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hat Democracy Is... and Is NotSchmitter, Phi1ippe C.Karl, Terry Lynn, 1947-

Journal of Democracy, Volume 2, Number 3, Summer 1991, p. 75-88 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press00/: 10.1353/jod. 1991.0033

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WHAT OEMOCRACY 15ANO 15 NOT

Philippe C.~=;-'

p .. . Se is ro esso 01 olitícal and director 01 theCenter for European Studies at S ant.ord v rsi . Te", Lynn Kan iassociate professor 01 polítical science and director 01 the Cen er forLatin American Studies at the same institution. The original, longerversion 01 this essay was written at the request 01 the United StatesAgency for lnternational Development, which is not responsible for itscontento

For some time, the word democracy has been circulating as a debasedcurrency in the polítical marketplace. Politicians with a wide range ofconvictions and practices strove to appropriate the label and attach it totheir actions. Scholars, conversely, hesitated to use it-without addingqualífying adjectives-because of the ambiguity that surrounds it. Thedistinguished American política] theorist Robert Dahl even tried tointroduce a new term, "polyarchy,' in its stead in the (vain) hope ofgaining a greater measure of conceptual precision. But for better orworse, we are "stuck" with democracy as the catchword of contemporarypolítical discourse. lt is the word that resonates in people's minds andsprings from their Iíps as they struggle for freedom and a better way oflífe; it is the word whose meaning we must discem if it is to be of anyuse in guiding polítical analysis and practice.

The wave o a itions awa f o ratic rule that began withPortugal's 'Revolution of the Camations" in 197 and seems to havecrested with the co apse of communist regimes across Eastem Europein 1989 as produced a welcome convergence towards a commondefinition of dernocracy.' Everywhere there has been a silentabandonment of dubious adjectives like "popular," "guided," "bourgeois,'and "formal" to modify "democracy." At the same time, a remarkableconsensus has emerged conceming the minimal conditions that polítiesmust meet in order to merit the prestigious appellation of "dernocratic."Moreover, a number of intemational organizations now monitor how well

Journal of Democracv Vol.2. No.3 Summer 1991

76 Journal o/ Democracy

these standards are met; indeed, some countries even consider them whenformulating foreign policy.'

at Democrag 1

Let us begin by broadly defining democracy and the generic conceptsthat distinguish it as a unique system for organizing relations betweenrulers and the ruled. We will then briefly review procedures, the rulesand arrangements that are needed if democracy is to endure. Finally, wewill discuss two operative principies that make democracy work. Theyare not expressly inc1uded among the generic concepts or formalprocedures, but the prospect for democracy is grim if their underlyingconditioning effects are not presento

One of the major themes of this essay is that democracy does notconsist of a single unique set of institutions. There are many types ofdemocracy, and their diverse practices produce a similarly varied set ofeffects. The specific form democracy takes is contingent upon acountry's socioeconomic conditions as well as its entrenched statestructures and policy practices.

Modern political democracy ls a system 01 governance in which rulers Iare held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens,acting indirectly througlt rhe competition and cooperation 01 their electedrepresentative 3

A regime or system 01 governance is an ensemble of pattems thatdetermines the methods of access to the principal public offices; thecharacteristics of the actors admitted to or excluded from such access;the strategies that actors may use to gain access; and the rules that arefollowed in the making of publicly binding decisions. To work properly,the ensemble must be institutionalized=-that is to say, the variouspattems must be habitually known, practiced, and accepted by most, ifnot all, actors. Increasingly, the preferred mechanism ofinstitutionalization is a written body of laws undergirded by a writtenconstitution, though many enduring political norms can have an informal,prudential, or traditional basis.'

For the sake of economy and comparison, these forms, characteristics,and rules are usually bundled together and given a generic label.Democratic is one: others are autocratic, authoritarian, despotic,dictatorial, tyrannical, totalitarian, absolutist, traditional, monarchic,oligarchic, plutocratic, aristocratic, and sultanistic.' Each of these regimeforms may in tum be broken down into subtypes.

Like all regimes, democracies depend upon the presence G rule~persons who occupy specialized authority roles and can give legitimatecommands to others. What distinguishes democratic rulers fromnondemocratic ones are the norms that condition how the former cometo power and the practices that hold them accountable for their actions.

Schmitter & Karl

The public realm ncompasses the making of collective nonns andchoices nat are mding on the society and backed by state coercion. Itscontent can vary a great deal across democracies, depending uponpreexisting distinctions between the public and the private, state andsociety, legitimate coercion and voluntary exchange, and collective needsand individual preferences. The liberal conception of democracyadvocates circumscribing the public real m as narrowly as possible, whilethe socialist or social-democratic approach would extend that realmthrough regulation, subsidization, and, in some cases, collectiveownership of property. Neither is intrinsically more democratic than theother-just differently democratic. This implies that measures aimed at"developing the private sector" are no more democratic than those aimedat "developing the public sector." Both, if carried to extremes, couldundennine the practice of democracy, the fonner by destroying the basisfor satisfying collective needs and exercising legitirnate authority; thelatter by destroying the basis for satisfying individual preferences andcontrolling illegitimate government actions. Differences of opinion overthe optirnal mix of the two provide much of the substantive content ofpolitical conflict within established democracies.

Citize are the most distinctive element in democracies. AlI regimes \have rulers and a public realm, but only to the extent that they aredemocratic do they have citizens. Historically, severe restrictions oncitizenship were imposed in most emerging or partial democraciesaccording to criteria of age, gender, class, race, literacy, propertyownership, tax-paying status, and so on. Only a small part of the totalpopulation was eligible to vote or ron for office. Only restricted socialcategories were allowed to fonn, join, or support political associations.After protracted struggle-in some cases involving violent domesticupheaval or international war-most of these restrictions were lifted.Today, the criteria for inclusion are fairly standard. All native-born adultsare eligible, although somewhat higher age limits may still be imposedupon candidates for certain offices. Unlike the early American andEuropean democracies of the nineteenth century, none of the recentdemocracies in southern Europe, Latin America, Asia, or Eastern Europehas even attempted to impose formal restrictions on the franchise oreligibility to office. When it comes to informal restrictions on theeffective exercise of citizenship rights, however, the story can be quitedifferent. This explains the central importance (discussed below) ofprocedures.

'CmJJn.etition h no alwa s been onsider· an e ential definiondition o democracy. "Classic" democracies presumed decision making

based on direct participation leading to consensus. The assembledcitizenry was expected to agree on a common course of action afterlistening to the alternatives and weighing their respective merits anddemerits. A tradition of hostility to "faction,' and "particular interests"

77

78 Journal of Democracy

persists in democratic thought, but at least since The Federalist Papersit has become widely accepted that competition among factions is anecessary evil in democracies that operate on a more-than-Iocal scale.Since, as James Madison gued, "the latent causes of faction are sown

into the nature of man,' and the possibleremedies for "the mischief of faction" areworse than the disease, the best course is torecognize them and to attempt to controltheir effects." Yet while dernocrats mayagree on the inevitability of factions, theytend to disagree about the best forms androles for governing factional competition.Indeed, differences over the preferredmodes and boundaries of competitioncontribute most to distinguishing onesubtype of democracy from another.

The most popular definition ofdemocracy equates it with regular elections,fairly conducted and honestly counted.

Some even consider the mere fact of elections--even ones from whichspecific parties or candidates are excluded, or in which substantialportions of the population cannot freely participate-as a sufficientcondition for the existence of democracy. This fallacy has been called"electoralism" or "the faith that merely holding elections will channelpolitical action into peaceful contests among elites and accord publiclegitimacy to the winners"-no matter how they are conducted or whatelse constrains those who win thern.' However central to democracy,elections occur intermittently and only allow citizens to choose betweenthe highly aggregated alternatives offered by political parties, which can,especially in the early stages of a democratic transition, proliferate in abewildering variety. During the intervals between elections, citizens canseek to influence publlc policy through a wide variety of otherintermediaries: interest associations, social movements, locality groupings,clientelistic arrangements, and so forth. Modern democracy, in otherwords, offers a variety of competitive processes and channels for theexpression of interests and values=associational as well as partisan,functional as wel/ as territorial, collective as we/l as individual. All areintegral to its practice.

Another commonly accepted image of democracy identifies it with:Ffajority rulY Any governing body that makes decisions by combining

the votes of more than half of those eligible and present is said to bedemocratic, whether that majority emerges within an electorate, aparliament, a committee, a city council, or a party caucus. Forexceptional purposes (e.g., amending the constitution or expelling amember), "qualified majorities" of more than 50 percent may be

"Houieoer centralto democracy,elections occurintermittently andonly alloui citizensto choose betweenthe highlyaggregatedalternatiuesoffered by politicalparties ..."

Schmitter & Karl 79

required, but few would deny that democracy must involve some meansof aggregating the equal preferen es of individuals.~----------~---~~A problem arises, however, when num ers meet intensities. Whathappens when a properly assemb e majonty (especia Iy a stable, self-perpetuating one) regularly makes decisions that harm some minority(especialIy a threatened cultural or ethnic group)? In these circumstances,successful democracies tend to qualify the central principIe of majorityrule in order to protect minority rights. Such qualifications can take thefonn of constitutional provisions that place certain matters beyond thereach of majorities (bilIs of rights); requirements for concurrent majoritiesin several different constituencies (confederalism); guarantees securing theautonomy of local or regional govemments against the demands of thecentral authority (federalism); grand coalition govemments thatincorporate all parties (consociationalism); or the negotiation of socialpacts between major social groups like business and labor(neocorporatism). The most common and effective way of protectingminorities, however, lies in the everyday operation of interest associationsand social movements. These reflect (some would say, amplify) thedifferent intensities of preference that exist in the population and bringthem to bear on democratically elected decision makers. Another wayof putting this intrinsic tension between numbers and intensities wouldbe to say that "in modem democracies, votes may be counted, butinfluences alone are weighted."

Cooperation has always been a central feature of democracy. Actorsmust v n an y make collective decisions binding on the polity as awhole. They must cooperate in order to compete. They must be capableof acting colIectively through parties, associations, and movements inorder to select candidates, articulate preferences, petition authorities, andinfluence policies.

But democracy's freedoms should also encourage citizens to deliberateamong themselves, to discover their common needs, and to resolve theirdifferences without relying on some supreme central authority. Classicaldemocracy emphasized these qualities, and they are by no means extinct,despite repeated efforts by contemporary theorists to stress the analogywith behavior in the economic marketplace and to reduce ofdemocrac 's operations to competitive interest maximization Alexis deTocquevill best described the importance of independent groups or

emocracy in his Democrac in America, a work which remains a majorsource of inspiration or alI those who persist in viewing democracy assomething more than a struggle for election and re-election amongcompeting candidates."

In contemporary political discourse, this phenomenon of cooperationand deliberation via autanomous group actiyity, goes under the rubric of"ci' society" The iverse umts o oclal identity and interest, byemammg mdependent of the state (and erha s even of {!arties), not

80 Journal o/ Democracy

only can estrai the arbitrary, actLonsof rulers, but can also contributeto forrmng 15ettercitizen -who are more are of the preferences ofot ers, more self-confident in their actions, and more civic-minded intheir willingness to sacrifice for the common good. At its best, civilsociety provides an intermediate layer of governance between theindividual and the state that is capable of resolving conflicts andcontrolling the behavior of members without public coercion. Ratherthan overloading decision makers with increased demands and makingthe system ungovernable,? a viable civil society can mitigate conflictsand improve the quality of citizenship-without relying exclusively onthe privatism of the marketplace.

epr-esentatives~whether directly or indirectly elected=-do most of thereal work In modern democracies. Most are professional politicians whoorient their careers around the desire to fill key offices. It is doubtfulthat any democracy could survive without such people. The centralquestion, therefore, is not whether or not there will be a political eliteor even a professional political class, but how these representatives arechosen and then held accountable for their actions.

As noted above, there are many channels of representation in moderndemocracy. The electoral one, based on territorial constituencies, is themost visible and publico It culminates in a parliament or a presidencythat is periodically accountable to the citizenry as a whole. Yet the sheergrowth of government (in large part as a byproduct of popular demand)has increased the number, variety, and power of agencies charged withmaking public decisions and not subject to elections. Around theseagencies there has developed a vast apparatus of specializedrepresentation based largely on functional interests, not territorialconstituencies. These interest associations, and not political parties, havebecome the primary expression of civil society in most stabledemocracies, supplemented by the more sporadic interventions of socialmovements.

The new and fragile democracies that have sprung up since 1974must live in "compres sed time." They will not resemble the Europeandemocracies of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and theycannot expect to acquire the multiple channels of representation ingradual historical progression as did most of their predecessors. Abewildering array of parties, interests, and movements will allsimultaneously seek political influence in' them, creating challenges to thepolity that did not exist in earlier processes of democratization.

Procedures that Make Democracy Possible

The defining components of democracy are necessarily abstract, andmay give rise to a considerable variety of institutions and subtypes ofeemeeraey. Por cemeeraey te tnnve, nowever, speeíne proeedural nerms

must be followed and civic ri hts must be es ected. Any polity that \fails to impose such restrictions upon itself, that fails to follow the "ruleof law" with regard to its own procedures, should not be considered

democratic. These procedures alone do not define democracy, but theirpresence is indispensable to its persistence. In essence, they are necessaqb t ot sufficlent con inons for its existence.

obert Dah has offered the rnost generally accepted listing of whathe terms the " rocedural minimal" conditions that must t;p'resent formodero political democracy (or as he puts it, "polyarchy") to exist:

'r e. lt1\ J .." /ij'... "t. '-- 1) ~1 over government decisions about policy is constitutionally, \ti t ", Á'&' vested in e ed officials.

____ 2) Elected officials are chosen in fre uent and fairly conductede \! ,t....I i'\ f l 11J. rr •• ~s in which coercion is comparatively uncommon:--\¡ 60ft •••.e 1" 1'~. ~ 3) Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of ~

f ,.A officials. ~Q.. t t.,~'t~ • ./.. 4) Practically all adults have the ri ht to run for elective offices in

/ the government. . . .~ •. l.h /5) Citizens have a . ht to x ress themselves without the danger of

J.J-. v.¡'"'\ -..-'" severe punishment on political matters broadly defined....11, 6) Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of infonnation.]

I •s-' ,L h Moreover, altemative sources of information exist and are protected by!1r""" . r law.

~,'./'W. 7) ... Citizens also have the right to form relatively inde endent"J vv-~ . a~sociations or organizations, including independent political parties and

fr( interest groups.1O

# t' These seven condiUon seem to capture the essence of roceduraldemocra<;y for many theorists, but we propose to add two others. Thefirst might be thought of as a further refinement of item (1), while thesecond might be called an implicit prior condition to all seven of theabove.

8) Pepularly eleeted erñeíaís mUSI be able m exercíse meírconstitutional powers without being subjected to overriding (albeitinformal) opposition from unelected officials. Dernocracy is in jeopardyif milit officers, entrenched civil servants, or state managers retain thecapacit to act independently of elected civilians or even veto decisionsmade by the people's representatives. Without this additional caveat, themilitarized olities of contemporary Central America, where civiliancontrol over the military does not exist, might be classified by manyscholars as democracies, just as they have been (with the exception ofSandinista Nicaragua) by V.S. policy makers. The aveat thus guardsagainst what we earlier called "electoralism"-the tendency to focus on /the holding of elections while ignoring other political realities. /

9) The polity must be self-governing; it must be able to act \\índe ndentl)' of censtraints ¡mpas d by som oth r overarching polítical I \

!lY t m. Dah nd oth r contemporlU'y d moerane th orist probabl~ took

Schmitter & Karl 81

11 ti ~'--.y-~ ~.

82 Journal 01 Democracy

this condition for granted since they referred to formally sovereignnation-states. However, with the development of blocs, alliances, spheresof influence, and a variety of "neocolonial" arrangements, the questionof autonomy has been a salient one. Is a system really democratic if itselected officials are unable to make binding decisions without theapproval of actors outside their territorial domain? This is significanteven if the outsiders are themselves democratically constituted and if theinsiders are relatively free to alter or even end the encompassingarrangement (as in Puerto Rico), but it becomes especially critical ifneither condition obtains (as in the Baltic states).

PrinciRles that Make Democra~ Feasible

Lists of component processes and procedural norms help us to specify \what democracy is, but they do not tell us much about how it actuallyfunctions. The sim lest answer is "by the...fQ.Jl~el!!..2f the people"; themore com lex one is "by the . t consent of politicians acting J/under conditions of bounded uncertainty."

In adeÍnocracy, representatives must at least informally agree thatthose who win greater electoral support or influence over policy will notuse theír temporary superíoríty to bar the losers from taking ofi'iCeOrexerting influence in the future, and that in exchange for this opportunityto keep competing for power and place, momentary losers will respectthe winners' right to make binding decisions. Cítizens are ex ected toobey the decisions ensuing from such a process of competition, providedits outcome remains contingent upon their collective preferences asexpressed through fair and regular elections or open and repeatednegotiations.

The challenge is not so much to find a set of goals that commandwidespread consensus as to find a et of mies that embod contingenteonsent. The precise shape or thls "dernocratic bar aín." to use ah sexpression, I can vary a good deal from society to society. It depends onsocial e eavages and such subjective factors as mutual trust, the standardof faimess, and the willingness to compromise. It may even becompatible with a great deal of dissensus on substantive policy issues.

All democracies involve a de ee of uncertainty ab0!lt who will beelected and what policies they will pursue. Even- in those polities where~ne party persists in .winning elections or one policy is consistently

)!implemented, e ossibilit f chan e through inde ndent collectiveª,ction still exists, as in Italy, Japan, and the Scandinavian socialdemocracies. f it does no t e systemJs not emocratic, as in Mexico,Senegal, or Indonesia.

But the uncertainty embedded in the core of all democracies isboundcd. Not just any aeter eWl S tinto th eompetition and raisc anylssue he er she ple85es-there are prevleusly establlshed rules thut must

Schmitter &: Karl 83

be respected. Not just any policy can be adopted-there are conditionsthat must be met. Democrac institutionalizes~al," limited politicaluncertainty. These boundaries vary from country to country.

onsUt tioQal ar tee 11ro rt)!, privacy, ~pression, 1!Jld other \ \rights are a art of this, but the most effective b . s are eneratedby com etition among interest groups and cooperation within civilsociety. Whatever the rhetoric (and some polities appear to offer theircitizens more dramatic altematives than others), once the rules ofcontingent consent have been agreed upon, the actual variation is likelyto stay' within a predictable and generally accepted range. .

This emphasis on t>~rative· guidel' ne contrasts with a highlY)persistent, but misleading theme in recent literature on \1 S •democracy=-namely, the emphasis upon "civic cultu 'The principIeswe have suggested here rest on rules of 2rudence, not on deeplyin rained habits of tolerance, I.!!.oderation, mutual respect, fair play,readiness to compromise, or trust in public authorities, Waiting for suchhabits to sink deep and lasting roots implies a very slow process ofregime consolidation--one that takes generations-and it would probablycondemn most contemporary experiences ex hypothesi to failure. Ourassertion is that ontin ent consent and bounded uncertainty can emer efrom the interaction between antagonistic and mutually suspicious actorsand that the far more benevolent and ingrained norms of a CiV1C u tureare better thought of as a producr and not a roducer of democracy.)

emocracies ¡fier

Several concepts have been deliberately excluded from our genericdefinition of democracy, despite the fact that they have been frequentlyIlIJIl iated with it in both everyduy practice and scholerly work. TheyIU'G, nevenheless, e/lpEl ially lmpenant when ir eemes te dlsdngulshlngu y o ~ " Q y. 1 e no s S set o tual n tuuucns,

practices, or values embodies democracy, polgies moving away fromauthoritarian rule can mix different components to produce different~emocracles. It is important to recognize that these do not define pointsalong a single continuum of improving performance, but a matrix of

o e ti 1 combinations that are differently democratic.1) Consensus: All citizens may not agree on the substantive goals of

political action or on the role of the state (although if they did, it wouldcertainly make goveming democracies much easier).

2) Participaríon: All citizens may not take an active and equal partin politics, although it must be legally possible for them to do so.

3) Access: Rulers may not weigh equally the preferences of all whocome before them, although citizenship implies that individuals andgroups should have an equal opportunity to express their preferences ifmey choose to 00 sO.

I

84 Journal of Democracy

4) ss: Rulers may not always follow the course of action Ipreferred by the 'tizen . But when they deviate from such a policy, sayon grounds o "reason of state' or "overriding national interest," theymust ultimately be held accountable for their actions through regular andfair processes.

5) Ma 'ori rule: Positions may not be allocated or rules may not beDdecided solely on the basis of assembling the most votes, although ~deviations from this principle usually must be explicitly defended and VIpreviously approved.

6) Parliamenta soverei n : The legislature may not be the onlybody t at can make rules or even the one with final authority indeciding which laws are binding, although where executive, judicial, orother public bodies make that ultimate choice, they too must beaccountable for their actions.

7) Party government: Rulers may not be nominated, promoted, anddiscipl[ned in their activities by well-organized and programmaticallycoherent political parties, although where they are not, it may provemore difficult to form an effective government.

uralism' The political process may not be based on a multiplicityof overlapping, voluntaristic, and autonomous private groups. However,where there are monopolies of representation, hierarchies of association,and obligatory memberships, it is likely that the interests involved willbe more closely linked to the state and the separation between the publicand prívate spheres of action will be much less distinct.

9) Federalism: The territorial division of authority may not involvemultiple levels and local autonomies, least of a11 ones enshrined in aconstitutional document, although some dispersal of power acrossterritorial and/or functional units is characteristic of all democracies.

10) P.asldentiulism: The ehlef exeeutlve of leer rnay net be 11 singleperson and he or she may not be directly elected by the citizenry as awhele, annougn seme concentranon er authojíty is present in ulldemocracies, even if it is exercised co11ectively and only held indirectlyaccountable to the electorate.

11) Checks and Balances: lt is not necessary that the different Abranches of government be systematically pitted against one another, Valthough governments by assembly, by executive concentration, by ~ ," ,../1

judicial cornrnand, or even by dictatorial ñat (as in time of war) must be ..(-ultimately accountable to the citizenry as a whole.

While each of the abovehas been named as an essential componentof democracy, they should instead be seen either as indicators of this orthat type of democracy, or else as useful standards for evaluating theperformance of particular regimes. To inelude them as part of the genericdefinition of democracy itself would be to mistake the American polityfor the universal model of democratic governance. Indeed, theparítamenrary, eenseelanonal, unltary, corperatíst, and eeneemrated

Schmitter &. Karl 85

arrangements of continental Europe may have some unique virtues forguiding polities through the uncertain transition from autocratic todemocratic rule."

What Democracy Is Not

We have attempted to convey the general meaning of moderndemocracy without identifying it with some particular set of rules andinstitutions or restricting it to some specific culture or level ofdevelopment. We have also argued that it cannot be reduced to theregular holding of elections or equated with a particular notion of therole of the state, but we have not said much more about what democracyis not or about what democracy may not be capable of producing.

There is an understandable temptation to load too many expectationson this concept and to imagine that by attaining democracy, a societywill have resolved all of its political, social, economic, administrative,and cultural problems. Unfortunately, "all good things do not necessarilygo together."

¡:-mt democraci s ar o ecessarilx more ef c·en e o ica t an 111other forms of government. Their rates of aggregate growth, savings, andinvestment may be no better than those of nondemocracies. This isespecially likely during the transition, when propertied groups andadministrative elites may respond to real or imagined threats to the"rights" they enjoyed under authoritarian rule by initiating capital flight,disinvestment, or sabotage. In time, depending upon the type ofdemocracy, benevolent long-term effects upon income distribution,aggregate demand, education, productivity, and creativity may eventuallycombine to improve economic and social performance, but it is certainlytee mueh te ~x~ot that these improvements will oceurimmedilltely~muc::h íess that they will be deñníng characterístícs ofdemocratizatiofi.

~¡;-\liT - aemosraeres are not neeessaruy mere ernetemadmmistratively. Their capacity to make decisions ma even be slowerthan that of the regimes they replace, if only because more actors must~_ consulted. The costs of getting things done may be higher, if onlybecause "payoffs" have to be made to a wider and more resourceful setof clients (although one should never underestimate the degree ofcorruption to be found within autocraci ). Popular ati faction with thenew democratic governrnent's performance may not even seem greater,if only because necessary compromises often please no one completelysand because the losers are free to complain.

Tliir ,jdemocracies are ot ikely to appear more orde{ly, e nsensual,stable~ or governable than the autocracies they replace, This is partly abypraduc:t oí d m ratie ír edem oí xpr ssien, but it is alse a f fleetienef the llkellheed ef eentinuing dísagreement ever new rules and

86 Journal 01 Democracy

institutions. These products of imposition or compromise are ofteninitially quite ambiguous in nature and uncertain in effect until actorshave leamed how to use them. What is more, they come in the aftennathof serious stroggles motivated by high ideals. Groups and individuals

with recently acquired autonomy will testcertain roles, protest against the actions ofcertain institutions, and insist onrenegotiating their part of the bargain. Thusthe presence of antisystem parties shouldbe neither surprising nor seen as a failureof dernocratic consolidation. What counts iswhether such parties are willing, howeverreluctantly, to play by the general roles ofbounded uncertainty and contingent consent.

Governability is a challenge for allregimes, not just democratic ones. Giventhe poli tic al exhaustion and loss oflegitimacy that have befallen autocracies

from sultanistic Paraguay to totalitarian Albania, it may seem that onlydemocracies can now be expected to govern effectively and legitimately.Experience has shown, however, that democracies too can lose the abilityto govern. Mass p'ublics can become disenchanted with their performance. 1)Even more threatening is the temptarion for leaders to fiddle withprocedures and ultimately undennine the principies of contingent consentand bounded uncertainty. Perhaps the most critical moment comes oncethe politicians begin to settle into the more predictable roles and relationsof a consolidated democracy. Many will find their expectations frustrated;some will discover that the rtew roles of com etition ut them at adi5ndvuntugc¡ a few rnay even feel that thelr vital lnterests are threatened

y PQJlU ar m cnn .1'\ lt m eraeí s will hay m re epsn so ietle!! ead pelities than

the autocracies they replace, but not necessaril more o n economies.Many of today's most successful and well-established democracies havehistorically resorted to protectionism and closed borders" and have reliedextensively upon public institutions to economic development.While the long-tenn com atibility between d~ocracy and capitalismdoes not seem to be in doubt, despite their continuous tension, it is notclear whether the promotion of such liberal economic goals as the rightof individuals to own property and retain profits, the clearing functionof markets, the private settlement of disputes, the freedom to producewithout government regulation, or the privatization of state-ownedenterprises necessarily furthers the consolidation of democracy. After all,

emocracies do need to le taxes and re ulate certai ransactions,)les eially where ftvate mono ¡tes aM o 'gQ . t. cínzens or(helr representatíves may decide tliat ít is desirable to protect the rights

"...democracieswill havemore opensocieties andpolities than theautocraciesthey replace, butnot necessarilymore openeconomies. "

Schmitter &< Karl

of coIlectivities from encroachment by individuals, especiaIly propertiedones, and they may choose to set aside certain forms of ro ert for

ublic or coo erative ownershi . In short, notions of economic libertythat are currently put forward in neoliberal economic models ar n ts non mous with litica] freedom-and rnay even impede it.

~mocratiz~n wilI not necessarily bring in itS wake economicrowth, social eace, administrative efficiency, political harmony, free

markets, or "the end of ideology." Least of all wTIi it bring about "ilie~ history." No doubt some of these qualities could make theconsolidation of democracy easier, but they are neither Qrereguisites forit nor immediate products of it. Instead, what we should be hoping foris the emer ence of olitical institutions that can peacefully comeete jQ

.f.2rm governments and inf'[uence public policy, that can channel social<md economic conflicts through regular procedures, and that havesufficient linkages to civil society to represent their constituencies andcornmit them to collective courses of action. Some types of democracies,especialIy in developing countries, have been unable to fulfilI thispromise, perhaps due to the circumstances of their I Ion omauthoritarian rule." The democrati~~g~s ~uch a regime, onceestablished, will not only persist by reproducing itself within its initialconfining conditions, but will eventualIy expand beyond thern." Unlikeauthoritarian regimes, democracies hay ea acit to modify their rulesand institutions consensualIy .n res o ceso Theyrnay not imme iátely produce all the goods mentioned above, but theystand a better chance of eventualIy doing so than do autocracies.

NOTES

l. Por 11cornparauve anaíysls or tne reeent reglme ehunges In seuibem EUfOpo andLatln Amerlca, see Gulllennó O Donnell, f5hlllppe C. Sek¡¡¡lft@r, Iilld uureft @Whitehead,eds .• Transitions Irom Authoritarian Rute, 4 vols. (Baltirnore: Johns Hopkins University_ '" <:1116_· Ih.." "'1,, . h~t g. o . r I nnrnash s Larrvniamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, ees., DtfflOCflJCy In DeveloplngCountries, vols. 2, 3, and 4 (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989).

2. Numerous attempts have been made 10 codify and quantify the existence ofdemocracy across polirical systerns. The best known is probably Freedom House 'sFreedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, published since 1973 byGreenwood Press and since 1988 by University Press of América. Also see CharlesHumana, World Human Rights Guide (New York: Facts on File, 1986).

3. The definition rnost commonly used by American social scientists is Ihal of Josc5Cllum ter: "that institutional arrangement for arriving al polítícal decisions in whichindivi u s acquire the power 10 decide by means of a cornpetitive struggle for Ihe people'svote." Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: George AlIen and Unwin, 1943),269. We accepl certain aspects of Ihe classical procedural approach to modem dernocracy,but differ primarily in our emphasis on the accountability of rulers to citizens and therelevance of mechanisms of cornpetition other than elections.

4, N I MI)! d 811 /l I:! Imlri/l~ pt !lli~/l a ~tabl/l form of d mocrac)/ without a formal(lgll~titlltiºn ( .11" Cire!!l Bri!!lin and 1 Tllel), bur even more countríes nave conSlit\llions W1d

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legal codes thar offer no guarantee of reliable practice. On paper, Stalin's 1936constitution for the USSR was a virtual model of democratic rights and entitlements.

5. For the most valiant attempt to malee some sense out of this thicket of distinctions,see Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes" in Handbook o/ Potitical Science,eds. Fred 1. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addision Wesley, 1975),175-411.

6. "Publius" (Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison), The FederalistPapers (New York: Anchor Books, 1961). The quote is from Number 10.

7. See Terry Karl, "Irnposíng Consent? Electoralisrn versus Democratization in ElSalvador," in Elections ami Democratization in Latin America, 1980-1985, eds. Paul Drakeand Eduardo Silva (San Diego: Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, Center forUS/Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1986), 9-36.

8. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 2 vols. (New York: Víntage Books,1945).

9. This fear of overloaded government and the imminent collapse of democracy is wellreflected in the work of Samuel P. Huntington during the 1970s. See especially MichelCrozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis o/ Democracy (New York:New York University Press, 1975). For Huntington's (revised) thoughts about the prospectsfor democracy, see his "WilI More Countries Become Democratic?," Po/itical Science:Quarterly 99 (Summer 1984): 193-218.

10. Robert Dahl, Dilemmas o/ Pluralist Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press,1982), 11.

11. Roben Dahl, Aftu the Revolutlon: Authority in a Good Society (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 1970).

12. See Juan Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," Journal o/ Democracy 1 (Winter1990): 51-69, and the ensuing discussion by Donald Horowitz, Seymour Martin Lipset, andJuan Llnz in Journal of Democracy I (Fall 1990): 73-91.

13. Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilernmas of Democratization in Latin Arnerica," ComparativePolitics 23 (October 1990): 1-23.

14. Otto Kif(lhhllimllr. "CIlnfinins Cond'!ioM Md RIIYohnionlP'Y Brllaklhrol!ahs"American Political Science Review 59 (1965): 964-974.