caudillismo en paraguay

7/30/2019 Caudillismo en Paraguay

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Interpersonal Relationships and Caudillismo in ParaguayAuthor(s): Frederic HicksReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Jan., 1971), pp.89-111Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of MiamiStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/174749 .

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FREDERIC HICKSDepartment of AnthropologyUniversity of LouisvilleLouisville, Kentucky

INTERPERSONALELATIONSHIPSNDCAUDILLISMON PARAGUAY*araguayhas a relativelyopen (for LatinAmerica) class structure,a strongnationalconsciousness, two-partypoliticalsystem,andmass involvementn nationalpolitics,all of which are featuresthat some writers'believe shouldbe associatedwith representative e-mocracyof the North American ype. In Paraguay,however,these fea-tures are associatedwith, andin fact reinforce,a political systemwhichformostof the past centuryhas consistedof a seriesof conservative ndunstabledictatorships.It will be suggestedn this paperthat this association s made pos-

sibleby the developmentof certainkinds of interpersonal elationshipswhichhavebeen called"dyadiccontracts" sincetheybind two individ-uals in eitherpatron-clientelationships r colleaguerelationships.Theytake variousinstitutionalizedormsin many peasantsocietiesthat lack* Materialfor this paperwas gathered,at firstcasually andonly later systemat-ically, between March 1963 and September1965 while I was a visiting professor ofanthropologyat the Universidad Nacional de Asuncion under the Fulbright-Haysprogram.I have not been able to keep in touch with developments n Paraguaysinceleaving that country,however, so except where otherwisenoted, the political systemis here describedas it was in 1965.1 E.g., Theodore Wyckoff, "The Role of the Military in Latin AmericanPolitics," Western Political Quarterly 13 (September 1960): 745-763.2 George M. Foster, "TheDyadic Contract: A Model for the Social Structureof a Mexican Peasant Village," American Anthropologist 63 (December 1961):1173-1192; idem. "The Dyadic Contract in Tzintzuntzan, II: Patron-Client Rela-tionships,"ibid. 65 (December 1963): 1280-1294.

89


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90 JOURNAL FINTER-AMERICANTUDIES NDWORLD FFAIRScorporatedescentgroups,havingbeen described or Italy,3Spain,4andthe Philippines,5 s well as Latin America.Among their effects s to linkthe peasantryand other ower class sectorsto the elite, including he po-liticalelite.This effecthasbeen noted in manycountries.Whatseems dis-tinctiveaboutParaguay s the way the dyadiccontractcomplex s linkedto the nationalpoliticalpartysystem.This has the effectof politicizing hepeasantry (and the urbanlower classes), yet directingtheir politicalenergies o the supportof conservativegroupswhich do not usually actin their nterest. t is also related o the preservationin modified orm)of caudillismo,a political systeminvolvinga successionof leaders whoachievepowerchiefly throughviolencewith the supportof a personalfollowingwhichexpects a shareof the spoils that accrueto the power-holder.6

DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARAGUAYANPOLITICAL SYSTEMThe presentParaguayan oliticalsystembegan to takeshape in thedecades ollowing he Warof the TripleAlliance(1865-1870), in whichParaguayoughtthe combined orces of Brazil,Argentina,and Uruguay.

Thewar,whichParaguay ost, devastatedhe country,wipedout an esti-matedone-halfof its population,andbroughtwidespreadpolitical,eco-nomic,andsocialdisruption.Politically, he relative solationof the countryunder ts threegreatdictators,GasparRodriguezde Francia (1814-1840), CarlosAntonioLopez (1844-1862), andFranciscoSolanoL6pez (1862-1870), endedwith the deathin the war of the youngerLopez. Underthe eyes of theBrazilianoccupation orces,a new constitutionwas drawnup by a num-ber of educatediberalParaguayanswhohadfled theircountrybeforethewarandin manycasesfoughtonthe sideof the Alliesfor thepurpose,astheysaw it, of liberating heircountryfromthe tyrannyof Lopez. Thenew constitution,which remained n effect until 1940, providedfor aliberal,democratic overnment,withanelectedpresidentand a bicameral

3 Jeremy Boissevain, "Patronage n Sicily,"Man, new ser., 1, no. 1 (March1966): 18-33; Sydel F. Silverman, "Patronageand Community-Nation Relation-ships in CentralItaly,"Ethnology4, no. 2 (April 1965): 172-189.4 Michael Kenny, "Patternsof Patronage in Spain,"Anthropological Quar-terly 33 (January1960): 14-23.

5 Mary R. Hollensteiner, "Social Structure and Power in a PhilippineMunicipality," n Jack M. Potter et al, eds., Peasant Society: A Reader (Boston:Little-Brown,1967), pp. 200-212.6 Merle Kling, "Towarda Theory of Power and Political Instabilityin LatinAmerica," WesternPolitical Quarterly9 (March 1956): 21-35; Eric R. Wolf andEdward C. Hansen,"CaudilloPolitics: A StructuralAnalysis," ComparativeStudiesin Society and History 9, no. 2 (January 1967): 168-179.


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INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN PARAGUAY 91legislature, reedomof the press,universal uffrage,and the inviolabilityof private property.Although an enlighteneddocumentfor its time, itwas the productof a foreignculture, mposedupon Paraguayand quitealientothe Paraguayanradition.Many landownershad abandoned heir propertiesn theirflight toescape the war's devastation.After the war, the countrywas opened upto hordesof adventurers nd speculators,of diversenationalities,whopoured n to take advantage, or personalgain, of the disorganizedondi-tions and the corruptionwhich soon prevailed.A series of questionablefinancialmachinations lungedthe countryever deeper into debt.

A wayout of thefinancialproblemswas eventuallyound n the saleof public ands.Between 1883 and 1887, a series of laws werepassed topermit he sale of vast quantitiesof state-owned ands, inherited rom theLopez era or acquiredafter heir ownershad abandoned hemduring hewar, and whichmeanwhilehad been occupiedby peasantsor smallfarm-ers. The lands were sold exclusively n large parcels, at prices that wereextremelyowbuttoohighfor the pennilessParaguayan easants,and theconditionsof sale were such that few but foreignerscould meet them.Within en years, virtuallyall of the productive,accessiblepubliclandswere ownedby foreigners, or the most part land speculatorswho livedoutsideParaguay.As aresultof thelandsales, thousands f peasantsweredrivenfrom lands which, in some cases, they had occupied for genera-tions. Withno place to go, many sufferedextreme privation.Workingconditions, or those few able to find work, got steadilyworse.For thefirst time, Paraguayansn appreciablenumbersbegan to emigrate romtheircountry.7

It was under these conditionsof defeat, foreigneconomic domina-tion, andeconomic nsecurity hat the modernParaguayan oliticalsys-tem began. The system as it developedwas adapted o theseconditions,whichrecallthose prevalentearlier n many other parts of LatinAmeri-ca whencaudillismoas a political system developed,8and underwhich,in Kling'sanalysis,9 hronicpolitical nstability houldprevail.Theyalsorecall those of Sicily, for which Boissevain'0has describeda systemofpatronagesimilar to that of Paraguay.While today it is doubtfulthatforeign economic dominationand economic insecurityare appreciablygreater n Paraguay hanin most Latin Americancountries, heirforms

7 Alcides Codas Papaluca', Cuestiones rurales del Paraguay (Buenos Aires:Editorial Tupa, 1949); Carlos Pastore, La lucha por la tierra en el Paraguay:proceso historico y legislativo (Montevideo: Editorial Antequera, 1949).8 Wolf andHansen,"CaudilloPolitics."9 Kling, "Theoryof Power."10 Boissevain, "Patronage n Sicily."


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92 JOURNAL OF INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRShave undergone ittle changesince the late nineteenth entury.The politi-cal system,with its patternof patronageand instability,1' till bears themarksof the conditionsunderwhich it arose, and to some extent it func-tions to maintain hose conditions.The two politicalpartieswhichstill today dominate he political ifeof Paraguay race their originsbackto two rival clubs,of limited mem-bershipand influence, hatwere formed shortly after the war. They didnot beginto organizeon a national cale, however,until 1887. In June ofthatyear, a groupof businessmen, rofessionals, ndintellectuals ormedthe Centro Democratico, later called the Partido Liberal, to defend theirinterestsagainsta clique which, with the supportof the government,threatened o monopolizeeconomicopportunities. n response,membersof the governmentunder the leadershipof the president,GeneralBer-nardinoCaballero, ormed n September f that year the AsociacionNa-cional Republicana, also called the Partido Colorado after the red bannerit adoptedas its emblem (the Liberalsadopted he colorblue).12Througha networkof friendships,patron-client elationships,andgroup nterests,membershipn one orthe otherof thetwo partiesspreadthroughout he country, nvolvingpeople of all social classes,so that to-daythe membership f the two parties s assumed o be aboutequal.Tothe extent that ideologieswereinvolved,both partiesadoptedthe liberalprinciples hatweretheorderof the day,butpartyaffiliation eflectedpri-marilypersonal oyalties,notpoliticalprinciples.Historianswrite thatthe Coloradopartyruleduntil 1904, when theLiberalera began, astinguntil 1941 exceptfor a brief interluden 1936-1937. Then came the dictatorship f Morinigo,a nonpartyman, whichlasteduntil the revolutionof 1947, whenthe Coloradosregainedpower,which they hold to this day. In reality, however,there has rarelybeenmuchpartycohesion.Factional plitshave occurred epeatedly.At risk of

11 At this writing, PresidentAlfredo Stroessnerhas succeeded in holding officefor more than fifteen years, longer than any presidentsince Carlos Antonio Lopez,and many Paraguayansunderstandablyregardthis as "politicalstability."However,he has retained officesimply by being able to triumphover all attemptsto oust himso far, or, as Kling (see footnote 6) would put it, by "a series of successful anticipa-tory revolts."12 Policarpo Artaza, Que hizo el Partido Liberal en la oposici6n y en elgobierno (Buenos Aires: Talleres GraficosLucania, 1961), pp. 15-19; Justo PastorBenitez, Formaci6onocial del pueblo paraguayo (Asuncion & Buenos Aires: Edi-torial America-Sapucai, 1955), pp. 152-153, 165; Carlos P. Centuri6n,Historia dela cultura paraguaya I (Asuncion: Biblioteca "Ortiz Guerrero", 1961), pp. 408-413; Justo Prieto, Paraguay, la provincia gigante de las Indias (Buenos Aires:Libreria-Editorial"El Ateneo", 1951), pp. 132, 195; Paul H. Lewis, The Politicsof Exile: Paraguay's Febrerista Party (Chapel Hill: University of North CarolinaPress, 1968), pp. 17-25.


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INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN PARAGUAY 93grossoversimplification,ne can perhaps ay that t is common or factionsto develop withinthe party n power overthe divisionof the spoils, andin the partyout of power over the bestway to get in. The violencewhichhas so often characterized araguayanpoliticallife is due as much tothese factionalsplitsas to the rivalrybetweenthe two parties.'3Effortsto establish hird partiesor new political movementshavebeen made rom timeto time, but theyhave not had lastingsuccess.Dur-ing the resurgence f nationalismn the 1920s and 1930s, therewas muchtalk of buildinga "New Paraguay."4 A Communistpartywas formed,and t madesomeheadwayamong hecountry's ew urbanworkers.Moreimportantwas theFebreristaparty, originally omposedof the followersof Chaco War hero Colonel Rafael Franco, who held the presidencybriefly ollowinga coup in February,1936. More recently,a ChristianDemocraticmovementwas establishedn 1960, and it becamea politicalpartyin 1965. Today, the Febreristaand ChristianDemocraticpartiesboth have legal status,but they have few adherentsoutsidethe urbanbourgeoisie.15 hevast majorityof Paraguayansontinue heirallegianceto oneor the otherof the two "traditional"arties,Coloradoand Liberal.This is despite the fact that these partiesare both avowedly"rightist,"while the smallerparties espouse programswhich might be expectedtohavewidemassappeal.Both of the traditionalpartiesare, however,affectedby factional-ism. Shortlyafter the revolutionof 1947, the Coloradopartysplit intofactionsknownas "GuionRojo" and "Democratico," nd while thesefactionshave not yet been completelyamalgamated,hey worktogethernow on a national evel and havebecome argelyovershadowed y a newgenerationof Coloradosowing allegianceonly to PresidentStroessner,who,as head of the armed orces,seizedthe presidencyn 1954 andhasheldit sincethattime.A dissidentColorado actionknown as the Movi-

13 Artaza, Partido Liberal, pp. 33-38; Manuel J. Cibils, Anarquia y revolu-cion en el Paraguay (Buenos Aires: EditorialAmericalee, 1957), pp. 29-31; Lewis,Politics of Exile, pp. 25-37; Pastore, Tierra en Paraguay, pp. 144ff; RodolfoRivarola, "El ParaguayPolitico", Revista Argentina de Ciencias Politicas, Afio 1,2 (1911): 5-23; Harris G. Warren,Paraguay, an InformalHistory (Norman: Uni-versity of OklahomaPress, 1949), pp. 265-268.14 Harris G. Warren,"Political Aspects of the ParaguayanRevolution, 1936-1940,"Hispanic American Historical Review 30 (February 1950): 2-25.15 The Febreristaparty has repeatedly split into factions, usually identifiableas "left" or "right",over ideological and tactical issues (see Lewis [footnote 12]for a summary and analysis of these schisms). Generally the more conservativefactions have remained active in Paraguay,while the more radical ones have con-tinued their separateorganizationsin exile. The latter sometimes make news withdeclarations issued in exile, but their impact on affairs inside Paraguay is negli-gible.


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94 JOURNALFINTER-AMERICANTUDIES NDWORLD FFAIRSmientoPopularColorado MOPOCO),formedbetween1955 and1958,operatesclandestinely othinsideand outsideof Paraguay.The Liberalpartysplitintofactions n 1963 overthe issueof participationn the fixedpresidentiallectionsof thatyear (theywereofferedone-thirdof theseatsin congressand one ambassadorshipr two, regardlessof vote count, iftheywouldparticipaten the elections).The government ecognized hesmalldissidentaction hatfavoredparticipation s the onlylegalLiberalparty.Themajority f theLiberalsremainedaloofuntil1966, whentheyaccepted egalrecognitionunderthe namePartidoLiberalRadical,buttheyarestillunderstoodo be themajorityactionof theLiberalparty.

Nationalelectionsarecustomarilyheld at periodic ntervals(everyfive years,normally),butrarely f everhavethesebeen credible ests ofpopularpoliticalpreferences.Elections in which the dominantparty'scandidate unsunopposed,or withonlytokenopposition,havebeentherule.Politicalpowerhas neverpassedfromone partyto anotheras theresult of an election,andknowledgeableParaguayans oubtthat it everwill underthe presentpoliticalsystem.CLASS AND POLITICIZATIONParaguays a relativelyhomogeneousnation culturally,and its so-cial class systemis not markedby the rigidbarriers o mobilitythat areso characteristic f the Andean countriesand CentralAmerica.1,6nparticular,hegreatsocialgulfthatseparateshelaboringpeon classfromthe non-peonclassesin those countries s virtuallyabsent.Indeed,manyParaguayans old almostas a dogmathat social class differencesdo notexist ntheircountry,onlywealthdifferences.Thedifferences a realone,

althought canbe overstated.Wealthof coursebringsadvantages,but itis primarilywealth,notascribed tatusor culturalbackground,hatbringsthem.17Politicalactivityandthe fruitsof suchactivityare not expected obe withheld romany sectorof societybecauseof its wealth,education,background,r occupation.The socialdistinctionwhichperhapsbest correlateswitha differencein politicalbehavior s thatbetweenpeoplewith a cosmopolitan, ome-what ntellectual,urbanculturalorientation, n the one hand,andpeopleof a moreprovincialorientation,ess intellectuallynclined,on the other.

16 Ralph L. Beals, "Social Stratification in Latin America," American Jour-nalof Sociology 58 (January1953): 327-339.17 The distinctionbetween the baile oficial and the baile popular, which theServices found so useful as an indicator of class differencesin Tobati (see ElmanR. Service and Helen S. Service, Tobati: Paraguayan Town [Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1954J,pp. 136-137) is either absent or much less formalized inmany Paraguayancommunities, and is definitely on the decline.


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INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN PARAGUAY 95

This is not entirelya wealthdifference, orthe social systemprovidesop-portunities or membersof the lattergroup to become wealthy (usuallythrough he armed ervices,politics,orcommercial griculture ndstock-raising) withoutacquiring n urban,cosmopolitanorientation. t is onlya somewhatmore rural-urbandifference,because even Asuncion, thecapital and largestcity, is sufficiently rovincial, o that the contrastbe-tween it and manyruraltownsis not extreme.A moderatelyurban en-vironmentand a certainminimumof economic resourcesare necessaryfor theacquisition f a cosmopolitan utlook and the values that go withit but do not assuretheiracquisition.The associateddifference n political behavior is this: the cosmo-politan, urban-orientedntellectual ends to be concernedwith politicalprinciples nd ideologiesand mayregardpoliticsas a potential nstrumentfor bringingaboutsocial or economicchange.He knows from his formaleducation hatthis is what politics s supposed o be about.Theless cos-mopolitan,moreprovincially-orientedersons-and such are of coursethe vast majority-see politics primarilyor exclusivelyas a means ofmanipulating eople so as to achieveadvancement nd power for them-

selves or their clique. To them, politics is "politicking"-politiqueria.Most of what s writtenaboutpolitics nParaguays writtenbymem-bers of the intellectual, osmopolitangroup. It is primarilymembersofthis group also that are attracted o the newer, smaller, ideologically-orientedparties.The larger, traditionalparties, however, providemoreopportunitiesor advancementhroughpoliticalactivity,especially n therural areas. So these parties have greater appeal for people of a moreprovincial,ess intellectual rientation.Regardless f socialclass,Paraguayans ave a highlydevelopedna-tional consciousness.There are no patriaschicas in Paraguay; hereis agood deal of geographicalmobilityand very little regional variation.18Almost withoutexception,sentimentsand loyaltiesare directedtowardthe nation,not towardany particularocality withinit. This, plus therelativelyopen class structure,meansthat Paraguayans f all classes andregionscan havethe satisfactionof being involved n a formof politicalactivitywhich,as will be seen, bringsrewardsand is significant n a na-

tional scale;but their involvementdoes not lead to politically-initiatedchanges avoring he lowerclasses,and thisis largely he resultof thewaythe dyadiccontractworksin a politicalcontext.18 Domingo M. Rivarola, "Bases preliminarespara el estudio de la movilidadsocial en el Paraguay,"Revista Paraguaya de Sociologia, Anio 1, no. 1 (September-December 1964), pp. 9-29.


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96 JOURNAL OF INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRSTHE DYADIC CONTRACT AND CAUDILLISMO IN PARAGUAY

Like manyLatin Americancountries-and underdevelopedoun-tries throughoutheworld-Paraguayhas few impersonalmeans of pro-vidingeconomicand egal security or its inhabitants. t had virtuallynonein the decades ollowing heWar of theTripleAlliance,whenthe presentParaguayanpoliticalsystemwas takingform. For people of the lowerclasses, the social welfare programsare inadequate o meet the need,there are few opportunitiesor secureemployment, nd courtor bureau-craticprocedures re invariablybeyondtheir level of sophistication.Ontheuppersocial levels,therehas in the past beenrelatively ittledepend-ablegovernmentprotectionof business nterests;governmentavoritismand arbitrariness,s well as economic luctuations, ave addedto invest-ment risks, particularlyor Paraguayannationals.These conditions have led to the developmentof other means ofproviding he individualwith the securityhe needs. These means arebasedon the establishment f ties of mutual oyaltyand obligationon aperson-to-person asis. They take variousforms,dependingon the con-textandthe statusof the person nvolved,but forthe most partareof thetypethat Fosterhas called"dyadiccontracts,"9 since basically hey aretiesbinding wo individuals. oster distinguisheswo typesof dyadiccon-tract operatingin Tzintzuntzan,Mexico. Colleaguerelationships"tiepeople of equal or approximately qual socioeconomicstatus,who ex-changethe samekinds of goods and services,"while patron-client ela-tionships "tie people . . . of significantly different socioeconomic status(or orderof power), who exchangedifferentkinds of goods and ser-vices." 0 The proliferation f such relationshipsmay createa networkpermeating irtually he entiresociety,but it will be a networkbasedonindividual elationships,ather han on classunityand opposition.One formof patron-client elationships the well-known nstitutionof compadrazgo-ritualco-parenthood-which is widespread hrough-out the Latinworld.This institution ervesto provide he individualwithanumber f pseudo-kinwithwhomhe is linkedbyobligations ndrespon-sibilitieswhich ncludemutualaid.2' InParaguayt is important rimarilyin the rural areas, and, as in many other countries,compadres (co-parents) are often chosen not merelyout of friendshipbut with a viewtoward cementing relationshipsof certain useful kinds. A conscious19 Foster, "DyadicContract."20 Foster, "DyadicContract n Tzintzuntzan,"p. 1281.21 Sidney W. Mintz and Eric R. Wolf, "An Analysis of Ritual Co-Parenthood(Compadrazgo)," SouthwesternJournal of Anthropology 6 (Winter 1950): 341-368; Service and Service, Tobati,pp. 126-127.


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INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN PARAGUAY 97effort s often made to obtaincompadresor oneself, andpadrinos(god-fathers)for one'soffspring,who would be ableto provideeconomic as-sistanceor influence houldcircumstancesmakethisnecessary.The manwho is potentially n a position o giveaid (the patron)receives rom therelationshipheloyaltyof hisclientcompadre nd feels free to callonhimforsuch assistanceas he can provide, ncludingassistancewhich can onlybe effective f it is voluntary, uchas votes or their functionalequivalentandtalk which willpromotea favorable mage for the patronamonghisclient'sassociates.22A less institutionalizedormof patron-clientelationships exempli-fiedby a behaviorpatterngenerally alled "paternalism"hich,primarilyin employer-employeeelationships,s characteristic f much of LatinAmerica.23Typically,and especially in small concernswhich are notunionized, heemployers expected o displaya certainsenseof noblesseobligewhichmayrequirehim to provide or his workersmore than theirusuallymeagerwage.He may be expected o pay a worker'smedicalex-penses or the schoolexpensesof his children, o pay a largeshareof thefuneralexpensesof a formerworker,and to advance oans.24The worker,for hispart,may oftenbe calledupon to providepersonal ervices or hisemployerbeyondwhatwouldusuallybe expectedof him in highly ndus-trialized ountries.Elmanand HelenService'sdescription f peasantbe-havior n a wage workingcontext in Tobati,in this case involvingverysmallruralconcerns,appliesto most smallerParaguayan ommunitiesandto a largeextentto smaller oncerns nAsuncionaswell. Theattitudeis somewhatas if theemployer patron)were doing theemployeea favorby hiringhim and,to at leastan equaldegree,the employee s doingthepatr6na favorbyworkingor him.Theexchangeof money s playeddownasif itwereonly a minorpartof thearrangement.It is not unusual or the employer o become the padrinoof one oftheemployee's hildren, o thatthetwo men becomecompadres,but thisis not a necessarypart of the pattern.The breakingof the employer-employee relationshipbecomes a delicate matter, as both parties areconsidered o be bound by ties that go beyond the purely economic,even if the compadrerelationships not present.25This does not meanthat wage workis in itself undesirable.On the contrary,a steady job,

22 Service and Service, Tobat4,chap. 12; cf. for Mexico, Foster, "The DyadicContract in Tzintzuntzan,"pp. 1283-1284.23 Robert J. Alexander, Today's Latin America (Garden City: DoubledayAnchor Books, 1962), pp. 88-90.24 Frederic Hicks and Egidio Picchioni, "Algunos aspectos de la industria-lizacion en una comunidad paraguaya," Suplemento Antropol6gico de la Revista delAteneo Paraguayo2, no. 1 (Diciembre 1966): 31-54.25 Serviceand Service, Tobati, pp. 126-127.


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98 JOURNAL OF INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRSwith a regularsalary,is a very attractivealternative o the subsistencefarmerwhose sole monetary ncome, if any, comes from the small sur-plus his wife may be ableto sell. However, f the peasantmust abandonfarming o take up employment, e is likely to sufferextraordinary ard-shipif he is suddenlydismissed;hence the effort o createpersonalbondsof amorepermanent ature.Colleaguerelationships,26n which the participants re of approxi-matelyequalstatus,areimportantn Paraguaymainly n the uppersocio-economic strata. It is considereda friendly gesture,if not actually anobligationof friendship, o grant to friends, and of course to relativesalso,27what favorsone can by virtue of one's position, knowledge,orskills. It is assumed hatthe favor will be returned hould an appropriateoccasionpresent tself.A friend n customsgets one'spackageout quicklyand with little formality; friend n the railwayadministrationets one asleeperreservationon short notice; a memberof the oppositionLiberalparty retainshis governmentob, a youth of Liberalparentsgains easyadmittance o the nationalcolegio, or a left-wingFebrerista emainsun-molestedbecausethey have Coloradofriends or relativesin high gov-ernmentpositions.One is not expected o wait his turn and comply withalltheformaldetailsof a bureaucraticroceduref hehasa friend hroughwhomhe can by-pass hem,andthefriendwouldbe hurt f the favorwerenotaskedof him.MostParaguayans ouldbe shocked f this werecalled"corruption."To those who can participaten it, it is seensimplyas a manifestation f acharacteristicrait of friendlinessand hospitalityof whichParaguayansarejustifiably ery proud.They emphasize hat no moneyever changeshands; o offeranoutrightbribewouldbe extremely mproper.Thepointis thatby doinga favor,onecreatesanobligationonthe partof the personfavored o return t, whilebriberycreatesno suchtie. It is rumored hatsome briberydoes occurin Paraguay,but it is said to be confined o thehighest evelsof the politicalor militarybureaucracy, nd I suspectthat,if so, it involvesmainly oreigners r otherswithwhomenduring ecipro-cal obligations annotbeestablished.The emphasison reciprocal oyalitiesandobligations,as manifestedin the systemof dyadicrelationships,s a themeof Paraguayan ulturethatfinds ts natural xpressionn therealm of politics.It can function oprovidecertain ndividualswithlargepersonal ollowingswhichtheycan

26 Foster, "DyadicContractin Tzintzuntzan,"p. 1281.27 For the purposesof this paper I believe that kinshipties may be treated asdyadic relationships;they are often very strong but still dyadic.


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INTERPERSONALELATIONSHIPSNPARAGUAY 99use to political advantage.28It forms the basis for caudillismo, a politicalsystem which, I would maintain, is still very much alive in Paraguay, notonlyon a locallevel in ruralareasbut on a national evel as well, involv-ing the highestoffices n thegovernment.Wolfand Hansen29 ave argued hat as a politicalsystem,caudillis-mo (or as these authorsterm it, caudillaje) began to give way in the1870s, when the particularbalance between landowningcriollo, lowerclass mestizo,andforeign nterests,on which the systemdepended,wasupsetby a shift n the natureof foreign nvestment. would suggest,how-ever,thatwhileParaguayanaudillismo s somewhatmodified,and neces-sarilymore discreet than the form which was so prevalent hroughoutLatin Americaa centuryago, its essential eaturesarestill present oday.Thesefeaturesncludepersonal ule(rather han rulethroughhe author-ity vested n a politicaloffice)maintained y buildingup a loyal personalfollowing,a followingwhich is retainedby rewards of wealth or thepowerto bestowpatronage hroughcontrolof accessto the sourcesofwealth.30The core of this following s said to consist of a group of militaryofficerswhoare PresidentStroessner'slosestassociates.31Althoughoftenof intermediate ank (majors or colonels, usually), and holding titleswhich in some cases sound inconsequential (e.g., chief of the militarycabinetof the presidency, ommander f thepresidentialscortbatallion),they are in fact amongthe mostpowerfulmen in the country.They in-cludethosein actualcommandof troops,andtheir oyaltyis retainedbygrantingthem unusual opportunities or self-enrichment.Many of themore ucrativebusinessenterprisesn thecountry anda few in neighbor-ing Brazil) belongto militarymen. The variousexpandingstate enter-prises-the alcohol monopoly,meat packingand export, shipping,therailway,anairline, lectricpower-provide sourcesof wealthandpatron-age easily disposableas rewards.Rumorscirculatingn 1964 were thatone of the mostpowerfulmilitaryunitsreceiveda regularsumsiphoned

28 Ramiro Dominguez, "El valle y la loma: comunicacion en comunidadesrurales," Suplemento Antropologico de la Revista del Ateneo Paraguayo 1, no. 2(February 1966): 127-242.29 Wolf and Hansen, "CaudilloPolitics,"pp. 177-178.30 Domingo M. Rivarola, "Universidad y estudiantes en una sociedad tradi-cional,"Aportes 12 (Abril 1969): 63-64.31 The statements in the remainder of this paragraphcannot, of course, bedocumented, and I must present them simply as rumors. These and others likethem, however, come with great consistencyfrom a diversity of sources, and I haveno doubt that they are true in essence, if not always accurate in detail. I presentthem despite the lack of substantiation because the Paraguayan political systemcannot be understoodwithout taking this kind of information into account.


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100 JOURNAL OF INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

off fromthe statealcoholmonopoly o retain ts loyalty. The large-scaletrafficn contrabandtemsof all kinds,which is carriedon quite openlythroughout he country,is generallyunderstood o be run by militarymen. Theyare alsosaid to directmuchof the cattle-stealinghat prevailsin the more remoteparts of the country.Men in these positionscan inturncontrol he accessof others o economicopportunities nd can grantsuch accessas favors.It must all be done discreetly,however, estParaguay'snternationalrelationsbe jeopardized.The pictureconveyedby Wolf and Hansen32of predatoryarmedbandsmore or less openlyengaging n "the syste-maticpillageof 'free'resources"s too grossto applygenerallyo present-day Paraguay.Whileno one doubtsPresidentStroessner'smachismo,heis certainlynot a flamboyantpublic personality.His very obscurityhow-ever,helpspreservehe systemby not calling nternational ttention o it.Visitingjournalistsareviewed with greatapprehension y officials,andmuchof the press censorship,whichis particularly ffectivebecauseitrelies on informalpressuresand understandingsather than on officialdecrees,seems designedsimplyto preventParaguay rombecominganinternationalewscenter.Possiblythe caudillosystempersists n Paraguay odaybecausethebalanceof interests eferredo abovehas not yet been sufficiently ltered,butit may alsobe that the relationship etween he dyadiccontractcom-plex and the traditionalpoliticalpartysystem has enabledit to survivesomedegreeof economicalteration. n any case,its existenceas a systemis recognizedby most Paraguayans, ndmany consider t a praiseworthysystem-despite its more predatory aspects,which they shrug off assomethingone mustput up withfor the sake of peace.It is by its naturea conservative ystem,however,becauseit func-tionsby utilizingexistingpowerrelationshipswhich the peopleinvolved,whetheras patronsor as clients,are obliged o maintain.Lacking he ex-periencefor betteringone's conditionthroughhard work or businessacumen,one seeksadvancement y allyinghimselfwithsomeonealreadyin a positionto bestow favors.As the Services noted, "themost usualresponse rom a peasantwho is queriedabouthis economicor technicaldifficultiess not that he needs a good steelplow, betterseed, or a yokeof oxen,but thathe needsa good patronwho willhelphim."33 An indi-vidual who is sufficientlyadept may be able to work his way up thepolitical adderthrough he system,so there is a turnoverof personnel,but neitherthe systemnor the existingpowerrelationshipsare thereby

32 Wolf and Hansen, "Caudillo Politics."33 Service and Service, Tobati, p. 125.


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INTERPERSONALELATIONSHIPSNPARAGUAY 101changed. In fact, the system provides a certain amount of opportunity forpeopleof relativelyhumbleoriginto achievea moderatelyhigh politicalposition,and manywho consider hemselvesaristocrats re annoyed hatthey must deal with such "simplebrutes"as often occupy positions ofauthority.

THEPOLITICALARTIESThe moststriking eatureof Paraguayan olitics s thenear-universaladhesion o one or the otherof the two traditional oliticalparties,Colo-rado and Liberal.The vast majorityof Paraguayans, uraland urban,of

all social classes andin all but the most remoteparts of the country,seethemselvesas belonging o one or the other of these parties,whetherornot they are formally nscribed n the partyrolls.34One is expected o re-main always oyal to his party;to changeone's partyaffiliations con-sidered ittleshort of treasonous.Except for membersof the cosmopoli-tan, intellectual lass concernedwith such matters, his loyalty does notinvolve the ideology or programof the party, of which most people areonly vaguelyaware,but the symbolsand slogansof the party.The partyleadersare not above criticism,buthoweverbitterlyan individualmem-ber may criticize hem, he always affirmshis unwavering oyalty to theparty.Once one does become allied with a particularpolitical leader,however, he is expected to remain oyal to him. This means that in apoliticalcontest, orexample,one shouldvotewith themanto whom oneowesloyaltyand shouldremain oyalto the candidate hismansupports,whetherhe winsor loses.Consequently, oting (for example, n an elec-tion of local party officials) frequently results in the formation of factions,as the followersof the losing candidatequite commonly (normally,ac-cording o many Paraguayans) efuse to reuniteand cooperatewith thewinner.35Thus factions readily form, and the existence of factional splits with-in a political party, on either a national or a local level, is perhaps thesecond most striking feature of Paraguayan politics. The factions formedafter one electiontendto endure or long periodsof time,the sameonesappearingn election after election. This is understandableonsideringthat electionsseldom involve ideological ssues but ratherare contests

34 At present the Liberal party is split into what are officially two parties (seebelow). Similar situations have existed in the past and have so far always provedephemeral.35 This pattern is apparentlynot limited to political elections among the ruralor provincially-oriented ector. I know of at least one such case involving an elec-tion among the highly-educatedmembershipof a professional society in Asuncion.


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102 JOURNAL OF INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRSfor positionsfrom which to form a power base throughopportunity obestowpatronage.The candidate's upportersare those who hope forsuitablerewards f he wins. If he loses, they can expect no considerationfromtheman they opposed,whois obliged o rewardonly his supporters.Indeed,he rarelyhas the means to tempthis formeropponentsafter re-wardinghis supporters,who would in any caseresentfurtherdivision oftheirshare of the spoils.Theoretically, particularly uccessful actionalleadermight becomeso successfulas to acquirea larger followingthanhe couldreward,but the two-party ystemprecludes uch an eventualityby placinga limit on the numberof followers hateven the most success-ful leadercan acquire, incethey can be drawnonlyfrom his own party.Thus the best course of action for followersof a losing candidate s tostickwiththe manthey supported ndhopefor better uck next time. Onewho switchesallegiances s clearlynot to be trusted; ince it is unlikelythat he would do so out of a changein his convictions,his motivationcouldonly be personalgain.It follows fromthis that,aside fromthe urban, ntellectual, osmo-politanclass, everyonemusthave an "opini6n"-a commitment o oneoranotherpartyor faction.One does not knowhow to deal witha personwithoutknowingwhat his politicalaffiliation s. Onedoesnot know howto interprethis statements,nor how one's own will be interpreted. inceParaguayansrefullyawareof the functional elationships etweenpoli-tics and so manyotheraspectsof theirculture,few topics of conversa-tion can long remainwhollyfree of politicalimplications; o one quitecommonlyfeels uneasytalkingwith someone whose politicalaffiliationis unknown.If a personattempts o maintaina positionof aloofness orneutrality,he is likely to be regardedwith suspicionand mistrustedbynearlyeveryone.People oftenexpresstheirdissatisfactionwith suchper-sonsby callingthem"Communists," hichis understoodo mean some-one who worksundercover owardsubversive ndvaguelyevil ends. Thetruth s probably hat lackof a partyor factionalcommitments an indi-cation not of one'spoliticalbeliefs but of his attitude owardsociety.Hedeclinesto be eitherclient or patron;he presumesneitherto need thesupportof his fellows nor to offerhis own. A sincerelyneutralpersoncouldonlybe antisocial,or if not that,thena spy or otherwise omehowsubversive.i36The foregoingdescriptionappliesto the vastmajorityof Paraguay-ans butnot to all. A greatmanyof the cosmopolitan,urban ntellectualshave eitherbecomedisillusioned ltogetherwiththe two traditionalpar-

36 Frederic Hicks, "Politics, Power, and the Role of the Village Priest inParaguay,"Journal of Inter-AmericanStudies 9 (April 1967): 273-282.


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INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN PARAGUAY 103ties or cynicallyseek to takeadvantage f theprevailingpatternof partymembershipo suit theirown purposes.From the formergroup arisetheleaders of the newer and smaller parties, such as the FebreristaandChristianDemocratic,plusthe occasional rue Communist nd thosewhoaresimplyapolitical.Fromthelattergroupare drawnmanyof theholdersof civilianpoliticalposts,plus the inevitablebureaucratwho has learnedto adjust o the situationas it is and to aniembotavy,hatis, to appear oaccepteverythingn innocentgood faith and retaina satisfactorymiddle-class job. But there are alsomany membersof this class,including omeof thecountry's oremost ntellectuals,who are justas firmly oyal to thesymbolsandtraditions f theirpartyas is any peasantand whose viewofpolitics smuch he same.

LOCAL ORGANIZATION AND THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIESOn the local level party membersare organized nto territoriallybased wards,called seccionales in case of the Colorados,and comitesin the case of the Liberals. n theoryand to a large extent n practice, heentirecountry s divided ntowardswhoseboundariesgenerally oincide

withotheradministrativeoundaries, uchas distritos(unitscomparableto New England ownshipsor smallSouthern ounties), barrios(wards)of cities, etc.37 t is on this level that votingbehaviorandother formsofpoliticalactivitycan be mosteasilyobserved n Paraguay.The party membersof each ward elect a comision, or governingbody, which is chargedwith the task of mobilizing he party membersand,particularlyn the case of the Coloradoseccionales,exercisingvigi-lanceoverthe opposition.Since heColoradoparty s inpower, he leadersof its seccionalesoftenplayimportant olesin local politicalaffairs,and,especially n smallcommunities, he presidencyof the seccional is gen-erallyconsideredone of the three most importantpoliticalpositions,theothersbeing that of intendente,or mayor (in those townslarge enoughto have this office), and that of police comisario.The activitiesof theseccionalesandcomiteswillpresentlybe examined n more detail, but itwillbeworthwhile o examine irst heelectoralprocedure.Unfortunately,I havesufficientdata only for the Coloradoparty.

Each seccional s governedby a comisionof from twelve to thirtymembers,consistingof a president,one to threevice-presidents, ne ortwosecretaries, treasurer, ndmembers-at-largevocales). This leader-shipis electedby thevote of allColoradopartymembersn the wardand37 In Asuncion, for example, there are (as of 1965) twenty-five Coloradoseccionales, which are divided into subseccionales,and a reportedforty-six orthodoxLiberal (now RadicalLiberal) comite's.


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104 JOURNAL OF INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRSholds office for three years. The electionis supervisedby the Junta deGobierno (governingboard) of the party, which has headquartersnAsuncion,through an agency called the Comision de ReorganizacionPartidaria.When the officialsof a given seccionalare about to completetheir term of office, this agency appointsa delegation(delegacion) tosupervise the election of a new comision.The delegation s normallyheaded by a prominent,well-known igurein the national government,assistedbyoneor two lesserparty unctionaries. heirduty s to go to thecommunityn question, alk to the moreinfluentialparty members,andtryto get them to nominateand elect a comisionacceptable o the Juntade Gobierno.Thedelegation enerallyries o getall of thepartymembers o agreeon a singleslateof candidateswhich can be elected without opposition,because hispromotespartyunitymore effectivelyandavoidsthe forma-tion of irreconcilableactions. This effort often requiresrepeatedvisitsby thedelegation o the community,nthe courseof which heymakesug-gestionsand then give the people time to consider hem informally.Thusthe precisedate of the electionis not set far in advancebut merelyforthe winterof a givenyear; heactualelection akesplacewhen allprepara-tionsarecomplete. f a singleslateof candidates annotbe agreedupon,a systemof proportional epresentationssures helosingslateof at leastsome positionson the governing omision,provided ts marginof loss isslim.Since the powerof the seccionalpresidentdepends heavilyon hisacceptancebytheJuntade Gobierno, romwhichhe deriveshis ability obestow patronage, he delegationcan pressure he electorate o vote forthe slate it favors.38f not done adroitly,however, his can causebitter-nessandmayevenintensify actionaldifferences,eadingmanyColoradosto be critical of what they regardas undue interferenceby the Juntadelegation.Theseccionalelectiontakesplaceduring he courseof an asambleapartidaria, ndis a majorpoliticalandsocial event.Thedelegatescome39andmakespeeches o the assembledpartymembersn whichtheyextoll

38 Reasons for favoritism are various. For example, in Capiata, in 1965, theparty was divided into two factions, and the leader of the faction favored by theJunta de Gobierno impressedme as much less capable than his opponent, until itwas pointed out to me by a Junta official that the latter man commuted to work inAsuncion (20 km away) and often spent weeks away from Capiat'a,hence couldnot keep closely in touch with local affairs.39 The descriptionwhich follows is based on an asambleawhich I witnessed,as a guest of the delegation, in a community not far from Villa Hayes in August1964. Supplemental nformationwas provided by informants who had witnessed orparticipated n other asambleas.


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INTERPERSONALELATIONSHIPSNPARAGUAY 105the partyand its pastandpresent eaders,particularly residentStroess-ner, and urgeparty unity, vigilanceover the opposition,etc. Then thevotingtakesplace,by acclamationf possible.This is followedby a feast,as lavish as local resourceswill permit,attendedby the delegatesand,ideally,most of thepartymemberswho werepresentatthe voting.Drink-ing begins before the meal, and beer or wine is served with it. Toasts areofferedwith someregularity, nd a danceis heldin the afternoon.The delegates romthe Junta de Gobiernoare expectedto partici-pate in all this. The chief of the delegation s usually a nationallyprom-inent politicianwhose name has appeared requentlyn the newspapersand s familiaro thepeople;exceptforthisoccasion heywouldprobablyneverbe privilegedo actuallymeethim. But as the alcohol and the gen-eral festive moodbreaksdownreserve,ordinarypeasantsengagehim inconversation ndpresent o him theirproblems;he danceswith the localgirls, and the feeling is fostered hat the leadersof the Coloradogovern-ment,howeverexalted,maintaina closepersonalnterestn thewell-beingof their fellowpartymembers,howeverpoor,in allparts of the country.The occasionalso providesan opportunityor youngmen seekingpoliticaladvancemento bring hemselves o theattentionof thedelegates(offering oastsandmakingmpromptu peeches s one way of doing his)andto makecontactswhichmaylaterbe useful. At the sametime, thedelegates,representinghe nationalparty eadership, ome to know andevaluate he principalparty eaders n the community. have had occa-sionto be impressedwith the extentto whichpartyofficials n Asuncion,through he obligation o serveon suchdelegations,have come to knowand understandocal problemsand personalitiesn many parts of thecountry.From what little information have been able to gather,thesame appears o be true of theirLiberalcounterparts.It is primarily hroughthe local seccionalorganization hat partycohesion s maintained, ndthisin turn s animportantactorstrengthen-ing government ontrolover thecountry, ightening he task of the policeandmilitary orcesin keepingsuchcontrol.Oneof the stated unctionsof the seccionalorganizations to attendto the welfareof fellowpartymembers.Sometimes his is donein a verydirectway, by paying funeralexpenses, providingegal aid, distributingnecessary choolsupplies o childrenof poor Colorado amilies,and thelike. If necessary,collections are taken up locally, but the partyhead-quartersalsoprovides undsforthispurpose (all government mployeesarerequiredo donate5 percentof theirsalary o theparty).40

40 The published expenses of the party for the period September 1963-Sep-tember 1964, which total Gs. 7,481,906, include as the largest single item Gs.


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106 JOURNAL OF INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRSIn othercases suchwelfare s attended o by meansof recommenda-tions. A letter of recommendationrom the presidentof a seccionalisimportant nd sometimes ssential n order o obtaingovernment mploy-ment of any kind, and such a recommendationmay carry more weightthan one froma teacher n gainingadmission o one of the country's ewpublic (virtually ree) secondary chools.The seccional eadershipmayattemptto exert pressureon privateemployers o give preferences nhiringto personsrecommended y themor to makecontributionso thewelfareof the seccional,but theirpowerto do this varies; hey arelikelyto be moresuccessfulwhere he communitys heavilyColoradoandwherethe enterprise oncerneds Paraguayan-ownednd dependenton govern-ment contractsor patronage.The government,however, s the country'slargest employer,and as in most underdeveloped ountries, jobs arescarce and muchin demand.A steadyjob makes an excellentrewardfor politicalservicesrendered.Anotheracknowledgedunctionof theseccionalandone of the mostimportantrom the pointof view of the nationalgovernments politicalvigilance.Partymembersare supposed o keep watchover all publicin-stitutions, o see that they are operatedproperly.But more important,theyareurgedto watch all oppositionpoliticalactivityandreportwhat-evertheyobserve o the seccional eadersor, if appropriate,o thepolice.They arewarned o be on guardagainst"Communists"a termappliedto all people who agitate for change without governmentapproval),mysterioustrangers, ndthe like. Especially n the moreremoteareasofthecountry,any strangers regardedwithsuspicion,andif the suspicionis great enough,force may be used to drive him from the community.The seccional eadersandtheir followersareexpected o watch forany gatheringof people known to be affiliatedwith oppositionpartiesandto be surethe local police detachments informed(duringmuchofits recenthistory,Paraguayhas been under a state of siege, and anymeetinghas requireda police permit). This emphasison vigilancehasgivenriseto the individual alleda pyragie', originallya furtivecharacterout of Guarani olklore,whosebody is all coveredwith hair, even thesoles of his feet so he can walk very silently.The term now refersto

2,000,000 for 20,000 guardapolvos-the white smocks that form the principalpartof the obligatory school uniform. Other items include Gs. 440,000 for 40,000"President Stroessner" school notebooks, Gs. 100,000 for 40,000 pencils, Gs.66,500 for 700 first and second gradereaders,and Gs. 154,000 for 15,400 boxes ofcolored pencils. Also in the list of expenses were Gs. 312,000 for the distributionof 1,200 blankets, Gs. 496,350 for medicines and hospital bills, and Gs. 381,000for the distributionof toys on epiphany (Patria [Asuncion],27 September1964).


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INTERPERSONALELATIONSHIPSNPARAGUAY 107a personwho seeks to listen in and informthe authorities f oppositionpoliticalactivity.The Liberalparty'sdirectorate orrespondso the Coloradoparty'sJuntade Gobierno.However,since thispartyis out of power,its mem-bersare only part-timepoliticalworkers.They seek to maintaincontactwith Liberal leadersin all parts of the country, train futurepoliticalleaders,and take care of the materialneeds of the local comitemembersas best they can. Providing egal aid for its members s a particularlyimportant unction of this party. Liberals are encouraged o contributefinancially o their party, and because of their numbersthey are ableto obtain enoughto keep the party organization unctioning,althoughtheyare unable orequire uchcontributions. hepartydirectorateworkson a national evel to reducediscrimination gainstLiberalswithregardto economicopportunities.On a local level, the Liberals requently akesides as a bloc in Coloradofactionaldisputes. Lacking voting power,they cannotinfluencedirectly he outcomeof seccionalelections,but bytheir numbers and what economicresourcesthey commandthey cangive their favoritesomeadditionalpoweror influencen the community.Sincethe party, exceptfor a small splintergroup,was technically llegalprior o its reorganizationn 1966 as the RadicalLiberalparty,the activi-tiesof the Liberalcomit's, including heirelections,had to be carriedonquietlyandunobtrusively.The ColoradoandLiberalparties are the only ones that have thisextensive local organization. n small communities,members of otherpartiesare rarelyencountered.One may find an occasionalFebrerista,usuallya Chaco Warveteranwho becamea follower of Francoduringthewarandwho,nowmiddle-aged r older,hasretained hisloyalty.Anoccasionalthoughtful,dissatisfied,and religiousman may declare him-self a ChristianDemocrat.But the two traditionalpartiesretaintheirhold over the massof the people, despitethe fact thatthe leadershipofthesetwopartieshasusuallybeenin the handsof men whose understand-ing of and responsiveness o the needsof the lowerclasses has generallybeen limited to the minimumnecessary o retain an adequatedegreeofpartycohesion.

This hold is maintained,however,not becauseof the ideologiesoftheparties-indeed, they arerarely houghtof as having deologies-butbecause of their function as mutualaid societies and channelsof socialmobility.They functionthis way becausethey are amongthe most im-portantchannels hroughwhichpatronages dispensed.The two tradi-tionalparties (and only these two) providethe meanswherebya man


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108 JOURNAL OF INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRScan achieve the power to become a patron and thereby acquire a clientelewhich may bring him still greater power. Opportunities to achieve poweroutside the political party structureare few, and even these generally re-quire the power-holder to maintain a balance between power blocs whicharebased on the partystructure.4'

A side effect of this role of the political parties is that when non-intellectually-inclined, provincially-oriented Paraguayans become con-cerned over matters of civic improvement, or social or economic condi-tions, they are not likely to think of these as problems to be tackled in thepolitical arena. They are not likely to support candidates for politicaloffice who would promise to improve conditions. To them, politics meanspatronage. Civil or social improvements have nothing to do with politics,and must be brought about in otherways.

THE Two-PARTY SYSTEM AND THE STABILITY OF CAUDILLISMOThe maintenance of the Paraguayanpolitical system depends, I sug-

gest, on the assumption that each of the two traditional parties has ap-proximately the same number of members, each drawing its membershipfrom all socioeconomic levels, and between them commanding the loyaltyof the vast majority of the people. No figuresare available on the precisenumerical strength of either party, and it would be imprudent to try togather such information. It seems to be generally understood that which-ever party is in power tends to gain membership at the expense of theother because of its greateraccess to sources of patronage;but it has beenassumed that such gains are relatively small and that the numericalstrength of the two big parties is more or less equal.42

Such equality, or the assumption of such equality, seems essentialfor two reasons. The firstis that it keeps attention focused on the mutual-aid role of the political parties and the second that it diverts attentionfrom the fact that basic social and economic problems are not being met.The Colorado party is able to retain the allegiance of its people largely byits ability to maintain a spirit of rivalry against a powerful opposing partyand by giving its followers certain advantages in the competition for jobs,political favors, and protection. Advantages, that is, over the Liberals;

41 See Hicks, "PoliticsPower,"for an illustration.42 A survey conducted among Asuncion university students in 1965 revealedthat, of those willing to respond to a question concerning political affiliation, 36percentclaimedColorado affiliation,32 percent Liberal,20 percentChristianDemo-cratic, and 12 percent Febrerista (university studentspresumablyrepresentlargelythe urban, cosmopolitan sector, hence the high proportion of nontraditional af-filiations). However, 62 percent declined to give their political affiliation. SeeDomingo M. Rivarola,"Universidady estudiantes,"pp. 62-63.


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and it is becausethere are so manyLiberalsto opposeandto comparethemselveswith that the Coloradoscan see this relative advantage.Ifthis comparisonwerenot kept constantlybeforethem,they might makeothercomparisons,which could lead to increasingdiscontentwith thesystem.The Liberalsare in a similarposition.Because their party is out ofpower, they must stick together for mutual protection against theColorados.Becauseof its largefollowing, he Liberalparty s ableto pro-vide a measureof security or its people by giving them some legal andfinancialaid when needed. By beingwell organizedand led by sophisti-cated and influentialmen (whose influence s often derived from col-league relationshipswith their Coloradocounterparts), t can also pre-vent excessive oppressionby the dominantColorados. Again, rivalrywith the Colorados,and the need for protection, eadsrankand file Lib-erals to concentrateon the distinctionbetweenLiberaland Coloradorather hanon socialandeconomicdistinctions.The second reason for the maintenanceof the two-partysystem isthat it limitstheclienteleamongwhompatronageneedbe distributed.Asthe nature of foreigninvestment n the Paraguayaneconomy changesand the proportionof economicresourcesavailable or disposalthroughthe patronagesystem diminishes, he systemof caudillismo s able tosurvivebecausethe proportionof the population hatneed be benefitedis limitedto the membership f one politicalpartyand,on a local level,often to only one factionwithin t. Because of the prevailingview of theroleof politicalparties, hisformsa socially acceptableway of deprivinghalf ormore of the populationof a shareof the scarcebenefits.The rankand file Liberalscomplainof specificinstancesof this deprivation,butthey accept he system, ortheyknow thatwhen the day comes thattheirpartycanseizepower he tableswillbeturned.Significantly,he Coloradopartydoes not maintaina policyof en-couragingwholesaleand indiscriminate ecruitmentof Liberals to theColoradobanner.Apparently,neitherpartyhas evermaintained uch apolicywhenit was in power. Joininga politicalparty s a formalmatter.As he nearsvotingage,a youthof Liberalparentsmaysometimesbe ap-proachedto become a Colorado,or he may solicit membershipn theparty,but he musthave the acceptanceof the seccionalleadershipandwill beprovidedwithapolitical"tutor"; e is notadmitted o formalpartymembershipuntil his continuing oyalty seems certain. The prevailingpatterns to respect heLiberalwhostayswith hispartyevenwhen it is ata disadvantage.Despite the flamboyantand militantrhetoricheard atpoliticalrallies,the frequentharassment f Liberalpolitical eaders,and


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110 JOURNAL OF INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

eventheoccasionalperiodsof anti-Liberalerrorism,herulingColoradoshave consciously efrainedromtakinganymeasures hatwouldseriouslydiminishLiberalpartymembership.It also appears hatlocal Colorado actional eadersdo not seek togain more adherents han are necessaryfor them to control access topatronage.However,the nationalparty leadershipdoes strive to pre-vent local factionsfromforming,since in the past dissidentfactionsofthe partyin powerhave sometimeshelpedthe rivalparty to overthrowthe government.This is a system n whichnationalelections,withthe presidencyatstake,wouldappearto be dysfunctional.Yet, due to a combinationofhistoricalcircumstances ndthe natureof Paraguay'snternationalela-tions (whichrequire hat a somewhatdemocraticmagebe projected),periodicelectionsmustbe held.Prior o 1968,suchelectionswereusuallysingle-candidateffairs,or otherwise onductedn sucha way as to makeonethinktheywere deliberatelydesignednot to be takenseriously.Theassumption hat the two partieswere numerically qual was neverputto the test. However,as the world-wide piritof reformand revolutionbeganto be felt in Paraguay,t must havebecomeevident thatthe sys-tem would be endangered y keepingtheLiberalsundergroundndthusreceptive o ideaswhich, n Paraguay, rebestdiffusedunderground. heFebreristasand ChristianDemocratshad been grantedrecognitionaspoliticalparties,eligibleto participate n elections,in 1964 and 1966respectively.Lackinga ready-made lientele, heycouldhardlydo other-wisethancampaign nissuesof policyand deology.In 1965 manyLiberalssupportedFebrerista andidates n the na-tionwidemunicipalelections.A surveyof politicalpreferencesof Asun-cion university tudents n thatyearshowedratherstrikinggainsfor theChristianDemocrats.43 y 1968 therewas little choice but to allowtheLiberals(now called RadicalLiberals)full participationn the nationalelections.Thealternativewouldhavebeenthegrowthof theideologically-basedpartiesattheexpenseof thepatronage-basediberals,anda changeinthewholenatureofpolitics.The published iguresgave the Liberalsonly about one quarterasmanyvotes as the Colorados.44 araguayans ave been conditionednotto expecttheirelections o be honest andso maynot acceptthesefigures.They are at least plausible,however,andif peopleacceptthem as true,theymust alsoacknowledgehatthe twopartiesarein fact quiteunequalin numbers.The Liberalswill thus have to gain adherentsfrom the

43 Ibid.44 Louisville Times, 12 February1968.


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Colorado anks,whichtheymayfindtheycanmosteasilydo by introduc-ing real issues and advocatingmeaningfuland significantreforms. Inany case, electoralcompetitionbetweenthe two majorparties,whichcircumstances aveapparentlyorced he governmento accept,maywellprove ncompatiblewiththecontinuation f caudillopolitics.

caudillismo en paraguay

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