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1964-0925

THE DISASTER RESEARCH CENTERTHE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITYCOLUMBUS, OHIO 43210

Research Note #9

S o m e Resea rch Questions and Planning Implications Raisedby Observations M a d e at a Flood Threat in Laredo, Texas,and Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, September 25, 1964.

BYJ a m e s R. Hundley, Jr,

Department of SociologyJanuary 15, 1965

M u c h of the material in this preliminary report has beenderived using funds fr om the Office of Civil Defense, Officeof the Secretary of the A r m y , under Contract No. OCD-PS64-46, Subtask 265lA. Th e report has not, however, yetbeen reviewed formally by the Departrnent of Defense norissued officially by OCD to the general public,

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INTRODUCTION

As a result of heavy rains in late Sep tember of up to five inches in partsof Southwest Texas, the Rio Grande Rives and its tributaries rose to flood ornear-flood stage in Del Rio, Eagle Pass, and La red o on the Am er ica n side aswell as in the Mexic an towns of Villa Acuna, Piedras Negras, and Nue voLaredo. Of paricular concern on Friday, September 25, 1964, w a s Laredo,Texas, where Weather Bureau and International Boundary and Wa te r Cornmissionofficials predicted the water would rise to a 39-42.5 foot level. Since this was9-12.5 feet above flood stage, the DRC dispatched a staff m e m b e r to the scene.

Bec ause there w e r e only infrequent flights to Laredo, the field workerhad to take a bus f r om San Antonio, and arrived in the supposedly-endangeredarea at noon on Sunday, Septe mber 27. Both fo rm al and informal interviewsw e r e conducted in Lare do and Nuevo Lar edo on Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday.Organizations contacted in Laredo included:

Civil Air Patrol4th Ar my , Fort S a m HoustonAm er ic an National Re d C rossCivil Def ensePolice Departmen tRadio Station KVOZ

Organizations contacted in Nu ev o L ar do included:Police DepartmentCity Gov ern men t

Contrary to the original prediction, the waters of the Rio Gran de hadcrested at only 34.2 feet in the vicinity of Laredo. As a consequence, only fourh o m e s w e r e da ma ge d by flood waters. In essence there had only been a threat,not an actual community disaster. Even for the threat, the twelve hour warning

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-2-

before the crest occurred had given city and organizational officials ample ti meto plan and execute suc h evacuation, shelter, and feeding operations as had b ee nundertaken,

Since it w a s evident on Sunday that no com mu ni ty organization had under-gone any m aj or stress, the field w o r k focused upo n the alerting and preparationprocedures. hitially, agencies on the Am eri ca n side w e r e contacted, and M o n -day afternoon and Tuesday w a s spent examining organizational responses inNu ev o Laredo.in Laredo because of the language differences and the greater inaccessibilityof city officials.not s e e m to warrant a m o r e extensive study, so the DRC staff m e m b e r returnedafter four days.

Obtaining information in Nu ev o Lare do w a s m o r e difficult than

The ab sence of ma jo r strain on comm un it y organizations did

T he following pages point out s o m e of the research questions and planningimplications that em erged f rom a consideration of the limited data obtained inthis field excursion. T h e questions and implications are divided into threecategories, those pertaining (1) to CD organizations, (2) to other organizations,and (3) o com mu ni ty e me rg en cy social systems.questions and implications are posed, although occasionally hypotheses areadvanced.ables to which field wo rk er s might be responsive, and to indicate some racticalfactors that might be considered in planning for the mobilization and activity oforganizations and communities in large- cale emergencies, N o attempt is m a d eto present answers or detail rec omm endations, nor is any effort m a d e to analyzethe specific responses to this particular flood threat.merely used for illustrative purposes.

In most instances, only

The basic pu rpo se of this report is to suggest s o m e research vari-

T h e incident itself is

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-3-I. Questioqs and Implications for CD Organizations

1 Civil Air Patrol and ROTC cadets in Laredo se em ed to perform the sa m efunction as do CD auxiliary or security corps in other U. S. cities. That is,they provided m an po w er for evacuation, shelter, communication, and trans-portation tasks.cally available for use by local CD organizations in co mm un it y disasters?

What alternative or additional sources of ma np ow er are typi-

2. The Laredo CD Director w a s head of a city agency, i. e., the PublicHealth Department. Th e County CD Director was a functionary in the Sheriff's

office. In smaller cities, h o w is the speed and nature of the response affectedby the fact that the person holding the position of CD Director frequently holdsanother and full-time job in an organization which b ecomes subordinate to CivilDefense during emergencies ?

3. In Laredo, CD s ee m ed to be equated with the Director as a person and/orwith the Public Health Department. A m o n g the possible variations, CD can beconceived of: (1) as a distinct organization, (2) s an organization with n orm al"peace ti mett uties as well as CD duties, or (3)as a person or small group ofpersons w h o occasionally "wear a CD at.different conceptions during times of eme rg en ci es ?

What ar e the consequences of these

4, In Laredo, the Ma y o r "turned over the reins" to the CD Director.Legally he did not have to do so,Director is an integral part of the no rmal administrative structure of a citythan when he is head of a semi-autonomous agency?

Is this m o r e likely to occur w h e n the CD

5. Laredo CD had no,plans or a control center or for shelters but b ec am einvolved in setting up both. CD o v e d in this direction because other commu nity

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-4-organizations did not se e m prepared to step in and carry out such functions.Is there a tendency for CD to fill whatever breeches develop wh en other groupsdo not act to carry out necessary tasks during an emer ge nc y?

6. Lardo CD s concerned about the closing of the border in the event of w a rand the effect on the city of thousands of migrants who expect to escape toMexico.by regional or national CD, and is resigned to being powerless to solve theproblem locally. To what extent do co mm un it y CD units visualize emergencypr oble ms for which they do not actively seek guidance f r o m higher echelons?

Laredo CD has no solutions, believes it has not been offered guidance

7. Laredo GD had no specific plans for w a r or natural disasters. However,the very existence of even a skeletal structure se e m e d to help in the coordinationof a rather adequate co mm un it y response to the high water threat."paper" CD organizations m o r e functional during times of stress than mightsuperficially appear to be the ca se?

Ar e even

8. As a result of the flood threat in Laredo, the local CD Director:a.b.C.d.e.

feels the need for m o r e m a n p ow e r and vehicles;believes he can convince city officials of the need for a nu mb erof CD subordinates;b e c a m e awa re that shelter officals should know Spanish;intends to prepare elevation m a p s of the city;is personally convinced that he should have a two-wa y radioin his car.

What specific, concrete facts, procedures, needs and so forth do CD or-ganizations typically learn as a result of undergoing a disaster experience?

9. Prior to the flood threat, CD apparently wa s not positively viewed in thecommunity.acceptable to be associated with a s y m b o l of Civil Defense in Laredo.

After the event, there w e r e some signs that it w a s m o r e sociallyTo what

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- -extent are even mer el y threats of emerge ncies a factor in changing the im age ofCD

11. Questions and Implications for Other Organizations

1 Other earlier studies have indicated that there are s o m e majo r groupdifferences in Am er ic an and Mexican responses to crises.l These also appearedin this potential disaster,differences in organizational reactions to the flood threat.though evacuation occurred in both Lar ed o and Nuevo Laredo, different organi-

zations participated in the activity.not pe rform the s a m e functions,Fir e Depa rtm ent searched for dead bodies in the river, wh ereas this task isusually one for county officials in Laredo.cross-cultural differences in values an d social relationships that exist inAmeric an and in Mexi can society. Ap art from theoretical implications, obser-vations of such phenomena clearly raise questions about the possible differentconsequences of varying structures for em ergency planning and functioning.

There we r e similarities, but there were also noticeabltF o r instance, all

Also, similar agencies in both cities didF o r example, personnel f ro m the Nuevo Laredo

Presumably, such variations reflect

a. City government. Although both cities are so mew ha t of the s a m e size,ea ch having a population of over 50, 000, their political structure and resultantfunctions are somewhat different. Thus, in Nue vo Lared o there is no countygovernment, a weak state government, and a strong Federal governme nt whichcarries on m a n y of the activities traditionally a s s u m e d by city agencies in theUnited States. Therefore, it was the Hydraulic an d the Public W o r k s Departments1R.A. Clifford, T h e Rio Gr an de Flood: A Compa rativ e Study of Border C o m -munities in Disaster, Washington, Disaster Rese arch Group, National A c a d e m yof Sciences, 1956, and Charles P. Loomis , Social Systems, New York, V a nNostrand, 1960, p, 136,

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both under the Federal government, which prepared sandbags during the threat.It w a s the Wa te r and Sanitation Co mm is si on , a Feder al department, whichcovered pipes and sewe rs in the face of a possible flood. Similarly, rehabili-tion and welfare in Nu ev o Lare do is handled either by the Federal government,or by a club of upper class w o m e n w h o collect m o n e y and materials for welfareduring the year, The M a y o r did ha ve under his control the fire, service, andmaintenance departments for evacuation and debris removal, but in emergenciesh e wou ld direct them through his Police Chief.

Clearly all sorts of questions ar e involved in the possible differences inspeed of mobilization, ease of communication, degree of coordination, and soforth, w h e n the city gove rn me nt is relatively simple and very limited in scope,as against wh e n it is far m o r e co mp le x and has broader responsibilities, as inthe United States.studied in a cross-cultural context.

variations a m o n g Am er ic an city gov ernm ents to allow any meaningful examinationof these matters.

It would s e e m that these are problems that could only beTh er e are probably not enough fo rm al

b. Law enforcement agencies. There are differences in both organiza-tional structures and resource capabilities between the protective forces thatw e r e available in Nue vo Lar edo and those normally present in a comparableA m e r i c a n city.and 25 secret service agents.

T h e Nue vo La re do Police Depa rtme nt consists of 75 policemenIn addition, there are about 150 part-time

"watchmen" in the city. T h e police cars have no radios and thus have to departf r o m and return to the police station after each call. Other equipment is alsosom ewh at limited, even though the department supposedly has m o r e administrati

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- -responsibility over s o m e public service agencies than do the police in Laredo.T he order of priority in calling upon law enforcement officials in emergenciesin Nu ev o La re do is: (1)the policemen, (2) he secret service agents, (3) heeight state police locally stationed, (4) he eight federal police locally stationed,(5)the firemen, and finally, (6) he military.

Given s o m e non-comparability in structure and resources, it w a s notsurprising to note differences between the La redo and Nuev o La re do law en-forcement agencies in the tasks each carried out. Th e Laredo departmentparticipated in evacuation efforts, for example, but the Nuevo L aredo policedid not. However, the multiple differences in this particular instance precludesgoing beyond the general observation that a different structure was correlatedwith different functions.

\c, Th e R e d Cross. Th e R e d Cro ss in Neu vo Laredo, as in Mexicogenerally, functions primarily as a medical organization. It operates on theprinciple that the greatest need is in the field of health and medical care. Thus,the Red Cross administers and m a n s a hospital in Nue vo Lar edo which offersfree medical care and ambulance service.one military hospital elsewhere in the city).shelters or provide food.in Nu ev o La re do w e r e evacuated to three school buildings.

(There are only four private andT he Red Cros s does not operate

At the time of the flood threat, one hundred familiesThe people brought

their o w n mattresses with them.Re d Cross, in this instance, did prepare the food.

T h e city provided food for breakfast. The

This is a clear example of a cross-cultural difference in organizationalfunctioning. Gf nterest is fie fact that RO group provided what the Nue vo Laredo

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-8-R e d Cr oss did not provide, i. e. , bedding. It could be hypothesized that dif-ferent cultural values affect whether any need which is not me t by an organi-zation will be m e t by another group or only through the convergence of individualm a s s behavior.

2. All of the Am er ic an R e d Cro ss personnel on the scene in Laredo were fromthe regional office in 3, ouis.quite similar for each e me rg en cy in which they work.that the American National R e d Cross is involved locally, one can expect th emto attempt to pe rf or m similar functions in each disaster,

These persons generally see their duties asTherefore, to the extent

Howe ver, what pr ob lems arise because of this wh e n non-local-level per-sonnel be c o m e involved with the local organization?R e d Cro ss personnel have the s a m e conception of tasks as do local chapterm e m b e r s ? If there are differences, how are they reconciled?

Do national and/or regional

3,A National R e d C ross staff m e m b e r in La red o indicated that the role of theorganization is to alert, evacuate and m o v e in order of priority: 1) people,2)furniture, 3) livestock, and 4) rain and buildings.this normativ e order predict actual X e d Cross behavior in disasters ? Also,

T o wh at extent does

do the priorities of National and local R e d Cr os s chapters generally coincide?4. O n Sunday evening, a free m e a l was being served in Laredo, presumably

only for those persons w h o had evacuated.convergence of non-evacuated individuals and it appeared that the A r m y and theR e d Cross might run out of food. Discussion ensued as to whether or not somepeople should be asked to step out of the waiting line,

Ho we ve r, there w a s a substantial

T h e R e d Cross suggestedthat serving be continued until the food gave out. Organizational personnel m a d e

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-9-reference to the possibility of a ne ws pa pe r seizing up on the situation and statingthat the R e d Cr os s had denied food to the needy.served,

Thus, everyone in line wa s

W h a t are the circumstances under which Organizations see themselvesforced to act contrary to wha t they consider their operating principles becauseof perceived necessity of maintaining an im ag e? Ar e s o m e groups m o r e vulner-able to such behavior than others3 How often does such behavior occur?

5. Prior to and during the threatening period in Laredo, one of the radiostations periodically called Del Rio and Eagle Pass for weather information.This station also asked people over the air to call in the amounts of rainfall theywe r e receiving in their neighborhoods. T h e audience response wa s reportedlyimmense.Wea ther Bureau.

S o m e of this information was then regularly relayed on to the local

This establishment of what w a s essentially a n informal feedback me ch ani smby this organization raises a n u m b e r of questions. Does involving the generalpublic in such activity m a k e t h e m m o r e accepting and likely to respond to laterofficial. arnings that might be issued by organizations doing this ? Wh at dis-tortions might result in technical assessments ofagencies arrived at fr o m datagathered and pas sed through non-technical communications channels of othergr oups ? What are the conditions which generate the development of such kindsof information feedback mech ani sm s outside of the official organizationalstructure for such purposes 3

6. The Police Depa rtme nt in Lar edo responded to the threat in various ways.Friday and Saturday, 57 m e n we r e on double shifts (38 e n at a time). Elevenpatrol cars we re used f r o m 3 p. m. to 7:30 p. m. on Friday to untangle a 15-block

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-10-traffic j a m resulting f r o m people crossing the International Bridge, m a n y ofw h o m had c o m e to see the rising waters. At least 6 policemen we r e assignedto keeping persons back at a safe distance on shore f r om the rapidly rising RioGrande.an assigned are a warning people of the high water and actually transporting t he mto shelters. M a n y persons also kept calling Police Headquarters for informationand about the need for evacuation.

F or a twelve-hour period starting Friday at 1 p. m. the Police covered

All this convergence behavior m a d e it difficult for the police to performother duties that they might normally have been expected to perform. Thus,they did not station men in shelters or around evacuated homes. Looting wasreported at 3-4 a, m, Saturday. Th re e police cars sent to guard against furtherlooting had to be subsequently assisted by two cars from the Sheriff's office anda numb er of Laredo AFB patrol cars. The police department behavior in thisinstance suggests that there are situations wh e n organizations will lessen their

emphasis on s o m e traditional tasks because of the urgency of demands for thecarrying out of other traditional tasks. W h at ar e the nature of the de ma nd swhich will lead to such shifts in emphases? Are there differences between or-ganizations in this? W h a t are the circumstances that will bring an organizationback to its normal and traditional activities?

ID. Questions and Implications for Co mm un it y Emer genc y Social Systems1, A functional br ea kd ow n of which organizations did what in La re do includes:

a.b. Evacuation: Police, Sheriff, and Fire Departments;C. Shelter: Civil Defense, Schools, Air Force, and R e d Cross;d.e.

Alerting and Technical Information: eath er Bureau and InternationalBoundary and Wate r Commission (IBWC);

Food: A r m y and Air Force;Ma np ow er Resources: Civil Air Patrol and High School ROTC;

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-I-f. Operations of Control Center: Sheriff, Civil Defense, and City Cfficials;g.h. Social Control and Protection: Police, Sheriff, and Air F orce Niilitaryi.

Information: Civil Defense and Ma s s Media;Police;Rehabilitation: R e d C r o s.

It migh t be hypothesized that the occasion of a disaster calls into play cer-tain activities that are to be performed independently of any specific organizationavailable to perf orm them. C o m m u n i t y strain during em er ge nc y arises wh en thecommunity collectively defines a situation as calling for certain activities to bepe rf or me d which are not being adequately performed at that time. Thus, com-munity stress is the condition of forging out new patterns or innovations inrespo nse to the strain.nection is w h y does the division of functions among organizations take the patternthat it does in commu nity emergencies ?

T h e key general question to be exam ined in this con-

2. Laredo officials called a n 11 a. m. meeting on Friday before the predictedhigh wa ters w e r e to reach the city.public and private organizations.

It w a s attended by representatives of both

A general coming-together of this sort se e m s to occur in most communityW h oisasters (whether there has been prior warni ng or impact is unexpected).

typically initiates such meetings encompas sing communit y-wide e me rg en cy or-ganizations? What are the general subjects of discussions and h o w are decisionsmade at such gathering ? Wh er e such meetings do not occur, wh at s e e m to bethe consequences for the functioning of co mm un it y eme rge ncy social systsms ?

3. At the 11 a.m. meeting in Laredo, there w e r e s o m e allegations of mani-festations of friction between different political factions.

How do antagonistic local political lines or entities affect community

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-12-disaster operations? How intense does an eme rg en cy have to be to overridesuch differences and allow a measure of cooperation? Is political animosityin a social syst em m o r e likely to appear at later rather than earlier stages ofthe co mm un it y reaction?

4. On e radio station in Laredo presented live broadcasts of both the 11 a.m.general meeting and on-the-scene accounts of the high water at the InternationalBridge.

D o live broadcasts add a sense of urgency or immediacy to a communitylsdefinition of em er ge nc y? Do es such public broadcasting of what is occurringserve to wea ken the appearance of inter-organizational conflicts which mightm o r e easily be expressed in private meetings? A r e there any dysfunctional as=pects to such public airing of a potential threat and the steps the organizationsin a co mmu ni ty are taking to me e t it--e. g., the creation of a feeling that"so me on e is taking care of the problems'' leading persons and groups to slacken

their o w n responses to the emer genc y?5. Seemingly relevant factors in La re do which defined the high waters as a

possible threat or not included:a. Previous experience with a highly da ma gi ng flood in 1954;b.e.d. Predictions of high water from official sources, i e, the Weather

M a s s me di a reports earlier in the w e e k of flooding and damage up theriver f r o m Laredo, especially in De l Ria;Conflicting predictions f r o m Nuevo Lare do and Laredo about theheight the water w a s to attain; andBureau and the IBWC.

Loc al people almost inevitably in their interviews and co mm en ts touchedon the "54 flood". It clearly w a s a ma jo r reference point or symbol in thehistorical " m e m o r y " of the city. To what extent do such "historical memories''

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-13-affect the development of com mun ity e me rg en cy social syst ems?to slow down or speed up the group response to a ne w threat? In what wa ys aresuch collective symbols used as a device measuring for what m a y or m a y nothappen in the later emer gen cy ?

D o they tend

!

Laredo and Nuevo Laredo radio stations gave conflicting predictions aboutthe probable height of the flood.officals m easured f r o m their side of the river (which is deeper) and used themetric system. Because of the bilingual ability of the Laredo population this

In part, this resulted f r om the fact that Mexica

ipformation w a s apparently being circulated concurrently with the not altogetherconsistent information being issued by the American stations. It might behypothesized that such ambiguity in communicat ion would lead to a tendency toaccept the less threatening information. Th e massing of spectators on andaround the bridge and at the river bank suggests that ma n y persons did not takethe warnings too seriously. T h e question is suggested, to wh at extent can acommu nity em ergen cy social system e me rg e if large blocs of the population donot define the situation as at least potentially dangerous ?

T he combination of m a s s me dia reports of floods elsewhere and the pre-dictions of high water fr o m responsible sources undoubtedly m a d e s o m e officialsm o r e willing to accept the flood threat than would otherwise have been the case.H o w m u c h reliance is placed b y public officials on the ma ss media? Whathappens if there is a difference between the information being presented by theme di a and by other sources? W h a t difference does it m a k e if a community re-lies on many, although possibly discordant, sources as c ompared with a few butprobably consistent s ur c s ?

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-15-mo vi ng supplies, transportation, and communication, Ho we ve r, they could beused only for a limited time,turning shelter supplies w a s accounted for by the fact that the C A P personnelhad to return to school the next day.

Thus, much of the CAP activity on Sunday of re-

U se of such volunteers always poses pro ble ms in emergencies. Forexample, w hat are the consequences of letting relatively inexperienced per-sonnel man art of the communications at a control center? How well can suchpersons be integrated with experienced role encumbents in established organi-zations? M o r e generally, h o w effective is it for a comm uni ty in an emergencyto attempt to use young and inexperienced volunteers who have responsibilitiesin other parts of the institutional structure?

Ans wer s to all of the above questions would undoubtedly substantially ad-vance our knowledge not only of disaster reactions, but of organizational, c o m -munity, and societal responses to crises.