,and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the NewCivil Code.


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It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon byPriscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethicaltransfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration for the approval of the project of partition. In thisconnection, We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice thus:

And so we are now confronted with this all-important question whether or not the acquisition byrespondent of a portion of Lot 1184-E and the subsequent transfer of the whole lot to"TRADERS" of which respondent was the President and his wife the Secretary, was intimatelyrelated to the Order of respondent approving the project of partition, Exh. A.

Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the transactions between theReyeses and the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E, and he insists that there is no evidence

whatsoever to show that Dr. Galapon had acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E, in mediation forhim and his wife. (See p. 14 of Respondent's Memorandum).

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On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in the record showing that Dr.Arcadio Galapon acted as a mere "dummy" of respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E from theReyeses. Dr. Galapon appeared to this investigator as a respectable citizen, credible and sincere,and I believe him when he testified that he bought Lot 1184-E in good faith and for valuableconsideration from the Reyeses without any intervention of, or previous understanding withJudge Asuncion (pp. 391- 394, rec.).

On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted illegally in approving the project ofpartition although it was not signed by the parties, We quote with approval the findings of the InvestigatingJustice, as follows:

1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have required the signature of the partiesmore particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of partition submitted to him forapproval; however, whatever error was committed by respondent in that respect was done ingood faith as according to Judge Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counselof record of Mrs. Macariola, That he was authorized by his client to submit said project ofpartition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24, January 20, 1969). While it is true that such writtenauthority if there was any, was not presented by respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramoappear to corroborate the statement of respondent, his affidavit being the only one that waspresented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain actuations of Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator to

believe that she knew the contents of the project of partition, Exh. A, and that she gave herconformity thereto. I refer to the following documents:

1) Exh. 9 Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban CadastralSurvey in which the deceased Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share" (Exh. 9-a). On tills certificateof title the Order dated November 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the project of partition was dulyentered and registered on November 26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);

2) Exh. 7 Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by Bernardita Reyes MacariolaonOctober 22, 1963, conveying to Dr. Hector Decena the one-fourth share of the late FranciscoReyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In this deed of sale the vendee stated that she was the absolute owner ofsaid one-fourth share, the same having been adjudicated to her as her share in the estate of herfather Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale was duly registered and annotated at the back of OCT 19520on December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e).

In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be noted that in the project ofpartition dated October 16, 1963, which was approved by respondent on October 23, 1963,followed by an amending Order on November 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was


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adjudicated to Mrs. Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot 1154 which complainant sold to Dr.Decena on October 22, 1963, several days after the preparation of the project of partition.

Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter sold her one-fourth share inLot 1154 by virtue of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and not because of the project of partition,Exh. A. Such contention is absurd because from the decision, Exh. C, it is clear that one-half ofone- fourth of Lot 1154 belonged to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz while the other half ofsaid one-fourth was the share of complainant's mother, Felisa Espiras; in other words, thedecision did not adjudicate the whole of the one-fourth of Lot 1154 to the herein complainant

(see Exhs. C-3 & C-4). Complainant became the owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot 1154 onlyby means of the project of partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola sold Lot 1154 onOctober 22, 1963, it was for no other reason than that she was wen aware of the distribution ofthe properties of her deceased father as per Exhs. A and B. It is also significant at this point tostate that Mrs. Macariola admitted during the cross-examination that she went to Tacloban Cityin connection with the sale of Lot 1154 to Dr. Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968) from which

we can deduce that she could not have been kept ignorant of the proceedings in civil case 3010relative to the project of partition.

Complainant also assails the project of partition because according to her the propertiesadjudicated to her were insignificant lots and the least valuable. Complainant, however, did notpresent any direct and positive evidence to prove the alleged gross inequalities in the choice and

distribution of the real properties when she could have easily done so by presenting evidence onthe area, location, kind, the assessed and market value of said properties. Without such evidencethere is nothing in the record to show that there were inequalities in the distribution of theproperties of complainant's father (pp. 386389, rec.).

Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code inacquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper forhim to have acquired the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics whichrequires that: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal

behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life,should be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise andindiscreet on the part of respondent to have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of property that was or

had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife wereranking officers at the time of such transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has the dutyand responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not onlymust he be truly honest and just, but his actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust inthe uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular case of respondent, he cannot deny that thetransactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his actuations open to suspicion and distrust. Even ifrespondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation in his court and that he waspurchasing it from a third person and not from the parties to the litigation, he should nonetheless haverefrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to a corporation in which he and his wife werefinancially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his acquisition was related in one way or another to hisofficial actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of respondent gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010,the lawyers practising in his court, and the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his actuations

and the integrity of our courts of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).

II

With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing andFishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having been organized toengage in business. Said Article provides that:

Article 14 The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor canthey hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial


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or industrial companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which theydischarge their duties:

1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution inactive service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipalprosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging the functions of

judge or prosecuting attorney.

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5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in adeterminate territory.

It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of Commercewhich is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law asit regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justicesand judges.

Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation ofthe governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory

(People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law,law of public corporations, administrative law including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically,Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulatesthe conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political inessence.

It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, withsome modifications made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which wasextended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction onDecember 1, 1888.

Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the

Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogatedbecause where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible ornot with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted byaffirmative act of the new sovereign.

Thus, We held inRoa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:

By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, eitherfollowing a conquest or otherwise, ... those laws which are political in their nature and pertain tothe prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty.(Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).

While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the newsovereign continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, thepolitical laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of theprior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new sovereign,may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States,171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton(1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said:

On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relationsof the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with theirformer sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and


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the government which has acquired their territory. The same act which transferstheir country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law

which may be denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that whichregulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in force,until altered by the newly- created power of the State.

Likewise, inPeople vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general principle ofthe public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totallyabrogated. "

There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of theCode of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic ofthe Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannotapply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of

Appeals.

It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic ActNo. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officersalready penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any publicofficer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business,contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part inhis official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any Iawfrom having any interest.

Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no showing thatrespondent participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders

Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in whichrespondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. The business of saidcorporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court ofFirst Instance. As was held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code whichhas a similar prohibition on public officers against directly or indirectly becoming interested in any contract or

business in which it is his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be a public official to be subject to thiscrime; it is necessary that by reason of his office, he has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and,hence, the official who intervenes in contracts or transactions which have no relation to his office cannotcommit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino;Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).

It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any undue advantage in itsbusiness operations by reason of respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited inone way or another in any case filed by or against it in court. It is undisputed that there was no case filed in thedifferent branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the corporation was either party plaintiff ordefendant except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales,et al.,"wherein the complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid corporation. It must benoted, however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was filed only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2,1970 by CFI Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent Judge was no longer connected with thecorporation, having disposed of his interest therein on January 31, 1967.

Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is no provision in both the 1935and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of theJudiciary from engaging or having interest in any lawful business.


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It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does notcontain any prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges mayengage in teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of law after office hours but with the permissionof the district judge concerned.

Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is, asheretofore stated, deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America,

because it is political in nature.

Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code against the purchase by judges ofa property in litigation before the court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot apply torespondent Judge because the sale of the lot in question to him took place after the finality of his decision inCivil Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders approving the project of partition; hence, the property was nolonger subject of litigation.

In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made pursuant to the Civil Service Act of1959 prohibits an officer or employee in the civil service from engaging in any private business, vocation, orprofession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a

written permission from the head of department, the same, however, may not fall within the purview ofparagraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because the last portion of said paragraphspeaks of a prohibition by the Constitution or law on any public officer from having any interest in any

business and not by a mere administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a violation of the aforesaid rule by anyofficer or employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in private business without a written permission fromthe Department Head may not constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined by law.

On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil ServiceRules, We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgatedthereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under saidSection 12: "No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or beconnected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permissionfrom the Head of Department ..."

It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by RepublicAct No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973Constitution.

Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the President of thePhilippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconductand inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of the Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its ownmotion, or upon information of the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to conduct the correspondinginvestigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the grounds and prescribes the special procedure for thediscipline of judges.

And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can discipline judgesof inferior courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary.

It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner may, for ... violation of theexisting Civil Service Law and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the service, removeany subordinate officer or employee from the service, demote him in rank, suspend him for not more than one

year without pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding six months' salary." Thus, a violation of Section 12 ofRule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action against civil service officers and employees.

However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or employees subject to thedisciplinary authority of the Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head ofthe Judicial Department to which they belong. The Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and the CivilService Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the department head of the Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No.


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2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the only other or second branch of thegovernment (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot beconsidered as a ground for disciplinary action against judges because to recognize the same as applicable tothem, would be adding another ground for the discipline of judges and, as aforestated, Section 67 of theJudiciary Act recognizes only two grounds for their removal, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.

Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who hasoriginal and exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty days, after submission to it, alladministrative cases againstpermanent officers and employees in the competitive service, and, except as

provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon their removal, separation, and suspension and upon allmatters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officers and employees; and prescribestandards, guidelines and regulations governing the administration of discipline" (emphasis supplied). There isno question that a judge belong to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government as aPresidential appointee and is therefore not covered by the aforesaid provision. WE have already ruled that "...in interpreting Section 16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized that only permanent officers andemployees who belong to the classified service come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner ofCivil Service" (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710,713 [1965], Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]).

Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business by joining the TradersManufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not violative of theprovissions of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce and Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

as well as Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules promulgated pursuant to the Civil Service Act of1959, the impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable because Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethicsexpressly declares that:

A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to beinvolved in litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the bench, he should not retain suchinvestments previously made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to dispose of them

without serious loss. It is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from allrelations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his

judgment, or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties....

WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31,1967 from the aforesaid corporation and sold their respective shares to third parties, and it appears also thatthe aforesaid corporation did not in anyway benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there was nocase filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte from the time of the drafting of the

Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966, up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967, andthe eventual withdrawal of respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation. Such disposal or sale byrespondent and his wife of their shares in the corporation only 22 days after the incorporation of thecorporation, indicates that respondent realized that early that their interest in the corporation contravenes theaforesaid Canon 25. Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve the commendation for their immediate

withdrawal from the firm after its incorporation and before it became involved in any court litigation

III

With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty ofcoddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of thelaw and utter disregard for ethics. WE agree, however, with the recommendation of the Investigating Justicethat respondent Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid causes of action are groundless, and WE quote thepertinent portion of her report which reads as follows:

The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that respondent associated andclosely fraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as apractising attorney (see Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said Dominador Arigpa Tan


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does not appear in the Roll of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar as certified toin Exh. K.

The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an "impostor" and claims thatall the time he believed that the latter was a bona fide member of the bar. I see no reason fordisbelieving this assertion of respondent. It has been shown by complainant that Dominador

Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as an attorney-at-law to the extent of putting up asignboard with his name and the words "Attorney-at Law" (Exh. I and 1- 1) to indicate his office,and it was but natural for respondent and any person for that matter to have accepted that

statement on its face value. "Now with respect to the allegation of complainant that respondentis guilty of fraternizing with Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent of permitting his wife to be agodmother of Mr. Tan's child at baptism (Exh. M & M-1), that fact even if true did not renderrespondent guilty of violating any canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations withDominador A. Tan and family did not influence his official actuations as a judge where saidpersons were concerned. There is no tangible convincing proof that herein respondent gave anyundue privileges in his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan or that the latter benefitted in hispractice of law from his personal relations with respondent, or that he used his influence, if hehad any, on the Judges of the other branches of the Court to favor said Dominador Tan.

Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as much as possible frommaintaining close friendly relations with practising attorneys and litigants in his court so as to

avoid suspicion 'that his social or business relations or friendship constitute an element indetermining his judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does havesocial relations, that in itself would not constitute a ground for disciplinary action unless it beclearly shown that his social relations be clouded his official actuations with bias and partialityin favor of his friends (pp. 403-405, rec.).

In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not violateany law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in

business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of First Instance ofLeyte, he should be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities, because his conduct asa member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with propriety but must always be above suspicion.

WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBYREMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.

Fernando, C.J., Abad Santos and Esolin JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO,J., concurring and dissenting:

I vote for respondent's unqualified exoneration.


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BARREDO,J.,concurring and dissenting:

I vote with Justice Aquino.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO,J., concurring and dissenting:

I vote for respondent's unqualified exoneration.

BARREDO,J.,concurring and dissenting:

I vote with Justice Aquino.

OCKET NO. / CASE NO.: A.M. No. 133-JDATE: May 31, 1982COMPLAINANT: Bernardita R.. MacariolaRESPONDENT: Hon. Elias B. Asuncion, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte

FACTS:When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon. Judge Elias B. Asuncion ofCourt of First Instance of Leyte became final on June 8, 1863 for lack of an appeal, a project of partition wassubmitted to him which he later approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto wascomplainant Bernardita R. Macariola.

One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot according to the decisionrendered by Judge Asuncion was adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 intofive lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.

On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to JudgeAsuncion and his wife Victoria Asuncion.

Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot 1184-Eto the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. wherein Judge Asuncion was the president.

Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil Case No. 4234 in the CFI ofLeyte against Judge Asuncion with acts unbecoming a judge alleging that Judge Asuncion in acquiring bypurchase a portion of Lot 1184-E violated Article 1491 pr. 5 of the New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of theCode of Commerce Sec 3 par H ofRA3019 Sec 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canons of JudicialEthics.

On November 2, 1970 Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered a decision dismissing thecomplaints against Judge Asuncion,

After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court ofAppeals, she recommended on her decision dated March 29,1971 that Judge Asuncion be exonerated.

ISSUE: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law in acquiring bypurchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E which he previously decide in a Civil Case Nio. 3010 and his engage ment in

business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute anact unbecoming of a judge?

HELD: No. The respondent Judge Asuncions actuation does not constitute of an act unbecoming of a judgeBut he is reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities.


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JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

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G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ,petitioner,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,vs.JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THESENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX

WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN,MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWINGATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGARERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAON, JR., CECILIACARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR,

WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINOBIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATOMATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR.,FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDINROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAELDUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO,FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGENDILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO,

ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA,ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR.,JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA,

ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS,

RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ,respondents,JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

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G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003

HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C.REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S.MALLARI,petitioners,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,

vs.HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY

AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES,respondents,JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

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G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003


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G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER ORPRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THEPHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.DRILON, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003

CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THEPHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003

U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V.ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S.RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B.CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND INBEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,

vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIXFUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVESOF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILEDTHE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.DAVIDE, JR. respondents.

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G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003

FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,vs.

THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THEHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003

NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,vs.HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OFTHE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE


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HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THEPHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003

VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEA, petitioners,

vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THESENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLINDRILON, respondents.

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G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003

IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIOG. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.

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G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER,HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON,respondents.

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G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003

DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M.MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIALBOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OFCEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY.MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES,INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS

ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACIONINTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOSG. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY

LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITOFLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OFTHE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,

vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ASHOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, ASSENATE PRESIDENT,respondents.

CARPIO MORALES,J.:


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(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representativesor by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included inthe Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within threesession days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shallsubmit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with thecorresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within tensession days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a

favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contraryresolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all theMembers of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senateshall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shallbe initiated against the same official more than once within aperiod of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting forthat purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is ontrial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall beconvicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office anddisqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shallnevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purposeof this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of

Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (HouseImpeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules 1approvedby the 11th Congress. The relevantdistinctions between these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules areshown in the following tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT

Section 2.Mode of InitiatingImpeachment.Impeachment shall beinitiated only by a verified complaint forimpeachment filed by any Member of theHouse of Representatives or by any citizenupon a resolution of endorsement by anyMember thereof or by a verified complaint orresolution of impeachment filed by at leastone-third (1/3) of all the Members of theHouse.

RULE V

BAR AGAINST INITIATION OFIMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS

AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL

Section 16. ImpeachmentProceedings Deemed Initiated.Incases where a Member of the House files a

verified complaint of impeachment or acitizen files a verified complaint that isendorsed by a Member of the House througha resolution of endorsement against animpeachable officer, impeachmentproceedings against such official are deemed


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initiated on the day the Committee onJustice finds that the verified complaintand/or resolution against such official, asthe case may be, is sufficient in substance, oron the date the House votes to overturn oraffirm the finding of the said Committee thatthe verified complaint and/or resolution, asthe case may be, is not sufficient in

substance.

In cases where a verified complaint or aresolution of impeachment is filed orendorsed, as the case may be, by at leastone-third (1/3) of the Members of theHouse, impeachment proceedings aredeemed initiated at the time of thefiling of such verified complaint orresolution of impeachment with theSecretary General.

RULE V

BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT

Section 14.Scope of Bar.Noimpeachment proceedings shall be initiatedagainst the same official more than once

within the period of one (1) year.

Section 17.Bar Against Initiation OfImpeachment Proceedings.Within aperiod of one (1) year from the dateimpeachment proceedings are deemedinitiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, noimpeachment proceedings, as such, can beinitiated against the same official. (Italics inthe original; emphasis and underscoringsupplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2sponsored by Representative FelixWilliam D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid oflegislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of theJudiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint4(first impeachmentcomplaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5of this Court for "culpable

violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."6The complaint was endorsedby Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7and was referred tothe House Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of theConstitution which reads:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House ofRepresentatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall

be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committeewithin three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all itsMembers, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together

with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the Housewithin ten session days from receipt thereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was"sufficient in form,"9but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in


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substance.10To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary inaccordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, aday after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11was filed

with the Secretary General of the House12by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac)and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. Thissecond impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by

at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives. 13

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al.,most of which petitions contendthat the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same officialmore than once within a period of one year."

In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment,that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendentalimportance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedurein Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14posits that his right to bring an impeachmentcomplaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrarychanges in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House ofRepresentatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof bedeclared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House ofRepresentatives et. al.to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return thesecond impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and topromulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondentHouse of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al.,as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that theissues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, theissuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of

Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibitingrespondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment againstthe Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with theimpeachment trial.

In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyersand members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involvespublic interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the secondimpeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conductingfurther proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he has locusstandi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay

Development Corporation,16prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint bedeclared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legalprofession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representativesfrom drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, andrespondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.

In G.R. No. 160295,petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez,alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only


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constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that thesecond impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160310,petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al.,claiming that they have a right to be protectedagainst all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect theSupreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari andProhibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the secondimpeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) thisCourt enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the

second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors andagents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160318,petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers, andits co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in theirpetition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involvesparamount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the secondimpeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160342,petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine BarAssociation and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as ataxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction toenjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160343,petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code ofProfessional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition thatSections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declaredunconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with thesecond impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160360,petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibitionthat the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160365,petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition forProhibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v.

Factoran17which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writprohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further proceedings on thesecond impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachmentcomplaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of theJudiciary.

In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in hispetition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the PhilippineJudicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Courtand its officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writprohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and theSenate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.

In G.R. No. 160376,petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition thatrespondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were"absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles ofImpeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."

In G.R. No. 160392,petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofilea, alleging that asprofessors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari andProhibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their


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students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying theArticles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160397,petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging thatthe second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund(JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive

jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void forLack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160403,petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of thesecond impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition forCertiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom bedeclared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articlesof Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles ofImpeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.

In G.R. No. 160405,petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al.,as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petitionfor Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsementand impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondentsSenate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachmentagainst the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited fromproceeding with the impeachment trial.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen whichwere filed before this Court,18prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminaryinjunction to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising fromthe second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewiseprayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for beingunconstitutional.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28,2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that HouseResolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF)infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutionalprinciple of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put forth thatthe second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because theHouse of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19and as reflected above, to date, the Articles ofImpeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.

Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminaryinjunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recusethemselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed himto participate.

Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolvedto (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as theSolicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set thepetitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal expertsas amici curiae.20In addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo,enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that wouldrender the petitions moot.

Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr.and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court


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has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independentand co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionallymandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own

behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21and Comment, praying that "the consolidatedpetitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachmentproceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to tryand decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized andupheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them withthe earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. ofNovember 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.

On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed aManifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis inlaw or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before itsince (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt ofthe Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertainexclusively to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.

On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261,160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quoResolution issued by this Court onOctober 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutionaldeadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicialdetermination.

On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a"Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."

On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.filed aMotion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of thePhilippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.

The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintaland Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.

On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiaeand the arguments of petitioners,intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principalissues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:

Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on whatissues and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:

a) locus standiof petitioners;

b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);

c) political question/justiciability;

d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;

e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;


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f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-visSection 3(5) of Article XI ofthe Constitution; and

g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as welas the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Courthas sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the powerof judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yetremaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.

Judicial Review

As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine thevalidity of the second impeachment complaint.

This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, ArticleVIII of our present 1987 Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as maybe established by law.

Judicial power includes the dutyof the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involvingrights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has

been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part ofany branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)

Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in thedefinitive 1936 case ofAngara v. Electoral Commission23after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whoseprovisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par.2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel dis

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