1

School of Social and International Studies

Department of Development and Economic Studies

2011/2012

Level: MA

Issues in Development Policy – ID 7017D

Semester Two

Course Coordinator: Behrooz Morvaridi

"Critically examine the impact of liberal

peacebuilding policies to the development of

war-torn societies"

Submitted by: 10003785

Turnitin paper ID: 17698384

Words: 3412

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1. Introduction

For more than two decades, since the end of the Cold War, the world has been

witnessing the prevalence of a new type of conflict affecting the international

relations, followed by more than two decades of responses given by the international

community to the conflict-affected countries. Regardless of a considerable amount of

practice, these last twenty years of さpeace-orientedざ initiatives demonstrate how the

United Nations (UN) and donor agencies working in warfare countries worldwide are

still crawling to, as facilitators, enable these countries to create internal conditions for

a sustainable peace process, aﾐd to iﾏpleﾏeﾐt さlessoﾐs leaヴﾐedざ fヴoﾏ past

experiences.

This essay focuses specifically on the deficiencies of a certain part of the

iﾐteヴﾐatioﾐal Ioﾏﾏuﾐit┞げs ヴespoﾐse to the war-torn societies, the peacebuilding

process, particularly its (neo)liberal orientation and (in)consequences to the

development1 of those societies. The first part briefly introduces the evolution of the

concept and practice of peacebuilding since the end of the 1980s, and the similarities

shared with the exported Western development model. The following section critically

analyses the inappropriateness of the "suggested" neoliberal policies down the throats

of countries emerging from conflict, and the consequent anomalous social dynamics

resulted from it – not much different from the ones produced by the Washington and

post-Washington Consensus, and structural adjustment processes in the developing

world in the late nineteenth-century.

The proposal is not to simply repeat the well-known critiques of neoliberalism

to the development of the so Ialled けfヴagile statesげ, Hut to highlight the counter-

productive insistency on a Western model proved flawed in non-conflicting societies,

let alone in the ones emerging from political, social and economic instability left by

civil wars. The theoretical debate is illustrated by two protracted peacebuilding

initiatives, in Afghanistan and East Timor2, selected considering the diversified nature

1 Although the Ioﾏple┝ities iﾐ┗ol┗iﾐg defiﾐitioﾐs foヴ de┗elopﾏeﾐt as a IoﾐIept, the さworking definitionざ

adopted is authorship of Morvaridi (2008): さthe progressive improvement in the social, economic well

being of people so that they live longer, healthier and fuller lives within any given political entityざ. 2 The country had its name changed to Timor Leste with its independence from Indonesia in 2002;

however, the term being used follows the practice of the author being referred to.

3

of each of the conflicts and political motivations behind Western involvement on

them3. Combining such conceptual discussion with the fore mentioned examples on

the ground aims to conclude that the liberal peacebuilding model, the methodology

used to implement it, and its harmful results are unhelpful to build the さsoIial

iﾐfヴastヴuItuヴe of peaIeざ ふBo┞Ie & OげDoﾐﾐel, ヲヰヰΑぶ in post-conflict societies, moreover

letting them in the verge of the resurgence of violence.

2. The liberal peacebuilding project

The dynamics of international relations and its actorsげ interaction have been

experiencing particular changes for the past twenty years. Previously, threats to

international security used to come from さpowerful aggressive statesざ (Newman, et al.,

2009, 9), with which it was necessary to be either ready to combat or align to. In the

さpost-Westphaliaﾐ eﾐ┗iヴoﾐﾏeﾐtざ, the failiﾐg oヴ IoﾐfliIt-prone states have been the

ones representing the most menace (ibid.), with which developed/threatened states

deﾏoﾐstヴate さIoopeヴatioﾐざ ┗ia peヴsoﾐﾐel IoﾐtヴiHutioﾐ ふtroops and civilians) and aid

assistance (agencies and investments) in peace operations4, in an attempt to

guarantee stabilization and their security5. It is in such scenario that the liberal

peacebuilding6 project is strengthened.

Furthermore, the increasingly common internal violence in such countries,

occurring between state and non state actors, targeting civilians, infrastructures and

livelihood systems, さeﾐduヴiﾐg I┞Iles of ┗ioleﾐIe aﾐd displaIeﾏeﾐtざ, HeIaﾏe さa

terminal threat to sustainable development (Duffield & Waddell, 2006, 6), in a period

3 The political motivation behind peacebuilding initiatives, or the political economy of peacebuilding, will

not be addressed throughout the paper, which does not intend to dismiss its fundamental role in the

subject. Because of the limited space of this paper, the focus chosen was some of the practical

development impacts of the peacebuilding policies in post-conflict societies. 4 Especially after 1988, ﾏost of the UNげs opeヴatioﾐs foIused oﾐ the task of post-conflict peacebuilding

(Paris, 2004). 5 Mainly after the 9/11 attacks, the security concerns with civil wars in countries hosting terrorist groups

have been much alive behind peacebuilding initiatives. 6 The UN definition of peacebuilding is broad: "Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to

reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for

conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding

strategies must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national

ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set

of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives." (UN, 2012; UN, 2012).

4

of intense discussions worldwide about the promotion of human security7 and the

responsibility to protect8. Thus, peacebuilding became an important vehicle to

さdeli┗eヴざ huﾏaﾐ seIuヴit┞ (Turner, et al., 2011), performing multiple tasks in societies

devastated by conflicts.

The current peacebuilding policies result, therefore, from a mixture of security

and development (Duffield & Waddell, 2006), in such order of priorities – which do not

reflect Galtuﾐgげs original proposal of assisting indigenous skills to manage peace and

resolve conflict, and liHeヴatiﾐg people fヴoﾏ さstヴuItuヴal ┗ioleﾐIeざ9 (Paris, 2004;

Peacebuilding and the United Nations, 2012). The failure to address the latter is the

focus of this paper.

The liberal peace project basically seeks to implement さdeﾏoIヴatizatioﾐ, ヴule of

la┘, huﾏaﾐ ヴights, Ii┗il soIiet┞, ﾏaヴketizatioﾐ aﾐd de┗elopﾏeﾐtざ in war-torn societies,

Iヴeatiﾐg さsocial, economic, and political models (that) conform to a mixture of liberal

aﾐd ﾐeoliHeヴal iﾐteヴﾐatioﾐal e┝peItatioﾐs iﾐ a gloHalized aﾐd tヴaﾐsﾐatioﾐal settiﾐgざ

(Richmond, 2008, 187). To perform the tasks necessary to secure individuals, Boutros-

Ghali10

claimed for an international division of labor among NGOs, UN agencies, civil

society and states (Boutros-Ghali, 1995), resulting, in peacebuilding contexts, in the

International Financial Institutionsげ (IFIs) responsibility for economic matters, and UN

and other agenciesげ responsibility for political and security issues11

(Boyce & O'Donnell,

2007).

Regarding the role of the IFIs, in spite of the disastrous effects of the

conditionalities imposed to the so called Third World countries in the 70s and 80s,

7 According to the UNDP Human Development Report 1994, one of the documents responsible for the

iﾐtヴoduItioﾐ of the IoﾐIept iﾐ the UN ageﾐda, さThe IoﾐIept of huﾏaﾐ seIuヴit┞ stヴesses that people should be able to take care of themselves: all people should have the opportunity to meet their most

essential needs and to earn their own living. This will set them free and help ensure that they can make

a full contribution to development – their own development and that of their communities, their

Iouﾐtヴies aﾐd the ┘oヴld. Huﾏaﾐ “eIuヴit┞ is a IヴitiIal iﾐgヴedieﾐt of paヴtiIipatoヴ┞ de┗elopﾏeﾐt.げ ふUNDP, 1994, 24). 8 The concept Responsibility to Protect was created in 2001 with a report of the International

Commission on Intervention and State So┗eヴeigﾐt┞, aﾐd gi┗es a ﾏoヴal dut┞ foヴ states to iﾐteヴ┗eﾐe さ┘heﾐ a state is uﾐaHle oヴ uﾐ┘illiﾐg to eﾐsuヴe the huﾏaﾐ seIuヴit┞ of its Iitizeﾐsざ (Duffield & Waddell, 2006, 9). 9 Galtung defines structural violence as aﾐ┞thiﾐg さaffeItiﾐg sustaiﾐaHle aﾐd positive peace, caused by

pooヴ eIoﾐoﾏiI aﾐd soIial Ioﾐditioﾐs, politiIal aﾐd eIoﾐoﾏiI iﾐstitutioﾐs, s┞steﾏs, oヴ stヴuItuヴesざ (Galtung, 1969 cited by Paris, 2004, 58). 10

Boutros-Ghali was the sixth Secretary-General of UN, between 1992 and 1996, and published the

document being referred to, the Agenda for Peace, in 1995. 11

Such division between economic and political processes has been one of the critiques of the model,

which will be further addressed in the next section.

5

Pugh states that さThe old-style unthinking Washington consensus about development

may be merely a virtual death, with a liberal peace redivivus eﾏeヴgiﾐg fヴoﾏ the ashesざ

(2005, 6). In the beginning of the 90s, the rules for war-toヴﾐ soIietiesげ loaﾐs ┘ith

International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank12

consisted on the same that

used to be applied, such as fiscal and monetary austerity measures, low public

expenditure, limited provision of credit and devaluation of local currency, envisioning

low inflation rates, macroeconomic balance, privatization, liberalization of trade and

deregulation of financial and labor markets (Paris, 2004). By the end of the 90s, good

go┗eヴﾐaﾐIe, さ┗oiIeざ aﾐd partnership were added to the post-Washington Consensus

list (ibid.; Maxwell, 2005), covering even more the ticking boxes of the western liberal

democracy.

Many critiques of the neoliberal development project of peacebuilding have, to

a certain extent, succeded in bringing a さreformulationざ, at least in the discourse, of

the liberal peace project in recent years. The aIIeptaﾐIe of the fla┘ed さiﾐstitutioﾐall┞

oriented, neoliberally aimed and constructed around the elite governance of conflict

zoﾐesざ liHeral peace model (Richmond & Franks, 2008, 187) has encouraged pressure

for fair trade, accomplishment of Millenium Development Goals (MDGs), lessening

debt, advocacy for social protection and negligence of aid conditionality (Pugh, 2005).

Theヴe has also Heeﾐ a ﾐe┘ さIoﾐfliIt iﾏpaIt assessﾏeﾐtざ into decision-making at

official development agencies (Boyce & O'Donnell, 2007, 9), and the creation of the

Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and UN Peacebuilding Support Office, in order to

さiﾐstitutioﾐalize lessoﾐs leaヴﾐedざ aﾐd pヴoﾏote duヴaHle peaIe iﾐ post-conflict regions

ふPugh, ヲヰヰヵぶ. Noﾐetheless, aIIoヴdiﾐg to Bo┞Ie & OげDoﾐﾐell ふop Iitぶ, さIoﾐfliIt iﾏpaIt

assessﾏeﾐtざ applied to revenue policies, for example, さis still in its infancyざ and the

PBC, instead of reporting to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and General

Assembly, does it to the power-disputed Security Council, and induces early

involvement of IFIs in peace process, reinforcing even more the liberal ideology and

practice (Pugh, 2005).

The liberal peace project has been institutionalized to the extent that most of

the human rights, development and emergency relief agencies on the ground accept

12

According to Paris (2004), the World Bank started to impose conditionalities to its loans in the 80s

only.

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its ideals as the さdesiヴaHle oHjeIti┗es foヴ de┗elopiﾐg statesざ ふPaヴis, ヲヰヰヴぶ. Pugh argues

that the さヴefoヴﾏsざ pヴoposed – H┞ ﾐoﾐe otheヴ thaﾐ the さlifeguaヴdsざ of Iapitalisﾏ13 – are

better described by the teヴﾏ さliddisﾏざ14, which do not represent, therefore, the

necessary paradigm shift for the emergence of real emancipatory and sustainable

peace processes in post-conflict realities (Pugh, et al., 2008, 395).

3. The (lack of) developmental role of the liberal peacebuilding project

Although the reasonable years of experiences and failures of the broad and

ambitious liberal peacebuilding project, it continues to be implemented –

Ioﾏpleﾏeﾐted H┞ the ﾐe┘ さ┗aluesざ stated eaヴlieヴ – promising to establish market

democracies which promote human rights and civil peace (Richmond, 2006). However,

the fruits harvested by the recipient societies are most frequently state and

iﾐstitutioﾐsげ ┘eakﾐess, uﾐeﾏplo┞ﾏeﾐt aﾐd laIk of de┗elopﾏeﾐt (ibid.), not much

different from what developing countries had experienced in the late nineteenth

century. Paddy Ashdown15

appropriately addressed such malfunction:

さIヴoﾐiIall┞, as a politiIiaﾐ I Iaﾏpaigﾐed agaiﾐst ﾏaﾐ┞ of heヴ [ThatIheヴげs] ヴefoヴﾏs, aヴguiﾐg that the┞ ┘ould lead to lost jobs and the selling off of the national wealth; only to find

myself instituting very similar reforms in Bosnia and facing the

same arguments and opposition. What makes matters worse

in most post-conflict countries is that they are poor, not rich –

so the pain can be far greater. There is not much the

interveners can do about this, except understand it and

recognize that by insisting on accelerated reforms we are

often asking local politicians to take responsibility for a level of

social disruption which our own politicians at home would

ヴejeIt ┘ithout a seIoﾐd thoughtざ (Ashdown, 2007 cited by

Cooper, et al., 2011, 7)

Several arguments can be derived from his words. The most evident relates to

the fast-speed political and economic changes requested by intervenors, whose

13

Oﾐe e┝aﾏple is Jeffヴe┞ “aIhs, eaヴlieヴ ヴespoﾐsiHle foヴ the stヴuItuヴal adjustﾏeﾐt aﾐd さshoヴt shaヴp shoIk tヴeatﾏeﾐtざ, aﾐd lateヴ aヴIhiteIt of the Ioﾏpilation of the Millenium Declaration into MDGs. The latter is

filled ┘ith liHeヴal assuﾏptioﾐs, suIh as さoﾐe-size-fits-allざ to taIkle e┝tヴeﾏe po┗eヴt┞, puHliI iﾐ┗estﾏeﾐt for private purposes, and absence of state dirigisme in integration to the global trade (Pugh, 2005, 7). 14

さLiddisﾏざ, a term designed by Paul Rogers, means keeping a lid on disorder (Rogers, 2000). 15

Padd┞ Ashdo┘ﾐ ┘as a MeﾏHeヴ of Paヴliaﾏeﾐt duヴiﾐg Maヴgaヴet TatIheヴげs adﾏiﾐistヴatioﾐ, aﾐd lateヴ (2002-2006) the High Representative of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and

Herzegovina.

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impacts the governments, when existent, are not able to absorb. Furthermore, Chua

states that さat ﾐo poiﾐt iﾐ histoヴ┞ did any Western nation ever implemented laissez-

faire capitalism and overnight universal suffrage at the saﾏe tiﾏeざ ふヲヰヰヴ, ヱヴぶ.

Similarly, widespread privatization, especially in social services, does not seem suitable

where even basic services are not delivered (Pugh, 2005).

Aﾐotheヴ iteﾏ deヴi┗ed fヴoﾏ Ashdo┘ﾐげs stateﾏeﾐt ヴegaヴds the sepaヴatioﾐ

between economics and politics/social values in peacebuilding strategies, which Cox

(1992) cited by Pugh (2005, 9ぶ Ialls さde-politization of eIoﾐoﾏiI issuesざ. Hazaヴdous

effects are generated in post-conflict societies as a result of the absence of a holistic

approach to deal with their complexities, which is also a reflect of the lack of synergy

between, for example, the British Department for International Development (DFID)

aﾐd that Iouﾐtヴ┞げs Depaヴtﾏeﾐt of Tヴade aﾐd Iﾐdustヴ┞ in dealing with their aid recipient

countries (Collier, 2007). As declared by Ashdown, reforms instituted by intervenors in

post-conflict realities such as removal of barriers for free trade are still rejected by

their own politicians at home, where the rule is that integration to global markets is

followed by growth, which is followed by protectionism in order to safeguard critical

economic interests in the promotion of freer trade (Pugh, 2005). DIFD efforts in the

development of war-torn societies would be much more effective if it had a voice in

the British industrial and trade sectors.

Ha┗iﾐg said that, oﾐe last issue IoﾐﾐeIted to Ashdo┘ﾐげs ケuote is the ヴole of the

state in the post-conflict economy. Beyond imposing trade barriers and protecting

national industries, it is the primary responsibility of governments to invest and

provide public goods and services, create employment, reduce the shadow economy,

and most importantly, さヴedヴess hoヴizoﾐtal aﾐd ┗eヴtiIal iﾐeケualities that aヴe iﾏpliIated

iﾐ ┗ioleﾐt IoﾐfliItざ, ﾐeIessaヴ┞ foヴ the さsoIial iﾐfヴastヴuItuヴe of peaIeざ (Turner, 2006;

Boyce & O'Donnell, 2007, 9). Private-sector markets are far from adjusting such

inequalities automatically, as advocated by neoliberal policies, and which had been

proven by the experience of developing countries – not emerging from conflict – in the

past two decades.

The peacebuilding policies demonstrate a major concern with the (re)creation

of a state capable of implementing the rule of law dictated by externals, usually to be

implemented by ruling local elites, in order to regulate a turbulent environment. The

8

establishment of a functioning society, with a sustainable economic process capable of

generating employment and a welfare system (Richmond, 2006), with the participation

of its people, although gradually incorporated in policy documents, is far from being

set as priority by doﾐoヴsげ pヴaItiIes. An example on the ground was the imposition of

the foreign centralized judicial system and さﾐe┘ざ rule of law in East Timor, in conflict

┘ith loIal さsuIo ふ┗illageぶ aﾐd tヴiHal la┘ざ, which has caused troubles with compliance

and police training in the country (Richmond & Franks, 2008, 195).

Regarding the welfare16

systems of those societies, some are the reasons for

their hindrance. First of all, the wealth creation system is not only imposed from the

さforeign aboveざ, but it is also likel┞ to He ﾏaﾐaged H┞ elites さthat IoﾐduIted IoﾐfliIt iﾐ

fiヴst plaIeざ, iﾐteﾐsif┞iﾐg さthe soIiall┞ di┗isi┗e, atoﾏiziﾐg effeIts of IoﾐfliIt – capital

accumulation by dispossession, reorientations of patronage and fragmentation of

authoヴit┞ざ ふibid., 296; 83). The absence of locals in leading the political and economic

course of their own societies, marginalising their understanding of peace and well-

being, and not addressing their needs (Newman et al., 2009; Richmond, 2008), leads to

a fiscal dilemma: none or few services delivered to the peoples, results in their

proportionate will to pay taxes, which affects not only the governnemnt revenues but

also its legitimacy (Boyce & O'Donnell, 2007).

Secondly, amid such environment of unsustainable market-oriented economic

reconstruction delegated to a minority – which Amy Chua contends as the recipe for

group hatred and ethnic violence17

– and with no viable alternative livelihoods, the

shadow economy is frequently considered a possibility (Cooper & Pugh, 2004). That is

very much the case in Afghanistan, where the drug economy, which figures as a

historical aspect of the country, さis the ﾐeaヴest thiﾐg to a ﾐatioﾐal seItoヴざ aﾐd Βヰ-90

peヴIeﾐt of the eIoﾐoﾏ┞ is さiﾐfoヴﾏal, desIeﾐtヴalized … aﾐd fヴagﾏeﾐtedざ (Goodhand &

Sedra, 2010). The iﾐteヴﾐatioﾐal pヴoIess of aidiﾐg the Iouﾐtヴ┞げs ヴeIoﾐstヴuItioﾐ has not

pヴopeヴl┞ Ioﾐsideヴed the さIoﾐte┝t of Afghaﾐ histoヴ┞ aﾐd soIial ヴelatioﾐsざ by considering

activities of the organized crime and informal economies as obstacles for the state-

building process, and enforcing the rule of law in an attempt to restrain them

16

Refraining from a theoretical debate about the concept, in will be simply considered さiﾐdi┗idual aﾐd community fostered well-Heiﾐgざ ふNe┘ﾏaﾐ, et al., ヲヰヰΓ, Βヰぶ. 17

さMaヴkets IoﾐIeﾐtヴate eﾐoヴﾏous ┘ealth in the hands of an さoutsideヴざ minority, fomenting ethnic envy

aﾐd hatヴed aﾏoﾐg ofteﾐ IhヴoﾐiIall┞ pooヴ ﾏajoヴitiesざ ふChua, ヲヰヰヴ, Γぶ.

9

(Goodhand, 2004). There is a need, instead, of engaging with the さillegalざ

entrepreneurs to support them channel their profits to investment in the not-so-

attractive licit economy (ibid.). According to Newman,

さDisﾏissal of all elements of informal welfare

pヴaItiIed iﾐ the さtヴiIks of lifeざ – as socially corrosive and

leading to moral collapse – is to misunderstand the need for

social cement in everyday life where social corrosion is

engendered by increasing disparities of wealth under

liHeヴalizatioﾐざ (Newman, et al., 2009, 88).

A number of neoliberals even dare to affirm that ┘elfaヴe is a さdisiﾐIeﾐti┗e to

iﾐ┗estﾏeﾐt aﾐd ┘oヴk, aﾐd Iヴeate depeﾐdeﾐIeざ ふOffe, ヱΓΒヲ Iited H┞ ‘iIhﾏoﾐd, ヲヰヰΒ,

293). They do not mention, however, the dependency created by the external

presence in countries hosting peacebuilding missions which are liteヴall┞ さdeli┗eヴedざ to

post-conflict societies by an externally designed agenda, enabled by foreign aid, and

implemented by international workers. The main aspects of the さhoヴﾐHookざ were

previously explored; the impacts of international financial assistance and human

resources also deserve some considerations.

The importance of aid in reconstructing countries emerging from conflict

should not be undermined. Nevertheless, the relatively high amounts flowing into the

economy possibly represents: a) a discouragement for raising domestic revenues

through collecting taxes; b) an overloading of the already restrictive stateげs aHilit┞ さto

disburse funds in a timel┞ aﾐd tヴaﾐspaヴeﾐt fashioﾐざ; c) a hindrance in Huildiﾐg さstate

IapaIit┞ iﾐ Hudget alloIatioﾐ aﾐd e┝peﾐdituヴe ﾏaﾐageﾏeﾐtざ, oﾐIe aid is ﾏaiﾐl┞

conducted via private actors and NGOs (Boyce & O'Donnell, 2007, 10). As a result,

several authors mention the creation of a dual public sector one managed by the

government, and the other managed and funded by donors (Goodhand, 2004;

Ishizuka, 2008).

Furthermore, the previously mentioned imposition of conditions à la Bretton

Woods by donor agencies and countries in order to continue delivery of aid, such as

good governance, ﾏo┗es the ﾐatioﾐal ageﾐda a┘a┞ fヴoﾏ さloIal ﾐeeds aﾐd aspiヴatioﾐsざ

(Newman, 2009, 11), iﾏpediﾐg the Iヴeatioﾐ of さa soIial IoﾐtヴaIt Het┘eeﾐ Iitizeﾐs aﾐd

institutioﾐs that Iitizeﾐs peヴIei┗e as legitiﾏateざ (Richmond & Franks, 2008, 198),

undermining even more the strengthening of the state.

10

In East Timor, the dual and external-interest driven economy is appropriately

represented by the American management of revenues from the Timorese oil and gas

reserves. The country has contracts with Australia and international energy

organizations, but the oil funds flow through the US central bank in order to avoid

corruption by the Timorese government. According to Richmond (2008), corruption

actually occurs on the side of those さa┗oidiﾐgざ it, as Americans work with Fretilin18

to

oppose to the Iouﾐtヴ┞げs go┗eヴﾐﾏeﾐt.

Iﾐ the Afghaﾐ Ioﾐte┝t, H┞ ヲヰヰヴ, ヵヰ peヴIeﾐt of the Iouﾐtヴ┞げs GDP Ioﾐsisted oﾐ

aid, and one third of the total amount that had been aided to Afghanistan since 2001

had come from USA (Goodhand, 2004). Thus, the priority had been given to military

and security sector reform, creating such a structure – especially oriented by the short

term objectives of counter-insurgency operations – that the government will not be

aHle to sustaiﾐ iﾐ the loﾐg teヴﾏ さe┗eﾐ ┘ith the ﾏost optiﾏistiI ヴe┗eﾐue pヴojeItioﾐsざ

(ibid., 88). The apparently aspiration of Afghans for a strong and centralized state

capable of providing a functioning legal system and stability is disregarded, which runs

the ヴisk of tヴaﾐsfoヴﾏiﾐg a さIヴiﾏiﾐalized ┘aヴ eIoﾐoﾏ┞ざ iﾐ a さIヴiﾏiﾐalized peaIe

eIoﾐoﾏ┞ざ ふiHid., 76).

‘egaヴdiﾐg iﾐteヴﾐatioﾐal ┘oヴkeヴsげ iﾐ┗ol┗eﾏeﾐt iﾐ Iouﾐtヴies hostiﾐg

peacebuilding missions – most of them coming from developed realities –, or local

employees by UN or international NGOs, two issues deserve considerable concern.

Firstly, the consuming habits of expatriate workers induces the development of a

parallel economy consisted by overpriced hotels, cafes, restaurants and supermarkets,

only afforded by those earning an international salary (Ishizuka, 2008). In East Timor,

suIh さdispla┞ of afflueﾐIe aﾏid the po┗eヴt┞, destヴuItioﾐ aﾐd uﾐeﾏplo┞ﾏeﾐt ┘hiIh

IhaヴaIteヴized the loIal eIoﾐoﾏ┞ ┘as aﾐ affヴoﾐtざ (Overseas Development Institute,

2002 cited by Ishizuka, 2008, 55).

Second, the employment of local people by external organizations have two

side effects in the economy dynamics: their better working conditions and salaries

iﾐduIe a さHヴaiﾐ dヴaiﾐざ fヴoﾏ state iﾐstitutioﾐs aﾐd Ioﾏﾏuﾐit┞ Hased oヴgaﾐizatioﾐs, aﾐd

such international salary stimulates inflation on price le┗els, さdepヴessiﾐg the ┗alue of

18

Fretilin is the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, the opposition party to the

government of East Timor.

11

state salariesざ ふGoodhaﾐd, ヲヰヰヴ, Γヰぶ. In Afghanistan those effects reverberated in the

national economy by the forty thousand locals employed by international

organizations, who were characterized H┞ Afghaﾐs as the さIo┘s that drink their own

ﾏilkざ (ibid., 94). Likewise, in East Timor there was a widespread national sentiment

that さTiﾏoヴese HeIaﾏe the seヴ┗aﾐts of iﾐteヴﾐatioﾐal aid ┘oヴkeヴs iﾐ theiヴ o┘ﾐ Iouﾐtヴ┞ざ

(Ishizuka, 2008, 54).

The highlighted issues herein are far from covering the whole range of impacts

caused by the current liberal peacebuilding project in the reconstruction and

development of post-conflict societies. However, it intended to demonstrate how

さE┗eヴ┞da┞ life does ﾐot Ioﾐfoヴﾏ to the ヴatioﾐalisﾏ of the eIoﾐomic engineers from

outsideざ (Newman, et al., 2009, 87), and the real impacts of their magic-formulas on

the ground, already known by previous neoliberal development initiatives. It is more

adeケuate to sa┞ that these soIietiesげ ┘elfaヴe is aヴヴaﾐged despite the international

assistance and not because of it (ibid.). The reasons for insisting in the same mistakes

from past experiences are subject for another essay.

4. Conclusion

The liberal peacebuilding and the amendments it has undergone throughout

the past two decades is paralleled to the changes occurred in the development model

being implemented in less developed regions by international organizations and donor

agencies. The financial crisis of 2008 has once again demonstrated that the American

さﾏagiI foヴﾏulaざ of ﾐeoliHeヴal ﾏaヴket-democracies, especially in a deliberatively

liberalized capital market environment, can bring catastrophic consequences to the

societies well-being (Birdsall & Fukuyama, 2011). The need for social protection and a

sequencing liberalization process19

have been proposed and implemented in countries

such as Brazil and Mexico, but have not yet reached peacebuilding (ibid.), what this

piece of work has attempted to demonstrate.

The analogy made between the concepts and practices of the liberal

peacebuilding and the development models stresses how unproductive and even

19

Sequencing liberalization means liberalizing only after a strong regulatory system has been in place

(Birdsall & Fukuyama, 2011).

12

counter-productive it is to continue implementing such a さpackageざ, which has

historically caused serious political, economic and social damages to the developing

world, in societies destroyed by civil wars. Some of those damages caused by the

peacebuilding experiences in East Timor and Afghanistan, which have been in place

throughout the past decade, illustrated that.

Furthermore, considering the fragile aspects of the post-conflict realities, the

iﾏpaIts of the Iuヴヴeﾐt peaIeHuildiﾐg pヴogヴaﾏﾏes ﾏa┞ easil┞ e┝aIeヴHate さthe soIial

tensions that resulted in violeﾐt IoﾐfliIt iﾐ the fiヴst plaIeざ, ﾐot IoﾐtヴiHutiﾐg, theヴefoヴe,

for the sustainable peace envisioned (Newman, et al., 2009, 13). Quoting Birdsall &

Fukuyama, and correlating peace and development, さde┗elopﾏeﾐt has ﾐe┗eヴ Heeﾐ

something that the rich bestowed on the poor but rather something the poor achieved

for themselvesざ ふヲヰヱヱ, ヵンぶ. As well as for development, for a peace process to be

durable it must involve the welfare dynamics and culture of the peoples affected, who

must be the protagonists of their own emancipation. Such message is made clear in

the following statement by Xamana Gusmão, current Prime Minister of East Timor,

さWe aヴe ﾐot iﾐteヴested iﾐ a legaI┞ of Iaヴs aﾐd la┘s, nor are we interested in a legacy of development plans for the

future designed by [people] other than East Timorese. We are

not interested in inheriting an economic rationale which

leaves out the social and political complexity of East Timorese

reality. Nor do we wish to inherit the heavy decision-making

and project implementation mechanisms in which the role of

the East Timorese is to give their consent as observers rather

than the active players we should start to beざ (Dodd, 2000,

183).

13

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