subs aha ran africa presentation

8/2/2019 Subs Aha Ran Africa Presentation

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INTRODUCTION


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INTRODUCTION

COUNTRIES IN THE REGIONAngolaBeninBotswanaBurkina FasoBurundiCameroonCape VerdeCentral African RepublicChadComorosRepublic of the CongoDemocratic Republic ofthe CongoCote d'IvoireDjiboutiEquatorial Guinea

EritreaEthiopia GabonThe GambiaGhanaGuineaGuinea-BissauKenyaLesothoLiberiaMadagascarMalawiMaliMauritaniaMauritiusMozambiqueNamibia

NigerNigeriaRwandaSao Tome and Principe

SenegalSeychellesSierra LeoneSouth AfricaSouth SudanSudan

SwazilandTanzaniaTogoUgandaZambiaZimbabwe


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INTRODUCTION

COLONIZATION AND INDEPENDENCE

European colonization by WWI


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INTRODUCTION

FORMS OF GOVERNMENT

TRANSITIONAL

Result of civil wars

among rebel groups

REPUBLICS

Varies in levels of

authoritarianism,single or multi-party

MONARCHIES

Hereditary king orqueen acts as head of

state, power may be

limited by constitution

*** OTHERMilitary junta,

constitutional democracy,

parliamentary democracy


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INTRODUCTION

ECONOMY

Natural resources: the region is a major exporter

to the world of gold, uranium, chrome, vanadium,antimoney, coltan, bauxite, iron ore, copper,

manganese, platinum, diamonds

Africa's external debt now stands at $255 billion


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INTRODUCTION

HUMANITARIAN ISSUESA majority of Sub-Saharan Africa still lack basic civil liberties and

human rights.

Humanitarian crisis as a combination of drought, exrteme poverty,

civil conflict, epidemics and economic decline threaten nearly 60

million of the region's 550 million people.

Militarization: Hundreds of thousands of Africans have died at thehands of state-supported military units. Scarce foreign currency was

used for military hardware - money that could have been used for

development or humanitarian aid.


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POLITICAL DYNAMICS

DYNAMICS

OF POLITICS

[CONCEPT]

STATE


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POLITICAL DYNAMICS

STATE:

An organization within the society where it coexists andinteracts with other formal and informal organizations fromfamilies to economic enterprises of religious organizations.It is however, distinguished from the myriad of otherorganizations in seeking predominance over them and inaiming to institute binding rules regarding the other

organizations activities.

[BRATTON]


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POLITICAL DYNAMICS


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POLITICAL DYNAMICS

THE AFRICAN STATE Partial autonomy alongside partial interpenetration (forrest)

national leaders and administrators remain closely linked to

societal actors and groups, to some extent beholden to theirinterests and often bearing the brunt of their dissatisfactions

not able to consolidate the political penetration of local level

institutions remain independent of higher level authorities

LEGITIMATING IDEOLOGY ; African leaders are unable to

convince the majority of their populace that the state's central

purpose is to act in the interests of its citizenry.

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =


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POLITICAL DYNAMICS

THE STATE & THE ECONOMY

Link between African bureaucracy and economy (Goldsmith)

Legitimacy down because of poor economic performance

undermining popular support and reducing further already

fragile capacity of state to perform (Bratton)

Subject to pressures for financial sector reform from global

markets and international financial institutions.

LIBERALIZED; COOKIE CUTTER Financial Sector

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =


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POLITICAL DYNAMICS

THE STATE & INSTITUTIONS

the state's rules and procedures of law are distinguished by a

claim to universality

REGULATION establishing state autonomy, takes shape in

any policies that are designed to displace the rules and

practices of alternative institutions.

state-society relations are really an encounter between astructural arrangement of rule-bearing institutions, of which

the state is only one.= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =


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POLITICAL DYNAMICS

THE STATE & INSTITUTIONS

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = == = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

Conditionality: debts from world institutions


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POLITICAL DYNAMICS

THE STATE & BUREAUCRACY

Link between African bureaucracy and economy (Goldsmith)

Bureaucracy not over-expanded but underperforms(Goldsmith)

Legitimacy down because of poor economic performance

undermining popular support and reducing further already

fragile capacity of state to perform (Bratton)

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =


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POLITICAL DYNAMICS

THE STATE & CIVIL SOCIETY

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

Lack of sovereignty, citizens dont recognize or are

skeptical that the government will work towards the

populace interest

Ethno-regional opposition | Inter- Clan, ethnic

political disputes

state-society relations are really an encounter

between a structural arrangement of rule-bearing

Institutions, of which the state is only one


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POLITICAL DYNAMICS

THE STATE & CULTURE

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = == = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

Tension/conflict between retaining culture vs modernity

i.e. Bantu: own ontological history; own civilization

[evolution of human personality

THE STATE & COLONIZATION

Tension/conflict between retaining culture vs modernity

Question of the political efficacy oftotalitarianism vsdemocratization

African state as weak in respect to conventional measures

of institutional capacity


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FRAMEWORKS

POST COLONIALISM

Deconstruction, questions the legitimacy of

the state and its institutionalism

Rationalizing the

NON-WEST

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =


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FRAMEWORKS

POST COLONIALISM

External Fusion | Internal Fission

Bhabas HYBRIDIZATION THEORY

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =


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FRAMEWORKS

STATE as most eligible institution of power

interacting with other institutions BUT

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = ======

=========

TRADITIONAL

Rational actor

NEO

Natural protector

NEO-STATISM


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MODELS

- constellation of leaders, officials, political

institutions, administrative agencies, and military

and police organizations that holds centralized

political power in a given territorial domain[FORREST]

STATE


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MODELS :

States in postcolonial Africa have moved

to consolidate their power through the

establishment of bureaucratic, behavioral,

and decision-making autonomy from

social and economic forces in society.


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MODELS :

STATE HARDNESS

STRUCTURAL AUTONOMY

state institutions, leaders and

officials effectively removethemselves from the influence

of societal actors and influences

and are thereby able to act and

make decisions independentlyof social forces

National leaders and

administrators remain

closely linked to societalactors and groups,

thereby counteracting

states moves towards

autonomy

1

THEORY OF WEAK

STATES [FORREST]

THEORY OF WEAK


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MODELS:

POLITICAL PENETRATION

OF SOCIETY

national leaders and

governmental institutionssecure clear cut hegemony

over intermediary and

ground level political actors

and social units

National leaders are not able to

thoroughly consolidate the

political penetration of local

level political and social

institutions so that these

structures remain mostly

independent of higher level

authorities rather than

becoming effectively integratedinto formal, the centralized

politico-administrative system

2

THEORY OF WEAK

STATES [FORREST]

THEORY OF WEAK


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EXTRACTION OF

RESOURCES FROM THE

MOST PRODUCTIVEECONOMIC SECTORS:

peasant agriculture

Severe limitations in

appropriating peasant

resources and in establishing

regularized, official controlover rural trade, which

presents an especially

problematic challenge to states

economic growth in these

predominantly agrarian and

non-industrialized nations

3

MODELS:THEORY OF WEAK

STATES [FORREST]

THEORY OF WEAK


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IDEOLOGICAL LEGITIMATION

promulgation of official

doctrines to defend andjustify the achievement of

autonomy, penetration

extraction

Leaders are unable to convince

the majority of their populace

that the states central purpose

is to act in the interests of its

citizenry

4

MODELS:THEORY OF WEAK

STATES [FORREST]

PATRIMONIALISM/


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MODELS:PATRIMONIALISM/

ANTI-PATRIMONIALISM

Top-down and traditional form of political

dominion

Power flows directly from the leader to

the bureaucracy

Strengthen bureaucracy

MAX WEBER

PATRIMONIALISM/


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ANTI-PATRIMONIALISM

In order to reconcile the untenable image of an

autonomous state and the fragmented nature of

society, the patrimonial state model needs to be

refined with an analytical tool that adequatelyassesses the variable weight and influence of

competing forms of authority.

(Williams)

PATRIMONIALISM/


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ANTI-PATRIMONIALISM

PATRIMONIALISM IS SEEN AS DETRIMENTAL TO

A GOVERNMENT

getting ahead becomes a matter of connections

than performance (Goldsmith)


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MODELS: WEBERIAN MODEL OF DEMOCRACY

An effective bureaucracy is run by efficient,

capable, and qualified personnel

Achieved through competitive system of

selection based on merit and qualification

[ ][ ]= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =


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MODELS: WEBERIAN MODEL OF DEMOCRACY

Economic troubles in Africa are more likely

related to aimless or inattentive but not

necessarily enlarged bureaucracies. (Goldsmith)

Countries that fail to bring their public

bureaucracies closer in line with Weberian

precepts are going to have a hard time meetingtheir populations economic and social needs.

(Goldsmith)

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =


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CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS

ECONOMY - BANKING

STATE HARDNESS MODEL

Relationship between state and private sector(IV) the entrenchment of the domestic

politics of financial reform and economic

progress (DV)

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =


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INSTITUTIONS LAND REFORM

Emergence of land reform policies that acts as

panaceas for revolutionizing national

development (IV) Institutions as elitist

instruments (DV)

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

PATRIMONIAL MODEL


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BANTU PHILOSOPHY POST COLONIALISM

Relation of colonial influence towards cultural

sturdiness (IV) explosive growth of informal

colonial influence through culture (DV)

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =STATE HARDNESS MODEL


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IMPLICATIONS

STRUCTURAL AUTONOMY

POLITICAL PENETRATION OF THE SOCIETY

EXTRACTION OF RESOURCES FROM THEMOST PRODUCTIVE ECONOMIC SECTORS

IDEALOGICAL LEGITIMATION

WEAK STATE

XXXX


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Beyond the state: Civil society and Associational Life in Africa


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Beyond the state: Civil society and Associational Life in AfricaMichael Bratton

Relationship of state and society in Africa: Elite politics

The state is an instrument for the accumulation of wealth

and power as well as the creation of social classes

An endogenous change in civil society is at hand

Bratton emphasizes the need to reevaluate African Civilsociety based on its contribution to political development

Beyond the state: Civil society and Associational Life in Africa


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Nigeria: Nigerian Bar association publicly opposed the

government's use of military tribunals to prosecutecorrupt civilian politicians and to ban critical organsin the press.

Senegal Islamic brotherhoods and the regional separatists

movement in the Casamance opposed thegovernment's experiment with multipartycompetition,

Zimbabwe white and black farmers have organized to

"contradict" party socialist policy preferences" andpush for policies more to their own liking

Beyond the state: Civil society and Associational Life in AfricaMichael Bratton

Reconsidering State and Society in Africa: The Institutional


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State autonomy through land reform

programs

Three patterns of change

1. Concentration of land Rights

2. Land alienation3. Elevated position of lineage authorities

Dimension in Land Reform PoliciesDonald C. Williams



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1. Concentration of land Rights

- Burkina Fasco: village chiefs used agrarian reform to

safeguard their authority

- Kenya and Cameroon: use of connections in order to

obtain land clearance

- Western Uganda: connections with Bahima chiefs toacquire Mailo lands (land was nationalized in 1975)




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2. Incidence of Land Alienation

- Ivory coast, Nigeria and Burkina Faso: used

authority to grant certificates of occupancy to

elites

- Uganda and Somalia: Land nationalization failed

certificates of occupancy only given to thosewho could afford it; peasants displaced in the

process:


Africas Overgrown State Reconsidered:


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Examines the relationship between

bureaucracy and economic growth

Size of bureaucracy

Strength of civil society

Measured through comparison of Botswana

and Mauritius with the rest of SSA

Bureaucracy and Economic Growth

Arthur A. Goldsmith



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Significant Findings on Botswana & Mauritius

Economic performance over the last 25 years

resemble East Asian Tigers\increase in capita income

(1985-95) SSA decline Botswana & Mauritius must have been built on a

base of impartial, professional bureaucrats

Mauritius & Botswanas bureaucracies are four times

larger than other African countries (World Bank) B&M have reputations for administrative integrity

and capability rapid economic growth


Arthur A. Goldsmith



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How do B&M avoid politicizing their bureaucracies? Botswana: countrys president only entitled to few senior

appointments; commitment to neutrality; recruitmentopen to all; promotion meritiocratic; employees haveright to appeal personnel decisions

Mauritius: heavy emphasis on achievement as means forclimbing up ranks; strong public service commission toinsulate bureaucracy from inappropriate politicalmeddling

Unlike Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia: civil service became aninstrument of political power patrimonialism (gettingahead is a matter of connections than performance)

Botswana and Mauritius are confident in their civilservice (541)


Arthur A. Goldsmith

The Quest for State "Hardness" in Africa


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Despite a sustained and vigorous drive toachieve state hardness, the political andeconomic strength of society has to a large

extent impeded state rulers from carrying outtheir goals

It is essential for states to achieve at least adegree of autonomy from society in order to

secure their power and exercise theirhegemony

QJoshua B. Forrest



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EMPIRICAL STUDIES: PARTIAL AUTONOMY

FROM SOCIETY VS. PARTIAL

INTERPENETRATION OF STATE AND SOCIETY

African rulers and officials seek to augment statehardness

Removing themselves form societal influences

Attempt to act in their own political,organizational and personal interests

QJoshua B. Forrest



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Zaire

Attempt to allow the political elite to morecompletely dominate the now restricted politicalarena

The Zairian administration thereby carved out azone of invulnerability vis--vis society

The state constitutes a partially autonomouscenter with an ability to distance itself fromdomestic and international class an and ethnicinterests giving public officials room tooverpower or ignore some of the less pressinginterest demands and to expand theiradministrative functions and powers

Joshua B. Forrest



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Kenya

patron-client relationships formed in earlyindependence period linked rural groups andindividuals to the state through informal ties

Cabinet members, members of parliament, middle

level bureaucrats became integrated into a hierarchyof patron client ties with regional, district, and localorganizations

Ultimately, state bureaucracy forced to take greater

account of peasant interests Peasant leaders were able to utilize informal links with

national officials to win a reversal of the governmentsinitial decision to empower planting restrictions and

trade control on coffee crop

Joshua B. Forrest



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National leaders are not able to thoroughly consolidate thepolitical penetration of local level political and socialinstitutions so that these structures remain mostlyindependent of higher level authorities rather thanbecoming effectively integrated into formal, the centralized

politico-administrative system

Most contemporary African states have been largely unableto overcome the resilience of deeply entrenchedtraditional, village, ethnic, religious, and other non-formal

sector, local level sociopolitical units and to ensure thatthese groupings function according to official rules andwithin a centrally

Joshua B. Forrest

Bantu Philosophy


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Bantu Philosophy explores the ideologies of

the Bantu civilization

the nature of beings,forces and true wisdom

Bantu philosophy is seen to be primitive

based on the Western standard of the

civilized,

Important part is discussion of the Wests

mission to civilize the Bantu

Placide Tempels

Bantu Philosophy


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Correct attitude in respect of non-civilized

people

What is the true primitive man?

The mission to civilize did not begin with a

tabula rasa

We are not starting from scratch

Placide Tempels

Bantu Philosophy


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Civilization is a progress in human personality Industrialization has neglected man and may in

the long run, lead to the end of a civilizationunless human personality steps in

Does not civilization consist, before all else, inability to entertain an intelligent view of theworld and of life, to have convictions in regard toman's ends, to be steeped in the enthusiasm ofone's faith to the extent of being ready to makesacrifices for it and to suffer for it? (75)

Placide Tempels

Bantu Philosophy


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What point of view should the colonizer

adapt in face of Bantu Philosophy?

We must get to know how to present them as

ways of increasing and strengthening their being,their vital force; and not as means of annihilating

the mind of the Bantu. (77)

Placide Tempels

Reconsidering State and Society in Africa: The InstitutionalDimension in Land Reform Policies


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3. Elevated position of lineage authorities

- Cameroon and Kenya: land seekers must seek the help of

their kin and lineage elders

- Uganda: impossible to obtain occupancy rights without

seeking the help of kin


On the Postcolony


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Achille Mbembe

Commandement: the specific imaginary of state

sovereignty

Factors on activity of governing

1. Dealing with human behavior and how it is

regulated in a state framework

2. Postcolonial African regimes have not

invented- what they know of government is from scratch.

On the Postcolony


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Two main features of state sovereignty in acolony

1. Weakness of and inflation of "Notion of right

2. Colonial Sovereignty rests on 3 kinds ofviolence

1. Founding Violence: colonizer as the sole power overlaws

2. Legitimization: converts founding violence into anauthorizing authority

3. Authoritys maintenance, spread, and permanence:role in everyday life; establishes cultural imaginarythat state shared with society

Achille Mbembe

On the Postcolony


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Its distinctive feature was to act as bothauthority and morality

1. Eliminated all distinction between ends andmeans

2. It introduced infinite permutations betweenwhat was just and what unjust

The distinctive feature of colonialsovereignty: unpredictability

Unconditionality and impunity as principle ofpower in the colony

Achille Mbembe

On the Postcolony


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Two Traditions (image of the colonized as an

animal)

Hegelian Tradition

the native subjected to power and to the colonialstate could in no way be another myself.

Bergosnian tradition

one can sympathize with the animal/colonized but be

affectionate toward the master in return; object of

experimentation

Achille Mbembe

On the Postcolony


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COMMANDMENT AS MODE OF EXERCISING

POWER:

1. Rgime dException

2. REGIME OF PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

3. LACK OF RULING BETWEEN RULING AND

CIVILIZING

4. CIRCULARITY

Achille Mbembe

On the Postcolonyh ll b b


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1. Rgime dException

- principle which departed from common/ single law

- political elite have more power

- i.e. landlords raising troops, levy taxes

2. Regime of privileges and immunities

- companies, being vehicles of colonization were given power to

raise taxes, collect rents, exempted from license/customs, right to

trade

Achille Mbembe

On the Postcolonyhill b b


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3. Lack of ruling between ruling and civilizing

- colonial arbitrariness,

- political and social ethical

- increases in supply need justified use of natives in modes of

production

- imaginary of the state as an organizer of state happiness- estatisation of colony - patronage and old hierarchies;

privatization of public prerogatives & socialization of arbitrariness

- FIRST AND FOREMOST HAVE COMMAND ON NATIVE compelled

to carry out obligations, proceed by orders and demands

- COMMANDMENTACCOUTREMENT AND ATTITUDE, powerreduced to right to demand, force ban

4. Circulatory

- accomplishments not directed to a public

Achille Mbembe

On the PostcolonyA hill Mb b


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Nigeria Exploitation of oil and minerals

Cameroon, Cte dIvoire, Kenya, Gabon, Zimbabwe most stable and most prosperous countries

Achille Mbembe


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THEORETICAL GAPS


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THEORETICAL GAPS

PROBLEM OF THE SUB SAHARAN AFRICAN WEAK STATE

One cause of weakness of the state is rooted in colonially

drawn boundaries cutting across ethnic groups.

What solutions can be suggested towards

reconciling the tensions between post

colonial ethnic boundaries and the current

state formation of sub Saharan Africa?

THEORETICAL GAPS


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THEORETICAL GAPS

PROBLEM OF RISING TENSIONS BET. STATISM & PLURALISM.

A reconceptualization of state-society relations is necessary to

keep pace with a changing reality, to discern avenues that might

lead out of the current economic crisis, and to appraise theprospects for democracy in Africa. (Bratton)

What are the conditions which facilitate associational life in

Sub Saharan Africa and the strengths, weaknesses, and

potentialities of civic organizations in promoting economic,

social, and particularly political development? (Bratton)

THEORETICAL GAPS


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THEORETICAL GAPS

How can we resolve the incongruities between

the rule of the patrimonial state in Sub

Saharan Africa and the formal stateapparatus? Williams

In order to reconcile the untenable image of an autonomous

state and the fragmented nature of society, the patrimonial

state model needs to be refined with an analytical tool that

adequately assesses the variable weight and influence of

competing forms of authority (Williams)


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HYPOTHESIS: Associational life is likely to be most

developed in economies that have undergone the

greatest degree of indigenous capitalist

industrialization. In these situations, social classes

are most likely to have constructed an economic baseindependent of the state and a set of shared interests

that are best defended by autonomous political

action

- Beyond the state (Bratton) pg. 427

SOUTH AFRICA CONGO


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SOUTH AFRICA

Deepest penetration of capitalist

production and exchange relations

and the highest rates of domestic

capital accumulation outside of the

state.

Banking systems are more clearly

dominated by private capital and

embedded in more competitive,

diverse, and market-oriented

financial systems.

CONGO

Statist banking system: banking is

highly concentrated andgovernment controlled.

These countries are characterized

by low levels of financial

development, including and in

general have less diversified and

developed economies than many

other sub-Saharan African

countries.

State, capital and the politics of

banking reform (Boone)

SOUTH AFRICA


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LINK BETWEEN ECONOMIC AUTONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT OF

CIVIL SOCIETY?

SOUTH AFRICA

United Democratic Front (UDF) in South Africa Called into being new forms

of organizing popular groups in all spheres of life of the society

Over six hundred affiliate organizations and two million adherents. It

represented a multiclass alliance of workers, poor peasants, rich peasants,

traders, students, and professionals, with a known leadership drawn from

among the clergy, trade unionists, lawyers, and journalists.

Organizationally, the UDF was a loose national federation of membership

groups built on principles of mass participation, democratic accountability,

and ideological pluralism.

Civil society and associational life(Bratton) pg. 419


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Greatest number of intermediate activist

organizations in Africa today can be observed in

urban South Africa

One would also therefore expect the expansion

of civil society to be led by, and to accrue to the

advantage of, social classes well positioned to

exploit economic opportunities in a capitalist

economy


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Potential comparison between South Africa

(developed economy) and Congo (under developed

economy) and the strength of their civil society

RECOMMENDATIONS


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RECOMMENDATIONS

[POTENTIAL COMPARISONS/CONCLUSIONS]

COMPARISON WITH POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF INDIGENOUS

COMMUNITY IN LATIN AMERICA, WHERE GROUPS WITHIN CIVIL

SOCIETY GAINED GREATER OPPORTUNITIES TO ATTRACT A

FOLLOWING, DEVELOP A BUREAUCRATIC FORM, AND FORMULATE

POLICY ALTERNATIVES DUE TO STATE REFORMS IN THE 80S

INDIGENOUS POLITICS

AND DEMOCRACY

Contesting Citizenship

in Latin America

Deborah J. Yashar

As policymakers face the challenge of responding to indigenousorganizations in civil society and their demands, they confront the issueof if and how states can recognize both individual and communal rights inan ideologically meaningful, practically feasible, and enduring way

The conditions under which indigenous movements haveemerged in Latin America are primarily a response to thetwin emergence of incomplete political liberalization and

state economic reforms.

Political liberalization in the 1980s provided greater spacefor the public articulation of ethnic identities, demands, andconflicts.

RECOMMENDATIONS


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RECOMMENDATIONS

As policymakers face the challenge of responding to indigenousorganizations in civil society and their demands, they confront the issueof if and how states can recognize both individual and communal rights inan ideologically meaningful, practically feasible, and enduring way

The conditions under which indigenous movements have emerged inLatin America are primarily a response to the twin emergence ofincomplete political liberalization and state economic reforms.

Political liberalization in the 1980s provided greater space for thepublic articulation of ethnic identities, demands, and conflicts.

RECOMMENDATIONS


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RECOMMENDATIONS

the provision ofsocial and

economic policiestargeting peasants

as a corporatesector

institutionalizingcorporate forms of

staterepresentation thatappeared to offer

access to the state.

Greater state penetration, land reforms, and theestablishment/protection of property rights somewhat

unwittingly, although not uniformly, increased local

autonomyaspeasants often increased their economicindependence from landlords and carved out localspaces for traditional authority structures and

customary law.

PROMISES OF DEMOCRATICALLY

ELECTED LEADERS IN LATIN AMERICA

RECOMMENDATIONS


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RECOMMENDATIONS

How can this comparison contribute to scholarly literatureon civil society and its active participation and integrationinto the sub Saharan African state?

What comparisons can be made between the degreeand effects of political liberalization in Latin Americaand Sub Saharan Africa?

How does this comparison work towards bridging the gapbetween the wants and needs of various ethnic identitiesand the demands of the state in Sub Saharan Africa?

COMPARING

STATE BUILDING

AND

SUBSEQUENT

POLITICALORGANIZATION

OF INDIGENOUS

COMMUNITY IN

LATIN AMERICA

WITH CURRENT

TRENDS IN SUB

SAHARAN

AFRICA

RECOMMENDATIONS


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RECOMMENDATIONS

Can this be used as a model for thestrengthening of associations in civilsociety?

How can we compare the process of statebuilding and its relation to social

movements in Latin America with SubSaharan Africa?

COMPARING

STATE BUILDING

AND

SUBSEQUENT

POLITICALORGANIZATION

OF INDIGENOUS

COMMUNITY IN

LATIN AMERICA

WITH CURRENT

TRENDS IN SUB

SAHARAN

AFRICA

CONCLUSION


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CONCLUSION

STATES IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA ARE WEAK WITH

RESPECT TO THE FACT THAT IT IS UNABLE TO

PENETRATE THROUGH SOCIO-POLITICAL

INSTITUTIONS AND PRODUCE MATERIAL WELFARE.

THE DIFFICULTY TO CONFORM WITH WESTERN

STANDARDS MAY SUGGEST THAT THERE IS A NEED

FOR INDIGENOUS STRUCTURES OF ORGANIZATIONTO BE CONSTRUCTED.

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subs aha ran africa presentation

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