Masjid Khadijah 3

Editorial :Ustaz Mohamed Hj Ali, Mohd Abu Bakar Mohd Sultan,Salim Mohd Nasir,Mohd Feisal Mohd Hassan, Abdul Karim Senin, Mohd Samad Afandie

Masjid Khadijah, 583 Geylang Road, Singapore 389522website : www.khadijahmosque.org email : admin@khadijahmosque.org

36 Islam - Ummatan Wasatan, An Ummah Juslty Balancedby Ustaz Mohd Haniff HassanResearch Analyst S RAJARATNAM School Of International Studies,Nanyang Technological University

44 Youth Convention 2007Fighting Terrorism : Preventing The Radicalization Of Youthin a Secular & Globalized World

46 Charter of moderation in Religious Praticeby Ustaz Mohd Haniff HassanResearch Analyst S RAJARATNAM School Of International Studies,Nanyang Technological University

52 The Poverty of FanaticismBy Abdal - Hakim MuradM.A Arabic in Al - Azhar, Trustee & Secretary of The MuslimAcademic Trust & Director of the Anglo-Muslim Fellowship for Eastern Europe

62 The Causes of the Radicalization of the Muslim Communities in Southeast Asia

By Angel M. Rabasa, RAND Corporation

68 Disaggregating the Islamist MovementsBy Mustapha Kamel Al-SayyidProfessor of Political Science,Director, Center for the Study of Developing

Countries,Cairo University

Advisor :Ustaz Haji Ali Haji Mohamed

4 Masjid Khadijah

Our say....

The drive to prevail over religious extremismand radicalisation must start with a dialogueon what set in motion the conflict in the

Middle East. Understanding the religious premiseof the extremists and radicals is just as vital asknowing how their global network and violentstrategy have managed to break into the borders oftheir targeted countries. Study indicates that manyIslamic scholars agree with the assessment that theinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan are slowlydeveloping into a war of ideas that will serve as acatalyst for the globalisation of religious extremismif left unchecked.

There is an urgent need to address the existing riftbetween western and eastern cultures.Understanding Arab culture and the culture of Islamis the first step in bridging the religious divide thatthe West currently faces. The West must get toknow the people of Islam and the culturalimperatives of the religion. The worst mistakeanyone in a decision-making position could do is tomake light work of the effort to understand Islam.For many, the distractions of globalisation,urbanization, and transnational terrorism cloud thereception of those with the greatest need to listen.The failure to understand the nature of Islampermits the radicalisation of Muslims worldwidewhile blinding the rest of humanity to a solutionwhich hides in plain sight. The solution must includea closer examination of the influence Islam has onits community of faith. Before the world can buildan effective strategy to neutralize the extremistideologies that underpin the global extremistmovement, it must first commit to understandingIslam as it is practised and observed by Muslimstoday.

The need to understand religious civilisation as akey factor of change in the Middle East is furtherevidenced by the failure of international efforts toeffectively engage religious leaders with anymeasurable consistency. Strategies for dealing withreligious leaders have tended to be vague and hastyat best. Scholars of Islam take a slightly differentapproach to the issue. They characterise the ongoingwar of ideas as a lack of western understandingregarding religion and the role of indigenous religiousleaders. These misunderstandings centre on the lackof knowledge of Islam, the Quran, and the religiousfaith of Muslims, which is in direct contrast to theliberal interpretations taken by astute extremistswith Islam and the Quran. Muslims are notconvinced that the secular humanism the West isoffering is the right solution for followers of Islam.

International bombings and the continued conflictin the Middle East have sent scholars, planners,and senior leaders worldwide scrambling to harnessthe influence of Islam on the Muslims and leadersin their communities. It also appears evident thatnot many diplomatic strategists predicted and evenfewer military planners were prepared for thesignificant role several Islamic leaders haveestablished in the ongoing conflict. Osama binLaden, Ayatollah Sistani, and the late Abu Musabal-Zarqawi each demonstrated their ability toimpede progress or influence change within theMuslim community. Understanding this type ofreligious influence on all aspects of change in anIslamic society is critical to the stability of theregion.

RELIGIOUSEXTREMISM

&RADICALISM

Masjid Khadijah 5

The demonstrated influence of the GrandAyatollah Ali Husseini al-Sistani became clear whenhe issued a number of fatwas to direct participationin the voting process. When the Askaria Shrine wasattacked, the Iraqi Shi’ite prelate, once again,stepped in with a different type of authority. Hespoke of the need for Shi’ite Muslims to defendthemselves with armed, religious militias if theforeign forces and the Iraqi government cannot. Thismagnitude of influence by religious leaders imploresadditional questioning. Were the foreign forces andcivil planners aware of the Ayatollah’s influenceprior to the fatwas being issued? Were strategicplanners aware of his span of control prior toarriving in theatre? Finally, what are they doing tobring the prelate aboard now? It appears lessonswere learnt rather belatedly.

An improved understanding of the Islamic rule oflaw and how Muslims interpret the Quran isimperative to the successful bridging of the culturalgaps. Western values, including individual andreligious freedoms, are not natural fits for the cultureof Islam. Young boys in Iraq, for example, grow upwith religion. They end up in the mosque, learningfrom the Imam; depending on the interpretation,they learn moderation or extremism, and in betweenthe two, there lies an abyss As a result, more andmore Muslims are answering the radicals call toarms which has led some observers to accuse theIslamic clergy of booby-trapping minds andexploiting the state of frustration suffered by theMuslim youth to perpetuate violence.

Religion and influential religious leaders continueto play a critical role in shaping global strife andreconciliation. Whether destructive or constructive,religious leaders, organisations, and institutionsoften influence the direction of conflict-preventionand post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Religiousgroups are typically deep-rooted, matureorganisations with independent resources to shapeconflict-prevention and reconstruction efforts fromthe grassroots to the international level. The broadrange of activities carried out by religious actors inconflict-prone settings demonstrates both thesignificant threats they may pose and the greatopportunities they represent. These organisationsare invaluable if effectively utilized. They areuniquely positioned to help or hinder evolvingsituations at the local level far better than anymilitary organisation or secular relief effort.

The world watched the ringleader of the 7 July2005 terrorist attack in London, his voice inflectedwith a West Yorkshire accent, preaching jihad inEnglish. Al Jazeera aired the communique of 30-

year-old Mohammad Sidique Khan, in which Khanexplained why he helped murder over 50 of hisfellow Britons on a bus and in the Underground.“Until you stop bombing, gassing, imprisonment,and torture of my people, we will not stop thisfight,” Khan declared. “We are at war, I am a soldierand now you too will taste the reality of thissituation.” The London bombings emphaticallydemonstrated the inroads made by certain ideologiesthroughout the Muslim world, especially thealienated Muslim diasporas in Europe. Attacks likethese are further evidence that these creeds haveevolved into a well-financed, complex, globalmovement.

The religion of Islam is undergoing a significantrevolution due to the pervasive ideological pressures.The insurgency consists of people who draw upona long tradition of extreme intolerance that does notdistinguish politics from religion and distorts both.Extremists believe Islam is the only true religionand there is no room for interpretation. An insurgentbelieves that his immoral acts of violence are moraland that he is on the right path to God.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, we are currentlywitnessing a spiritual tug-of-war between IslamicHirabah (terrorist) and the West-led foreign forcesto win the hearts and minds of the people who arein essence the living spirit of Islam. This conflict isnot limited to improvised explosive devices, trafficcheckpoints, or door-to-door searches. This war isabout regional stability, failing nation-states, andreligious ideology, a war unrestrained byconventional conflict with a reach that extends toincidents like the recent caricaturing of the Prophet,whereupon terrorists and global extremists ralliedthousands in defense of yet another perceived attackon Islam. This perceived threat perpetuates theradical extremists’ cause and serves to lengthen analready protracted conflict between east and west.

Overtly, extremist terror is carried out in the nameof religion; yet, the terror imposed upon the worldprovides neither salvation nor solutions. Clearly,there is a plethora of useful lessons to learnconcerning the values, beliefs, and cultures of Islam,to include those of radical extremists. An enhancedunderstanding through increased debate and opendialogue about the nature of religious extremistswill better assist policy makers to deal with theseissues. And at the core of it, the West mustimplement a moral, just policy towards the MiddleEast.

6 Masjid Khadijah

Ustaz Syed Ahmad bin Muhammad Semaitwas born in Singapore, on Monday, 21August 1933, corresponding to 29 Rabiul

Akhir 1352. His father was an Arab who worked asa clerk in a real estate company and was active insocial works among the local Arab community. Hismother hailed from Kemaman, Terengganu,Malaysia.

Ustaz Syed Ahmad has one maternal brother andtwo maternal sisters, and three brothers and twosisters from the same father and mother. When hewas 12 years old, his father passed away. With noone to support the family, life was hard. His father’srelatives suggested that Ustaz Syed Ahmad and hisyounger brother, Mufti Syed Isa, to be sent to anorphanage called Malja’ al-Aitam (later renamed toDarul Ihsan). This is to enable both of them tocontinue their studies. However, Ustaz SyedAhmad could not stay long in that orphanage. Hehad to work to ease the financial burden of hismother. Ustaz Syed Ahmad received his formaleducation at Madrasah Aljunied Al-Islamiah. Hestopped when he finished Level Six and did notcontinue in the Special Class which was opened toselected students, even though he was among thebest students in his cohort. He worked fulltime in atextile shop owned by the famous scholar SheikhUmar bin Abdullah Al-Khatib.

His education did not stop there. He continuedattending the weekly religious class with theMadrasah principal at that time, Syeikh AbdullahBalfaqeh, learning the traditional way. He alsoattended the famous Sunday morning class, readingbooks on Tasauf, Hadith and Tafsir with the localulama. And on every Thursday night, he attendedanother class held by a group of ulama, readingbooks on Fiqh and other subjects. Both of theseclasses continue till today. In his later life, bothclasses were to be lead by Ustaz Syed Ahmad. Now,the trust to lead them fell on his brother, MuftiSyed Isa Semait.

His work in the textile shop owned by the famousscholar Sheikh Umar bin Abdullah Al-Khatibserved to be more than just earning money for hismother and siblings. It was to be one of themomentous moment in his life. Two thingshappened when he worked there:

a) He benefited a lot from the knowledge andmastery of Islam from the erudite scholar SheikhUmar Al-Khatib. He was not only his employer,but more importantly, as what Ustaz Syed Ahmadlater admitted, his ‘Syeikh Al-Fateh’. He learnt withSheikh Umar Al-Khatib throughout his life. Eventhough there were certain things that he quite notagree with Syeikh Umar Al-Khatib, that onlyshowed his critical and analytical mind. And SheikhUmar Al-Khatib did not stop him from giving secondopinions.

b) He began to develop the interest and acumenin business. He began to see business opportunitiesin selling Arabic reference books to madrasahstudents and teachers.

In 1950, he left his teacher’s shop and togetherwith his brother, Syed Umar bin Muhammad Semait,he opened up a shop dealing with Arabic books. Hecalled it Al-Maktabah At-Tijariyah Asy-Syarqiyah.During this time, his other brother, Mufti Syed Isabin Muhammad Semait, was studying in Al-AzharUniversity in Cairo, Egypt. He used thisopportunity to appoint his brother as bookspurchaser in Cairo and to send them back toSingapore.The business went well. He decided toexpand it to include books meant for the Malaycommunity. Thus, he folded up his company andsetup a new one and gave it a Malay name: PustakaNasional. He wanted this company to be his mediumof dakwah.

Ustaz Syed Ahmad proved to be a prolific writerand translator. He wrote many books on Islam, andtranslated numerous Arabic books to Malay. Whenthey were already Islamic books in Arabic translatedto Malay, he would republished them with better

Ustaz Syed Ahmad binUstaz Syed Ahmad binUstaz Syed Ahmad binUstaz Syed Ahmad binUstaz Syed Ahmad bin

Muhammad SemaitMuhammad SemaitMuhammad SemaitMuhammad SemaitMuhammad Semait(21/8/1933 – 15/7/2006)(21/8/1933 – 15/7/2006)(21/8/1933 – 15/7/2006)(21/8/1933 – 15/7/2006)(21/8/1933 – 15/7/2006)

Source by : Mufti Syed Isa SemaitReport in Berita Harian, 20 July 06,

Report in The New Paper, 17 July 06 &Obituaries in Berita Harian, 20 July 06

Masjid Khadijah 7

type face, layout and in more readable Malay.Sometimes he would made the necessarycorrections and additions after counter checkingwith the original Arabic text.

The following are some of the books he wrote:1) Kuliah Subuh – Pada membicarakan Hadis40 (3 vols: 741 pages)2) Hadis Qudsi – Analisa dan Komentar(2 vols: 648 pages)3)Sepuluh Yang Dijamin Masuk Syurga(1 vol: 450 pages)4) 100 Tokoh Wanita Terbilang (1 vol: 577 pages)5) Untaian Kisah Para Wali (1 vol: 472 pages)6) Syarah Ratib Haddad (1 vol: 280 pages)

Some of the books he translated:

1) Isra’ dan Mi’raj – Abdul Halim Mahmud(2001, 150 pages)2) Kurnia Rabbani Limpahan Rahmani - Sidi Syeikh Abdul Al-Jailani (2001, 660 pages)3) Dakwah Yang Sempurna Peringatan YangUtama – Imam Habib Abdullah Al- Haddad (2000,299 pages)4) Al-Adzkar Lin Nawawi – Imam An-Nawawi(2000, 794 pages)5) Tata-tertib Pengajian Al-Quran – Imam An-Nawawi (1999, 182 pages)6) Belitan Iblis – Ibnul Qayyim (1994, 478 pages)7) Dosa-dosa Besar – Muhammad bin AhmadAdz-Dzahaby (1994, 598 pages)8) Benteng Diri Ahli Hakikat – Syed AhmadAr-Rifa’I (1994, 425 pages)9) Halal Dan Haram Dalam Islam – Dr YusufAl-Qaradhawi (1995, 578 pages)10) Taubat Dan Liku-likunya – Imam Ghazali(1995, 280 pages)11) Rahsia Sufi – Syeikh Abdul Qadir Al-Jailani(1997, 263 pages)12) Untaian Kisah Nabi Dan Para Sahabat –Al-Kandahlawi (1997, 795 pages)13) Petunjuk Thariqat ke Jalan Akhirat –Imam Habib Abdullah Al-Haddad (1999, 225 pages)14) Bimbingan Mu’min – Imam Ghazali(1978, 873 pages)15) Nasihat Agama Dan Wasiat Iman – ImamHabib Abdullah Al-Haddad (1981, 493 pages)16) Petunjuk Jalan Thariqat / Penuntun HidupBahagia – Imam Habib Abdullah Al- Haddad17) Masalah Sufi – Abu Said Al-Kharraz (1981,598 pages)18) Peringatan Tentang Umur Insan – ImamHabib Abdullah Al-Haddad (1982, 168 pages)19) Mu’jizat Al-Quran – Muhammad MutawalliSya’rawi (1985, 592 pages)

21) Roh – Ibnul Qayyim (1990, 551 pages)22) Was-was – Ibnul Qayyim (1990, 123 pages)23) Induk Pensucian Diri – Syed Hawa (1992,1426 pages) – co.translater M. Abdai Rathomy24) Kifayatul Akhyar – Imam Taqiyuddin AbuBakar bin Muhammad Al-Husaini (1993, v1:736pages, v2: 624 pages)25) Sahih Al-Bukhari – Imam Muhammad binIsmail Al-Bukhari (published post-humously in 2006,3 volumes)

Ustaz Syed Ahmad Semait might not leave a mark

giving wonderful speeches and lectures, but hisdakwah through writing has left a profound impactin the literary world. Perhaps his most famous andwell received work is the book ‘Nasa-ih Ad-Diniyahwal Wasaya Al-Imaniyah’ by Imam Abdullah binAlawi Al-Haddad, which he translated to Malayand gave the title ‘ Nasihat Agama dan Wasiat Imam’.He went to great length to ensure the accuracy andintegrity of his translation, reading the book coverto cover several times with Sheikh Umar Al-Khatiband trying to understand the true meaning of everyword and sentence. The book has two editions:Malay Rumi, and Malay Jawi. The Rumi editionwas printed 8 times, the last one in 2001. The Jawiedition was printed 7 times, the last one in 2004.Hedid not teach many classes. But his famous was theIhya’ Ulumiddin class held every Friday after Isyakprayers at Masjid Abdul Razak. There he wouldexplain what Imam Al-Ghazali wrote in that book,and shared what he had gathered from his teacherSheikh Umar Al-Khatib in his Sunday morning’sIhya’ Ulumiddin class.

Ustaz Syed Ahmad’s last class was on Friday, 14July 2006. As usual, after Isyak he taught Ihya’Ulumiddin at Masjid Abdul Razak. After that class,he took his wife and some of his relatives, to KualaLumpur by car where he had his normal weeklyreligious class at a mosque there. It was unsual sincehe normally would take the bus.

About 1.10 am, Saturday morning, 15 July 06,near the 190.1 km mark along the Yong Peng-Pagohstretch of the highway, a boar crossed the road. Thecar hit it, flung up and overturned. Ustaz SyedAhmad and Madam Fatimah, the driver’s sister, werethrown out of the car. Both were seated beside thedoors.

Ustaz Syed Ahmad passed away at the site ofthe accident. He was buried at Batu Pahat, fulfillinghis wish to be buried at wherever he died. He leftbehind 3 children.

May Allah bless his soul.

20) Pendidikan Anak-anak Dalam Islam -Abdullah Nasih Ulwan (1988, v1: 612 pages,v2:

8 Masjid Khadijah

INTERVIEWING the more than 600 radicalsimprisoned in Saudi Arabia since 2004, thekingdom’s officials discovered an interesting fact:

It was not Osama bin Laden, the Saudi-born .leaderof Al-Qaeda, who had the most influence on them.

The dubious honour went to Abu Mohammedal.Maqdisi, a Palestinian Jordanian who is a self-taught Islamic intellectual. He is regarded as thespiritual mentor of Al-Qaeda’s head in Jordan, AbuMusab Zarqawi, who died in an American bombingstrike in June this year.

One reason for the Jordanian’s popularity amongthe Saudi radicals is obvious: In a 2000 treatisetitled Clear Evidence On The Infidel Nature Of TheSaudi State, he declares the kingdom’s rulers to beinfidels, against whom jihad must be carried out.And the same goes for other Arab regimes. Arabstates, he says, are apostate states. Not thatdemocracy is any better. He sees it as simplyanother religion.

Maqdisi, who is serving time in a Jordanian prisonon terrorism charges, is acknowledged as a leadinglight among radicals. Some terrorism analystsconsider him the most influential living jihadisttheorist. The Combating Terrorism Centre (CTC),a private think-tank at West Point, the US militaryacademy, conducted a study recently on the mostpopular jihadist radical texts to be found in Al-Qaeda’s main online library. Maqdisi’s works cameout tops in two of six categories.

In the category of most down- loaded, his ClearEvidence On The Infidel Nature Of The Saudi State- sometimes translated as The Shameful ActionsManifest In The Saudi State’s Disbelief, CTCresearcher Will McCants told The Straits Times -topped the list. It had been downloaded 47,123

times since its publication in 2000. In the categoryof the most read, Maqdisi s other treatise, This IsOur Doctrine, published in 2003, came out top with106,104 hits. This text contains, among other things,a detailed and careful discussion of takfir, thepractice of deeming individuals unbelievers.

The CTC study, “the first systematic

mapping of the ideology driving the

actions of the terrorists responsible for

the 9/11 attacks and other violent

actions around the world”, aims to identify

“the most infuential people... among the jihadithinking class, what they are thinking, and wherethe movement is most vulnerable ideologically”.

One of the most interesting findings in the study:When jihadists get most criticised and condemnedis when they (1) declare other Muslims apostates;(2) attack other Muslims, women, children and theelderly; (3) attack the sources of a nation’s wealth,such as tourism and the oil industry; and (4) createpolitical and social chaos.

These condemnations are particularly damagingwhen they come from three tyes of individuals:influential religious leaders, former jihadists andprominent current jihadists.

THE SHADOW OF TERRORISMTHE SHADOW OF TERRORISM

Spreadingjihad online

by Mafoot SimonSenior Writer

“Article courtesy of SPH - The Straits Times”

Masjid Khadijah 9

These are the chinks in the armour that should befully exploited, the CTC researchers recommend.But back to Maqdisl. Just who is he? He was bornIsam Tahir al-Barqawi in Nablus, in what is currentlyknown as the West Bank, in 1959. His familyemigrated to Kuwait and the young Maqdisi wentto Iraq to study engineering at the wishes of hisparents.

But what he really wanted was to study syariahat the Islamic University in Medina. So he embarkedon a self-guided study course. He travelledthroughout the region and, while in Medina, washeavily influenced by the writ- ings of Saudischolars, in particular the 18th-century clericMuham- mad ibn Abd al Wahhab, the founder ofWahhabism. As analyst Steven Brooke has noted inThe Preacher And The Jihadi (Eudson Institute,November 2006), Maqdisi’s studies of thesethinkers had a deep impact on his life and thought.In his 1985 book Millat. Ibrahim, which is oftentranslated as The Religion Of Abraham, Maqdisielaborated on two Islamic principles that havepreoccupied him throughout much of his intel-lectual career.

The first is tawhid or the oneness and absoluteindivisibility of Allah and the related religiousobligation to worship Him and no other god. Thesecond and related principle is the obligation tostruggle against polytheism in all its manifestations.

A Muslim, said Maqdisi, must demonstrateenmity and hatred to- wards all of polytheism’sadherents until they renounce their ways and returnto the true path of Islam. For Maqdisi, fulfillingthese twin obligations is the paramount duty ofevery Muslim, more important than daily prayer,alms giving or any other religious obligation.

In Maqdisi’s mind the combination of these tworeligious obligations - belief in tawhid and the Islamicstruggle against polytheism - translated into a desirefor radical political change and jihad.

“Jihad is an act of worship and an

obligation that is legislated until the

Day of Judgment. Nothing invalidates

it. It is permissible to perform it at any

time, like charity, unlike zakat”,

10 Masjid Khadijah

he wrote in This Is Our Doctrine. Zakat is theobligatory practice of giving alms once a year, whilecharity can be carried out at any time.

According to Maqdisi, he chose to write his booksbecause he realised that “many beginning studentsof knowledge have access to our books and thatsome Issues may confuse them”. The trouble, ofcourse, is that Maqdisi is not the only one who isbeing read by “many beginning students ofknowledge”. There are other even more radicaljihadist thinkers whose thoughts are found online.

TTTTTop Militant Ideologuesop Militant Ideologuesop Militant Ideologuesop Militant Ideologuesop Militant IdeologuesTHESE are the four top radical ideologues,

according to a recent study by a team from theCombating Terrorism Centre at West Point.

» Abu Qatada al-Filistini: A Jordanian intellectualof Palestinian origin. His most read work is theCharacteristics Of The Victorious Sect In TheMuslim’s Home Land (Greater Syria). In it, he saysjihad is the essence and identity of the Muslim, andit is obligatory for every Muslim to fight an apostategovernment, even if he has to do it alone.

His other works include Why Pursue Jihad? andIslamic Movements And Contemporary Alliances.He was born Umar Mahmud Abu Umar in 1960 inBethlehem, in what is now the West Bank, and haslived in Britain since he sought asylum there in1993. Now in a British jail, Jordan is seeking hisextradition to face terrorism charges, but there is noextradition treaty between the two countries. He issaid to be a member of Al-Qaeda’s fatwa committee,a spiritual father of the Algerian radical group GIAand mentor to Richard Reid, the shoe bomber. Hewas involved in terrorist cells in Paris and Madridand is wanted by several Western governments.

» Abu Jandal aI-kill: A Saudi scholar. His mostread work is his 460-page tome Osama b. Laden:Renewer Of The Era And Conqueror Of Americans,a biography of AI-Qaeda’s leader. His real name isFaris b. Ahmad Al Shuwayl al-Zahrani. In 2003, hesucceeded Saudi Shaykh Yousef al-Ayiri, the leadingideologue of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, who wasarrested by Saudi security forces. Abu Jandal washimself arrested and jailed in 2004.

His biography on Osama elevates the AI-Qaedaleader to the position of mujaddid, which is typicallygiven only to a pious person who revives andrejuvenates the religion.

Moderate Muslims believe there is only one suchin each century. An example is the ninth-century

Islamic scholar Imam Shafii, the founder of the Shafiischool of jurisprudence. Abu Jandal’s next mostpopular work is a 2002 publication entitled TheScholar’s Ruling On The Killing Of Soldiers AndSecret Police. It is, in effect, a fatwa on the legitimacyof killing Saudi security forces.

In March 2004, he released an article entitled TheAI-Qaeda Organisation And Asymmetrical War, inwhich he described several characteristics and tacticsused by Al-Qaeda.

» Abu Umar al-Sayf, another Saudi scholar,dubbed the Mufti of Arab fighters in Chechnya.His most read work is The State Of The IslamicNation And The Absent Terror. Muhammad b. AbdAllah al-Sayf al-Jabir al-Buaynayn al-Tamimiwasborn in Qassim, Saudi Arabia. He was to have beenresponsible for the Islamic courts in Chechnya whenthen Chechen president Zelimkhan Yandarbievattempted to declare the country an Islamic state.He was killed last year, at the age of 37, in a Russiancounter-terrorism operation in neighbouringDagestan.

» Abd al-Akhir Hammad al-Ghunaymi, a formersenior leader of Egypt’s Jama’a al-Islamiyya. Hewas one of the earliest Jama’a members to go toAfghanistan to join the anti-Soviet jihad there, andwas among those sentenced to death (in absentia)in the so-called “returnees from Afghanistan” masstrials of 1992 in Egypt. He sought asylum and hasbeen living in Bonn since 2000. His most read workis On Doctor al-Buti And His Book On Jihad, a1997 publication which takes on Syrian scholarMuhammad Sa’id Ramadan al-Buti’s interpretationof jihad. Several historical phases of jihad aregenerally acknowledged by Muslims. The first wasthe Mecca era, which lasted three years. The secondwas called the Medina era; in which God allowedfighting.

In the third phase, there are three categories orchapters: fighting with permission, fighting backagainst only those who attack Muslims and fightingall infidels.

Al-Buti considered each a separate category thatcan be implemented in specific cases and suitablesituations. For Hammad, on the other hand, thethree are a progressive evolution of one into theother, and Muslims are now into the final chapterof fighting all infidels.

Masjid Khadijah 11

THAT fears of terrorist strikes might haveled to the postponement of the Aseansummit that is to have taken place in the

Philippines today is a reminder again that terrorismcasts a long shadow unlikely to fade any time soon.Five years ago this month, the Singapore andMalaysia governments simultaneously arrested anumber of Muslim militants planning terror attacksin the region. In Malaysia, the 13 men arrested weremembers of a new wing of an Islamic militant groupwith links to Zacarias Moussaoui, a Frenchmaninvolved in the Sept 11, 2001, terrorist attacks inthe United States.

In Singapore, the 13 detained were members ofthe Jemaah Islamiah (JI), a clandestine network withcells in Malaysia, Indonesia and, more recently, thePhilippines. They were planning to strike US navalvessels in Singapore waters, as well as a shuttle busservice used by Americans to travel between theYishun MRT station and Sembawang Wharf. Twoof them had trained with the Moro Islamic LiberationFront, a separatist movement fighting forindependence for Mindanao Island in the southernPhilippines. The latter, incidentally, is seen bysecurity experts as the weak link in South-eastAsia’s fight against terrorism.

In Singapore today, 34 people linked to JI arestill in custody. There are 26 others not locked upbut who must comply with certain restrictions orrisk being detained.

So the terrorism threat is real and has a face - infact, many faces: The terrorist is not always aMuslim, a ‘jihadist’ willing to kill others andhimself. If there were comprehensive statistics, wewould probably find that the majority of terroristsare in fact not Muslim. However, four aspects makethe threat from the jihadist particularly challenging.

Asymmetrical meansAsymmetrical meansAsymmetrical meansAsymmetrical meansAsymmetrical meansTHE first is the nature of jihadi terrorism itself.

Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong once observed thatwhere ‘the communists fought to live...the jihaditerrorists fight to die and live in the next world’.Their willingness to martyr themselves gives thema competitive advantage over security and lawenforcement officials.Yes, terrorists of otherpersuasions are also willing to martyr themselves.But Islamic militants are disproportionatelyrepresented. Some of them (not all, it must be said)also elevate to the status of legitimate targets peoplewith no fault other than that they are ‘unbelievers’or ‘infidels’.Not surprisingly, the root causes ofIslamic terrorism are more complex than those ofmost other forms of terrorism. Political causes mightexplain the nationalist or separatist who resorts toviolence. Alienation and anomie might explain theanarchist. A sense of injustice and wanting to rightcapitalistic wrongs might explain the communist.But the Islamist, and the Islamic terrorist?

5 years after the JI arrestsLong shadow of terrorism

By Chua Lee HoongReview Editor

“Article courtesy of SPH - The Straits Times”

12 Masjid Khadijah

Security experts are increasingly coming to acceptthat Islamic terrorism cannot be neatly diagnosedas stemming from this or that. There are no clearroot causes. There are factors that give terrorists apretext for action, such as the US-led invasion ofIraq and the conflict between Israel and thePalestinians, but take these away and there willstill be jihadi terrorists. One stark example: planningfor the Sept 11 World Trade Centre blasts began in1993, long before the US ouster of Saddam Husseinin Iraq.

Thin red l ineThin red l ineThin red l ineThin red l ineThin red l inePROFESSOR John Esposito, a well-known Islam

expert at Georgetown University, and Ms DaliaMogahed of Gallup Organisation recently conducteda survey of some 9,000 Muslims in nine majorMuslim countries. The survey yielded thefascinating result that very little separates the‘moderate’ from the ‘radical’; the former defined asa Muslim critical of the Sept 11 attacks, and thelatter as one in support of them. Levels of education,income and religiosity hardly varied between thetwo groups.

What did vary was the way they viewed the West.Moderates were willing to build bridges with theWest, while radicals saw the West as attempting to‘influence and control my way of life’.Ms AnnaSimons, a professor of defence analysis at the NavalPostgraduate School in Monterey, California, takesthe argument further. It is not wise to formulatepolicies based on any perceived distinction between‘moderates’ and ‘radicals’ because the line betweenthe two is not stable. Rebuking Westerncommentators who attribute Islamic terrorism topat reasons of discrimination and alienation, shewrote in The American Interest (Summer, 2006):‘We gloss over the possibility that Islamists mightwant to do us grave harm out of deep spiritualconviction. It is easier and more politic to boil theproblem down to inequities rather thaniniquity.’Note here that deep spiritual convictionis not the same as deep spiritual learning; all toooften the jihadi terrorist has been found to be aMuslim who does not know his religion as well asmight be desired. In the European Union, fully 20per cent of jihadi terrorists are recent converts toIslam.

Global inspiration, local actionGlobal inspiration, local actionGlobal inspiration, local actionGlobal inspiration, local actionGlobal inspiration, local actionTHIS brings us to the second point, the ability of

Islamic terrorism to be local and global at the sametime. Some call it the ‘glocalisation’ of terrorism.

Islam is a religion whose reach is global. With theInternet as enabling medium, this helps terroristsrecruit, advertise and communicate. For example,Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian terrorist implicatedin Al-Qaeda’s 1998 bombings in Tanzania andKenya, recently called on the ummah, the globalMuslim community, to ‘wage a popular jihadistwar’.Home-grown terrorist groups have thusmushroomed in many countries - in Asia andincreasingly in the more open societies in the West.The March 11, 2004, Madrid train bombings andthe July 7, 2005, London subway bombings arespectacular examples.

Less spectacular but no less worrisome are thefoiled plots. In Canada, 17 Muslim men werearrested in June this year for a plot to cause ‘massive’damage in the Toronto area. In the US, more than50 Muslim Americans have been arrested for variousplots since Sept 11. Most of them were born andbred in the US. Counter-terrorism officials call theseperpetrators ‘clean skins’: they have no priorcriminal or security record. Their intellectual andideological inspiration comes from militantteachings that can be found on the Internet. Theyoperate locally and independently, without directlinks to any established terrorist organisation. Somemay even be mere teenagers. They are a big sourceof worry to law enforcement agencies becausemonitoring them effectively requires tremendousamounts of resources, both human and technological.

This was perhaps why, last month, Dame ElizaManningham-Buller, the head of Britain’s domesticintelligence service, MI-5, told the British mediaabout ‘close to 30 plots’ that her agency haduncovered and was monitoring. It was a departurefrom her usual taciturnity that helped to raise publicawareness of the seriousness of the issue. Thethreat, she said, was one that would ‘last ageneration’. Or more. The threat, after all, has taken30 or more years to reach its present proportions,and the end game is nowhere in sight. Communismtook 100 years to defeat, and even then it was notoverwhelmed as such, but burnt itself out - afterenough people were convinced by the evidence oftheir own eyes that it did not offer a superior wayof life, far less a solution to the world’s problems.

A widening divideA widening divideA widening divideA widening divideA widening divideIN THE case of jihadi terrorism however, things

will probably get worse before they get betterbecause of what seems to be a widening divide

Masjid Khadijah 13

between the Muslim and the non-Muslim worlds.On the Muslim side is a perception of victimisationfuelled by unsympathetic Western comments andmedia reports; on the non-Muslim side is aperception of Muslim unreasonableness fuelled byreports of what they see as Muslim over-reactionto events such as the publication by a Danish paperof cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad and PopeBenedict’s remarks about reason and religion.PrinceAlwaleed, nephew of King Abdullah of SaudiArabia, noted in a recent interview in The McKinseyQuarterly: ‘In the West, and specifically in the US,any act of terrorism by a Muslim is blamed on theentire Muslim community. In response to a recentattempted terrorist plot in the United Kingdom,for instance, the President of the United States talkedof Islamic fascism. One or two people, or 20 people,or 100, or even 1,000 may fall into that category,but you can’t make a general statement about 1.3billion people. I acknowledge that we have problemsinside our Islamic community, but putting allMuslims into one pot and implying Islam is aterrorist religion adds fuel to the fire. Thispolarisation between Islam and Christianity is verydangerous.’

Indeed it is. There is nothing more that the militantideologues – upon whose teachings terrorists feed -would like than for that to happen. One ideologuefound online, Abu Bakr Naji, writes almost gleefullyof ‘dragging the masses into battle such thatpolarisation is created between all the people’.

Exploit ing democracyExploit ing democracyExploit ing democracyExploit ing democracyExploit ing democracyWHEN Madrid was struck in 2004, three days

before a general election, it signalled that jihaditerrorists had reached a new tactical high. They hadlearnt to manipulate the very political system thatdemocratic countries build their foundations on.Angered by official attempts to pin the blame onBasque separatists instead of Al-Qaeda, as theevidence pointed, Spanish voters threw out thePopular Party headed by then Premier Jose MariaAznar, and voted in the Socialist Party headed byMr Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. Mr Aznar was arare European supporter of the US involvement inIraq, while Mr Zapatero had promised to withdrawSpain’s 1,300 troops from Iraq if he won. Which hedid promptly.The terrorists had successfullyexploited political differences within Spain, andbetween Europe and America. In the Middle East, anumber of what might be called terrorist-political

organisations have exploited democracy in adifferent way, by taking part in elections andwinning seats in government. The MuslimBrotherhood in Egypt, Hizbollah in Lebanon andHamas in the Palestinian territories are primeexamples.

The long-term implications of this trend are farfrom clear. To be optimistic, the responsibilities offormal power might temper their violent tendenciesand moderate them into ‘normal’ political partieswhich seek power through constitutional means.To be pessimistic, their new positions will allowthem to spread their influence and subvert thesystem from within. One can expect the rise ofsubconventional warfare between these groups andthe governments they seek to unseat. And they arenot confined to national boundaries: Their linksand influence cut across borders. Taken together,Hamas, Hizbollah and the Muslim Brotherhoodmark the rise of non-state actors as players in theMiddle East. This is a new challenge to the powerbalance in the region, dominated traditionally bySaudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria and Iraq.

In syncIn syncIn syncIn syncIn syncSO, THE shadow of today’s terrorism threat is

indeed a very long one. It spans the globe, touchingmyriad local communities, including Singapore’s.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the Singapore governmenthad a programme to inoculate Singaporeans againstcommunist ideology. Many organisations werecalled into action - from schools to the People’sAssociation to business groups. Today, we have aroughly similar, although probably not as concerted,programme via the Religious Rehabilitation Group,the Community Engagement Programme and Inter-racial Confidence Circles.But today’s terrorist threatis more complex and delicate. In the Middle East, itis complicated by interplay with nationalist andpolitical factors. In most other countries, includingSingapore, it is complicated by communal andreligious factors. Countering the jihadist threat, ifdone clumsily and with racial or religious prejudices,risks alienating entire Muslim communities andwidening racial fault lines.

To counter the threat effectively, it is necessaryfor many things to be in sync - every national policy,every government action, every arm of government,every national media, every private organisationthat might unwittingly host a potential terrorist. Itis a tall order, but that is the only way - if the longshadow of terrorism is not to grow.

14 Masjid Khadijah

In a noisy house in Curug, East Jakarta,Fauzi Isman sits crossed-legged on asimple wooden bench. He is wearing a

plain white T-shirt and blue sarong. ‘It is goodto be a free man,’ he says.

Isman, 36, comes from a military family andgraduated from the Jakarta State Academy ofStatistics in 1988. He said he had wanted tooverthrow the Indonesian government andreplace it with an Islamic state. He was arrestedin 1989 for subversion and freed 10 years later

ByNoor Huda Ismail

Two former Islamic militants hope to helpprisoners of ideology see their way out

Out OfRadicalism’sCCCCClutcheslutcheslutcheslutcheslutches

The writer is a graduate of the Ngruki Islamic boarding school. He recently graduated fromSt Andrews Institution Scotland in International Security.

Masjid Khadijah 15

However, he is still under police probationbecause of his old ties with a group calledPengajian Santa (Santa Study Group), anoffshoot of Darul Islam (DI). DI was itself amovement that began in 1948 during a regionalrebellion in West Java under the charismaticleadership of S. M. Kartosuwirjo, who wasdisappointed with the then-newly independentIndonesia for its rejection of Islam as its solefoundation.

Then-president Sukarno had opted insteadfor Pancasila, an ideology based on thephilosophy of the Indonesian people

Independently, other rebellions under thename of DI emerged in South Kalimantan, SouthSulawesi and Aceh. Over more than half acentury, the movement produced severaloffshoots, such as Jemaah Islamiah (JI), whichoften resort to violence in their aim to establishan Islamic caliphate in the region.

The bombing in front of the AustralianEmbassy in Jakarta last September showed howJI collaborated with members of other DIsplinter groups. Heri Golun, the alleged suicidebomber, is said to have been a DI member. (Butearlier reports said he was an aimless youthuntil he was enlisted by two hardline clerics.)

Isman says that the underground movementsdevelop their capabilities in secrecy. ‘If theyfeel they have sufficient logistics anddedicated members, they will resurface andbecome more capable than ever.’

Recalling his involvement in DI, Isman saysthat one day in April 1988, a friend, Nurhidayat,asked him to join an Islamic training group. Heagreed, and the next day he joined nine othersfor three days of training in the Pasar Santamosque in South Jakarta. (Hence, the group’sname.)

On the first day of the course, the instructortaught the group the meaning of illah, theconcept of God and its implications; andmuskilatul ummah, the current problems of theMuslim community.

During this session, the instructor claimedthat although Muslims made up the majority inIndonesia, this did not mean that they werefree to fully practise their religion. Why?Because the country was not run under syariahlaw, or Islamic jurisprudence. ‘Our law is madeby man, not by God,’ the instructor had said.

On the second day, Isman was taught akhlaq,or Islamic ethics. The group was also taughtsyiroh, which is commonly understood as thehistory of Islam. In this case, however, syirohwas mainly the history of DI founderKartosuwirjo.

On the last day, the instructor introduced thetrainees to the concept of firoq, a clearsegregation from the secular Indonesiangovernment.Members of DI, Isman says, rejectthe idea of the state based on Pancasila, theIndonesian state ideology, and seek to replaceit with Islamic state or caliphate.

The trainees were also taught themovement’s concepts of jihad and martyrdom.During this stage, the concept of fa’i - robbinginfidels or enemies of Islam to secure funds fordefending the faith - was introduced.

But fa’i also attracted many thugs to themovement. This tactical alliance betweenpurists and thugs, between ideologues andcriminals, proved important for raising funds,making logistical plans and recruitingadditional manpower for waging jihad.

In 1989, Isman travelled to Talangsari, avillage in South Sumatra, for more training. Hejoined a few hundred like-minded militantsliving in a radical training camp established bya man named Warsidi.

During his one year at this camp, Isman wastrained in martial arts and the use of crudeweapons, among other things. He also learntto shoot a bow and arrow.

In 1989, the head of a local military garrisonconfronted Warsidi about the group’sactivities. The military man was later foundmurdered. Following this incident, the armysent troops to the insurgents’ camp. Theensuing battles left at least 100 dead accordingto official accounts.

Isman, however, claims the number is closerto 300. But he was not at the location andtherefore did not witness the killings. Instead,he was in Bali, on a recce of the island for abomb attack. But soon after, he was arrestedfor subversion and locked away in Jakarta’sCipinang prison.

Isman’s involvement in the movement endedthere. He declares that he is a repentant mannow and no longer supports violence.

16 Masjid Khadijah

But that did not stop the radicals from tryingto recruit him again. Five years ago, he says, agroup of mujahideen trained in Afghanistanand the Philippines visited him at home,inviting him to join in their plans to blow upchurches. But he refused.

He had undergone conversion while inprison, he says, jokingly. These days, heteaches the Chinese martial art of taiji.

He also wants to start his own religion andcall it ‘Love and Happiness’, he jokes.

Meanwhile, on the outskirts of Jakarta, TajulArifin, a former member of the DI military wingAngkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara (Amin),recalls the day he robbed Bank Central Asia in1999 under the banner of fa’i.

His leader had told him that doing so was theright thing as the bank’s transactions were notinterest-free and thus it was a non-syariahinstitution.

‘The bank’s practices were not in accordancewith Islam and were against the syariah law,’says the 39-year-old Arifin.

For his crime, he was jailed for five years. Hewas released in March.

Voicing his regrets, Arifin, who is also from amilitary family, notes that he hadmisunderstood a saying of the Prophet:‘Whosoever sees disobedience to God(munkar) should change it with his hand(might). If he is unable to do it, he should changeit with words (advice) and if he is still unableto do that, he should change it with his heart(reject it).’In the past, Arifin had taken that tomean that it was right for the Muslim to useviolence (might) to right perceived wrongs(munkar). Now, he realises that ‘might’ doesnot necessarily equal ‘right’, and a better wayto resolve conflicts is through persuasion andadvice.

Mr Mohamad Haniff Hassan, an analyst atthe Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies,explained in a recent article (Vigilante ActionIs Un-Islamic, The Straits Times, November2004) that Islamic scholars interpret ‘hand’ inthe hadith to denote the ‘hands of authority’.

‘For example, for acts of evil in a family, thepersons of authority are the father and themother; those who are not the persons ofauthority in that family do not have the power

Masjid Khadijah 17

to prevent evil with the ‘hand’. At school, theperson of authority is the headmaster of theschool,’ he had written.

While in prison, Arifin, who was also allegedto have taken part in an attempt in 2000 toassassinate Indonesian politician MatoriAbdul Jalil, a one-time leader of the IslamicNational Awakening Party, wrote a book forhis friends still in the underground movement,urging them to stop their violence.

One is naturally surprised and must wonderhow a highly educated man and son ofIndonesian military officer could be involvedin such a clandestine movement.

Mr Yunanto, the executive director of TheRidep Institute in Jakarta and a writer onradicalism, militancy and fundamentalismwithin the Muslim community, says that peoplewho join militant movements usually have asimplistic understanding of Islam.

‘With such mentality, they promoteobedience and loyalty more than criticism andlogical argument,’ he says.

These people view Islam as a religion thatshould be followed blindly. They also claimthat their simplistic understanding of Islam isthe ‘true Islam’.

They often consider interpretations embracedby the majority of Muslims, such as those ofmainstream Islamic organisations likeMuhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama - twomajor Islamic organisations said to havebetween them some 80 million members - as‘polluted Islam or not true Islam’.

Both Isman and Arifin can attest to how suchpeople think. It is rare that these people analysethe root of problems in Muslim society fromwithin. Nor do they look at the dynamics withinIslamic society from the spirit of inter-cultural,inter-faith or inter-civilisational dialogue, orpartnership between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities, they say.

‘With such characteristics, radical tendenciesare prone to violence,’ Isman says.

Both Isman and Arifin are convinced thatthere are many more militants who are nothappy with the path they have taken. But theyrequire help to get out.

‘They are the prisoners of ideology,’ Ismannotes.

He adds that the best way to help them isthrough repentant murobby, the movement’sterm for someone who recruits andbrainwashes new recruits.

But he realises it is not going to be easy.‘There are not many murobby who haveadopted a new life, but at least there are a fewwe can approach and work with,’ he says.

Isman believes radicals can only be changedby those whom they respect. They could thenbe deployed gainfully in mosques, Islamicschools or other charity organisations.

‘They are actually hardworking anddedicated,’ he adds.

It is rare that these peopleanalyse the root of problems in

Muslim society from within. Nordo they look at the dynamics

within Islamic society from thespirit of inter-cultural, inter-faithor inter-civilisational dialogue,

or partnership between theMuslim and non-Muslimcommunities, they say.

‘With such characteristics,radical tendencies are

prone to violence,’

Both Isman and Arifin areconvinced that there are many

more militants who are nothappy with the path they have

taken. But they requirehelp to get out.

18 Masjid Khadijah

The Ideological Batt leThe Ideological Batt leThe Ideological Batt leThe Ideological Batt leThe Ideological Batt le

Terrorism as an act of violence has beencommitted by people from all religiousand political backgrounds. Several

groups who called themselves Jews,Christians or Muslims, have used terrorismto force their agenda, issues or beliefs. Noneof these groups represent the true religionof the Jews or the Christians as much as theseterrorists represent Islam.

Attacks on the civilians and the leastexpecting people around the world by thesegroups is the kind of strife that cannot bejustified by any religion or under any causeand is strongly condemned in all religionsincluding Islam as clarified by the words ofGod in the Quran and the Final Testament.Thousands of women, children and men,young and old have been killed in attemptsto achieve or hold on to special interestswhether political, social or “religious”.

Terrorism occurs when ideologicalmotivation meets with operational capability.The way in which a terrorist group shapesits radical worldview and disseminates it toaudiences worldwide plays an important role

in the public interface between the groupand its target audience. The war on terror isought to be called the ideological battleagainst radical extremists who happen to useterror as a weapon to disrupt the conscienceof the free and peaceful world.

Counter TCounter TCounter TCounter TCounter Terror ism Approacheserror ism Approacheserror ism Approacheserror ism Approacheserror ism ApproachesAn effective multi-pronged approach is

needed for us to combat terrorism in the longrun. Technically, counter terrorism can bedivided into 2 approaches, namelyOperational and Strategic. OperationalCounter Terrorism aims at reducing theimmediate threat by targeting the terroristcells and disrupting their attack plans. Onthe other hand, Strategic Counter Terrorismaims at changing the mindset and to create ahostile environment for the terrorists. Inother words, we can say that it aims atchanging the hearts and minds of theterrorists

Why Ideology is ImportantWhy Ideology is ImportantWhy Ideology is ImportantWhy Ideology is ImportantWhy Ideology is Importantfor Tfor Tfor Tfor Tfor Terror is ts?error is ts?error is ts?error is ts?error is ts?

Let us look at the significant role thatideology plays for terrorists’ organizations

byUstaz Mohamed Haji Ali

Research Analyst at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Researchat the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

IIIIIDEOLOGICALRESPONSE toTERRORISM &EXTREMISM

Masjid Khadijah 19

like Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) inSoutheast Asia. Firstly, ideology is theorganizing principle of the terroristorganizations. It provides a motive andframework for their actions. Secondly, asdemonstrated by the World Trade Centre,Bali 1 and 2, Marriott and Australian embassybombings, it provides justification for theiracts of violence. Thirdly, ideology is alanguage of mass mobilization. Calling forjihad in the name of Islamic duty has enabledAl-Qaeda and JI to continuously indoctrinateand recruit terrorist members. Fourthly, in theguise of a social program, ideology cangenerate Muslim public support whether assupporters who provide financial, logisticalassistance or as sympathizers who do notmorally condone these acts. Finally, overtime, the ideology will further radicalizeMuslim communities by indoctrinating theminto a culture of violence and radicalinterpretations of Islam.

Why Ideological Response?Why Ideological Response?Why Ideological Response?Why Ideological Response?Why Ideological Response?Given the unique challenges posed by

religiously-motivated terrorism, effectivecounter-terrorism measures demands a multi-pronged approach. In particular, we need to

focus our deterrence efforts on battling theideological and social framework of radicalIslam for four main reasons:

Firstly , counter ideology will providealternative solutions to terrorist propagatingviolence. Given the alienated anduncompromising worldview of the terrorists,they cannot be bought by polit icalconcessions, amnesties or other personalincentives. The best chances for success isto engage them in dialogue, show them wherethey have gone astray and provide them withbetter alternatives to their violent acts.

Secondly, it is important to note thatgeopolitical battle rather than ideological

battle will result in the loss of human lives,damage to property and vital installationsand create a greater sense of fear andinsecurity. In fact, engaging in physicalbattle may create the opposite effect desired;that the terorrists may have reason tovalidate their actions and in turn increasetheir pool of recruits, supporters andsympathizers. Thirdly, counter ideologicalwork will prevent further radicalization ofMuslim communities.

And finally, it is crucial for us to immuniseespecially the Muslim youth from being

20 Masjid Khadijah

indoctrinated into a culture of violence,hence preventing new generation ofterrorists from being recruited

Ideological Response. How?Ideological Response. How?Ideological Response. How?Ideological Response. How?Ideological Response. How?To develop a viable blueprint for an

ideological response, we must factor in themultifaceted, global threat of religiouslymotivated terrorism.

In the short term, we need to pre-empt andprevent the propagation of terroristmessages by obstructing its channel oftransmission, like the websites and sales ofbooks. In the longer term, it is important forus to target the terrorist recruitmentmechanism. This can be done bymarginalizing the Islamic radicals, promotingthe ideological tenets of traditional Islam andstrengthening the bonds between Muslimcommunities and the state

We also need to accumulate sufficientknowledge and expertise in the terroristideology before we can develop an effectivecounter-ideology programme. Towards thisend, there is a need to accelerate academicresearch, particularly to study the variousIslamic concepts that have beenmisinterpreted by the extremists andterrorists. Concepts like Jihad and IslamicState, for instance, need to be studied andunderstood correctly and practicedcontextually.

The spread of the religious ideologycannot be halted without the participationof Muslim communities. In particular, theUlamas or Muslim religious scholars are theonly people who can steer the efforts ofcounter ideological work. Activecontributions from religious scholars andpracticing Muslims are crucial as they followincentives to speak out against radicals,define and defend their own religion

Countering the threat through educationcan be implemented by engaging thechannels of Islamic intellectual activity andthe traditional routes for knowledgetransmission. As the terrorists’ ideologuesare often disguised as religious teachers/leaders, there is also a need for a watchdogbody to fi l ter out deviant teachers anddeviant teachings. In this case, theintroduction of an Asatizah Recognition

Scheme by the Islamic Religious Council ofSingapore late last year is a step in the rightdirection as a committee of prominent Islamicscholars will act to control the access toreligious status and limit the number andquality of individuals competent to providereligious instructions.

Ideological Response. Who?Ideological Response. Who?Ideological Response. Who?Ideological Response. Who?Ideological Response. Who?Firstly, it is important to engage religious

deviants in dialogue or counseling sessionsin an attempt to bring them to correct Islamicteachings and to instill into them genuinefeelings of repentance and remorsefulness.

Secondly, it is equally crucial to extend thecounseling services to the families ofreligious deviants to break the cycle ofviolence as direct families members are highlyexposed to the ideology. As in the case ofSingapore, the welfare of the detainees andtheir families are taken care of for e.g. lookinginto the children’s education needs, financialassistance while their father are beingdetained and assisting the detainees tosecure jobs once he is released.

General public should also

be targeted in order to create

awareness within the

community of the danger

of these ideologies.

One way of doing this is

through public talks on

deviant ideology, hence

preventing them from

becoming susceptible to the

terrorists’ ideology.

Masjid Khadijah 21

Finally, the general public should also betargeted in order to create awareness withinthe community of the danger of theseideologies. One way of doing this is throughpublic talks on deviant ideology, hencepreventing them from becoming susceptibleto the terrorists’ ideology.

Progress in Counter Ideological WorkProgress in Counter Ideological WorkProgress in Counter Ideological WorkProgress in Counter Ideological WorkProgress in Counter Ideological WorkIn Yemen, the ancestral home of Osama,

those suspected as having links with al-Qaeda or sympathizers were engaged inregular religious dialogue sessions by acommittee represented by prominent YemeniIslamic scholars. Other efforts to help themreintegrate into society include providingjobs for them. As of June 2005, the committeeclaimed a 90% success rate, with therecommendation of the release of 350 out ofthe 400 detained with whom they have hadfour rounds of dialogue.

In Indonesia, after privately watchingvideos showing Bali bombers recordingsbefore blowing themselves up, Indonesia’sscholars decided to form a task force tocounter extremist ideologies in the country.The gathering included members of thenation’s highest Islamic authority; theIndonesian Ulama (scholars) Council ,Muhammadiyah movement and NahdlatulUlama who count on some 40 million

members.Indonesian government has alsobeen requested to ban books that propagateterror like books written by Imam Samudraand Amrozi, two of the three 2002 Balibombers. Mainstream scholars are also urgedto write books to counter these books.

In Singapore, the Religious RehabilitationGroup or the RRG has played a veryimportant role in rehabili tating the JIdetainees and their families. While thesecounselling sessions are still ongoing, RRGhas embarked on to the next phase, which isthe public education phase. This is crucialto immunize the public especially the youngergenerations from JI’s deviant ideology, thuscutting off JI’s supply of new recruits in thelonger term.

Stay Vig i lant . Be Resi l ientStay Vig i lant . Be Resi l ientStay Vig i lant . Be Resi l ientStay Vig i lant . Be Resi l ientStay Vig i lant . Be Resi l ientThe terrorist network may have been

crippled but terrorist will continue to presenta long-term security threat to countries inthis region. Terrorist resilience can be partlycontributed by their religious ideology;hence an effective counter terrorism strategyshould not only disrupt the terrorists’ basebut also its ideology and appeal.

As an example, the emergence of newgroups and factions like Tanzim QaidatulJihad headed by Noordin Mohd Topindicates that al-Qaeda’s ideology sti l l

persists in the region in spite of effortsto eradicate the bases, structuralorganization and support system forthe group.

C o n c l u s i o nC o n c l u s i o nC o n c l u s i o nC o n c l u s i o nC o n c l u s i o nWe should also note that while the

current crop of terrorist leaders canbe kil led, captured or evenrehabilitated, the seeds have alreadybeen planted for the next generation.Hence, in the longer term, counter-ideological responses are crucial todisrupt the recruitment andregeneration cycle. The youngergeneration is particularly vulnerable,as i t has been shown that theseterrorist groups have been able torecruit young people for their suicidebombings.

22 Masjid Khadijah

Religious life is often colored by myths.In fact many religions have their rootsin the myths, originating from

enchantment with gods and nature. Revealedreligions like Islam, Christianity and Judaism (theAbrahamic religions) are, however, generallyopposed to the mythologising of their doctrine.As a strict monotheistic religion, Islam, inparticular, strongly emphasizes the need to keepthe faith free from any kind of myth. This isespecially true of myths relating to God, sincethat could lead to “associationism” (shirk), whichis one of cardinal sins in Islam.

Despite this, understandings of Islam amongMuslims are often colored by misperception, ifnot, in fact, myths. There is also a great deal ofmisperception and mythologising among outsideobservers about Islam and Muslims. This is – inmost cases – the result of complex historical,sociological and political factors that are beyondthe scope of this lecture. Instead, today a fewmyths that specifically relate to Southeast AsianIslam will be mentioned and critically assessed.

The first myth – still strong among manyWestern scholars and observers – is what I callthe “myth of abangan”, that is, that SoutheastAsian Islam is somehow not ‘real’ Islam. The very

term “religion of Java” (1968) coined by theinfluential American anthropologist, CliffordGeertz, to describe Islamic life among theJavanese, reflects a reluctance to recognize the‘Islamicity’ of Islam in Java, or even in SoutheastAsian in general. It is something ‘Javanese’ ratherthan something Islamic. Through his distinctionbetween santri (strict and practicing Muslims)and abangan (nominal Muslims), Geertz arguedthat majority of Muslims in Java, and byextension in Indonesia in general, were abangan,that is, nominal, only. As a result, SoutheastAsian Islam historically, sociologically, culturallyand politically has often been regarded as marginaland peripheral vis-à-vis Middle Eastern Islam. Itis viewed as an obscure phenomenon and only a“thin veneer of symbols attached to a supposedlysolid core of animistic and Hindu-Buddhistmeaning”. A consequence of this is that, Islam isthus regarded as having no significant impact onSoutheast Asian culture.

It is true that Southeast Asian Islam is amongthe least Arabicized forms of Islam, largely as aresult of a process of Islamization that wasgenerally peaceful, and gradual; but one shouldnot therefore be misled by the abangan “myth”.The reality is that while pre-existing local beliefs

Islam In Southeast Asia

Tolerance &Radicalism

byAzyumardi Azra Professor of History; Rector of State Islamic University, Jakarta,

Indonesia Honorary Professor, The University of MelbournePaper Presented at Miegunyah Public Lecture The University of Melbourne

Wednesday 6 April, 2005

Masjid Khadijah 23

and practices resisted the continued process ofIslamization, a purer and orthodox form of Islamdid, nevertheless, steadily penetrate deeper intoparts of the region.

A number of scholars have observed thisphenomenon. As early as 1950s, for example,Harry J. Benda maintained that the Islamic historyof Indonesia [as elsewhere in Southeast Asia] isessentially a history of santri cultural expansionand its impact on Indonesian religious life andpolitics (Benda 1958:14). Two decades later,Howard Federspiel (1970:3) concluded that overthe past four hundred years, Indonesia [as wellas Islam in Southeast Asia in general] has slowlybeen moving towards a more orthodox form ofreligion, while heterodox beliefs and practiceshave declined considerably over the same period.Later research by such scholars as Woodward(1989), Pranowo (1994), Ricklefs (1998) andothers have confirmed further the strongtendencies towards Islamic orthodoxy and theblurring of real distinctions between santri andabangan. The process is also known in Indonesiaas ‘santrinization’, a process that involves someindigenization or contextualization.

A move towards Islamic rejuvenation can beobserved clearly among Muslims in SoutheastAsia, particularly in Indonesia and Malaysia, inthe last two decades. New tendencies in religiousobservance, new institutions, new Muslim groupsand new Islamic life-styles have increasingly beenadopted by many Muslims in this period. Moreand more new mosques with new architecture(usually derived from the Middle East) have beenconstructed – and they are full of congregations,mostly youthful. At the same time, more andmore Muslims have gone on the haj, the pilgrimageto Mecca. In fact the number of the pilgrims(some 225,000 Muslims per annum) fromSoutheast Asia is the largest compared to thosecoming from other areas of the Muslim world. Atthe same time, an increasingly large sum ofreligious alms and donations (zakat, infaq andsadaqah/ZIS) have been collected from well-to-do Muslims and distributed among the poor anddeprived Muslims. New institutions for collectingZIS have been formed, like the Dompet Dhua‘faRepublika Indonesia, which has beenphenomenally successful.

Changes in the policies of government towardsmore conciliatory approaches to Islam andMuslim groups in both Indonesia and Malaysiasince the 1990s have greatly contributed to the

rise of new Islamic institutions, such as Islamicbanks (also known in Indonesia as syari‘ah banks,since they operate in accordance with the syari‘ah/Islamic law), Islamic insurance (takaful), Islamicpeople’s credit unions (BPR-Syari‘ah, or BankPerkreditan Rakyat Syari‘ah, and BMT or Baital-Mal wa al-Tamwil). Malaysia, of course,developed these Islamic institutions much earlierthan Indonesia. But now in Indonesia,“conventional banks”—following the Malaysianexample—also open Syari‘ah divisions orbranches.

In addition, new and high-quality Islamiceducational institutions have been established inMalaysia and Indonesia, either by Muslim privatefoundations or by the state. In Malaysia, thisincludes the formation of International IslamicUniversity Malaysia (IIUM) by the Malaysiangovernment, followed by a number of otherIslamic universities and colleges in Malaysia –the latest one being the College University IslamMalaysia (CUIM).

In Indonesia, Islamic higher education nowconsists of 33 State Islamic Colleges (SekolahTinggi Agama Islam/STAIN) which wereestablished in 1997 in various cities throughoutIndonesia. There are also 13 State Institutes forIslamic Studies (Institut Agama Islam Negeri/IAIN) established in the the 1960s and early1970s. In the last three years, three IAINs andone STAIN, have been converted to full-fledgeduniversity (Universitas Islam Negeri/UIN).These include not only faculties of Islamic studies(religious sciences), but also faculties such asEconomics and Social Sciences, Science andTechnology, Psychology and Faculties ofMedicine and Health Sciences.

These Islamic higher educational institutionsundoubtedly play an important role in themodernization of Muslim society. Owing muchto “rational” and “non-denominational”approaches to Islam, graduates of IAINs,STAINs, and UINs in general have beenrecognized by Indonesian society in general ashaving progressive, inclusive, and tolerant viewsof Islam. In contrast , many students andgraduates of “secular” universities such as theUniversity of Indonesia (UI) or Bandung Instituteof Technology (Institut Teknologi Bandung/ITB)tend to be more li teral in their view andunderstanding of Islam. STAIN, IAIN and UINgraduates are instrumental in the building andspread of Islamic institutions such as the Islamic

24 Masjid Khadijah

schools, pesantrens (traditional Islamic boardingeducational institutions), madrasahs (Islamicreligious schools), NGOs and Majlis Ta`lim(religious group discussions in offices and societyat large: Jabali & Jamhari 2002).

In the meantime, new quality schools andmadrasahs, such as the Sekolah Islam al-Azhar,SMU Madania, SMU al-Izhar, and the like havealso been established in ever-increasing numbersince the late 1980s. These Islamic schools areknown as “sekolah Islam unggulan” (qualityIslamic schools) are attended mostly by childrenof the Muslim elite. As I have argued elsewhere,these schools play an important role in the “re-Islamization” or “santrinization” of Muslimparents.

At the same time, the madrasahs—nowaccording to Indonesian Educational Law of 1989equivalent to “secular schools”—and pesantrensor pondok (the Islamic boarding schools) havebeen modernized as well. They now employ thenational curricula issued by the Ministries ofNational Education and of Religious Affairs. It isinaccurate to assume that in Indonesia themadrasahs and pesantrens have sufficientdiscretion in their curriculum to teach subjectsaccording to the wish of their teachers or thefoundations that own them. It is therefore wrongto regard them as the “breeding ground” ofTalibanism or extremism, as is the case for manymadrasah in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

Pesantren are now also established in the urbanareas. In the past, pesantren have been associatedmostly with rural areas, and have thus been asymbol of Muslim backwardness. This is nolonger true. Furthermore, in the past pesantrenwere generally located in Java, but now more andmore have been founded also in Sumatra,Kalimantan, Sulawesi and other islands. Pesantrennow play a number of roles. They are not onlycenters of Islamic education, but also centers ofsocial development and empowerment. As centersof Islamic education, pesantrens now offer avariety of education, ranging from general schoolsto madrasahs to vocational training, up touniversity level studies. And, as centers of socialdevelopment, pesantren conduct programs andactivities related to economic development, socialwelfare, appropriate technology for rural areasand so forth.

All of these developments represent widerchanges within Southeast Asian Muslimcommunities. Since the 1980s, a new Muslim

middle class has developed. While there is nospecific term used to denote them in Indonesia,in Malaysia the rising Muslim middle class iscalled the “new Malay” (cf Alatas 1996).Although this new Muslim middle class is heavilytied to, and dependent upon, the ruling regimesin the respective countries, there is little doubtthat they have played a significant role in theconstruction of, and support for, the new Islamicinstitutions. Furthermore, they are instrumentalin the spread of new life-styles, such as thewidespread use of jilbab for women, or of “bajukoko”, Muslim shirts – or even a new traditionof conducting religious discussions, seminars, andceremonies in hotels and other prominent places.

Despite all of these new attachments to Islam,it is important to point out that, by and large,they have not led to significant changes in politicalattitude. The majority of Muslims in SoutheastAsia continue to hold fast to the politicalarrangements achieved in the period ofindependence following World War II. It is truethat after the fall of Soeharto, many Islamic partieshave been established in Indonesia; but they haveusually failed to win significant votes, includingin the general elections of 1999 and 2004 (Azra2000). Likewise, in Malaysia, although PAS (theIslamic Party) was able to increase its power inelections during the last years of Prime MinisterMahathir Mohamad, it is clear that the secularistUMNO remains too strong to beat. In fact, thenew Prime Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi,has been able to reverse the trends and UMNOonce again won the last elections at the expenseof PAS, which saw its power decline significantly.It seems that it is almost a myth that the Islamistswould be able to wrestle political power in bothIndonesia and Malaysia, therefore to exaggeratethe strength and influence of the Islamists in theregion is to contribute to another myth.

One of the most obvious features of Islamicpolitics in Southeast Asia, particularly inIndonesia and Malaysia, is conflict andfragmentation among political elite. A greatnumber of Islamic political parties have appeared,especially in Indonesia in the post-Soehartoperiod. These parties have been involved not onlyin gaining political power, but also in determiningthe meaning and interpretation of Islam. But, againthis has not hindered the development ofIndonesia’s – long awaited – democracy. Thesurprisingly peaceful elections of 2004 onlyconsolidated this democracy further. The new –

Masjid Khadijah 25

and, once again, secularist – leadership ofIndonesia under Presiden Susilo BambangYudhoyono and Vice President Muhammad JusufKalla now have popular mandate to deliver betterpolitical, economics, social and cultural conditionsin Indonesia.

Transnat ional Connect ionsTransnat ional Connect ionsTransnat ional Connect ionsTransnat ional Connect ionsTransnat ional Connect ionsIt is clear that in addition to the internal

dynamics in Malaysia and Indonesia thatcontribute to the increased momentum of newattachment to Islam, transnational or globalinfluences have also played an important role.As I argued elsewhere (Azra 2004), the tendencytoward orthodoxy in Southeast Asia had itsorigins in the intense religio-intellectualtransnational contacts and connections since the16

th

century between Malay-Indonesian studentsand their co-religionists and ‘ulama’ (religiousscholars) in the Middle East, particularly in theHaramayn (Mecca and Medina). Returningstudents or scholars implanted a more shari‘ah-oriented Islam in the Malay-Indonesianarchipelago, which forced the so-called“pantheistic” (or wujudiyyah mulhid) Sufism to

cede ground (Azra 2004). This was the beginningof the rise of a more scriptural Islam, or in Reid’sterm, “scriptural orthodoxy” in Southeast Asia(Reid 1988) that we see today.

Intense contacts between Southeast Asian Islamwith that of the Middle East continued in the19th century and, by the end of that century, newtransnational waves of Muslim discourse reachedthe shores of the Malay-Indonesian archipelago.These were brought into the archipelago not onlyby returning students, but also by haj pilgrimswho from the 1870s traveled in ever increasingnumbers to the Holy Land. The most importantdiscourse in the Malay-Indonesian archipelagoarising from this wave was pan-Islamism, butother waves followed in the early 20

th

century,originating from Cairo, and categorized by manyobservers as “Islamic modernism”. The spreadof this new discourse had led to the formation ofsuch modernist Muslim organization as theMuhammadiyah (1912), al-Irsyad (1913) andPersis (in the early 1920s) (Azra 2002a; Laffan2003).

In contemporary times, the transnational wavesthat influenced Muslim discourse in Southeast

Qiblatain Mosque, Madina,Saudia Arabia

26 Masjid Khadijah

by Imam Nawawi

Asia no longer stem only from the Haramayn oreven from Cairo. In fact, the previously respectedposition of the Haramayn (or, indeed, SaudiArabia as a whole), has been in decline for thelast few decades, at least so far as the discourseof Southeast Asian Islam is concerned. In fact,Wahhabism, which originated from Arabia in thelate 18

th

century and which is now the officialreligious ideology of Saudi Arabia, remains ananathema for many, if not most, Muslims inSoutheast Asia. The traditions of Islam inSoutheast Asia are, in the main, simplyincompatible with Wahabi literalism, puritanismand radicalism. Therefore we should notoverplay the influence of Saudi ArabianWahhabism in Southeast Asia. There are, ofcourse, traces of Wahhabism in the region, butthey do not significantly influence the course ofmainstream Southeast Asian Islam (Azra 2002a).

In recent times, other places in the MiddleEast, or elsewhere in the Muslim world, havebegun to exert more influence and have, in turn,left their mark on Muslim discourse in SoutheastAsia. Thus, since 1980s the discourse developedby such scholars as Abu al-A‘la al-Mawdudi,Sayyid Qutb, Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani and MiddleEastern movements like al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun(and its splinter groups), Hizb al-Tahrir and thelike began to spread in Southeast Asia. The IranianIslamic revolution of Ayatullah Khomeini in 1979further inspired Islamists in the region to be moreassertive.

At the same time, however, Muslim thinkersliving in the Western hemisphere, such as Ismailal-Faruqi, Fazlur Rahman, Seyyed Hossein Nasrand others, provide another stream of Islamicthought that is widely circulated in SoutheastAsia. Through their books, which have beentranslated in Indonesian and Malaysian languages,they continue to exert a significant influenceamong Southeast Asian Muslim thinkers.

It is important here to point out that despiteall the influences from the outside, SoutheastAsian Muslim thinkers have also developed theirown distinctive thought. This is no simple,uncritical adoption of thought from abroad. Infact, there are continued attempts amongSoutheast Asian Muslim thinkers and ‘ulama’ toformulate ideas that respond to modern Islamicthought elsewhere in the world but which hasgreater relevance for Southeast Asian historical,sociological, cultural and political contexts. Thisis apparent in the concepts introduced bySoutheast Asian Muslim scholars such as

“indigenization”, or “contextualization” of Islamin Southeast Asia.

Continued “indigenization”, makes it almost acliché to say Southeast Asian Islam is distinctive,having a different expression compared withIslams in the Middle East or elsewhere in theIslamic world. In the 1990s Southeast Asian Islamwas dubbed by leading international media suchas Newsweek and Time magazines as “Islam witha smiling face”. Islam in the region was generallyregarded as a brand of peaceful and moderate Islamthat has no problem with modernity, democracy,human rights and other tendencies of the modernworld.

It is worth mentioning here that, according to areport entitled “Freedom in the World 2002: TheDemocracy Gap” released by the Freedom Housein late December 2001, Indonesia was identifiedas one of the “bright spots” of democracy amongdominant or pre-dominant Muslim countries. The‘democracy gap’ is especially clear in the IslamicArab countries, but Indonesia, and – I would argue– Malaysia as well, show considerable democraticfervour.

However, although democracy is strong in post-Soeharto Indonesia, its relationship with Islam isnot always so clear. Discussion and debate onthis issue is now at the forefront, as both discourseand reality, in Indonesian politics. The conflictingpolitical trends that emerged with Indonesiandemocratisation from the interregnum ofPresident B.J. Habibie until today has alsocreated much confusion in this regard but thesuccess of the peaceful general elections of 1999and 2004 has shown that Islam and democracy inIndonesia are not inherently opposed and can, infact, work well together.

Looking again at religious, sociological andpolitical realities of Southeast Asian Muslim, Iwould argue that there is only very limited roomfor radical discourses and movements inSoutheast Asia in general. It is therefore simplywrong to assert that Muslim radicalism in theMiddle East will find a fertile ground in SoutheastAsia.

Radical izat ion of Mi l i tant GroupsRadical izat ion of Mi l i tant GroupsRadical izat ion of Mi l i tant GroupsRadical izat ion of Mi l i tant GroupsRadical izat ion of Mi l i tant GroupsIn the last several years, however, some foreign

observers as well international media haveasserted that the face of Southeast Asian Islam isundergoing significant change. Increasingly, Islamin the region is regarded as experiencing a rapidprocess of radicalization - worse still, the Muslimregion of Southeast Asia is now perceived by

Masjid Khadijah 27

some as a potential “hotbed of terrorism”. Thisperception, I would argue, is another popular‘myth’ about Islam. There is – of course – thepotential for radicalism among Southeast AsianMuslims, as there is in most communities, but itis going too far to view the region as becoming a“hotbed”.

This must be explained carefully. The rapidpolitical changes that have been taking place atthe national, regional and international levels,especially after the September 11, 2002 tragedyin the US, have indeed witnessed a rise in Muslimradicalism in the region. The arrest of individualsand groups in Southeast Asian countries,including Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, andIndonesia has increasingly indicated that theyhave regional links with each other and probablywith international terrorist groups as well.

The investigation by the Indonesian police ofthe Bali bombings on October 12, 2002, forinstance, seems to disclose complex connectionsbetween the individuals and groups that carriedviolent and terrorist activities including theMarriot (2003) and Australian Embassy (2004)bombings. A clearer picture of the radical

networks appears and there are at least twoconspicuous patterns uncovered from policeinvestigation of the Bali bombings. Firstly, someof the perpetrators of the bombings are alumni ofthe Ngruki Pesantren, the chief of which is AbuBakar Baasyir, widely regarded as the spiritualleader of Jama‘ah Islamiyyah, the core of Islamicradical groups in Southeast Asia. Secondly, someof the perpetrators had been living in Malaysiain the period of Abu Bakar Baasyir’s self-exile toescape President Soeharto’s harsh measuresagainst him. (Azra, 2003b; ICG August 2002;ICG December 2002; Nursalim 2001).

This perception of the rise of radicalism amongSoutheast Asian Muslims appeared rapidly afterthe September 11, 2001 tragedy in New York andWashington DC. The perception grew strongerin the light of successive events in the aftermathof “9-11”, especially the Bali bombings that lefttwo hundred innocent people dead. The bombingsat a McDonald’s outlet and the Haji Kalla carshow room in Makasar, South Sulawesi, on theeve of ̀ Id al-Fitr (December 5) the following year,confirmed this perception of a tendency towardsterrorism among certain radical individuals and

28 Masjid Khadijah

by Rohan Gunaratna

groups in Indonesia.Certainly, there can be little doubt that the

September 11, 2001 tragedy did rapidly radicalizecertain individuals and groups among Muslims inSoutheast Asia, particularly in Indonesia. TheAmerican military operations in Afghanistanfollowing the attacks on World Trade Center inNew York and the Pentagon in Washington DChas, unfortunately, given real momentum for theradicals to assert themselves. The Bushadministration’s attacks on Afghanistan and Iraqhas fuelled bitter resentment among the radicals.The arrests of suspected radicals in Malaysia,Singapore, and Philippines has added fuel to theiranger and bitterness toward the US and symbolsthat they consider as symbolizing Americanimperialist arrogance, such as McDonald’s, orKentucky Fried Chicken, outlets.

In addition, political realities in Indonesia havealso contributed to radicalization of certainindividuals and groups. The breakdown of lawand order and the relative weakness of centralgovernment authority after the fall of PresidentSoeharto provided room for the radicals to assertthemselves. In fact, they attempted in a numberof ways to destabilize the President Megawati,whom they had opposed since her PDI-P wonthe 1999 general elections (Azra 2003a).

One should not be misled, however, with thesecomplex developments. In fact, radicalism amongcertain groups of Indonesian Muslims inparticular is not new. Although Southeast AsianIslam in general has been viewed as moderate andpeaceful form of Islam, the history of Islam inthe region shows that radicalism among Muslimshas existed for at least two centuries. In WestSumatra in the late 18th and early 19th centuries,for example, the Wahhabi-like Padri movementled other Muslims in the area to subscribe totheir literal and puritanical understanding ofIslam. This violent, armed movement aimed atspreading a pure and pristine Islam it presentedas the Islam practiced by the Prophet Muhammadand his companions (the salaf). The Padri,however, failed to gain support from majority ofMuslims and, as a result, their movement, whichultimately failed, became isolated as the onlyprecedent for Wahhabi-like radicalism in theSoutheast Asia region.

The Padri movement did, however, mark a shiftin the continued influence of Middle EasternIslam on the course of Southeast Asian Islam. AsI have argued elsewhere (Azra 2003b), from the

16th century to the 18th century, Islam in theMiddle East exerted very strong influence onIslamic intellectualism and religious life inSoutheast Asia, mainly through complex networksof Middle Eastern and Malay-Indonesian ‘ulama’who, as mentioned earlier, played a crucial rolein the peaceful reform of Islamic intellectualismand life in Southeast Asia over the centuries. Ishould mention, however, that toward the end ofthe 18th century, discourse on jihad (holy war)was introduced by such prominent Malay-Indonesian scholars as ‘Abd al-Samad al-Palimbani and Daud ibn ‘Abd Allah al-Patani, asa response to the increased encroachment ofEuropean colonialism in Southeast Asia. Thisversion of Jihad was usually not directed againstother Muslims. In West Sumatra, however, itwas. It is thus the Padri of West Sumatra whoset a precedent for radicalism among SoutheastAsian Muslims by launching jihad against theirfellow Muslims.

Polit ico-Religious Roots of RadicalismPolit ico-Religious Roots of RadicalismPolit ico-Religious Roots of RadicalismPolit ico-Religious Roots of RadicalismPolit ico-Religious Roots of RadicalismThe root causes of radicalism among Muslims

have always been very complex. The complexityis even greater now, because of a broad range offactors that are working to influence the courseof Muslim societies as a whole. In the past, beforethe modern period, the driver of radicalism weremainly internal, that is, radicalism was usually aresponse to internal problems faced by theMuslims, such as the rapid decline of Muslimpolitical entities and continued conflict amongMuslim communities.

Many Muslims in the colonial time stronglybelieved that the sorry situation of the Muslimworld dominated by Western Christians oratheists had a lot to do with the socio-moraldecay of Muslims themselves, resulting fromwrong religious beliefs and practices. Accordingto this argument, they had simply abandoned theoriginal and real teachings of Islam and were thusbeing punished.

As a result, some Muslims felt it necessary toconduct tajdid (renewal) or islah (reform) not onlythrough peaceful means, but also by force andother radical means they considered to be moreeffective. This, of course, included declaring jihadagainst Muslims who were regarded as being havegone astray. Islam of course emphasizes the needfor Muslims to renew their beliefs and practices.In fact, in one of his hadith (traditions of theprophet), the prophet Muhammad states that

Masjid Khadijah 29

there would be a reformer or renewer (mujaddid)of Islam, coming at the end of every century torenew and revitalize Islam. At the same time,however, it is clear that the same hadith prohibitsthe use of radical and violent means in the effortsto renew and reform Islam.

One of the strongest tendencies in thediscourses and movements of Islamic renewal andreforms is a tendency towards what is seen asthe pure and pristine Islam practiced by theProphet Muhammad and his companions (thesalafs). That is why most of the Islamic renewalmovements are identified as Salafiyyah (or Salafi,or Salafism). There is a very wide spectrum ofIslamic discourse and movements that can beincluded as Salafiyyah (Cf ICG 2004; Jamhari &Jahroni 2004). So much so, that I can make adistinction between “classic Salafiyyah” and“neo-Salafiyyah”; or “peaceful Salafiyyah” and“radical Salafiyyah”. The Wahhabi movement inthe Arabian Peninsula that gained momentum inthe late 18

th

century can, for example, becategorized as both ‘classic’ and ‘radical’Salafiyyah. This is also true of the Wahhabi-like

Padri movement in West Sumatra in the 19thcentury, described briefly earlier, which was“classic Salafism”, where internal factors withthe Muslim ummah or community were itsdriving force.

The spectrum of “neo Salafiyyah” discoursesand movements is certainly very complex. Theterm “neo” in the first instance refers to the periodof the modern period, beginning with the harshencounters between Muslim societies and Westerncolonial powers from the 16

th

century onwards.During this period, the external factors—associated mostly with the Western world—thatcould incite radicalism became increasingly moreand more dominant. In fact, the West has beenaccused by many Muslims as being responsiblefor many, if not most, of the problems thatMuslims have faced in the last several centuries.Confronting continued Western poli t ical ,economic and cultural domination and hegemony,many Muslims were afflicted by a kind ofdefensive psychology that led to, among others,a belief in “conspiracy theories”.

There were of course outbursts of Muslim

Demonstration in Jakarta

30 Masjid Khadijah

radicalism in Southeast Asia in the period of the19th century and up to World War II, during theheyday of European colonialism in the region.These were a different kind of radicalism. Theywere in fact jihads to liberate Muslim lands (daral-Islam) from the occupation of the hostileinfidel European coming from the lands of war(dar al-harb). According to classical Islamicdoctrines, jihad against hostile infidels may bejustified and can, in fact, be considered as justwar; Jihads of this kind are believed to be wars inthe way of God (jihad fi sabil Allah).

Looking at the whole history of radicalismamong Muslims, I would, however, argue thatradicalism among Muslims is more political ratherthan religious. In some instances, the originalmotive could be religious, but the movements soonbecome very political. Political developments inSoutheast Asia, particularly in Indonesia afterWorld War II were important factors in the riseof new kind of radicalism among Muslims. Forinstance, disappointed with the Indonesianmilitary policies of rationalization of paramilitarygroups following Indonesian independence onAugust 17, 1945, the Muslim militia leader,Kartosuwirjo rebelled against the embattledRepublic in the name of Islam. This was the originof the Dar al-Islam (DI, or Islamic State) or NegaraIslam Indonesia (NII, Islamic State of Indonesia)and the Indonesian Islamic Army (Tentera IslamIndonesia/TII), organisations that aimed toestablish an Islamic state, dawlah al-Islamiyah,in Indonesia. Even though this rebellion spreadto South Sulawesi and Aceh in the 1950s, it failedto gain support from the majority of IndonesianMuslims, who, after a bitter ideological strugglein the last year of Japanese occupation, hadaccepted Pancasila (“five pillars”) as the nationalideology, a doctrine that enshrined religiousplurality and rejected an Islamic state. As a result,the Indonesian army was able to muster sufficientsupport and crush these radical movements.

The idea of the establishment of Islamic state(dawlah al-Islamiyyah) is, however, one of themost significant issues that has continually arisenas an aspiration among certain groups of Muslimsin Indonesia. Groups among the moderates, suchas the Masjumi party under the leadership ofMohammad Natsir, for instance, also sought totransform Indonesia into a dawlah al-Islamiyyah.It is important to point out that – by contrast toDI – these attempts were carried out throughlegal and constitutional ways, more precisely,

through parliament. But they consistently failed,mainly because Islamic parties were involved inquarrels and conflicts among themselves and,therefore, failed to gain a majority in nationalelection of 1955, thus, also in the parliament.This has been the pattern ever since, at allsubsequent elections.

It is important to note here that despite thisfailure, moderate Muslim leaders in Indonesia havenever resorted to illegal means, such as armedrebellion, to transform Indonesia into an Islamicstate. In contrast, there has been growingtendency among them to accept Pancasila as afinal political reality, as the common platformfor a plural Indonesia that includes a majorityMuslim population. At the same time, however,there remain individuals and Muslim groups whokeep the idea of establishing an Islamic state inIndonesia alive. Depending on the politicalsituation, these people operate underground oropenly in achieving their goals. They may alsocollaborate with disgruntled elements of themilitary or even with other radical groups which,in terms of ideology, are incompatible.

The Soeharto New Order regime was not ongood terms with Muslim political forces in general– at least not in the period of 1970s and 1980s.In fact there much mutual suspicion and hostilitiesbetween the two sides and President Soehartotook very harsh measures against any expressionof Islamic extremism. But at the same time, it iswidely believed that certain military generals suchas Ali Murtopo and Benny Moerdani recruitedex Darul Islam/TII members to form KomandoJihad (Jihad Command), to conduct subversiveactivities in order to discredit Islam and Muslims(Ausop 2003).

This is a “marriage of convenience”, or inIslamic terms nikah mut`ah. We must thereforebe very careful in analysis of radical groups. Somecould be genuine, motivated mostly by religion,but others could be “engineered” radicalssponsored by certain individuals and groups ofpeople for their own political ends.

Contemporary Muslim Radical GroupsContemporary Muslim Radical GroupsContemporary Muslim Radical GroupsContemporary Muslim Radical GroupsContemporary Muslim Radical GroupsThe fall of President Soeharto after more than

three decades in power unleashed idle Muslimradicals. The euphoria of newly-found democracyand lifting of the “anti-subversion law” byPresident BJ Habibie, provided a basis for radicalsto express extremist and radical discourses andto conduct their activities in a more visible manner.

Masjid Khadijah 31

The lack of law enforcement because ofdemoralization of the police and military (TNI)has created a kind of legal vacuum that has beenexploited by the radical groups to take law intotheir own hands.

Some of the most important radical groupsshould be mentioned. These include are theLasykar Jihad (LJ), formed by the ForumKomunikasi Ahlussunnah Wa al-Jamaah(FKAWJ) under the leadership of Ja‘far UmarThalib; the Front Pembela Islam (FPI/IslamicDefence Front) led by Habib Rizq Shihab; theMajelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI/Council ofIndonesian Jihad Fighters) led by Abu BakarBaasyir; the Jamaah Ikhwan al-MusliminIndonesia (JAMI) led by Habib Husein al-Habsyi; and the Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI/Indonesian Party of Liberation) (Bamualim et al2001; Azra 2003a; Fananie et al 2002). Some ofthese groups have been either disbanded by theirown leaders—like the Lasykar Jihad—or havebeen laying low following the arrests and trial ofthe perpetrators of the Bali and Marriot Hotelbombings.

It is also clear that these radical groups areindependent and do not have any connection withestablished, mainstream Islamic organizations likeNahdlatul Ulama (NU) or Muhammadiyah, etc.Nor are they affiliated with Islamic politicalparties. This is because the radical groups do nottrust other established Muslim organizations,whether socio-religious or political in nature. Thisis mainly because, in the view of these radicalgroups, established Muslim organizations are tooaccommodative and too compromising in theirpoli t ical and religious att i tude vis-a-visIndonesian political and religious realities.Political struggles and conflicts among fragmentedpolitical groups, as well among the pro- and anti-status quo groups involving also circles in theIndonesian military (TNI) in the aftermath ofPresident Soeharto’s fall, provide another impetusfor the radical to asserts themselves.

I would suggest that there are at least twocategories of these radical groups. The first groupincludes radical groups that are basicallyhome-grown, such as the Lasykar Jihad, FPI andsome other smaller groups. The second groupincludes Middle Eastern affiliated- or orientedgroups, like the JAMI—which has its origin inthe al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun in Egypt—and Hizbal-Tahrir, which was initially founded in Jordanby Syaikh Taqi al-Din Nabhani in the 1950s. All

of these radical groups do, however, share verystrong Middle Eastern-oriented ideology. Inreligious terms, they subscribe to the ideology ofradical Salafism; and in terms of politics, theyare believers in the ideology of khilafatism whichaims for the establishment of a single, universalkhilafah (caliphate) for all Muslims in the world.

Yet, although these radical groups aim toestablish a dawlah Islamiyah of khilafah in theregion, they can be differentiated from the oldDarul Islam/NII movement in Indonesia. Due toconflicts and splits among the ex-Darul Islam/NII members resulting from Soeharto-eraIndonesian intelligence operations, as mentionedabove, radical groups tend to operateindependently from older groups (Ausop 2003).

It is important also to point out that thekhilafah and dawlah Islamiyyah areconspicuously absent in the discourse ofmainstream Muslim organizations such as NU,Muhammadiyah and other major organizationsthroughout the country. In fact, leaders of theseorganizations believe that concepts such asdawlah Islamiyyah are simply a new inventionamong certain Muslim thinkers and groupsresulting from Muslim encounter with Westernmodern concepts of the nation-state. Theyconclude that the Indonesian model of thePancasila state is already in conformity withIslam.

Looking at the whole phenomenon of radicalismamong Muslims in Southeast Asia, or in Indonesiain particular, it is clear that it has a long andcomplex history. The history of radicalism amongcertain Muslim groups also shows that there aremany causes for radicalism and that there is astrong tendency that their motives are politicalrather than religious. It is also conspicuous thattheir radicalism has a lot to do with the disruptionof political and social systems as a whole. Theabsence of law enforcement, or its weakness, iscertainly an important factor in this regard, asradicals take the law into their own hands in thename of their own vision of Islam.

‘Blessing in Disguise’?‘Blessing in Disguise’?‘Blessing in Disguise’?‘Blessing in Disguise’?‘Blessing in Disguise’?The terrorist bombing in Bali on October 2002

is certainly a tragedy for contemporary Indonesia.In fact, the bombing reflects a new phase ofviolence and terror in the country. This can beseen not only in the relatively large number ofthe victims, but also in the use of so lethal aweapon by the terrorists to achieve the greatest

32 Masjid Khadijah

possible psychological impact, both domesticallyand internationally. Worse still, there is suspicionthat one of the perpetrators was a suicide bomber,reminding one of the Palestinian suicide bombers.It is difficult for Indonesian people in general toaccept that individuals among them can be soruthless and inhumane.

But now, after intensive police investigation,the Bali bombing can, for several reasons, couldbe seen in some ways as a ’blessing in disguise’.This is because, first, the police have been ableto catch the alleged perpetrators of the bombing,and second, because, by doing so, they haveuncovered fresh evidence of networks of radicalsin Indonesia and Southeast Asia in the general.The revelation of the existence of these networkshas been crucial for establishing the fact that theradicals have been working in Southeast Asia, orin Indonesia in particular, in the last several yearsto achieve their ends, the most important of whichis supposedly an “Islamic State of Nusantara”that would consist of Indonesia, Malaysia, BruneiDarussalam, Singapore and, probably, also theMuslim area of South Philippines (Azra 2003b).

A great deal of credit, then, must be given tothe police who have worked tirelessly toinvestigate the case and have been successful inuncovering links between one perpetrator and

another.These events are important in Indonesia

because the revelation of the networks of theradicals by the police has silenced many of theskeptics, who from the very day of the Bali blasthad maintained that the bombing was simply aUS or Western plot to discredit Islam and destroythe image of Muslims in the country. Theskeptics, some of whom are prominent Muslimleaders, who seemed to believe in the so-called“conspiracy theory”, in fact accused theMegawati government of slavishly surrenderingto the wishes of President Bush of the US inparticular. This kind of accusation was also madeagainst Susilo Bambang Yudhoyomo duringPresidential elections of 2004 but it failed to makemuch impact on the public and Susilo BambangYudhoyono won the elections regardless.

The disclosure of the networks of the radicalsalso shows that the “conspiracy theory” doesnot ring true. The statements of Amrozi, ImamSamudra and their accomplices, allegedly involvedin the Bali and other bombings, make it clear thatthe bombings have been motivated by both“genuine” radicalism and hatred against the USand other Western powers. The fact that theperpetrators show no remorse for the innocent

Masjid Khadijah 33

victims has also shown that they have been morestrongly motivated by their own violent ideologythan by anything else and has done much to lesseneven tacit tolerance of radicalism.

Finally, the revelation of the networks ofradicals points to the fact that there are indeedterrorists among Indonesians who happen to beMuslims and who are more than happy to useviolent means to achieve their ends, even againstfellow Muslims. Before the police disclosures,there was a widespread reluctance among leadersof Indonesian Islam to admit that there areterrorists among Indonesian Muslims who havemisused the teachings of Islam to justify theirterrorist activities. In fact some prominentMuslim leaders have, in the past , issuedstatements that create an impression not only ofdefending the radicals, but even of condoningviolence and terrorist acts.

Empowerment of the ModerateEmpowerment of the ModerateEmpowerment of the ModerateEmpowerment of the ModerateEmpowerment of the ModerateIt is now the right time for Southeast Asian

Muslim leaders – the bulk of whom are moderates– to sincerely admit that there is a serious problemof radicalism among certain Muslim individualsand groups. This problem should be directlyaddressed by moderate Muslim leaders, hand inhand with law enforcement agencies, for the sakeof the image of Islam as a peaceful religion and ofSoutheast Asian Muslim followers as “Islam witha smiling face”. The problems of the radicalsshould be seen at two levels; first, the abuse andmanipulation of certain Islamic doctrines tojustify radicalism and terrorism. This abuseundoubtedly comes from literal, Wahhabi-inspired, interpretation of Islam. The secondproblem is more basic and it relates to the use ofviolence and terrorism, which, in i tself ,undoubtedly runs contrary to Islam.

Therefore, it is time now for moderate Muslimleaders to speak more clearly and loudly thatliteral and puritanical interpretations of Islam willonly lead to extremism that is unacceptable toIslam, and that Islam can not condone, let alonejustify, any kind of violent or terrorist act. Thereis absolutely no valid reason for any Muslim toconduct activities that harm or kill other people,Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Any kind ofresentment and deprivation felt by any individualor group of Muslims cannot, and must not, beused to justify any kind of desperate and inhumanact of this sort.

Furthermore, moderate Muslim leaders shouldnot be misled by the claims and assertion of the

radicals. The radicals are shrewd not only inabusing Islamic doctrines for their own ends, butalso in manipulating Muslim sentiment throughthe manipulation of mass media, particularlytelevision. Claims that the arrest of certain radicalleaders means the suppression of Islam and the‘ulama’ are very misleading. Similarly, claims thatthe police investigations in Indonesia of certainpesantren in the search for the perpetrators ofthe bombings, is a first step towards hostilityand suspicion against the whole pesantren systemis even more misleading.

The simplistic identification of radical leadersand groups with Islam and ‘ulama’ is likewisevery misleading. In fact the radicals are only avery small fraction of the ocean of moderateMuslims in Indonesia who from their sheernumber can be fairly regarded as therepresentation of the peaceful nature of SoutheastAsian Islam. Therefore, the moderates should bevery careful not to support any impression thatcould lead to the identification of the radicalswith Islam and Muslims at large in the region.

Some have argued that the defensive attitude ofcertain moderate Muslim leaders, particularly inIndonesia, originates from the trauma of politicalengineering and abuses by the police and militaryof the Muslims during the Soeharto period. Thisargument, I believe, seems irrelevant to thepolitical situation in contemporary Indonesia.There is no evidence that the MegawatiSoekarnoputri government was hostile to Islamand Muslims. In fact, President Megawati seemedvery sensitive on Muslim issues compared to herpredecessor, President Abdurrahman Wahid,despite the fact that he comes from the pesantrenmilieu. Lacking Islamic credentials, PresidentMegawati in fact carefully avoided makingstatements, let alone policies, that could sparkopposition from Muslims in general. This alsoseems true for President Susilo BambangYudhoyono, who is close to some Muslim groupsand, in fact, made political alliances with Islamicparties like the Crescent and Star Party (PBB)and the Justice and Welfare Party (PKS).

There has, of course, been a lot of criticism ofPresident Megawati Soekarnoputri who wasregarded as very hesitant and indecisive and waryof taking harsh measures against the radicals,because she was worried it is argued of possiblebacklash from Muslim public. It appears thatshe did not realize that the moderate Muslimleaders and organizations were more than willing

34 Masjid Khadijah

to rally behind her in opposition to any kind ofreligious extremism and radicalism. This wasmade clear by statements of Hasyim Muzadi(national chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama/NU) andSyafii Maarif (national chairman ofMuhammadiyah) in the aftermath of September11, 2001 tragedy in the US that Indonesian Islamcannot accept any kind of religious extremism.Furthermore, the two largest Muslimorganizations, representing some 70 millionIndonesian Muslims, have reached an accord totackle religious radicalism through their variouspolicies and programs.

As for the police force, i t has becomeincreasingly difficult for them to abuse humanrights to the extent they did in the past. The fallof Soeharto’s authoritarian regime and the rise ofdemocracy in Indonesia have forced police to bemore sensitive to human rights issues and to theprotection of the rights of the alleged perpetratorsof any kind of violence and terrorism. But this is,however, not to suggest that the police are freefrom heavy-handedness and insensitivity, butrather that it is becoming harder for them to getaway with it. It is the duty of the public to controland watch the police closely in theirinvestigations in order not only to preventpossible wrongdoings and mishandlings of thesuspected criminals by the police, but also toestablish credible procedures and support the dueprocess of law.

Therefore, moderate Muslim leaders whilemaintaining a watchful eye regarding policeefforts against perpetrators of violent andterrorist acts, should also support police in theirinvestigations. I suggest that one of the mostimportant root causes of violence and terrorismin present day Indonesia is the almost totalabsence of law enforcement and, worse still, thepersistence of impunity for state officials. In factthe vacuum of law enforcement and of decisiveactions by the police have been important raisond’etre for certain radical groups who have decidedto take the law into their own hands throughunlawful activit ies, such as the raids ondiscotheques, nightclubs, and other places theradicals believe to be sources of social ills.Above all, the future of moderate and peacefulSoutheast Asian Islam is dependent on a fair,objective, pro-active attitude on the part of themoderate majority in responding to developmentsamong Muslims in the region. Reactionary anddefensive attitudes are not going to help in efforts

to show to the world that Islam is a peacefulreligion and that Muslims are peace loving people.Again, it is time for the moderates to be moreassertive in leading the way to reestablish thepeaceful nature of Southeast Asian Islam.

Bibl iographyBibl iographyBibl iographyBibl iographyBibl iographyAlatas, Syed Hussein, 1996, The New Malay: His

Role and Future, Singapore: Association of MuslimProfessionals.

Ausop, Asep Zainal, 2003, “NII: Ajaran danGerakan (1992-2002)” [Negara Islam Indonesia/Islamic State of Indonesia: Doctrines andMovements, 1992-2002], Doctoral dissertation,Postgraduate Program, Universitas Islam NegeriJakarta.

Azra, Azyumardi, 2004,, The Origins of IslamicReformism in Southeast Asia, Crownest, Aust:AAAS & Allen Unwin; Honolulu: University ofHawaii Press; Leiden: KITLV Press.

Azra, Azyumardi, 2003, “The MegawatiPresidency: The Challenge of Political Islam”, inHadi Soesastro, Anthony L. Smith & Han MuiLing (eds.), Challenges Facing the MegawatiPresidency, Singapore: ISEAS.

Azra, Azyumardi, 2003b, “Bali and SoutheastAsian Islam: Debunking the Myths”, in KumarRamakrisna & See Seng Tan (eds.), After Bali:The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia,Singapore: World Scientific & IDSS.

Azra, Azyumardi, 2002a, “The Globalizationof Indonesian Muslim Discourse: ContemporaryReligio-Intellectual Connections betweenIndonesia and the Middle East”, in JohanMeuleman (ed.), Islam in the Era of Globalization:Muslim Attitudes towards Modernity and Identity,London: RoutledgeCurzon, 31-50.

Azra, Azyumardi, 2002b, Konflik Baru Antar-Peradaban: Globalisasi , Radikalisme &Pluralitas (New Inter-Civilizational Conflicts:Globalization, Radicalism & Plurality], Jakarta:RajaGrafindo Persada.

Azra, Azyumardi, 2002c, “Root Causes of theFailure of Democracy in the Muslim World”,paper presented in Seminar “A Clash ofMisunderstandings: Addressing the Root Causesof Islamic Extremism”, The Asia Society &

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American Indonesian Chamber of Commerce,New York, May 7, 2002.

Azra, Azyumardi, 2000, “The Islamic Factorin Post-Soeharto Indonesia”, in Chris Manning& Peter van Diermen (eds.), Indonesia inTransition: Social Aspect of Reformasi and Crisis,Canberra & Singapore: Research School of Pacificand Asian Studies, Australian NationalUniversity & Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,309-19.

Bamualim, Chaider S et al, 2001, LaporanPenelitian Radikalisme Agama dan PerubahanSosial di DKI Jakarta [Research Report onReligious Radicalism and Social Change in theSpecial Region of Capital City Jakarta], Jakarta:Pusat Bahasa dan Budaya & Badan PerencanaanPembangunan Daerah.

Benda, Harry J. 1958, The Crescent and theRising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the JapaneseOccupation, The Hague & Bandung: van Hoeve.

Fananie, Zainuddin, Atika Sabardila & DwiPurnanto, 2002, Radikalisme Agama &Perubahan Sosial [Religious Radicalism andSocial Changes], Surakarta: MuhammadiyahUniversity Press & The Asia Foundation.

Federspiel, Howard M., 1970, Persatuan Islam:Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia,Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Modern IndonesiaProject.

Freedom House, 2002, “Freedom in the World2002: The Democracy Gap”, New York.

Geertz, Clifford, 1968 (orig. 1960), TheReligion of Java, New York: The Free Press (orig.New Haven & London: Yale University Press).

ICG (International Crisis Group), September2004, Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafismand Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix, Southeast Asia/Brussel.

ICG (International Crisis Group), December2002, Indonesian Backgrounder: How theJemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Networks Operates,Jakarta/Brussel.

ICG (International Crisis Group), August 2002,Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the

“Ngruki Network” in Indonesia, Jakarta/Brussel.

ICG (International Crisis Group), October2001, Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslim,Jakarta/Brussel.

Jabali, Fuad & Jamhari (eds.), 2002, IAIN &Modernisasi Islam di Indonesia [IAIN andModernization of Islam in Indonesia], Jakarta:Logos.

Jamhari & Jajang Jahroni (eds), 2004,Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia [RadicalSalafi Movements in Indonesia], Jakarta:RajaGrafindo Persada.

Laffan, Michael F., 2003, Islamic Nationhoodand Colonial Indonesia, London & New York:RoutledgeCurzon.

Nursalim, Muh., 2001, “Faksi AbdullahSungkar dalam Gerakan NII Era Orde Baru”[Abdullah Sungkar’s Faction in the Movement ofthe Islamic State of Indonesia in the New OrderPeriod], MA thesis, Universitas MuhammadiyahSurakarta.

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Woodwark, Mark R., 1989, Islam in Java:Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanateof Yogyakarta, Tucson: The University of ArizonaPress.

Zada, Khamami, 2002, Islam Radikal:Pergulatan Ormas-ormas Islam Garis Keras diIndonesia [Radical Islam: The Struggle ofHardliner Islamic Groups in Indonesia], Jakarta:Teraju.

36 Masjid Khadijah

Allah Almighty made simplicity andmoderation as hallmarks of theMuslim ummah, as mentioned in the

Holy Quran: “Thus, have We made you an Ummah justly

balanced, that you might be witnesses overthe nations, and the Messenger a witnessover yourselves… “ (The Holy Quran 2:143)

The ulama (Islamic religious scholars)interpret the phrase Ummatan Wasatan asthe just (Al-‘Adl) and chosen (Al-Khiyar)people. These two interpretations do notcontradict each other, as justness is acriterion for being chosen by Allah. Thisdefinition is also in line with the meaning ofsimplicity, tolerance and moderation asopposed to extremism, as something is saidto be just, when it is balanced away fromextremes.

Moderation in Islam is characterised asfollows:

1. Islam is a religion which is easy topractise, and simplicity is preferred inpractising it.

Allah Almighty says in the Holy Quran:“… and has not laid upon you any

hardship in religion.” (The Holy Quran 22: 78)

In commanding fasting, Allah Almightysays:

“Allah intends every facility for you; Hedoes not want to put you to difficulties.”(The Holy Quran 2:185)

In commanding ablution, Allah Almightysays:

“Allah does not wish to place you in adifficulty, but to purify you, and to completehis favour on you, that you may be grateful.”(The Holy Quran 5: 6)

Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) warnedagainst complicating the practise of Islam,as it was meant to be easy;

“ Indeed this religion is easy and it willdefeat anyone who makes it difficult. “(Related by Al-Bukhari)

Here, ‘defeat’ means that someone whotries to make the practise of Islam difficultwill f ind himself unable to continuepractising it.

The Prophet (p.b.u.h.) also said:“Indeed the religion most favoured by

Allah is one which is convenient andtolerant.” (Related by Al-Bukhari)

ISLAM - UMMATAN WASATAN

AN UMMAHJUSTLY BALANCED

by Ustaz Mohd Haniff HassanResearch Analyst

S RAJARATNAM School Of International Studies,Nanyang Technological University

This section explains why Islam is, in essence, a simple and moderate religion,which loves peace and hates extremism.

This foundation is important to the correct and positive understanding of Islam.It also undergirds and facilitates discussions in subsequent sections of thispaper, especially in controversial issues.

Masjid Khadijah 37

In sending off his messenger on a mission,the Prophet (p.b.u.h.) advised as follows:

“Make it convenient and do not make itdifficult, tell them the good news and donot make them run away” (Related by Al-Bukhari)

In addition, the Prophet also reminded“Indeed, you have been sent to make

things easy (for the people), not to makethings difficult for them.” (Related by Al-Bukhari)

Aisyah r.a. said:“When the Prophet is given two choices,

he will choose the one that is moreconvenient between the two, so long as it isnot sinful.” (Related by Al-Bukhari)

Among the hallmarks of convenience inpractising Islam as a faith, is the provisionof rukhsah (exemptions), when one facesdifficulty in fulfilling certain requirements.

2. Tolerance is a characteristicthat cannot be isolated from Islam.

This characteristic is based onthe commandment that there is tobe no compulsion to accept Islam.Allah Almighty says,

“Let there be no compulsion inreligion.” (The Holy Quran 2: 256)

“Will you then compel mankind,against their will, to believe…?”(The Holy Quran 10: 99)

Islam encourages respect forother faiths, and does not interferein other faiths acts of worship.Allah Almighty says in the HolyQuran:

“Say : O you who reject Faith ! Iworship not that which youworship. Nor do you worship thatwhich I worship. And I will notworship that which you have beenworshipping. Nor will youworship that which I worship. Toyou be your Way, and to me,mine.” (The Holy Quran 109: 1-6)

Another Islamic injunctionwhich aims to inculcate respect for others, isthe prohibition against rebuking or insultingother faiths. This is mentioned in the HolyQuran;

“Do not revile those whom they call uponbesides Allah, lest they out of spite, revileAllah in their ignorance. Thus have We madealluring to each people its doings. In theend will they return to their Lord, and Weshall then tell them the truth of all they did.”(The Holy Quran 6: 108)

In the effort to foster tolerance, Muslimsare encouraged to counter wrong-doing withgood deeds.

“Nor can Goodness and Evil be equal.Repel (Evil) with what is better: then willhe between whom and you were hatred,become as i t were, your friend andintimate!” (The Holy Quran 41: 34)

38 Masjid Khadijah

“Repel evil with which that which is best:We are well acquainted with the things theysay.” (The Holy Quran 23: 96)

In addition, Islam enjoins forgiveness bothwithin the ummah and to others. Even in theextreme injustice of murder, the family of amurder victim is encouraged to forgive andin so doing, spare the murderer from capitalpunishment. Allah Almighty says,

“O you who believe! The law of equalityin prescribed to you in cases ofmurder…But if any remission is made by thebrother of the slain, then grant anyreasonable demand, and compensate himwith handsome gratitude.” (The Holy Quran2: 178)

The following verse was revealed whenone of the Companions was dissuaded byhis wife and children from joining ProphetMuhammad (p.b.u.h.) in batt le. AllahAlmighty says:

“O you who believe ! Truly, among yourwives and your children are (some that are)enemies to yourselves; so beware of them!But if you forgive and overlook, and coverup (their faults) , verily, Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful. “ (The Holy Quran64: 14)

Fighting for the cause of Islam is a bigobligation, and to obstruct someone from itis an equally big offence. Yet Islam proposesforgiveness for such a big offence.

Allah Almighty describes forgiveness as acharacteristic of the dwellers of heaven; thisis mentioned in the Holy Quran:

“Be quick in the race for forgiveness fromyour Lord, and for a Garden whose width isthat (of the whole) of the heavens and of theearth, prepared for the righteous - thosewho spend (freely), whether in prosperity,or in adversity; who restrain anger, andpardon (all) men; for Allah loves those whodo good; (The Holy Quran 3: 133 – 134)

Allah Himself is Most Forgiving. ProphetMuhammad (p.b.u.h.) said that AllahAlmighty declared:

“O, son of Adam, as long as you call uponMe and ask of Me, I shall forgive you forwhatever you have done, and I shall not

mind. O, son of Adam, were your sins toreach the clouds of the sky and were you toask forgiveness of Me, I would forgive you.O, son of Adam, were you to come to Mewith sins nearly as great as the earth, andwere you then to face Me, ascribing nopartner to Me (syirik) I would bring youforgiveness nearly as great as the earth is.”(Related by At-Tarmizi)

Tolerance in Islam may also be seen in themanner Prophet Muhammad treated thosewho committed offences; surely hisbehaviour is the best example and referencefor the Muslim ummah.

Abu Hurairah related an occasion when aBedouin urinated in the mosque, and thepeople angrily went to ask ProphetMuhammad (p.b.u.h.) to reprimand him. TheProphet calmly replied:

“Let him be. Pour over his urine a dipperof water. Indeed, you have been sent to makethings easy and not to make them difficult.”(Related by Al-Bukhari & Muslim)

A man sneezed during a prayer led byProphet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.). Muawiyah b.al-Hakam As-Salami r.a., who was in thecongregation, narrated as follows:

I then said, “May Allah bless you”. Peoplearound me looked at me with disapproval. Iasked, “Why are you all looking at me likethat?”. They then slapped their thighs withtheir hands. When I realised that they weretrying to quieten me, I kept quiet. ProphetMuhammad (p.b.u.h.) completed his prayers.Indeed, I have never before or after this, seena teacher who showed such a good example.By Allah, he did not scold, hit or reprimandme, but said :

“ Indeed, no word from man is suitable insolat (prayers). Solat is tasbih, takbir, andrecitation of Al-Quran.” (Related by Muslim& Abu Daud)

Muslims are not allowed to converse withothers during their prayers, and so the restof the congregation tried to signal toMuawiyah to keep quiet. Yet, ProphetMuhammad kept his patience till prayers wereover, before explaining it to Muawiyah.

Masjid Khadijah 39

3. Islam favours gentleness, promotesrefined etiquette, and denounces characterbashing.

Islam is a gentle and noble religion. Amongthe manifestations of gentleness andnobleness in Islam are in da’wah (preaching)for spreading the faith, and in muamalah(compassionate dealing) with people, eventhose who commit vice or act against norms.

Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) said :“ Indeed, kindness and gentleness does

not exist in anything, without beautifyingit; and it is not withdrawn from anything,without ruining it.” (Related by Muslim)

“Verily, Allah is kind and gentle, loves thekind and gentle, and confers upon the kindand gentle that which he does not conferupon the harsh.” (Related by Muslim)

Islam expects gentleness in da’wah.Indeed, the very basis of da’wah is graciouswords, even when the one being preachedto is a cruel tyrant. For example, when Allahsent the prophets Musa (Moses) and Harun(Aaron) a.s. on His mission to Pharaoh, Hecommanded :

“So speak (O Moses & Aaron) to him(Pharaoh) gently; perchance he may takewarning or fear (God). “ (The Holy Quran20: 44)

Similarly, Allah commanded ProphetMuhammad (p.b.u.h.) and all the preachersafter him;

“Invite (all) to the Way of your Lord withwisdom and beautiful preaching; and arguewith them in ways that are best and mostgracious: for your Lord knows best, whohas strayed from His Path, and who receiveguidance.” (The Holy Quran 16: 125)

In this verse, Allah Almighty teaches manto preach in one of three ways:

1. Using Hikmah (wisdom)2. Being a good example3. Debating in the best and most gracious

mannerIn this verse, Allah Almighty specifies that

to invite others to Islam, gentle and graciousmeans of preaching are to be employed, inline with the nature of Islam itself.

Allah expects dialogue with the People ofthe Book to be conducted amicably. AllahAlmighty says,

“And dispute you not with the People ofthe Book, except with means better (thanmere disputation), unless it be with those ofthem who inflict wrong (and injury).”

(The Holy Quran 29: 46)

40 Masjid Khadijah

There is no contradiction between thegentle means advocated for da’wah, and thecommand for jihad to remove hindrances inthe path of da’wah. This is because jihadcan only be applied when all peacefulinitiatives to overcome those hindrances hadbeen rejected.

This is borne out in Prophet Muhammad’sexample. For the first 13 years of his mission,he was commanded to be patient and toconduct his da’wah in a gentle manner, eventhough he and the Muslims were severelyabused and oppressed. He did not retaliate,nor allowed any of his followers to do so.Seeking a peaceful solution, he accepted theoffer to migrate to Madinah. Yet the attacksagainst him and Islam continued, eventuallyescalating into attacks against Madinah. Itwas only after that, did he use jihad to ensurethe freedom to preach.

Even after jihad was allowed, ProphetMuhammad (p.b.u.h.) continued to prefer apeaceful approach to da’wah. It was for thisreason that he signed the Hudaibiah Accordwhose terms were unfavourable to Muslims,even though by then, Muslims already hadthe upper hand.

When Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) sentout his army on a military mission, he alwaysreminded them as follows:

“ Wage war in the name of Allah and inthe way of Allah. Slay those who disbelievein Allah. Wage war, but do not be excessive;do not be treacherous, do not mutilate (thedead) bodies and do not kill the children.”(Related by Muslim)

In another hadith, Prophet Muhammad(p.b.u.h.) said :

“Do not kill the old, the children, babiesnor women, and do not be excessive. Gatherthe spoils of war, do good, and be virtuous.Indeed, Allah loves those who do good.”(Related by Abu Daud)

It is obvious from these hadith, that Islamexpects gracious conduct even in jihad.

Allah Almighty says,“And fight in the cause of Allah those who

fight you, but do not transgress limits. “ (The Holy Quran 2: 190)

In Islam, war should only be waged basedon lofty and noble aims – for defence, and toremove impediments to the spread of faith –not because of anger or hatred, norconducted excessively. That is why ProphetMuhammad (p.b.u.h.) prohibited themutilation of dead bodies (killed during war)and the killing of women and children.

In conducting jihad, Muslims are exhortedto fulfill their promises to those with whomthey have an accord; treachery is notaccepted as a means of securing the upperhand, even in battle. Allah Almighty says:

“O you who believe! Fulfi l l (all)obligations .” (The Holy Quran 5 : 1)

“…(but the treaties are) not dissolvedwith those Unbelievers with whom you haveentered into alliance and who have notsubsequently failed you in aught, nor aidedany one against you. So fulf i l l yourengagements with them to the end of theirterm: for Allah loves the righteous.”(The Holy Quran 9: 4)

In the Holy Quran, Allah Almighty alsocommands Muslims to be good to those whodo not wage war against them,

“God forbids you not, with regards tothose who fight you not for (your) Faith nordrive you out of your homes, from dealingkindly and justly with them: for Allah lovesthose who are just. Allah only forbids you,with regard to those who fight you for (your)Faith, and drive you out of your homes, andsupport (others) in driving you out, fromturning to them (for friendship andprotection). It is such as turn to them (inthese circumstances), that do wrong. “ (TheHoly Quran 60: 8 – 9)

Allah Almighty even favours beingforgiving in war. A good example of this waswhen Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) forgaveand spared the people of Makkah upontaking over the city, even though they hadcaused Muslims much pain before.

Islam acknowledges the weakness of Manwho, by nature, will make mistakes, isforgetful, and prone to commit sins. ProphetMuhammad (p.b.u.h.) said:

Masjid Khadijah 41

“If you do not commit sin, then Allah willbring forth a group that will commit sinuntil they begged for forgiveness from Allah,and Allah will forgive them” (Related byMuslim)

Prophet Muhammad also taught that vicehas various levels. A person should not becompletely condemned, instead he shouldbe judged on the type of wrong-doingcommitted.

Islam rejects the practice of generallylabelling every sin as kufur (of infidels),especially when accompanied by physical,verbal or emotional abuse, as these inhibitrepentance and keep Man away from religion.

In this respect, Allah Almighty says:“It is part of the Mercy of Allah that you

do deal gently with them. Were you severeor harsh-hearted, they would have brokenaway from about you; so pass over (theirfaults), and ask for (Allah’s) forgiveness forthem; and consult them in affairs (of themoment).” (The Holy Quran 3: 159)

The attitude of Islam towards those whocommit vice is not to scold or label them askufur (disbeliever), but to explain their errors,and encourage them to repent and improvetheir way of life.

The above are just some of the illustrationsof Islam’s gentleness in dealing with varioustypes of people, whether Muslims or non-Muslims.

History has recorded many episodes wherepeople embraced Islam in hordes, asdemonstrated in the Malay Archipelago; notbecause they had been threatened, orbecause of the might of the sword. Therewere even nations which once opposedIslam, but later embraced it without beingcoerced, as in the case of the Mongols.

Islam favours gentleness and graciousnessas much as it rejects harshness.

4. Islam prefers peaceful rather thanviolent approaches.

The emphasis on peace and harmony inIslam may be seen from the following:

a. By virtue of its name, Islam means peaceand harmony. Violence is not in line with sucha name.

b. Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) wasappointed as a blessing for the entireuniverse.

In the Holy Quran, Allah Almighty says,“We sent you not, but as a Mercy for all

the Universe.” (The Holy Quran 21: 107)Violence is not concordant with his missionof mercy (rahmat).

c. Allah Almighty commanded ProphetMuhammad (p.b.u.h.) to prioritise peace, asin the Holy Quran;

“And if the enemy inclines towards peace,do you (also) incline towards peace, andtrust in Allah.” (The Holy Quran 8: 61)

d. Violence does not appeal to the natureof man.

During the Battle of Uhud, the disobedienceof some of his followers resulted in a neartragedy. What is significant is firstly,Prophet Muhammad did not act harshlyagainst those who were guilty, and secondly,Allah actually commended him for that in theHoly Quran,

“It is part of the Mercy of Allah that youdo deal gently with them. Were you severeor harsh-hearted, they would have brokenaway from you; so pass over (their faults),and ask for (Allah’s) forgiveness for them;and consult them in affairs (of the moment)”

(The Holy Quran 3: 159)Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) also

reminded his followers similarly when he said:“Convey the good news and do not make

them run away, make it easy and do not makeit difficult.” (Related by Muslim)

e. Muslims are taught to counterwickedness with good deeds.

Violence contradicts this teaching. AllahAlmighty says:

42 Masjid Khadijah

“Nor can Goodness and Evil be equal.Repel (Evil) with what is better: then willhe between whom and you were hatredbecome as i t were, your friend andintimate! “ (The Holy Quran 41: 34)

f. Violence gives rise to a lot of difficulties,and will only inconvenience oneself.

Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) said :“Indeed this religion is easy and it will

defeat anyone who makes i t dif f icult”(Related by Al-Bukhari)

g. Prophet Muhammad himself establishedMadinah through peaceful da’wah.

h. Islam is more easily spread in a peacefulenvironment.

The Hudaibiyah Accord serves as apowerful demonstration of this: recordnumbers of people came into Islam in theconsequent peaceful years, so much that itwas almost the same as the total for thepreceding 19 years of Prophet Muhammad’smission.

i. History has shown that Islam has thepotential to spread rapidly via peacefulmethods as it did in the Malay Archipelagoand in China.

Therefore, peaceful ways of spreading thefaith should be preferred in place of forceand violence.

Examples of Moderat ion in Is lamExamples of Moderat ion in Is lamExamples of Moderat ion in Is lamExamples of Moderat ion in Is lamExamples of Moderat ion in Is lam

1Islam lies between the extremes ofthose who renounce the world and

those who devote themselves to materialgains and worldly pleasures.

This is indicated in the Holy Quran, whenAllah Almighty says:

“And seek, with the (wealth) which Allahhas bestowed on you, the Home of theHereafter, nor forget your portion in this

world: but do you good, as Allah has beengood to you, and seek not (occasions for)mischief in the land: for Allah loves notthose who do mischief.” (The Holy Quran28: 77)

2Islam lies between the extremes ofthose who renounce marriage to

maintain purity of their soul, and those whoadvocate unlimited sexual partners withoutany strings attached. Islam limits the numberof wives a man may take to four, provided heis able to be responsible and fair to all ofthem.

Allah Almighty says:“Marry women of your choice, two or

three or four; but if you fear that you shallnot be able to deal justly (with them), thenonly one.” (The Holy Quran 4: 3)

3Islam lies between those who preferto isolate themselves away from society

in order to avoid vice, and those whosocialise with unrestricted freedom.

Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) encouragedsocial interactions:

“A Muslim who socialises with others andis patient with their misdeeds, is better thana Muslim who does not socialise with othersand is not patient with their misdeeds.”(Related by At-Tarmuzi)

However, there are limits to be observed:“Anyone who believes in Allah and the

Hereafter, should not be alone with a womanwho is not his mahram1. Indeed the thirdamong them is Satan” (Related by Ahmad)

Moderat ion in Is lamModerat ion in Is lamModerat ion in Is lamModerat ion in Is lamModerat ion in Is lamModeration in Islam is neither subjective

nor determined by rational thought alone.While thoughts, traditions, and currentpractices are factors that may be taken into

1 In Islam, mahram refers to male relatives that a woman is not allowed to marry,e.g., her father, grandfathers, brothers, uncles and nephews.

Masjid Khadijah 43

account when discussing moderation, inIslam, it is determined based on the HolyQuran and the Sunnah.

Islam commands Muslims to be moderatein practising the teachings of the religion.The teachings of Islam, as outlined in theHoly Quran and the Sunnah, advocatemoderation in life. Extremism is actually theresult of ignoring or going against the tenetsof the religion.

On the other hand, moderation in Islamdoes not mean ignoring its commandmentssuch as praying (solat), fasting or wearingthe headscarf for women.

Moderation in Islam may be seen not onlyin the context of worldly life but also life inthe Hereafter. Allah Almighty mentions thispoint in the Holy Quran,

“And seek, with the (wealth) which Allahhas bestowed on you, the Home of theHereafter, nor forget your portion in thisworld: but do you good, as Allah has beengood to you, and seek not (occasions for)mischief in the land: for Allah loves notthose who do mischief.” (The Holy Quran28: 77)

In order to understand moderation in Islam,it is necessary to fully understand the Islamicworldview and to understand thephilosophy behind the teachings andpractices. Some issues which require thatprior understanding are; Why do Muslimsfast? Why are Muslims required to covertheir aurat? Why is extra-marital sexprohibited even with mutual consent?

It is also necessary to understand how theulama derive rulings from Al-Quran and As-Sunnah. With an understanding of thisprocess, one will be able to ascertain theextent and validity of their rulings. Withoutit, extremist tendencies may develop.

On this basis, i t can be seen that theconcept and meaning of moderation in Islamoverlaps significantly with that commonlyused, save for slight differences.

THE MEANING OF EXTREMISMTHE MEANING OF EXTREMISMTHE MEANING OF EXTREMISMTHE MEANING OF EXTREMISMTHE MEANING OF EXTREMISMACCORDING TACCORDING TACCORDING TACCORDING TACCORDING TO THE HOLO THE HOLO THE HOLO THE HOLO THE HOLYYYYY QURAN QURAN QURAN QURAN QURAN

& THE SUNNAH& THE SUNNAH& THE SUNNAH& THE SUNNAH& THE SUNNAH

Islam Prohib i ts ExtremismIs lam Prohib i ts ExtremismIs lam Prohib i ts ExtremismIs lam Prohib i ts ExtremismIs lam Prohib i ts Extremism

In essence, Islam guides towardsmoderation, away from extremism. This canbe seen from the following arguments(dalil);

1Allah commands that Muslims alwayspray for the straight and righteous path.

Allah Almighty says:“Show us the straight way, the way of those

on whom You have bestowed Your Grace,not those whose (portion) is wrath, and notthose who go astray.” (The Holy Quran 1: 6 – 7)

This verse teaches the Muslim ummah todistance themselves from two extremegroups, namely the group that neglects theteachings of the religion and the group thatis extreme in practising it. Muslims recite thisverse in every rakaat of every prayer. Thatis the extent to which Islam reminds itsummah to avoid extremism.

2Islam prohibits its ummah from beingextreme.

Allah Almighty says:“These are the limits ordained by Allah;

so do not transgress them, i f any dotransgress the limits ordained by Allah, suchpersons do wrong (to themselves as well asothers).” (The Holy Quran 2: 229)

This verse forbids Muslims fromtransgressing limits. It also alludes thatextremism goes against the teachings ofIslam.

Allah Almighty says:“Do not commit excesses in your

religion.” (The Holy Quran 4: 171, 5: 77)

2 Cited by Abdul Rahman b.Mu‘alla Al-Luwaihiq, Al-Ghuluw Fi Ad-Din Fi Hayat Al-Muslimin Al-Mu‘asirah, Muassasah Ar-Risalah, Beirut, 1992, pg. 65. See Sayid Qutb, Fi Zilal Al-Quran, Dar Asy-Syuruq, Beirut, 1403H, chapter 4, pg. 1931.

44 Masjid Khadijah

Masjid Khadijah 45

46 Masjid Khadijah

Although this revelation was originallydirected to the People of the Book, i tsmessage is clear for all – stay away fromextremism. Similarly, Prophet Muhammad(p.b.u.h.)said :

“Distance yourselves from being extremein religion.” (Related by Ahmad, IbnKhuzaimah, An-Nasa`ii, Ibn Majah and Al-Hakim)

3Muslims are commanded to practiseist iqamah (steadfast and straight,

without deviations)Allah Almighty says,“Therefore stand firm (in the straight

Path) as you are commanded, - you andthose with you, turn (unto God); andtransgress not (from the Path); Verily, Hesees all that you do. “ (The Holy Quran 11: 112)

This verse commands Muslims to practiseistiqamah. In his book, Fi Zilal Al-QuranSyed Qutb interprets the word istiqamah asi‘ t idal (moderation), that is , withoutdeviation2.

4Islam knows the damaging results ofbeing extreme.

Allah Almighty says: “These are the limits ordained by Allah;

so do not transgress them, i f any dotransgress the limits ordained by Allah, suchpersons do wrong (to themselves as well asothers).” (The Holy Quran 2: 229)

This verse states that the outcome ofextremism is cruelty and wrong-doing toothers.

Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) said :“Indeed that which destroyed the people

before you is the extremist stance inpractising religion.” (Related by Ahmad, IbnKhuzaimah, An-Nasa`ii, Ibn Majah and Al-Hakim)

“Disaster on those who are extreme.”(Related by Muslim, Abu Daud and Ahmad)

Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) said :“Do not make things dif f icult for

yourselves, then Allah will make it difficultfor you. Indeed there was a group whomade it difficult for themselves, then Allahmade it difficult for them. Their remnantsare those in the monasteries. They inventedMonasticism; we did not prescribe it forthem.” (Related by Abu Daud)

These hadith teach that being extreme willcause difficulties to oneself and to others.

The Charac te r i s t i csThe Charac te r i s t i csThe Charac te r i s t i csThe Charac te r i s t i csThe Charac te r i s t i cso f Ex t remism in Is lamof Ex t remism in Is lamof Ex t remism in Is lamof Ex t remism in Is lamof Ex t remism in Is lam

Among the characteristics of extremismthat can be gleaned from the Holy Quran andthe Sunnah are;

1Either taking it easy to the extent ofneglecting the teachings of the religion,

or making it difficult to practise the religion.

Allah Almighty says,“Show us the straight way, the way of those

on whom You have bestowed Your Grace,not those whose (portion) is wrath, and notthose who go astray.” (The Holy Quran 1: 6– 7)

The ulama in tafsir (Quranic interpretation)explain that what is meant as those whoearned the Wrath of Allah were the Peopleof the Book who made practising religiondifficult, while the group that strayed werethose who trivialised religion.

2The Al-Mutanattiun This group was mentioned by Prophet

Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) in his hadith;

“Destruction upon the Al-Mutanattiun”(Related by Muslim, Abu Daud and Ahmad)

3 Cited by Dr. Abdul Rahman b.Mu‘alla Al-Luwaihiq, Religious Extremism In the Life Of ContemporaryMuslims,translated by Jamaal Al-Din M. Zarabozo, Al-Basheer, 2001, pg. 73. See An-Nawawi, SyarhMuslim, Dar Ihya’ At-Turats Al-‘Arabi, Beirut, 1392H, chapter 16, pg. 220.

Masjid Khadijah 47

Imam An-Nawawi explained Al-Mutanattiun as those who tend to beexcessive, who go over the limits in theirwords and actions3.

3Those who make it a burden uponthemselves.

Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) said :“Indeed this religion is easy and it will

defeat anyone who makes i t dif f icult “(Related by Al-Bukhari)

The characteristic of extremism forbiddenhere, is making the affairs of religion sodifficult that it becomes a burden on oneself.

TTTTTypes of Extremismypes of Extremismypes of Extremismypes of Extremismypes of Extremism

Extremism may be classified as 2 types4:

a. Extremism in fundamental principles andaqidah (faith).

b. Extremism in juz‘ii (non-fundamental)and amali (practical) matters.

Extremism in fundamental principles relatesto the kulliyat (basic tenets) of syariah andbeliefs. For example, insisting that there areother infallible men after Prophet Muhammad(p.b.u.h.), treating Muslims who commit sinsas infidels, or declaring war on fellowMuslims.

Extremism in juz‘ii matters relates toextremism in the practise of Islam. Examplesof this are: renouncing marriage, praying(solat) all night through without sleeping,or giving alms to the extent of failing toprovide for one’s own family.

This classification helps us to understandthe following :

a.Some forms of extremism are detrimentalto the Muslim ummah in general. Others aredetrimental to the individual only.

b.There are different levels and degrees ofseriousness in extremism. These will have tobe factored into our response to it.

c.Extremism in juz‘ii and amali matterstends to be subjective. It may be extreme foran individual in a certain situation, but notextreme for others in a different situation.Some variance is expected and allowed.Therefore, in these matters, we cannot applya blanket rule to define who is extremist andwhat is extremism.

d.While some forms of extremism maycause one to become apostate, others aremerely sinful.

e.Extremism may exist in opinions only, orin opinions accompanied by action, or inaction only. Understanding that suchvariation exists, will help in handlingextremism. For instance, the handling ofextremist opinions will naturally differ fromthe handling of extremist actions.

f.Extremism in juz‘ii and amali matters, ifwidely imposed by some people upon themajority, will be detrimental. Such extremismthen becomes kulliy because of the extentof its seriousness.

g.Some forms of extremism may besupported by groups, others by individuals.Some may target small groups, while otherstarget large groups.

The Meaning of ExtremismThe Meaning of ExtremismThe Meaning of ExtremismThe Meaning of ExtremismThe Meaning of Extremismaccording to Syara’according to Syara’according to Syara’according to Syara’according to Syara’

1Extremism is when one interprets thenas (evidence from the Holy Quran and

the Sunnah) in a strict and burdensomemanner in contradiction with the nature ofthe syara’, making it inconvenient foroneself and for others.

4 Abdul Rahman b.Mu‘alla Al-Luwaihiq, Religious Extremism In the Life Of ContemporaryMuslims, pg. 74-77.

48 Masjid Khadijah

2Extremism is making it burdensome ininterpreting and understanding the

meaning of divine revelations; going beyondthat which is demanded from a Muslim, andgoing beyond established and acceptedmethodologies.

Both the above characteristics are part ofthe Al-Mutanattiun group mentioned in theearlier hadith.

The next hadith relates to points 3, 4 and 5.It is about 3 men: one who refuses to breakhis fast, another who prays without stoppingfor any sleep, and the third who distanceshimself from women and refuses to getmarried.

Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) counselledthem:

“Truly, I am the most fearful of Allah, andthe most pious among you; yet I fast andbreak my fast, I pray and I sleep, and I alsomarry women. Then, he who does not likemy example, is not of me (not one of myfollowers).” (Related by Al-Bukhari).

3Extremism is when one makes an actof worship compulsory on oneself or

on others when it is not compulsory in Islam,regardless of how much Islam encouragesthat act of worship.

4Extremism is when one treats as haram(forbidden) what Allah has declared as

halal, as illustrated in the above hadith.

5Extremism is when one neglectsdharuri (critical) needs like eating,

drinking and sleeping.

6.Extremism is not only in overdoing, butalso in neglecting.

Nevertheless, the following are notconsidered extremism in religion:

5 Cited by Abdul Rahman b.Mu‘alla Al-Luwaihiq, Religious Extremism In the Life Of ContemporaryMuslims,pg. 85. See Ibn Taimiyah, Iqtidho’ As-Sirat Al-Mustaqim (tahqiq Nasir Abdul Karim),1404H,chapter 1, pg 289.

6 Ibid, pg. 86. See Ibn Hajr, Fath Al-Bari, Al-Matba‘ah As-Salafiah Wa Maktabatuha, Kaherah,1380H, chapter 13, pg. 278.

7 Ibid. See Asy-Syatibi, Al-I‘itisom, Dar Al-Makrifah, Beirut, 1405H, chapter 3, pg. 304.

1.Striving to excel. Extremism only happenswhen it causes problems and becomes aburden on oneself.

2.Holding to a strict f iqh (Islamicjurisprudence) view, if it was proposed byan ulama who is mujtahid (expert in Islamiclaws) or being a follower of one who isknowledgeable in religion. For example,holding to the view that playing and listeningto string and wind musical instruments isharam. If extremism happens in this area, itis not primarily caused by having such aview, but by having a negative attitudetowards those who have a different viewpointand hurling abuse at them. A strict fiqh viewper se does not imply extremism.

The Meaning of Extremismaccording to the Ulama

To round up this discussion on themeaning of extremism, the following is howit is defined by the ulama:

Ibn Taimiyah wrote:“Extremism (Ghuluw) is being over the

limit , l ike adding on something, whilepraising or insulting someone whoqualifies, or the like.5”

Ibn Hajar explained it as,“To be excessive and rigid to the point of

transgressing limits.6”

The same meaning was given by ImamAsy-Syatibi7.

Masjid Khadijah 49

Islam encourages moderation andextremism is at odds with it. Extremismresults in various adverse outcomes

not only for the individuals concerned, butalso to the family, society, religion andcountry.

Advances in information technology hasprovided a rapid and unfettered platform forcommunication and dissemination of ideas.Hence, there is an urgent need to instruct

the community on the parameters ofmoderation.

The Charter Of Moderation in ReligiousPractice is an init iative to providebenchmarks on moderation in religiouspractice for the community.

The benchmarks serve to narrow areas ofambiguity and confusion. Clarity willfacilitate efforts in public education andcontrol. It will also facilitate efforts in closingthe gap between various differences, whichsometimes throw various parties intoextremist tendencies and conflicts.

This charter provides a framework not onlyfor handling the issue of moderationbetween Muslims and non-Muslims, butmore importantly, to strengthen the practiceof moderation amongst Muslims themselves.

We believe Muslims need to understandand practise moderation amongstthemselves before they can practise i tconsistently with others. More importantly,Muslims need to unite in support ofmoderation, to face greater challenges in thefuture.

We must learn from events in othercountries and the reality facing the Muslimummah all across the world. The mainstumbling block to us giving an adequateresponse to challenges such as extremism,is not the lack of resources, but the lack ofunity and mutual support in confrontingproblems.

While i t may be true to say that thechallenges facing the Muslim community inSingapore is not as severe as the situationin some countries, we cannot take it easyand wait for something undesirable tohappen before taking action.

The worldwide resurgence of Islam makesit more important in the life of the Muslims.More people will look at a certain issue froma religious perspective, more will search forreligious views on matters related toeveryday living, more people will comeforward to voice out their views taking intoaccount religious teachings, and more willcome forward in the effort for progress inreligious aspirations.

Without clear parameters separatingmoderation and extremism, there is an

by Ustaz Mohd Haniff Hassan

CHARTERof moderationin Religious PraticeThis section presents a charter whichaims to outline the parameters ofmoderation as a guide for the life andreligious practice of the Muslimcommunity in Singapore.

50 Masjid Khadijah

increased possibility of incidents that mayresult in conflicts and misunderstandingbetween Muslims and non-Muslims, andamong the Muslims themselves.

AAAAA POLICY POLICY POLICY POLICY POLICY ST ST ST ST STAAAAATEMENTTEMENTTEMENTTEMENTTEMENT

Islam supports moderation in aqidah,ibadah, muamalah and da’wah.

In whatever action and practice in Islamby individuals, institutions and the generalpublic, all forms of extremism should beavoided.

Extremism is an act that goes over the limitsof what should be, whether from theviewpoint of syara’, customs or rationality.It has the following characteristics;

1. Interpreting nas with a strictinterpretation which conflicts with thesyariah and its basic purposes, resulting indifficulties for oneself and others.

2. Making it burdensome in interpretingand understanding the meaning of divinerevelations beyond which demanded from aMuslim.

3. Making a practice obligatory on oneselfor on others for the purpose of devotion(ibadah ) , when Allah had not made itobligatory, regardless of how much Islamencourages that practice1.

4. Treating something as haram orforbidden for the purpose of devotion(ibadah), when Allah had made it halal.

5. Forsaking basic matters in life or part ofit, for example, refusing to eat and drink,sleep or marry, for the purpose of devotion(ibadah).

6. Excessive either in adulating orcondemning others.

CHARCHARCHARCHARCHARTER ON MODERATER ON MODERATER ON MODERATER ON MODERATER ON MODERATION INTION INTION INTION INTION INRELIGIOUS PRACTICERELIGIOUS PRACTICERELIGIOUS PRACTICERELIGIOUS PRACTICERELIGIOUS PRACTICE

The following are our standpoints inensuring moderation in da’wah;

1. We are committed to respecting theprinciples of democracy in social interactionsand in our efforts to achieve the aspirationsof the Muslim community. It is on this premisethat we commit to constantly abide by thelaws and regulations in our actions.

2. We are committed to safeguardingpeace. We are not harsh and violent inreligious practice, nor in achieving ouraspirations. We understand j ihad in i tsbroader meaning. Armed j ihad is onlyagainst those who declare war on us.

3. Diversity is inherently created in natureby Allah Almighty; therefore, we face itpositively. We are not hostile to differencesand diversity, be it in matters relating toreligion, nation or culture. We wish toestablish synergistic relationships out ofthis diversity, via peaceful and harmoniouscoexistence. Our relationships are based onmutual respect and the desire to promoteunderstanding, tolerance and confidence ofeach other.

4. We believe that Islam is a comprehensiveway of life and reject the separation betweenworldly and religious affairs. However, weconsider a secular state positively in that itguarantees freedom in religion, recognisesthe positive role of religion in developingthe society, and it acts as a neutral structurewithin which harmony in social and religiouspractice may be secured. In reality, it is apractical choice for the minority Muslims inSingapore.

5. We love this country and it is in ourmutual interest to ensure i ts progress,continous development and prosperity, asguided by the principles of our religion. We

1 This consideration is takes into account the ability of the particular individual, group orcommunity,and the consideration of other benefits and detriments.

2 The maqasid syar‘iah comprise these five objectives of the syariah:preservation of religion, life,mind, property/wealth and posterity.

Masjid Khadijah 51

identify ourselves as Singaporeans, as muchas we identify ourselves with our race andreligion. Having such multiple affiliationsinevitably causes conflicts in certainsituations, but we are committed to lookingfor a common and equitable meeting point.Whatever differences that arise should behandled according to the principles ofdemocracy and legal procedures via apeaceful process.

6. Da’wah is part of the responsibility andpoints of honour for the Muslim ummah.However, it must be carried out with dueconsideration of the maqasid syar‘iah2 andafter weighing its positive and negativeoutcomes based on established principles.For instance, Da’wah cannot be implementedin a manner that it will cause a biggerdetriment or eliminate a bigger benefit thanwhat already exists for the community.

7. In matters related to fiqh, we recogniseHanafi, Maliki, Asy-Syafi’i and Hanbali asschools of thought that may be practised by

Muslims in Singapore. Similarly we recognisethe views of the respected and mujtahidulama of the Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jemaah .However, for official matters, Asy-Syafi’i isthe official mazhab (school of thought).

8. In matters related to aqidah , werecognise the views and the principles ofthe Salaf. We also acknowledge the mazhabof Abu Musa Al-Asy’ari and Abu MansurAl-Maturidi as part of Ahlus Sunnah WalJemaah.

9. Khilaf (differences in opinions) mayoccur in issues that are supported by qat’iinas (definite nas). In matters of aqidah,ibadah and social relationships which arenot supported by qat’ii nas, it is acceptableto have khilaf.

10 Khilaf in matters not supported by nasmay be accepted, as long as such views aresupported by evidence that are consistentwith Usul Fiqh . The type of khilaf thatcannot be accepted are those that do not go

Ustaz Md HanifUstaz Md HanifUstaz Md HanifUstaz Md HanifUstaz Md Haniff giving talk on Al Wf giving talk on Al Wf giving talk on Al Wf giving talk on Al Wf giving talk on Al Wala’ala’ala’ala’ala’ W W W W Wal Bara’al Bara’al Bara’al Bara’al Bara’ at at at at atKhadijah Mosque on 3rd Feb 2007Khadijah Mosque on 3rd Feb 2007Khadijah Mosque on 3rd Feb 2007Khadijah Mosque on 3rd Feb 2007Khadijah Mosque on 3rd Feb 2007

52 Masjid Khadijah

through procedures agreed upon by themajority of ulama.

11.Followers of different mazhab may praytogether in the same mosque, and followersof one mazhab may pray behind the imam ofother mazhab in congregational or Fridayprayers.

12.One cannot claim their jemaah or groupis the one true Islamic jemaah, or that anyonewho does not join that particular jemaah ororganisation is considered to be out of theIslamic community or may be condemned.

13.In matters related to ijtihad, one cannotclaim that only his views are true and othersare wrong, deviationist or bid’ah.

14.Any opinion from man regardless ofhow lofty his position is, may either beaccepted, or rejected, except those of thema’sum ( infallible ) Prophet Muhammad(p.b.u.h.). One cannot adulate anyone elseto the point of considering him as ma’sumand as an indisputable source of truth.

15.A Muslim cannot disassociate (Bara’)himself from the Muslim community.

16. A Muslim cannot label another as kafir.In the Singapore context, judgement of kufror kafir may only be decided upon by thereligious authority.

17.A Muslim does not turn kafir merelybecause of the following;

a.Committing vice, as long as he does notconsiders the vice as halal

b.Holding political positions in a non-Islamic government

c.Living under a non-Islamic governmentor country

d.Not being in certain organisations

18. The practice of taqlid (following theopinion of a particular imam/mazhab) isacceptable for the general public, and shouldnot be condemned indiscriminately. On theother hand, i j t ihad cannot be madeobligatory for everyone.

19.Khilafiyah issues should not be asource of controversy, polemic or conflictsin society. Objective and academicdiscussions are to be encouraged at asuitable time and place, within the appropiateaudience.

Arab spain architecture culture palace

Masjid Khadijah 53

20.The practice of character bashing andlabelling others as kafir , fasiq, andcommitting bid’ah or other malicious nameswith regard to khilafiyah issues or, becauseof it, or because of the wrong-doing ofparticular individuals, is not acceptable.

21.Discussions on matters that are trivialand non-beneficial to society should beavoided.

22.Bid‘ah idhafiyah, tarkiyah and iltizamare khilafiyah isssues in fiqh and should notbe made a source of conflict in society.

23.The practice of uzlah (isolating oneselfaltogether) from a society consideredimmoral in order to protect oneself, isrejected, because Islam is a religion ofda’wah and reformation.

24.Sufism and tasawuf are accepted aspractices which aim to purify the soul andbring oneself closer to Allah. Since there iskhilaf among the ulama on this subject; anyopinion from the recognised ulama may beadhered to, except when there is fatwaprohibiting it.

25.Inspiration and kasyf (inner voice ordream) of pious men are gifts from AllahAlmighty to them, but these may not be usedas the basis for extracting religious rulings.It may only be used as a guide, provided it isnot contradictory with syara’.

26.Fatwa and the opinions of the ulamaare very much dependent on the prevailingtime, conditions and environment. Any fatwawhich does not involve matters that areqat’ii, may change according to changes intime, condition and environment..

27.Respecting the authorities, and beingpolite and constructive in voicingdisagreements are part of good manners inIslam and a manifestation of moderation.

PRPRPRPRPROPOSED AOPOSED AOPOSED AOPOSED AOPOSED ACTIONS CTIONS CTIONS CTIONS CTIONS TTTTTO NURO NURO NURO NURO NURTURETURETURETURETUREMODERAMODERAMODERAMODERAMODERATION & DEAL TION & DEAL TION & DEAL TION & DEAL TION & DEAL WITH EXTREMISMWITH EXTREMISMWITH EXTREMISMWITH EXTREMISMWITH EXTREMISM

To nurture moderation in the practice ofIslam, and to overcome extremist tendencies,we propose the following actions;

1. Extensively educate the community onthe accurate Tasawur (world view) of Islam.May consider to include the study of IslamicTasawur in madrasahs.

2. Popularise the learning of the syariahdecision-making tools and processes amongMuslims. These include the sciences of theHadith, Ulum Al-Quran , Usul Fiqh andQawa‘id Fiqhiyah. This will open up theirminds to the broader perspective of Islamon any one issue.

3. Popularise the learning of comparativefiqh to open up the community’s minds tothe diversity of opinions of the ulama onany one issue.

4. Popularise contemporary fiqh views.

5. Streamline the ulama’s viewpoints onimportant issues.

6. Engage and interact with extremistgroups via dialogue and discussions.

7. Narrow the gap between the ulama ,leaders and youth.

8. Clarify issues that arise.

9. Refrain from being harsh and extreme indealing with extremism.

10.Safeguard manhaj syar’ii (correctmethodology) in ist idlal and ist inbat(deducing a ruling from the sources of thesyariah) before issuing any ruling.

11.Stay clear of creating controversies,confusion and antagonism within thecommunity.

12.Stay clear of actions which createcontroversies, confusion and antagonismtowards Islam and Muslims.

54 Masjid Khadijah

Blood is no argument’, as Shakespeareobserved. Sadly, Muslim ranks aretoday swollen with those who

disagree. The World Trade Centre,yesterday’s symbol of global finance, hastoday become a monument to the failure ofglobal Islam to control those who believethat the West can be bullied into changingits wayward ways towards the East. There isno real excuse to hand. It is simply notenough to clamour, as many have done,about ‘chickens coming home to roost’, andto protest that Washington’s acquiescencein Israeli policies of ethnic cleansing is theinevitable generator of such hate. It is ofcourse true as Shabbir Akhtar has noted thatpowerlessness can corrupt as insistently as

does power. But to comprehend is not tosanction or even to empathize. To takeinnocent life to achieve a goal is the hallmarkof the most extreme secular utilitarian ethic,and stands at the opposite pole of theabsolute moral constraints required byreligion.

There was a time, not long ago, when the‘ultras’ were few, forming only a tiny wart onthe face of the worldwide attempt to revivifyIslam. Sadly, we can no longer enjoy theluxury of ignoring them. The extreme hasbroadened, and the middle ground, givingway, is everywhere dislocated and confused.And this enfeeblement of the middle ground,was what was enjoined by the Propheticexample, is in turn accelerated by theopprobrium which the extremists bring notsimply upon themselves, but uponcommitted Muslims everywhere. For here, aselsewhere, the preferences of the media workfirmly against us. David Koresh couldbroadcast his fringe Biblical message fromRanch Apocalypse without the image ofChristianity, or even its Adventist wing,being in any way besmirched. But when afringe Islamic group bombs Swedish touristsin Cairo, the muck is instantly spread over‘militant Muslims’ everywhere.

If these things go on, the Islamic movementwill cease to form an authentic summons tocultural and spiritual renewal, and will existas little more than a splintered array ofmaniacal factions. The prospect of such anappalling and humiliating end to the story ofa religion which once surpassed all others inits capacity for tolerating debate and dissentis now a real possibility. The entire experienceof Islamic work over the past fifteen yearshas been one of increasing radicalization,driven by the perceived failure of thetraditional Islamic institutions and the older

THE POTHE POTHE POTHE POTHE POVERVERVERVERVERTY OF FTY OF FTY OF FTY OF FTY OF FANAANAANAANAANATICISMTICISMTICISMTICISMTICISM

by Abdal - Hakim Murad

British convert to Islam, Abdal-Hakim Murad,was born in 1960 in London. He was educatedCambridge University (MA Arabic), and at al-Azhar University, the highest seat of learningin Sunni Islam. He has studied undertraditional Islamic scholars in Cairo andJeddah, including Shaykh Ahmad Mashhur al-Haddad, and Shaykh Ismail al-Adawi. Abdal-Hakim Murad has translated several classicalArabic works, including Imam al-Bayhaqi’s‘Seventy-Seven Branches of Faith’, and‘Selections from the Fath al-Bari’. He is alsothe Trustee and Secretary of The MuslimAcademic Trust and Director of The Anglo-Muslim Fellowship for Eastern Europe.

“The Islamic movement risks ceasing to form an authentic summons to cultural andspiritual renewal, and existing as little more than a splintered array of maniacalfactions. The prospect of such an appalling and humiliating end to the story of areligion which once surpassed all others in its capacity for tolerating debate anddissent is now a real possibility.”

Masjid Khadijah 55

Muslim movements to lead the Muslimpeoples into the worthy but so far chimericalpromised land of the ‘Islamic State.’

If this final catastrophe is to be averted,the mainstream will have to regain theinitiative. But for this to happen, it mustbegin by confessing that the radical critiqueof moderation has its force. The Islamicmovement has so far been remarkablyunsuccessful. We must ask ourselves how itis that a man like Nasser, a butcher, a failedsoldier and a cynical demagogue, could havetaken over a country as pivotal as Egypt,despite the vacuity of his beliefs, while theMuslim Brotherhood, with its pullulatingmillions of members, should have failed, andfailed continuously, for six decades. Theradical accusation of a failure inmethodology cannot fail to strike home insuch a context of dismal and prolongedinadequacy.

It is in this context - startlingly, perhaps,but inescapably - that we must present ourcase for the revival of the spiritual life withinIslam. If it is ever to prosper, the ‘Islamicrevival’ must be made to see that it is in crisis,and that its mental resources are provinginsufficient to meet contemporary needs. Theresponse to this must be grounded in an actof collective muhasaba, of self-examination,in terms that transcend the ideologised neo-Islam of the revivalists, and return to a moreclassical and indigenously Muslimdialectic.

Symptomatic of the disease is the fact thatamong all the explanations offered for thecrisis of the Islamic movement, the onlyauthentically Muslim interpretation, namely,that God should not be lending it His support,is conspicuously absent. It is true that wefrequently hear the Quranic verse whichstates that “God does not change thecondition of a people until they change thecondition of their own selves.” [1] But never,i t seems, is this principle intell igentlygrasped. It is assumed that the sacred text ishere doing no more than to enjoin individualmoral reform as a precondition for collectivesocietal success. Nothing could be morehazardous, however, than to measure suchmoral reform against the yardstick of the fiqhwithout giving concern to whether the

virtues gained have been acquired throughconformity (a relatively simple task), orproceed spontaneously from a genuinerealignment of the soul. The verse is speakingof a spiri tual change, specifically, atransformation of the nafs of the believers -not a moral one. And as the Blessed Prophetnever tired of reminding us, there is little valuein outward conformity to the rules unlessthis conformity is mirrored and engenderedby an authentically righteous disposition ofthe heart. ‘No-one shall enter the Garden byhis works,’ as he expressed it. Meanwhile,the profoundly judgmental and works -oriented tenor of modern revivalist Islam (wemust shun the problematic buzz-word‘fundamentalism’), f ixated on visiblemanifestations of morality, has failed toaddress the underlying question of whatrevelation is for. For i t is theologicalnonsense to suggest that God’s final concernis with our ability to conform to a complexset of rules. His concern is rather that weshould be restored, through our labours andHis grace, to that state of purity andequilibrium with which we were born. Therules are a vital means to that end, and arefacilitated by it. But they do not take itsplace.

To make this point, the Holy Quran deploysa striking metaphor. In Sura Ibrahim, verses24 to 26, we read:

Have you not seen how God coineth alikeness: a goodly word like a goodly tree,the root whereof is set firm, its branch in theheaven? It bringeth forth its fruit at everytime, by the leave of its Lord. Thus doth Godcoin likenesses for men, that perhaps theymay reflect. And the likeness of an evil wordis that of an evil tree that hath been torn upby the root from upon the earth, possessedof no stability.

According to the scholars of tafsir(exegesis), the reference here is to the‘words’ (kalima) of faith and unfaith. Theformer is illustrated as a natural growth,whose florescence of moral and intellectualachievement is nourished by firm roots,which in turn denote the basis of faith: thequality of the proofs one has received, andthe certainty and sound awareness of Godwhich alone signify that one is f irmly

56 Masjid Khadijah

grounded in the reality of existence. Thefruits thus yielded - the palpable benefits ofthe religious life - are permanent (‘at everytime’), and are not man’s ownaccomplishment, for they only come ‘by theleave of its Lord’. Thus is the sound life offaith. The contrast is then drawn with theonly alternative: kufr, which is not groundedin reali ty but in i l lusion, and is hence‘possessed of no stability’.[2]

This passage, reminiscent of some of thebinary categorisations of human typespresented early on in Surat al-Baqara ,precisely encapsulates the relationshipbetween faith and works, the hierarchy whichexists between them, and the sustainablebalance between nourishment and fructition,between taking and giving, which true faithmust maintain.

It is against this criterion that we mustjudge the quality of contemporary ‘activist’styles of faith. Is the young ‘ultra’, with hisintense rage which can sometimes render himliable to nervous disorders, and his fixationon a relatively narrow range of issues andconcerns, really firmly rooted, and fruitful,in the sense described by this Quranicimage?

Let me point to the answer with an exampledrawn from my own experience.

I used to know, quite well, a leader of theradical ‘Islamic’ group, the Jama’at Islamiya,at the Egyptian university of Assiut. Hisname was Hamdi. He grew a luxuriant beard,was constantly scrubbing his teeth with hismiswak, and spent his time preaching hatredof the Coptic Christians, a number of whomwere actually attacked and beaten up as aresult of his khutbas. He had hundreds offollowers; in fact, Assiut today remains acitadel of hardline, Wahhabi-style activism.

The moral of the story is that some fiveyears after this acquaintance, providenceagain brought me face to face with ShaikhHamdi. This time, chancing to see him on aCairo street, I almost failed to recognise him.The beard was gone. He was in trousers anda sweater. More astonishing still was that hewas walking with a young Western girl whoturned out to be an Australian, whom, as hesheepishly explained to me, he was intendingto marry. I talked to him, and it became clear

that he was no longer even a minimallyobservant Muslim, no longer prayed, andthat his ambition in life was to leave Egypt,live in Australia, and make money. What wasextraordinary was that his experiences inIslamic activism had made no impression onhim - he was once again the same distracted,ordinary Egyptian youth he had been beforehis conversion to ‘radical Islam’.

This phenomenon, which we might label‘salafi burnout’, is a recognised feature ofmany modern Muslim cultures. An initialenthusiasm, gained usually in one’s earlytwenties, loses steam some seven to tenyears later. Prison and torture - the frequentlot of the Islamic radical - may serve toprolong commitment, but ult imately, amajority of these neo-Muslims relapse,seemingly no better or worse for theirexperience in the cult-like universe of thesalafi mindset.

This ephemerality of extremist activismshould be as suspicious as i ts content.Authentic Muslim faith is simply notsupposed to be this fragile; as the Qur’ansays, its root is meant to be ‘set firm’. Onehas to conclude that of the two treesdepicted in the Quranic image, salafiextremism resembles the second rather thanthe first. After all, the Sahaba were not knownfor a transient commitment: their devotionand piety remained incomparably pure untilthey died.

What attracts young Muslims to this typeof ephemeral but ferocious activism? Onedoes not have to subscribe to deterministsocial theories to realise the importance ofthe almost universal condition of insecuritywhich Muslim societies are nowexperiencing. The Islamic world is passingthrough a most devastating period oftransit ion. A history of economic andscientific change which in Europe took fivehundred years, is, in the Muslim world, beingsqueezed into a couple of generations. Forinstance, only thirty-five years ago thecapital of Saudi Arabia was a cluster of mudhuts, as it had been for thousands of years.Today’s Riyadh is a hi-tech megacity of glasstowers, Coke machines, and glidingCadillacs. This is an extreme case, but tosome extent the dislocations of modernity

Masjid Khadijah 57

are common to every Muslim society,excepting, perhaps, a handful of the mostremote tribal peoples.

Such a transition period, with its centrifugalforces which allow nothing to remainconstant, makes human beings veryinsecure. They look around for somethingto hold onto, that will give them an identity.In our case, that something is usually Islam.And because they are being propelled intoit by this psychic sense of insecurity, ratherthan by the more normal processes ofconversion and faith, they lack some of thenatural religious virtues, which are acquiredby contact with a continuous tradition, andcan never be learnt from a book.

One easily visualises how this works. Ayoung Arab, part of an oversized family,competing for scarce jobs, unable to marrybecause he is poor, perhaps a migrant to arapidly expanding city, feels like a man lostin a desert without signposts. One morninghe picks up a copy of Sayyid Qutb from anewsstand, and is ‘born-again’ on the spot.This is what he needed: instant certainty, aframework in which to interpret thelandscape before him, to resolve theproblems and tensions of his life, and, evenmore deliciously, a way of feeling superiorand in control. He joins a group, and, anxiousto retain his newfound certainty, accepts theusual proposition that all the other groupsare mistaken.

This, of course, is not how Muslimreligious conversion is supposed to work. Itis meant to be a process of intellectualmaturation, triggered by the presence of avery holy person or place. Tawba, in itstraditional form, yields an outlook of joy,contentment, and a deep affection for others.The modern type of tawba, however, born ofinsecurity, often makes Muslims narrow,intolerant, and exclusivist . Even morenoticeably, it produces people whose faithis, despite its apparent intensity, liable tovanish as suddenly as it came. Deprived ofreal nourishment, the activist’s soul can onlygrow hungry and emaciated, until at last itdies.

THE ACTIVISM WITHINTHE ACTIVISM WITHINTHE ACTIVISM WITHINTHE ACTIVISM WITHINTHE ACTIVISM WITHINHow should we respond to this disorder?

We must begin by remembering what Islam

is for. As we noted earlier, our din is not,ultimately, a manual of rules which, whenmeticulously followed, becomes a passportto paradise. Instead, it is a package of social,intellectual and spiritual technology whosepurpose is to cleanse the human heart. Inthe Qur’an, the Lord says that on the Day ofJudgement, nothing will be of any use to us,except a sound heart (qalbun salim). [3] Andin a famous hadith, the Prophet, upon whombe blessings and peace, says that

“Verily in the body there is a piece of flesh.If it is sound, the body is all sound. If it iscorrupt, the body is all corrupt. Verily, it isthe heart.

Mindful of this commandment, under whichall the other commandments of Islam aresubsumed, and which alone gives themmeaning, the Islamic scholars have workedout a science, an ilm (science), of analysingthe ‘states’ of the heart, and the methods ofbringing it into this condition of soundness.In the fullness of time, this science acquiredthe name tasawwuf, in English ‘Sufism’ - atraditional label for what we might nowadaysmore intelligibly call ‘Islamic psychology.’

At this point, many hackles are raised andwell-rehearsed objections voiced. It is vitalto understand that mainstream Sufism is not,and never has been, a doctrinal system, or aschool of thought - a madhhab. It is, instead,a set of insights and practices which operatewithin the various Islamic madhhabs; in otherwords, it is not a madhhab, it is an ilm. Andlike most of the other Islamic ulum, it wasnot known by name, or in its later developedform, in the age of the Prophet (upon him be

“Verily in the body there

is a piece of flesh. If it is

sound, the body is all

sound. If it is corrupt,

the body is all corrupt.

Verily, it is the heart.”

58 Masjid Khadijah

blessings and peace) orhis Companions. Thisdoes not make it lesslegitimate. There aremany Islamic scienceswhich only took shapemany years after theProphetic age: usul al-fiqh, for instance, or theinnumerable technicaldisciplines of hadith.

Now this, of course,leads us into the oftenmisunderstood area ofsunna and bid’a, twonotions which arewielded as bluntinstruments by manycontemporary activists,but which are oftengrossly misunderstood.The classic Orientalistthesis is of course thatIslam, as an ‘arid Semiticreligion’, failed toi n c o r p o r a t emechanisms for its owndevelopment, and that it petrified upon thedeath of its founder. This, however, is anonsense rooted in the ethnic determinismof the nineteenth century historians who hadshaped the views of the early Orientalistsynthesizers (Muir, Le Bon, Renan, Caetani).Islam, as the religion designed for the end oftime, has in fact proved itself eminentlyadaptable to the rapidly changing conditionswhich characterise this final and most‘entropic’ stage of history.

What is a bid’a, according to the classicaldefinitions of Islamic law? We all know thefamous hadith:

Beware of matters newly begun, for everymatter newly begun is innovation, everyinnovation is misguidance, and everymisguidance is in Hell. [4]

Does this mean that everything introducedinto Islam that was not known to the firstgeneration of Muslims is to be rejected? Theclassical ulema do not accept such aliteralistic interpretation.

Let us take a definition from Imam al-Shafi’i,an authority universally accepted in SunniIslam. Imam al-Shafi’i writes:

There are two kinds of introduced matters(muhdathat). One is that which contradictsa text of the Qur’an, or the Sunna, or a reportfrom the early Muslims (athar) , or theconsensus (ijma’) of the Muslims: this is an‘innovation of misguidance’ (bid’at dalala).The second kind is that which is in itselfgood and entails no contradiction of any ofthese authorit ies: this is a ‘non-reprehensible innovation’ (bid’a ghayrmadhmuma). [5]

This basic distinction between acceptableand unacceptable forms of bid’a isrecognised by the overwhelming majority ofclassical ulema. Among some, for instanceal-Izz ibn Abd al-Salam (one of the half-dozenor so great mujtahids of Islamic history),innovations fall under the five axiologicalheadings of the Shari’a: the obligatory(wajib), the recommended (mandub), thepermissible (mubah), the offensive (makruh),and the forbidden (haram).[6]

“Are those equal, those who know andthose who do not know?” QURAN 39

Masjid Khadijah 59

Under the category of ‘obligatoryinnovation’, Ibn Abd al-Salam gives thefollowing examples: recording the Qur’anand the laws of Islam in writing at a timewhen it was feared that they would be lost,studying Arabic grammar in order to resolvecontroversies over the Qur’an, anddeveloping philosophical theology (kalam)to refute the claims of the Mu’tazilites.

Category two is ‘recommendedinnovation’. Under this heading the ulemalist such activities as building madrasas,writing books on beneficial Islamic subjects,and in-depth studies of Arabic linguistics.

Category three is ‘permissible’, or ‘neutralinnovation’, including worldly activities suchas sifting flour, and constructing houses invarious styles not known in Medina.

Category four is the ‘reprehensibleinnovation’. This includes suchmisdemeanours as overdecorating mosquesor the Qur’an.

Category five is the ‘forbiddeninnovation’. This includes unlawful taxes,giving judgeships to those unqualified tohold them, and sectarian beliefs and practicesthat explicit ly contravene the knownprinciples of the Qur’an and the Sunna.

The above classification of bid’a types isnormal in classical Shari’a literature, beingaccepted by the four schools of orthodoxfiqh. There have been only two significantexceptions to this understanding in thehistory of Islamic thought: the Zahiri schoolas articulated by Ibn Hazm, and one wing ofthe Hanbali madhhab, represented by IbnTaymiya, who goes against the classical ijma’on this issue, and claims that all forms ofinnovation, good or bad, are un-Islamic.

Why is it, then, that so many Muslims nowbelieve that innovation in any form isunacceptable in Islam? One factor hasalready been touched on: the mentalcomplexes thrown up by insecurity, whichincline people to find comfort in absolutistand literalist interpretations. Another lies inthe influence of the well-financed neo-Hanbali madhhab called Wahhabism, whoseleaders are famous for their rejection of allpossibility of development.

In any case, armed with this moresophisticated and classical awareness of

Islam’s ability to acknowledge and assimilatenovelty, we can understand how Muslimcivilisation was able so quickly to producenovel academic disciplines to deal with newproblems as these arose.

Islamic psychology is characteristic of thenew ulum which, although present in latentand implicit form in the Quran, were firstsystematized in Islamic culture during theearly Abbasid period. Given the importancethat the Quran attaches to obtaining a‘sound heart’, we are not surprised to findthat the influence of Islamic psychology hasbeen massive and all-pervasive. In theformative first four centuries of Islam, thetime when the great works of tafsir, hadith,grammar, and so forth were laid down, theulema also applied their minds to this problemof al-qalb al-salim. This was first visiblewhen, following the example of the Tabi’in,many of the early ascetics, such as Sufyanibn Uyayna, Sufyan al-Thawri, and Abdallahibn al-Mubarak, had focussed their concernsexplicitly on the art of purifying the heart.The methods they recommended werefrequent fasting and night prayer, periodicretreats, and a preoccupation with murabata:service as volunteer fighters in the bordercastles of Asia Minor.

This type of pietist orientation was not inthe least systematic during this period. Itwas a loose category embracing all Muslimswho sought salvation through the Propheticvirtues of renunciation, sincerity, and deepdevotion to the revelation. These men andwomen were variously referred to as al-bakka’un: ‘the weepers’, because of their fearof the Day of Judgement, or as zuhhad,ascetics, or ubbad, ‘unceasingworshippers’.

By the third century, however, we start tofind writings which can be understood asbelonging to a distinct devotional school.The increasing luxury and materialism ofAbbasid urban society spurred manyMuslims to campaign for a restoration of thesimplicity of the Prophetic age. Purity ofheart, compassion for others, and a constantrecollection of God were the defining featuresof this trend. We find references to themethod of muhasaba: self-examination to

60 Masjid Khadijah

detect impurities of intention. Also stressedwas riyada: self-discipline.

By this time, too, the main outlines ofQuranic psychology had been worked out.The human creature, it was realised, wasmade up of four constituent parts: the body(jism), the mind (aql), the spirit (ruh), and theself (nafs). The first two need little comment.Less familiar (at least to people of a moderneducation) are the third and fourthcategories.

The spiri t is the ruh, that underlyingessence of the human individual whichsurvives death. It is hard to comprehendrationally, being in part of Divine inspiration,as the Quran says:

“And they ask you about the spirit; say,the spirit is of the command of my Lord. Andyou have been given of knowledge only alittle.”[7]

According to the early Islamicpsychologists, the ruh is a non-materialreality which pervades the entire humanbody, but is centred on the heart, the qalb. Itrepresents that part of man which is not ofthis world, and which connects him with hisCreator, and which, if he is fortunate, enableshim to see God in the next world. When weare born, this ruh is intact and pure. As weare initiated into the distractions of theworld, however, it is covered over with the‘rust’ (ran) of which the Quran speaks. Thisrust is made up of two things: sin anddistraction. When, through the process ofself-discipline, these are banished, so thatthe worshipper is preserved from sin and isfocussing entirely on the immediate presenceand reality of God, the rust is dissolved, andthe ruh once again is free. The heart is sound;and salvation, and closeness to God, areachieved.

This sounds simple enough. However, theearly Muslims taught that such preciousthings come only at an appropriate price.Cleaning up the Augean stables of the heartis a most excruciating challenge. Outwardconformity to the rules of religion is simpleenough; but it is only the first step. Muchmore demanding is the policy known asmujahada: the daily combat against the lowerself, the nafs. As the Quran says:

‘As for him that fears the standing beforehis Lord, and forbids his nafs its desires, forhim, Heaven shall be his place of resort.’[8]

Hence the Sufi commandment: ‘Slaughter your ego with the knives of

mujahada.’ [9] Once the nafs is controlled, then the heart

is clear, and the virtues proceed from it easilyand naturally.

Because its objective is nothing less thansalvation, this vital Islamic science has beenconsistently expounded by the greatscholars of classical Islam. While today thereare many Muslims, influenced by eitherWahhabi or Orientalist agendas, who believethat Sufism has always led a somewhatmarginal existence in Islam, the reality is thatthe overwhelming majority of the classicalscholars were actively involved in Sufism.

The early Shafi’i scholars of Khurasan: al-Hakim al-Nisaburi, Ibn Furak, al-Qushayriand al-Bayhaqi, were all Sufis who formedlinks in the richest academic tradition ofAbbasid Islam, which culminated in theachievement of Imam Hujjat al-Islam al-Ghazali. Ghazali himself, author of some threehundred books, including the definitiverebuttals of Arab philosophy and theIsmailis, three large textbooks of Shafi’i fiqh,the best-known tract of usul al-fiqh, twoworks on logic, and several theologicaltreatises, also left us with the classicstatement of orthodox Sufism: the Ihya Ulumal-Din, a book of which Imam Nawawiremarked:

“Were the books of Islam all to be lost,excepting only the Ihya’, it would suffice toreplace them all.” [10]

Imam Nawawi himself wrote two bookswhich record his debt to Sufism, one calledthe Bustan al-Arifin (‘Garden of theGnostics’, and another called the al-Maqasid(recently published in English translation,Sunna Books, Evanston Il. trans. Nuh HaMim Keller).

Among the Malikis, too, Sufism waspopular. Al-Sawi, al-Dardir, al-Laqqani andAbd al-Wahhab al-Baghdadi were allexponents of Sufism. The Maliki jurist ofCairo, Abd al-Wahhab al-Sha’rani definesSufism as follows:

Masjid Khadijah 61

‘The path of the Sufis is built on the Quranand the Sunna, and is based on l ivingaccording to the morals of the prophets andthe purified ones. It may not be blamed,unless it violates an explicit statement fromthe Quran, sunna, or ijma. If it does notcontravene any of these sources, then nopretext remains for condemning it, exceptone’s own low opinion of others, orinterpreting what they do as ostentation,which is unlawful. No-one denies the statesof the Sufis except someone ignorant of theway they are.’[11]

For Hanbali Sufism one has to look nofurther than the revered figures of AbdallahAnsari, Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, Ibn al-Jawzi,and Ibn Rajab.

In fact, virtually all the great luminaries ofmedieval Islam: al-Suyuti, Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, al-Ayni, Ibn Khaldun, al-Subki, IbnHajar al-Haytami; tafsir writers like Baydawi,al-Sawi, Abu’l-Su’ud, al-Baghawi, and IbnKathir[12] ; aqida writers such as Taftazani,al-Nasafi, al-Razi: all wrote in support ofSufism. Many, indeed, composedindependent works of Sufi inspiration. Theulema of the great dynasties of Islamichistory, including the Ottomans and theMoghuls, were deeply infused with the Sufioutlook, regarding it as one of the mostcentral and indispensable of Islamicsciences.

Further confirmation of the Islamiclegitimacy of Sufism is supplied by the

enthusiasm of its exponents for carryingIslam beyond the boundaries of the Islamicworld. The Islamization process in India,Black Africa, and South-East Asia was carriedout largely at the hands of wandering Sufiteachers. Likewise, the Islamic obligation ofjihad has been borne with especial zeal bythe Sufi orders. All the great nineteenthcentury j ihadists: Uthman dan Fodio(Hausaland), al-Sanousi (Libya), Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza’iri (Algeria), Imam Shamil(Daghestan) and the leaders of the PadreRebellion (Sumatra) were active practitionersof Sufism, writing extensively on it while ontheir campaigns. Nothing is further fromreality, in fact, than the claim that Sufismrepresents a quietist and non-militant formof Islam.

With all this, we confront a paradox. Whyis it, if Sufism has been so respected a partof Muslim intellectual and political lifethroughout our history, that there are,nowadays, angry voices raised against it?There are two fundamental reasons here.

Firstly, there is again the pervasiveinfluence of Orientalist scholarship, which,at least before 1922 when Massignon wrotehis Essai sur les origines de la lexiquetechnique, was of the opinion that somethingso fertile and profound as Sufism could neverhave grown from the essentially ‘barren andlegalistic’ soil of Islam. Orientalist workstranslated into Muslim languages wereinfluential upon key Muslim modernists -

For Ibn Taymiya himself, although critical of the excesses of certainSufi groups, had been committed to a branch of mainstream Sufism.

This is clear, for instance, in Ibn Taymiya’s work Sharh Futuhal-Ghayb, a commentary on some technical points in the Revelationsof the Unseen, a key work by the sixth-century saint of Baghdad, Abdal-Qadir al-Jilani. Throughout the work Ibn Taymiya shows himself to

be a loyal disciple of al-Jilani, whom he always refers to asshaykhuna (‘our teacher’). This Qadiri affiliation is confirmed in thelater literature of the Qadiri tariqa, which records Ibn Taymiya as akey link in the silsila, the chain of transmission of Qadiri teachings.

62 Masjid Khadijah

such as Muhammad Abduh in his laterwrit ings - who began to question thecentrality, or even the legitimacy, of Sufidiscourse in Islam.

Secondly, there is the emergence of theWahhabi da’wa. When Muhammad ibn Abdal-Wahhab, some two hundred years ago,teamed up with the Saudi tribe and attackedthe neighbouring clans, he was doing sounder the sign of an essentially neo-Kharijiteversion of Islam. Although he invoked IbnTaymiya, he had reservations even abouthim. For Ibn Taymiya himself, althoughcritical of the excesses of certain Sufi groups,had been committed to a branch ofmainstream Sufism. This is clear, for instance,in Ibn Taymiya’s work Sharh Futuh al-Ghayb,a commentary on some technical points inthe Revelations of the Unseen, a key workby the sixth-century saint of Baghdad, Abdal-Qadir al-Jilani. Throughout the work Ibn

Taymiya shows himself to be a loyal discipleof al-Jilani, whom he always refers to asshaykhuna (‘our teacher’). This Qadiriaffiliation is confirmed in the later literatureof the Qadiri tariqa, which records IbnTaymiya as a key link in the silsila, the chainof transmission of Qadiri teachings.[13]

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, however, went farbeyond this. Raised in the wastelands of Najdin Central Arabia, he had little access tomainstream Muslim scholarship. In fact, whenhis da’wa appeared and became notorious,the scholars and muftis of the day applied toit the famous Hadith of Najd:

Ibn Umar reported the Prophet (upon whombe blessings and peace) as saying: “Oh God,bless us in our Syria; O God, bless us in ourYemen.” Those present said: “And in ourNajd, O Messenger of God!” but he said, “OGod, bless us in our Syria; O God, bless usin our Yemen.” Those present said, “And in

Masjid Khadijah 63

our Najd, O Messenger of God!”. Ibn Umarsaid that he thought that he said on the thirdoccasion: “Earthquakes and dissensions(fitna) are there, and there shall arise the hornof the devil.”[14]

And it is significant that almost uniquelyamong the lands of Islam, Najd has neverproduced scholars of any repute.

The Najd-based da’wa of the Wahhabis,however, began to be heard more loudlyfollowing the explosion of Saudi oil wealth.Many, even most, Islamic publishing housesin Cairo and Beirut are now subsidised byWahhabi organisations, which prevent themfrom publishing traditional works on Sufism,and remove passages in other worksconsidered unacceptable to Wahhabistdoctrine.

The neo-Kharijite nature of Wahhabismmakes it intolerant of all other forms ofIslamic expression. However, because it hasno coherent fiqh of its own - it rejects theorthodox madhhabs - and has only the mostbasic and primitively anthropomorphic aqida,i t has a fluid, amoebalike tendency toproduce divisions and subdivisions amongthose who profess it. No longer are theIslamic groups essentially united by aconsistent madhhab and the Ash’ari [orMaturidi] aqida. Instead, they are all tryingto derive the shari’a and the aqida from theQuran and the Sunna by themselves. Theresult is the appalling state of division andconflict which disfigures the modern salaficondition.

At this critical moment in our history, theumma has only one realistic hope for survival,and that is to restore the ‘middle way’,defined by that sophisticated classicalconsensus which was worked out overpainful centuries of debate and scholarship.That consensus alone has the demonstrableability to provide a basis for unity. But it canonly be retrieved when we improve the stateof our hearts, and fill them with the Islamicvirtues of affection, respect, tolerance andreconciliation. This inner reform, which is thetraditional competence of Sufism, is aprecondition for the restoration of unity inthe Islamic movement. The alternative islikely to be continued, and agonising, failure.

N O T E SN O T E SN O T E SN O T E SN O T E S1. Sura 13:11. 2. For a further analysis of this passage, seeHabib Ahmad Mashhur al-Haddad, Key tothe Garden (Quilliam Press, London 1990CE), 78-81. 3. Sura 26:89. The archetype is Abrahamic:see Sura 37:84. 4. This hadith is in fact an instance of takhsisal-amm: a frequent procedure of usul al-fiqhby which an apparently unqualif iedstatement is qualif ied to avoid thecontradiction of another necessaryprinciple. See Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri,Reliance of the Traveller, tr. Nuh Ha MimKeller (Abu Dhabi, 1991 CE), 907-8 forsome further examples. 5. Ibn Asakir, Tabyin Kadhib al-Muftari(Damascus, 1347), 97. 6. Cited in Muhammad al-Jurdani, al-Jawahir al-lu’lu’iyya fi sharh al-Arba’in al-Nawawiya (Damascus, 1328), 220-1. 7. 17:85. 8. 79:40. 9. al-Qushayri, al-Risala (Cairo, n.d.), I,393. 10. al-Zabidi, Ithaf al-sada al-muttaqin(Cairo, 1311), I, 27. 11. Sha’rani, al-Tabaqat al-Kubra (Cairo,1374), I, 4. 12. It is true that Ibn Kathir in his Bidaya iscritical of some later Sufis. Nonetheless, inhis Mawlid, which he asked his pupils torecite on the occasion of the BlessedProphet’s birthday each year, he makes hispersonal debt to a conservative and soberSufism quite clear. 13. See G. Makdisi’s article ‘Ibn Taymiyya:A Sufi of the Qadiriya Order’ in theAmerican Journal of Arabic Studies, 1973. 14. Narrated by Bukhari. The translation isfrom J. Robson, Mishkat al-Masabih(Lahore, 1970), II, 1380.

http://www.islamfortoday.com/murad02.htm

64 Masjid Khadijah

Southeast Asia, more than any otherregion in the Muslim world, is knownfor an extraordinarily moderate and

tolerant approach to the practice of religion.This is a region where several of the world’smajor civil izations and religious haveconverged, and where Muslims and othershave co-existed with other religious andcultural traditions in a way that makesSoutheast Asia stands as an example to otherregions of the world. Nevertheless, it is alsotrue that over the past decades, andaccelerating in recent years, there has beena process of radicalization of the Muslimcommunities of Southeast Asia, which, if leftunchecked, could lead to the loss, or at leastthe attenuation of this valuable tradition ofmoderation and tolerance in religion.

Conceptual Framework forConceptual Framework forConceptual Framework forConceptual Framework forConceptual Framework forthe Analysis of Radicalizationthe Analysis of Radicalizationthe Analysis of Radicalizationthe Analysis of Radicalizationthe Analysis of Radicalization

Before proceeding with the analysis of thetrends in the religio-political landscape ofSoutheast Asia and what they mean for thefuture of the region and of the Muslim worldwe need to define our terms, what we meanby radicalization, so that we can have acommon language in addressing this issue. Iwas asked to address the subject of radicaland moderate Islam at a hearing of a

committee of the U.S. House ofRepresentatives last month, and I said at thetime that one of the problems that we havefound in the discourse about Islam is thatthe terms “radical” or “moderate” are oftenused in a subjective and imprecise way,without going through a process of criticallyexamining what these terms mean. Inparticular, it is important to examine therelationship between radicalization andviolence.

I note that the paper that outlines thedesign of this conference names violentextremism and radicalization of Muslimcommunities as the subject or problems thatthis conference is examining. This suggeststhat violent extremism and radicalization areseparate, but related phenomena, that theremay be stages of radicalization that do notincorporate violence but that neverthelesshave the potential to lead individuals toviolence or that have other detrimentaleffects.

This is the view that we have taken in ouranalyses of radicalization in the Muslimworld, that the propensity for violence iscertainly a defining characteristic of the mostextreme segment of the radical spectrum—for instance, in terms of the definition ofjihad as armed struggle and as an individual

The CausesCausesCausesCausesCauses of theRadicalization of theMuslim Communities in

byAngel M. Rabasa, RAND Corporation

Southeast AsiaSoutheast AsiaSoutheast AsiaSoutheast AsiaSoutheast Asia Southeast AsiaSoutheast AsiaSoutheast AsiaSoutheast AsiaSoutheast Asia Southeast AsiaSoutheast AsiaSoutheast AsiaSoutheast AsiaSoutheast Asia

Masjid Khadijah 65

obligation of the same standing as the fivepillars of the religion (the profession of faith,prayer five times daily, zakat or almsgiving,fasting during Ramadan, and the hajj) .However, outside of the violent there is amuch larger universe of radicalfundamentalist or Salafi groups who may notthemselves practice violence, but thatpropagate an ideology that creates theconditions for violence and that issubversive of the values of democraticsocieties.

Therefore, the willingness to use or justifyviolence to attain religious or politicalobjectives is one element of what separatesradical from moderate Muslimsa veryimportant element, but only one elementnonetheless. This is why in our analysis ofpolitico-religious tendencies in the Muslimworld we have taken a broader view of whatconstitutes radical Islam. The analyticalframework that we have developeddifferentiates religious and political currentsaccording to their overarching ideologies;

their preferred forms of government (do theyseek to establish an Islamic state or are theywilling to accept non-sectarian forms ofgovernment?); their polit ical and legalorientation (do they insist on the applicationof Islamic law, or do they accept othersources of law?); their attitudes toward therights of women and religious minorities (dothey deny women equal rights, including theright to political participation? Do theysupport the education and advancement ofwomen? Would they allow freedom ofworship?).

The radical groups may not advocateviolence, but they would registersignificantly lower levels of tolerance. AsDonald Emmerson has noted,1 their lowertolerance may then lower these Muslims’reluctance to acquiesce or even take part inthe use violence for Islamist ends. In thisway, organizations such as the Hizb ut-Tahrirhave been identified as a gateway toterrorism. In our own studies of radicalrecruitment in the Middle East, we found that

66 Masjid Khadijah

individuals recruited into Salafi or MuslimBrotherhood groups decide at some pointthat their mentors are not Islamic enoughand move on to even more extreme andviolent groups. This progression fromreligious radicalism to violent extremism ismade possible by the absence of firewallsbetween mainstream Islam and radicals andviolent extremists. Violent extremists canderive scriptural justifications for theiractions. This is because the elements of theIslamic tradition that could be used to lendsupport to radical interpretations have notyet been anachronized. Therefore, if the goalis to turn the ideological tide, modernizingIslamic teachings on jihad is an area whereprogressive theological work is needed.

1 Donald K. Emmerson, “Islam, Muslims,and Violence: The Useful Diversity of‘Islamism,’” Paper prepared for SpecialSession on “Islam and Political Violence,”Annual Convention of the Middle EastStudies Association, November 20-23, 2004(draft).

2 International Crisis Group (ICG), “JemaahIslamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged butStill Dangerous,” ICG Asia Report No. 63,Jakarta/Brussels: August 26, 2003, p. 6.

3 “Saudis Quietly Promote Strict Islam inIndonesia,” New York Times, July 5, 2003.

4 Zachary Abuza, “Muslims, Politics, andViolence in Indonesia: An Emerging Jihadist-Islamist Nexus?” NBR Analysis, Vol. 15, No.3, September 2004, p. 31.

Sources of the Radical izat ion ofSources of the Radical izat ion ofSources of the Radical izat ion ofSources of the Radical izat ion ofSources of the Radical izat ion ofMusl im Communi t iesMusl im Communi t iesMusl im Communi t iesMusl im Communi t iesMusl im Communi t ies

in Southeast Asiain Southeast Asiain Southeast Asiain Southeast Asiain Southeast AsiaHaving defined radicalization and the

issues associated with this process in generalterms, we can turn to the Southeast Asianexperience. One of the assumptions statedin the concept paper for this conference isthat violent extremism and the radicalizationof the Muslim communities are recentphenomena. This is true, for the reasonsthat I suggested at the beginning of thispresentation, but there have been somehistorical deviations from the norm. As theIndonesian participants here know, the Padrimovement in Sumatra in the 1820s and 1830sinvolved an effort to introduce Wahhabism,

sometimes using forceful methods, bypreachers who had returned from Mecca andhad been influenced by Wahhabi teachingsduring the al-Sauds’ first occupation of thecity at the beginning of the nineteenthcentury.

With this exception, and of the uprisingsagainst the colonial powers that combinedethnic and religious factors, the only majorIslamist revolt in the modern history ofSoutheast Asia was the Darul Islam rebellionfrom 1949 to 1962. The Darul Islam experienceis important because i t is one of thefountainheads of the regional terroristmovement that goes by the name of JemaahIslamiyah, which seems to me amisappropriation of a perfectly respectablename, but this precisely one of the tactics ofthe extremists, which is to cloak themselvesin the language of religion.

As Sidney Jones has pointed out in heranalyses of the origins of Islamist terroristin Indonesia, Abdullah Sungkar, the co-founder of Jemaah Islamiyah, served as anofficer in Darul Islam leader Kartosuwirjo’sIslamic Army of Indonesia and Abu BakarBa’asyir, although he did not participate inthe rebellion, accepted the Darul Islam’sideological agenda.2 Individuals fromfamilies with a Darul Islam backgroundscontinue to play an important role interrorism in Indonesia. The point here is thatwhile external factors provided the catalystfor radicalization and violent extremism inSoutheast Asia, these phenomena haveinternal sources as well.

Nevertheless, while the seeds ofradicalization in Southeast Asia were alreadythere, this process was catalyzed by theworldwide Islamic revival in its Salafi andWahhabi manifestations there is nothingwrong with religious piety per se and by theinflux of money and ideologies from theMiddle East, which has allowed extremistgroups to expand their activities and to makeinroads Southeast Asian educational andsocial welfare networks.

First, the effects of the worldwide Islamicresurgence. This is a complex phenomenonthat reflects the stresses of traditionalsocieties and of individuals within thesesocieties as they seek to adjust to or cope

Masjid Khadijah 67

with rapid societal change. In its Salafimanifestations, this process involves arejection of modernity and an effort to returnto an imagined past. Chandra Muzaffardescribes the manifestations of thisphenomenon in his important study, IslamicResurgence in Malaysia. These include,among other things, greater insistence onthe outward manifestations of piety such asthe wearing of Islamic garb, greater socialdistance between the sexes, intolerance ofun-Islamic public behavior such asconsumption of alcohol at publicaccommodations, and exclusive, identity-driven politics.

In non-Arab countries, this process hasinvolved the displacement of indigenousculture by religious and social practices fromthe Middle East what the distinguishedIndonesian scholar Azyumardi Azra, whomwe are fortunate to have in this conference,has referred to as Arabization. Thisimportation of social, political and culturalpatterns from the Middle East has had apolarizing impact on Islam in Southeast Asia,

where the cultural context is quite differentand not always consistent with that in theArab world.

Second, the export of Saudi money andideology. Radicalization throughout theMuslim world has been driven by anaggressive proselytizing campaign, directedand funded by the Saudis, in countries fromBosnia to the Philippines. The Saudis fundedmosques, schools, and Islamic social welfareorganizations that, in countries such asPakistan, filled the void left by ineffectual ornon-existent state institutions. As in the restof the Muslim world, the influx of Saudimoney and ideology has been an importantengine of radicalization in Southeast Asia.In the early 1990s Mohammed Jamal Khalifa,Osama bin Laden’s brother–in-law and agentin the Philippines, became the regionaldirector of the Saudi-based charityInternational Islamic Relief Organization(IIRO), which he used as a cover for al-Qaedaoperations there. The Indonesian extremistAgus Dwikarna, who is in prison in thePhilippines on terrorism charges, was the

Recruitment methodologies vary: in

universities, for instance, the process

involves Quranic study groups or circles

where members gradually internalize the

ideology of the group. This has been the

specialty of the PKS in Indonesia.

68 Masjid Khadijah

regional head of the al-Haramain Foundation,which was listed by the United Nations in2004 as an organization with links to al-Qaeda.

The mechanics of Saudi funding ofactivities in Southeast Asia was throughinstitutional or personal links that Saudidonors established with ideologicallycompatible organizations or individuals inSoutheast Asia to whom they channeledfunds and scholarships for study at Saudiuniversities. For instance, beginning in the1970s the Rabithat al-Alam al-Islami (WorldMuslim League) funded programs run by theDewan Dakwah Islam Indonesias (DDII).The Religious Affairs Officer in Saudiembassies abroad is a channel for directSaudi propagation of Wahhabi ideology. Forinstance, the Saudi office in Jakarta financesthe translation of about one million books ayear from Arabic to Bahasa Indonesia andoffers scholarships to Indonesian studentsfor study in Saudi universities.3

Third, the consequences of the Afghan war.The war against the Soviets in Afghanistanattracted militants from all over the Muslimworld. The war not only served as the trainingground for many of today’s terrorists andradicals, but it provided the context for thecreation of the transnational networks thatserved as the foundation for al-Qaeda andits associated groups. About a thousandSoutheast Asians are estimated to haveparticipated in training or combat inAfghanistan. Of greater consequence, manyof the leaders of extremist organizations hadexperience in Afghanistan, for instance:former Jemaah Islamiyah leaders Hambali andAbu Jibril, the late Fathur Rahman al-Ghoziand Zulkarnaen; former Laskar Jihad leaderJa’afar Umar Thalib; and Abu Sayyaf Groupfounder Abdurajak Janjalani, among others.

Fourth, there is an organizational basis forthe spread of radical ideologies. Radicals byand large are a minority, but in many areasthey hold the advantage because they havedeveloped extensive networks spanning theMuslim world and sometimes reachingbeyond it. Hizb ut-Tahrir, for instance, is aninternational organization, and many of theSoutheast Asian Salafi groups have intimateties to their mentors, funders and

counterparts in the Middle East. Liberal andmoderate Muslims, although a majority inalmost all countries, have not created similarnetworks, although efforts are nowbeginning to be made, by some of the peoplepresent in this room, to network togethermoderate Muslim organizations in SoutheastAsian—an effort that perhaps could beexpanded on a global scale.

Fifth, another reason for the spread ofradical Islamist groups is their aggressiveand sophisticated recruitment techniques.The targets are separate potential pools ofrecruits, each requiring different methodsand venues for recruitment. The keyrecruitment nodes are mosques and Islamicstudy circles; schools, universities, andyouth organizations; health and welfareorganizations, including charities; and othersocial clusters. Recruitment methodologiesvary: in universit ies, for instance, theprocess involves Quranic study groups orcircles where members gradually internalizethe ideology of the group. This has been thespecialty of the PKS in Indonesia. Ineconomically and socially marginalizeddistricts, recruits might be willing to join theextremist group as an avenue of escape fromboredom or unemployment. Laskar Jihadrecruited among the poorest and lesseducated segments of the population,especially the young rootless urban poor.

Sixth, I should mention that violence itselfplays a central role in recruitment.International jihadists have become involvedin conflicts from Chechnya and Kashmir toMaluku and Poso, ostensibly to helpbeleaguered Muslims in these regions, butalso to gain credibility among some sectorsof the broader Muslim communities andespecially among the young people that theyhope to entice into joining. We see, forinstance, that the playing of sometimes verygraphic tapes of the armed jihad has a centralrole in recruitment events. But these localjihads also provide new members with a “riteof passage” which is the functionalequivalent of the previous generation’sexperience in Afghanistan Beyond that, itcould be that from the jihadist standpoint,violence is its own justification. Accordingto Zachary Abuza, the concept of purifying

Masjid Khadijah 69

violence is central to the JI ideology.Religious violence is seen as an act ofcleansing of sins, particularly important inthe case of JI members who were formerlycriminals and are seeking redemption.4

Factors Specific to Southeast AsiaFactors Specific to Southeast AsiaFactors Specific to Southeast AsiaFactors Specific to Southeast AsiaFactors Specific to Southeast AsiaI have outlined above some of the general

conditions and processes that havecontributed to the radicalization of Muslimcommunities in Southeast Asia. There are,of course, factors that are specific toSoutheast Asia. These domestic factorsinteracted with broader external trends toproduce greater militancy in the region. InIndonesia, the principal dynamic was theweakening of state authority after thedownfall of President Suharto.

The polit ical disorder also producedtactical alliances between some elite factionsand extremists, which gave the extremistsgreater scope to expand their polit icalinfluence. The result was the appearance ofradical mili t ias and vigilante groups,communal conflict in eastern Indonesia, andeven today, outburst of intolerance such asthe violence or threats of violence againstthe Ahmadiyah sect, Christian churches andUlil Abshar-Abdallah’s Liberal MuslimNetwork.

In the southern Philippines and southernThailand, the potential for radicalization liesin a strong sense of grievance on the part ofthe Muslim populations of these countriestoward the central government that hasmanifested i tself in a longstandinginsurgency in Mindanao—that has entered,however, a stage of what appears to beserious negotiations toward an equitable

settlement—and a situation of escalatingviolence in southern Thailand.

What is to be done?What is to be done?What is to be done?What is to be done?What is to be done?I believe that it is widely understood now

that only Muslims themselves can effectivelychallenge the message of radicals, and thatthe role of those of us who stand outside isto do what we can to empower Muslimmoderates in this ideological struggle. Inoted in my presentation that one of theadvantages of radicals is that they haveextensive networks, while by and largemoderates do not. Therefore, central to thistask is to create a strong internationalnetwork to unite the fractured voices ofmoderate Muslims.

The creation of this network can providemoderates with a platform for their messageand amplify their voices. Southeast Asia isunique in the Muslim world in that there isalready in place a dense structure of moderateMuslim insti tutions. There are massorganizations in Indonesia such as NahdlatulUlama and Muhammadiyah that by and largesubscribe to moderate conceptions of Islam.The Syarif Hidayatullah State IslamicUniversity system comprises, if myinformation is correct, 47 colleges anduniversities with over 100,000 students.Muhammadiyah also has an extensiveuniversity system.

In Malaysia and the Philippines there hasbeen a significant growth of Muslim civilsociety. There are already efforts to underway to network moderate Muslimorganizations in the region; I want to mentionin this regard the work of the InternationalCenter for Islam and Pluralism in Jakarta, andthe Philippine Council for Islam andDemocracy, among others.

These institutions can be instrumental indeveloping and disseminating a moderatenarrative that contradicts the radicalnarrative. So perhaps the turning of the tidecan begin not in the alleged center of theMuslim world, the Middle East, but here, inSoutheast Asia.

I believe that it is widely understoodnow that only Muslims themselves

can effectively challenge themessage of radicals, and that the

role of those of us who stand outsideis to do what we can to empower

Muslim moderates in thisideological struggle.

70 Masjid Khadijah

How radical are Islamist movements?. Thegeneral perception of Islamist movementsin the West ,if not Muslims in general, is

that they are all radicals, in the sense that theyaccept no compromise with whom they believeto be their adversaries and are inclined to useviolence in settling political disagreements withthose who hold other beliefs or support opposedviewpoints. Such perception did exist long beforeevents of September 11 in the US, was reinforcedby recent deadly explosions in Spanish trainsattributed to a group of Muslims mostly of NorthAfrican origins. How far is such an understandingcorrect?. This is the major question addressed inthis paper. It strives to answer this question bydefining the notion of radicalism, then byexamining the Islamist movements in a number ofMuslim countries in order to find out whethersuch understanding applies to any of them or allof them, and concludes by suggesting the possiblecauses that some sections of such movementsespouse beliefs and resorts to methods of actionthat could be described as “radical”.

Examples of Islamist movements are drawnbasically from Egypt, but also from countries farapart as Algeria, Pakistan and Malaysia in the

hope of discovering through the comparison someclues to the roots of “radicalism” among theiradherents. Egypt and Pakistan are chosen becausethey occupy prominent positions in the historyof Islamic movements. Egypt was the scene ofthe rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, correctlydescribed as the Greatest modern Islamicmovements. Pakistan is the country of Abul A’alaMaudoodi whose radical ideas inspired theEgyptian Sayyid Qutb, the ideological“godfather” of many radical Islamist movement.

The notion of “radicalism”The notion of “radicalism”The notion of “radicalism”The notion of “radicalism”The notion of “radicalism”The term “radical” is defined by Encyclopedia

Britannica to mean in politics “one who desiresextreme change of part or whole of the socialorder” (EB, 1994, ). The term was used in theBritish and French context originally to refer todifferent groups of people whose ideas have beencommonly accepted later on and became amainstream principle of political life in Britainand France. The first person to be described asradical was Charles James Fox who called inEngland of 1797 for a “radical reform” whichimplied granting universal manhood suffrage.According to the same source the term wasunderstood later to denote “all those whosupported the movement for parliamentaryreform”. (Ibid). In France, similarly the term wasused before 1848 to refer to supporters ofuniversal manhood suffrage as well as openadvocacy for Republican principles. The term isgiven a broader meaning in the US where it denotesextremism of any type whether of the left or

Disaggregating

the Islamist

MovementsbyMustapha Kamel Al - Sayyid

Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid, Professor ofPolitical Science,Director, Center for the Studyof Developing Countries,Cairo UniversityPresented to the Conference onRoots of Islamic Radicalism,Yale, New Haven, May 2004

Masjid Khadijah 71

right. Communism is an example of the formerand Fascism is an example of the latter (Ibid).

Radicalism, when it came into being, wasunderstood by the public to mean being in totalopposition to the existing order or to parts of it.Thus , the term referred only to the substance ofthe beliefs of those who are seen to be holdingextreme ideological positions, not to their methodsof action. In fact, the radicals in both UK andFrance used peaceful methods in their struggle toget their ideas accepted by the general public intheir countries. They would mobilize voters, tryto transform political parties to adopt their ideaspolitical platforms they communicate to theconcerned public.

The current usage of the term extends itsmeaning to encompass both extremism of ideasas well as of methods. Designating any one to beradical is of course a relative matter. Muchdepends on who makes such judgment. What isviewed to be “radical” by one person could be anordinary political stand for another. However, allwould agree that resort to non-peaceful methodsin struggle for power or in settling differences isindeed a “radical “ approach to politics, evenwhen it is justified by the repression used byincumbent regimes or foreign occupying powers.

It is perhaps in this sense that “radicalism ofIslamic movements” in current discourse in theWest is understood to refer to both their ideasand methods of action. In fact, the interest insuch movements has increased not when theirideas were known, but when some of theorganizations belonging to these movementsproceeded to armed action against theirgovernments as well as against foreigngovernments.

Classifying ComponentsClassifying ComponentsClassifying ComponentsClassifying ComponentsClassifying Componentsof Islamist movementsof Islamist movementsof Islamist movementsof Islamist movementsof Islamist movements

The major argument in this paper is twofold,that radical Islamists constitute only a smallfraction of the Islamist movement in any Muslimcountry, and that the power of this fraction couldonly be appreciated when it is seen as onecomponent of a larger movement which indirectlysustains it and could continually replenish itsranks so long as the causes that led to theradicalism of this fraction persist. Demonstratingthis argument would require a careful examinationof all the other components of the Islamist

movement and determining the kind of relationsthat exist among all of them.

It will be easy to appreciate the complexity ofthe Islamist movement if it is seen as a socialmovement. Social movements have been definedby many authors, but it would be sufficient forpurposes of this paper to use the definition thatthe Encyclpaedia Britannica offers for them as“loosely organized but sustained campaign insupport of a social goal, typically either theimplementation or the prevention of a change insociety’s structure or values. Although socialmovements differ in size, they are all collective”( EB, 1999, electronic version).

The Islamist movement, thus understood, iscomposed of a large number of individuals andorganizations, who perform different functions,hold varied beliefs or varied interpretations ofthe same belief, but they share in common thewish to see their societies conforming to a certainideal which they take to be an authentic Islamicorder.

Several authors have attempted to classifyIslamist movements. A usual classification is theone that divides Islamists into moderates andradicals, militants, activists and sympathizers. Amost recent study of Islamist movements in NorthAfrica suggested that Islamsits belong to one offive categories:

Salafiyyah ilmiyyah –Scientific Salafiyyaconcerned with re-establishment of the moralorder that prevailed at the time of the ProphetMohammed and who does not engage in politics,but does not mind using violence in order to getother Muslims to observe truly Islamic practices

Salafiyya Jihadiyya Militant Salafists who “attack Western targets in a campaign rationalizedin traditional doctrinal terms as a conventionalJihad in defense of Islamic world against Westernaggression” ,

Modernists Political activists who are inclinedtowards peaceful action and who are willing touse modern ideas , techniques and organizationsin order to reach their goal of an Islamist state,

Militants who believe that the only way toestablish a truly Islamic society is through theuse of armed struggle directed mostly against theirown governments.

Finally Diaspora Muslim activists who try tomaintain an Islamic identity in non-Muslimcountries to which Muslims have migrated which

72 Masjid Khadijah

are mostly Christian societies in Europe and NorthAmerica.(ICG,2004, I, 3)

The authors of this classification used twocriteria in classifying Islamist movements, mainlythe substance of beliefs of adherents to thesemovements as well as their methods of action inpursuit of their specific goal.

Fred Von Der Mehden, describing Islamists inMalaysia, he divided them into four categories:radicals, traditionalists, fundamentalists andaccomodationsits( F.V.Der Mehden in Esposito,1987, 184)

Such classifications are not adequate to portraythe complexity of the Islamist movements. Theyoverlook the indirect contribution of two otherstrands in that movement, one coming from theruling elites themselves, and the other is providedby apolitical Muslims. The first of these twogroups help the Islamist movement bypropagating through official media andinstitutions ideas glorifying a return to a “GoldenAge of Islam” , thus unwittingly serving the causeof oppositional Islam by making some of thearguments of the latter acceptable to the largemasses. The second group provides sympathyto the activists and militants as they are seen as

good Muslims sacrificing their efforts and eventheir lives for a noble cause.

One may even suggest a fifth category made upof people who could be considered as “SecularIslamists”. They are the people who are willingto accept temporarily a separation of religion andstate to advance the chances of Islamists’domination of the political system of theircountries. The Justice and Development Partyof Turkey is the perfect example of such groupat present. It does not even have the label Islamistin its official name. Given the history of peoplewho formed this party and the specificcharacteristics of the Turkish political system,who could deny that such a party is in fact verymuch of an Islamist party, but which has to makenecessary and painful concessions in order tosurvive.(R.Quinn Mecham, 2004)

Why would some people belong to one of thesecategories rather than any of the others? Whyshould some Muslims adopt the militant path asthe way to realize their ideal Islamic society?.Many hypotheses could be suggested to providesome clues to the answer of the second question.The following analysis would emphasize threevariables that might be relevant in this respect,mainly, the impact of particular interpretations

Visit by Professor Dr Abd Rahman to Khadijah Mosque.He is the Chairman of Rehabilitation Group in Saudi forcounter terrorism

Masjid Khadijah 73

of Islam , the social background of adherents tothe different categories and finally the type ofpolitical system under which Islamist movementsoperate, and particularly the mode of integrationof the Islamists into a legitimate political process.

The four countries from which examples ofIslamist movements are chosen in this paper areselected because all have important Islamistmovements, but they differed in their mode ofintegrating the movement in their politicalsystems. They also dealt with the tensionprovoked by the rise of the Islamist movementin different ways, and their ruling elites seem tobe immune for the time being from any seriousthreat to its power. They serve therefore as afield of study of the various conditions that couldgive rise to Islamic radicalism or could do theopposite by attenuating such radicalism.

Establishment Islam and theEstablishment Islam and theEstablishment Islam and theEstablishment Islam and theEstablishment Islam and therole of the State.role of the State.role of the State.role of the State.role of the State.

In all four countries, the state played a crucialrole in the rise of the Islamist movement,particularly its activist faction. This role wasplayed out in different ways, some of which werequite direct, others, no less important, werecarried out indirectly. The government of Egyptunder President Anwar El-Sadat released MuslimBrothers from prison and allowed them to publisha monthly and to take part in political activitiesin the hope of counter-balancing the influence ofthe Nasserites and the left. The latter were criticalof Sadat’s policies, particularly what seemed tobe a deviation from policies of his predecessorGamal Abdel-Nasser. In Algeria, it is claimed thatPresident Chadli Bendjedid was hoping to usethe Islamists to limit powers of the ruling FLN,or National Liberation Front(A.Basbous,2000,119). In Pakistan, severalPresidents, particularly Bhutto(1971-1977) andZia ul-Haq made concessions to the Islamistmovement to the point of adopting laws inspiredby the movement’s interpretation of IslamicShari’a ( Kemal A.Faruki in J.Esposito, 1987,57-76). Finally in Malaysia, young leaders of theIslamist movement ( Pan Malay Islamic Party)were integrated by Mahatir Mohammed, theformer Malaysian prime minister in both thegovernment and the ruling party UMNO (Malay-Muslim United Malay National Organization).Anwar Ibrahim the former leader of the the IslamicYouth Organization had occupied severalministerial posts in the cabinets of Mahathir,

ranging from culture, youth and sport, agriculture,education and finally becoming vice-premier forthe economy before his disgrace and trialimmediately after the Asian financial crisis of 1997(F.V. Der Mehden in J.Esposito, 1987, 183).

Besides, all four states helped the Islamistsindirectly by accepting some of their demands.They thus introduced legislative measures andadopted policies in response to calls by Islamists.They accepted implicit ly that part of theIslamists’ platform. President Sadat got the mediato remind the Egyptian people that his name wasMohammed Anwar El-Sadat. He called himselfthe Pious President. He also coined the sloganthat development of Egypt should be based onScience and Faith. One year before hisassassination , he got the constitution of thecountry to be amended so that its second articlewould elevate principles of Islamic Shari’a to abasic source of legislation.

In Algeria, Houary Boumediene, Algeria’ssecond president allowed the religious hierarchyto enjoy large influence within ministries ofEducation, Religious Affairs and Justice. Hissuccessor Shadli Benjedid introduced in 1984 afamily code that reflected Islamists’ conservativeinterpretation of Islam on personal status matters(Basbous, OP.cit ,142). A full program ofIslamisation of state and society was graduallycarried out in Pakistan under both Bhutto andZia ul-Haq. In Malaysia , the governmentemphasized the Islamic character of the state inmany ways. The Constitution of 1957 providedfor Islam as a religion of the federation, the Sultanto be the head of Islamic religion, and protectionof Muslims from proselytizing while allowingfro freedom of worship for other religions. Somestates adopted statutes that punish Muslims fordeviating from moral teachings of their religion.The Federal government attempted however todevelop a synthesis between Islam and modernpractices and insti tutions particularly ineducation and economic fields ( Der Mehden,op.cit.183-198).

Governments of the four countries did not wantto leave interpretation of Islam to be themonopoly of opposition groups that claim to bestriving to build an authentic Islamic society. Allhad at their disposal religious institutions andmembers of the clergy who were willing to offerthem , very often but not always , the kind ofinterpretation they l ike. The Egyptiangovernment , under the monarchy before 1952

74 Masjid Khadijah

and under the republican regime since 1953, coulduse a number of institutions for this purpose.These institutions included century-old ones thatwere brought under its control gradually with thecoming of a modern state institutions to thecountry at the time of Mohammed Ali in theearly part of the 19th century, as well as neworganizations that it established in order to extendits control over religious affairs.

The old institutions included both Al-AzharUniversity, whose chief is appointed by thePresident of the Republic, before the posts ofrector and chief scholar1 were separated underGamal Abdel-Nasser in 1961. The second post isthat of the Mufti, who is the final authority overthe interpretation of Islamic religious matters.One of the new institutions that were created bythe revolutionary regime of army officers in 1953was the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs,which is oriented more towards foreigners,explaining Islam to them and bringing youngpeople to study Islam in Egypt. Interestinglyenough, the first head of this council was AnwarEl-Sadat, who became President of Egyptseventeen years later. Another new institutionswas the Ministry of Waqf- religious properties-which came into being before the revolution of1952 for the specific purpose of running religious

properties. The head of this ministry was usuallya member of the clergy, whose views countedalso as being credible reading of religious texts.yeta third institutions was the College of IslamicStudies that was expected to offer a modernistinterpretation of religion

These institutions offered the government ofEgypt whatever it wanted from them. ShaykhAl-Azhar. The grand professor of Al-Azharclaimed in 1962 that fighting Israel was an Islamicduty. The person occupying the same post arguedin 1979 that making peace with Israel was quitecompatible with Islamic teachings. A minister ofWaqf lost his life in 1977 when he published abook arguing against claims of a militant Islamistorganization that the government of a Muslimcountry must rule on the basis of Shari’a,otherwise it would be usurping powers of Allah.Members of the clergy belonging to theseinstitutions, and who interpret religious teachingsthe government way, would find pages ofnewspapers, most of which indirectly controlledby the government as well as waves and screensof the electronic media, also owned by thegovernment, open to them to propagate views onreligion acceptable to the government.

Government ‘s reliance on such institutions tooffer a mantle of religious legitimacy to her own

Al -Azhar Mosque In Cairo

Masjid Khadijah 75

policies and actions allowed these institutions towield a measure of autonomy. Some of theirmembers may express views not to the liking ofthe government, with the government toleratingsuch autonomy for a time, until the person diesor is replaced by another clergyman moresympathetic to government views. That was thecase of the late Shaykh Gad Al-Haq who led AL-Azhar institution in the 1990’s and expressedviews at variance with wishes of the governmenton a number of issues, including interest paymentby banks, which he considered incompatible withIslamic teachings. He was opposed on this matterby Shaykh Tantawi , who occupied then the postof Mufti. The government waited for the deathof Shaykh Gad Al-Haq and replaced him byShaykh Tantawi. ( CPSS, 1995, 76).

One would find similar institutions in the otherthree countries, although they would normallyattach great importance to the views of Muslimclergy in Egypt because of the contribution ofEgyptian institutions, particularly Al-Azhar, oneof the world’s oldest universities, in trainingreligious scholars and clergy people for otherMuslim countries. In fact, the teaching of Arabicin post-independence Algeria was carried out byEgyptians , many of whom were either graduatesof Al-Azhar university, members of orsympathizers with the ideas of the MuslimBrothers, Egypt’s mainstream politico-religiousorganization. Government-controlled religiousinstitutions in Malaysia included the NationalCouncil for Islamic Religious Affairs( founded in1968), the Islamic Research Center and Instituteof Islamic Mission and Training ( 1974), besidesthe department of religion of the Prime Minister’sOffice( 1976). (Deliar Noer,in M.B.Hookered.1988,199). All these institutions supplementthe role of governors, Sultans of the differentnegeri( states) who are supposed to be guardiansof the Islamic religion. (Ibid, 199).

In Pakistan, the function of providing the state’sown interpretation of Islam was entrusted to anew organization established by Ayub Khan in1959, namely the Institute of Islamic Research,which was initially headed by Fazlur Rahmanwho became later professor of Islamic Studies atthe University of Chicago. Rahman was entrustedby Ayub to offer a more modernist interpretationof religion to counter the relatively conservativeone articulated by Islamist parties, particularly

the Jamaat-I-Islami (Islamic Party). ( S.V.R.Nasr,in J.L.Esposito,,1997, 141-145).

In their attempts to provide their owninterpretation of Islam, the four governments wereresponding to specific situations which variedfrom one country to the other. The Egyptiangovernment was eager under Nasser to use Islammainly as a tool of her foreign policy, and –underSadat- to gain a measure of legitimacy toundermine nationalist-socialist foundations oflegitimacy of the Nasserites. Algerian leaders until1991 considered the enhancement of the teachingof Islamic religion to be a way of asserting thecountry’s national identity, since the Algerianswere called Muslims by the French beforeindependence . A similar situation prevailed inPakistan as well which separated from India overthe issue of religion. As in Algeria, to be aPakistani, meant to be a Muslim as well. Finally,Islam was very important in Malaysia as a basisfor solidarity among the Malays in their attemptto gain for themselves what they would considera fair share of their country’s power and wealth.They believed that their share wasdisproportionately smaller than that of citizensof Chinese and to a lesser extent Indianorigins.(Von Der Mehden,Ibid, 183).

Apolitical Islam or Islam in daily lifeApolitical Islam or Islam in daily lifeApolitical Islam or Islam in daily lifeApolitical Islam or Islam in daily lifeApolitical Islam or Islam in daily lifeForeign visitors to Muslim countries since the

1980’s would soon remark the increasingmanifestations of the powerful presence of Islamin the daily life of their citizens. The externalsigns of such presence are numerous. A largenumber of females, young and old, are veiled.More mosques are being built. Observance ofreligious rites is rising. More people fast duringthe month of Ramadan. The sale of alcoholicdrinks is banned during this month andrestaurants and coffee shops are closed duringthe day time. The Friday prayer is attended bylarge numbers of people who would crowd streetsof major cit ies as the mosques cannotaccommodate all of them. The number of Muslimswho go to Mecca for Hajj-pilgrimage- has putmuch pressures on Saudi authorities that theydecided to fix a quota for each country not to beexceeded. Islamic charitable associations aremushrooming, many of them use the mosque as acenter for their medical, educational and socialactivities, without necessarily getting an officialpermission from the government to undertake.

76 Masjid Khadijah

The number of religious books on sale exceeds insome countries the number of books dealing withother matters. Recital of the Quran is often heardfrom many stores at different times of the dayparticularly in the morning.

This phenomenon of the “return of the sacred”has been described, if not necessarily documentedunder all its manifestations by many authors forthe countries under study. The causes of thisupsurge in external manifestations of religiosityhave been an object of wide speculation. Therewas no common explanation for this phenomenonthat would apply to all Muslim countries andMuslim communities. It was attributed- amongother variables- to a profound economic, socialand political crisis in Egypt in the wake of thecountry’s military defeat in the third Arab-Israeliwar of 1967(Carlyle Murphy,2002,25-40), to adeliberate effort on the part of some clergymento get Algerians de abide by correct rules ofIslamic behavior (Servaine Labat 1995199-208),and to determination of the Malays to affirm theirspecific identity in the context of inter-ethniccompetition for power and wealth in Malaysia (Roy F.Ellen in M.B.Hooker, 1988, 53-58). Someof these causes would probably apply to severalcountries, as the feeling of a profound moral andsocial crisis.

However, a legitimate question, in the contextof a paper on the Islamist movement is the extentto which such “Apolitical Islam” relates to“political Islam”? Is it correct to include apoliticalIslam as one of the components of Islamistmovements?. The answer is not easy. It could beargued that it is from these apolitical masses thatthe sympathizers with and potential voters forthe Islamist movement are found. It is also thiscollective adherence and strict observance ofIslamic teachings which drives otherwise“secularist” governments, as those of Sadat,Bhutto and Mahathir to make the effort todemonstrate their Islamic credentials in the faceof a skeptical public in their respective countries.

The Activists or the MainstreamThe Activists or the MainstreamThe Activists or the MainstreamThe Activists or the MainstreamThe Activists or the MainstreamIslamic OrganizationIslamic OrganizationIslamic OrganizationIslamic OrganizationIslamic Organization

Despite this presumed complexity of theIslamist movement, the public as well asspecialists would tend to identify the Islamistmovement in each of the four countries with onemainstream organization, believed to be “themother organization” from which all other

organizations split or founded by its formermembers. Thus the Islamist movement in Egyptis championed by the Muslim Brothers, inPakistan by the Jamaat-e-Islami, known asPakistan Muslim League, in Algeria by FrontIslamique du Salut – Front of Islamic Salvation-and In Malaysia by the Parti Islam se Malaysiaor the Islamic party of Malaysia. Suchorganizations are correctly described asmainstream for several reasons. They attract thelargest number of members, compared to otherIslamist organizations. They act as umbrellaorganizations, sponsoring other bodiesundertaking activities in many varied fields. Whenthey contest elections , they either come as secondonly to the ruling party in their countries, oreven capture the majority of votes in fair andfree elections. In fact, as it is well-known, one ofthese organizations did already defeat a rulingparty in local and regional elections in June 1990.It was poised to capture the majority of seats inthe parliament but was deprived of its electoralvictory through a military coup d’etat thatsuspended indefinitely a second ballot in January1992. This latter organization known as FISremains banned in Algeria till the present time.Another mainstream organization , namely theMuslim Brotherhood in Egypt is also legallybanned, although the Egyptian governmentsunder Presidents Anwar El-Sadat-(1970-1981)-and Hosny Mubarak 1981 preferred to keep it inthe “gray zone”, allowing it to operate, contestinglegislative elections as well as those ofprofessional associations, while continuing toharass its members all the time. Finally, theseorganizations are considered mainstream as theyadopt ideologies and policies accommodating thepolitical system existing in their countries, notsharing the view of other Islamist organizationswhich do not see the point of participating inelections which they would not be allowed towin. They thus embark upon armed struggle as away of seizing government power .

These organizations are willing to adapt theirideological platforms and tactics to changingconditions in their own countries. The MuslimBrothers in Egypt declined to participate inelections before the Revolution of July 1952, andopted for the status of an association rather thana political party. Its leadership maintained thisposition throughout the 1970’s after the releaseby the late President Anwar El_Sadat of its

Masjid Khadijah 77

leaders from prison. However, they decided since1984 to contest parliamentary elections andwould like restrictions on the formation ofpolitical parties included in the Law of PoliticalParties in Egypt of 1977 to be lifted, so that theywould be recognized as a party.2 The MuslimLeague of Pakistan was allegedly opposed to theestablishment of the state of Pakistan in the earlyyears of the Pakistan Republic, but it changedthis position later. The PAS in Malaysia movedto emphasize less religious questions followingits electoral defeat in 1986. Finally , even the FISof Algeria , while banned by the Algeriangovernment, came in 1998 to condemn armedstruggle which was launched by many of itsmembers following the indefinite postponementof a second round of elections in 1992.

Definitely, FIS of Algeria was electorally themost successful of Islamist organizations. It wonthe majority of votes in all electoral districtswhich have more than 20 000 inhabitants,including of course the large cities. It got thefollowing results

The big electoral districts included 28 of the30 big cities of Algeria. FIS emerged after theseelections as the most popular party among urbanpopulation of the country. Its electoral successeswere repeated a year and half later when legislativeelections were held. FIS got 47.27 % of the voteand 188 seats in the first round of that election in1991. It needed only twenty eight seats to beable to get an absolute majority in the 430members People’s Assembly if a second roundwere held on January 12, 1992. The Algerianmilitary command , concerned that its material

and political privileges would be lost if a secondround is won by FIS, it overthrew PresidentShadli Benjedid and postponed indefinitely thesecond round and outlawed FIS.

The military rulers of Algeria did not allow theelectoral process to be restored until 1995, makingsure that FIS would not be legalized again evenafter they agreed to release its leaders fromprison.( Labat, op.cit.223). However, otherIslamist parties were allowed to contestpresidential and legislative elections held sincethe restoration of the electoral process in 1995.In the last of these elections, two of the Islamistparties authorized by the Algerian government ,namely the Movement of the Peace Society andthe Movement of Islamic Renaissance got 7%and 0.6% of the seats in the Popular NationalAssembly respectively corresponding to 38 and1 seats . This share of the 380 seats of theAssembly was far less than their share in pastlegislative elections when the first had 69 deputiesand the second 33 deputies in the Assemblyelected in 1997. ( www.electionworld.org) Judging

by these results, one would say that support forthese parties is declining in Algeria. FIS remainsoutlawed.

Mainstream Islamist parties in Pakistan areonly second to FIS in terms of their electoralsuccesses. They constitute the largest bloc in theNational Assembly of Pakistan. Three of themcontrol no less than 46.4% of the seats in theAssembly elected in 2002. The largest of these isdefinitely the Pakistan Muslim League( Quaid-e-Azam) which got 25.7% of the seats ( 69 out of342) , followed by the United Action Council of

78 Masjid Khadijah

Pakistan with 11.3% of the seats ( 53 ) , and theother faction of the PML led by former primeMinister Nawaz Sharif ( 9.4% and 14 seats).Dissensions among these parties do not allowthem to turn their parliamentary majority into acoalition government with two other smallerIslamist parties as well as other parties that couldagree with them on a common program.(electionworld.org).

The two other Islamist organizations inMalaysia and Egypt fare less well in elections ,though for different reasons. The PAS of Malaysiagot only 15.8% of the seats ( 7 out of 219 in thelast legislative elections in that country held onMarch 21, 2004. The Muslim Brothers won 17out of 444 seats in the People’s Assemblyelections held in Egypt in October-November2000. It is true on the other hand that the twoparties come second to the ruling parties in thetwo countries, namely the coalition known asBarisan Nasional led by UMNO in Malaysia andthe National Democratic party In Egypt.Although there were some complaints aboutfairness of elections in Malaysia, these electionswould be judged to be far fairer compared toelections in Egypt characterized by the heavyhanded methods used by security forces which

even prevent people from going to vote in electoraldistricts with large support for the MuslimBrothers. Besides, PAS had overwhelmingsupport in three states in Northern Malaysia andit could run governments in different periods inthese states. Muslim Brothers in Egypt havenot been allowed to turn their overwhelming localsupport into control of local administration inany district again due to heavy handed methodsused by security forces.

By accepting to contest elections and toabandon the use of armed struggle in their questfor power, such parties do not meet one criteriaof radicalism. It is true that opponents of theseorganizations often accuse them of either engagingin violent resistance to their governments or beingsympathetic to other Islamist groups who tendto use armed struggle as a method of action. Suchcharges were leveled at the Muslim Brothers, PASand also FIS immediately after the annulment ofthe legislative election of 1991-1992. However,none of these charges have been proven in thelast decade for the MB and PAS , and probablyalso for FIS since the amnesty announced byPresident Bouteflika since he came to power in1999.

Masjid Khadijah 79

by the Brothers that their goal is” to strive toestablish “Allah’s Shari’a” since it is theBrothers’ belief that it is the only effective wayout of all the domestic and external problemssuffered by Egypt. This goal could be attained“the formation of the Muslim individual, theMuslim home, the Muslim government, and thestate that would lead all Muslim states , to bringthem together, restore their glory, recover theirlost territory and stolen land, and carry the bannerof the religious call so that the world would be ahappy place under Islam’s good and teachings”.

(Ikhwan online, march 3, 2004). All such statements leave much room for

interpretation, and overlook the right of Non-Muslims to lead their own lives according to theirown beliefs in a Muslim country. This view wasalready expressed by Mr.Hussein Abdel-Razeq,Secreatry General of the leftist Tajammo’ Partyin Egypt. Dr.Essam El_Erian, a leadingspokesman of the Brothers replied to this critiquearguing that political parties and movements ofthe country should emphasize what they have incommon, while maintaining each their specificviews on other matters. ( Al-Ahali, March 2004).

This kind of ambiguity is to be found as well inthe political platforms of the mainstream Islamistorganizations in other countries . Thus, the siteof the Pakistan Muslim League explains thepolitical framework of Islam to be based on threeprinciples of “towhid (Oneness of Allah), risala(Prophethood) and Khilafa (Caliphate). The lastof these principles means :“representation. Man, according to Islam, is the representative of Allahon earth, His vice-gerent: that is to say, by virtueof the powers delegated to him by Allah, andwithin the limits prescribed, he is required toexercise Divine authority”(jamaat.org/islam/humanrightsPolitical.html).

The document of the Pakistan Muslim Leaguegoes on to say that this understanding of Khilafais the point of departure of democracy in Islam.But it hastens to add that there are differencesbetween Islamic democracy and Westerndemocracy.“ the latter is based on the concept ofpopular sovereignty, while the former rests onthe principle of popular Khilafa. In Westerndemocracy the people are sovereign; in Islamsovereignty is vested in Allah and the people arehis caliphs or representatives. In the former, thepeople make their own; in the latter they have tofollow and obey the laws ( Shari’a) given by Allah

The ideology of these groups has gone througha major transformation since they came into being.All of them seem to accommodate themselves tothe existing political system in their owncountries, although they remain committed to thegoal of establishing an Islamic state, where Shari’ais the major , if not the unique , source oflegislation. It is the ambiguity surrounding theirinterpretation of Shari’a which mobilizes theiropponents and turn important sections of themiddle classes against them , to the point ofwelcoming an authoritarian government ratherthan seeing them in power. This is particularlythe case in Algeria, Egypt as well as Pakistan.

The most recent statement of the MuslimBrothers in Egypt of their ideas of reform comesa long way from their past statements , not onlyof the 1940’s , but even those of the 1970’s inwhich they rejected party systems. The statementdeclared by Mr. Mahdi “Akef, the new GeneralGuide, asserts commitment of the Brothers to anumber of principles including respect of thepopular will, alternation of power through theballot box, freedom of establishment of politicalparties, people’s representation through anassembly elected regularly for a definite periodof time, freedom of opinion “within public orderand morality and fundamental foundations ofsociety”. Their ideas on economic reform asexplained in that statement are close to the welfarestate known in Capitalist countries in which stateownership is limited to public utilities and “vitalestablishments”. The statement explains rightsof women , without recognizing the principle ofcomplete equality between men and women. Itdoes the same also when it considers the statusof Copts, who should have the same rights andobligations as Muslims. Very little of this part ofthe statement could be considered radical.Definitely, liberal critics of the Brotherhoodwould have liked them to state unequivocally theirrespect for equality of the sexes and the principleof citizenship as a basis for defining rights andduties of all the people who belong to the nationalcommunity with no distinction as to sex orreligion. Qualifying freedom of opinion to bewithin “public order and morals and fundamentalfoundations of society” leaves the door open forrestricting such right when its exercise isarbitrarily viewed by the government to be inviolation of these limits. However, critics of theBrothers found most disturbing the declaration

80 Masjid Khadijah

through his Prophet. In one, the governmentundertakes to fulfill the will of the people; in theother the government and the people have tofulfill the will of Allah”

Many Muslims have no problem being governedby the Will of Allah. The problem is that theinterpretation of this will is not a matter ofpersonal knowledge of and aptitude to understandGod’s teachings. Experience has demonstratedthat in many Muslim countries few clergymenclaim to have the monopoly of such privilege.Their interpretation led to serious violations ofrights of Muslims. The Example of Wilayat Al-Faqih in Iran is quite eloquent in this regard.

In another part of this statement , theexplanation of rights of non-Muslims living in aMuslim state renders their status to be far inferiorto that of a full citizen.

“Islam has also laid down certainrights for non-Muslims who may beliving within the boundaries of anIslamic state and these rightsnecessarily form part of the Islamicconstitutions. In Islamic terminology,such non-Muslims are called dhimmis(the covenanted), implying that theIslamic state has entered into acovenant with them and guaranteedtheir protection”

The statement does indeed say that thedhimmi’s life, property and honor are to berespected and protected

“in exactly the same way as that of aMuslim citizen. Nor is there differencebetween a Muslim and non-Muslimcitizen in respect of civil or criminallaw”

The statement stopped short of recognizingcomplete equality between Muslims and non-Muslims who share life in the same country. Nordoes it mention equality in political rights.

It would not be difficult to find the sameambiguity in platforms of either FIS or PAS. Thispoint has been well-elaborated in other writingsand there is no need to elaborate it further forthese two organizations in this paper.

The mainstream organizations strive to presentthemselves as poly-class organizations. Althoughthey do not use the class terminology, they liketo be seen as integrative bodies, the authenticrepresentative of the Islamic Umma, with nodistinction as to the social status, color orlanguage. However, in practice they are morerepresentative of certain sections of their societiesthan others. In Egypt, the Muslim Brothers havea major constituency within the middle classwith its two fractions, the educated professionalpeople as well as private entrepreneurs.Professional syndicates of medical doctors,engineers, scientists and even lawyers andassociations of university professors have beenstrong bastions of the Brothers.(CPSS, 1995).

In Pakistan, similar groups seem to besympathetic to the Muslim League. The directoryof the League gives a list of organizations andassociations “conforming with Jamaat –e-Islami”.These include religious scholars, boy studentsand girl students, lawyers, farmers, religious boystudents, business community homeo doctors,workers and agril scientists.(Ibid.www.jamaat.org/directory/affiliates.html.

As for Malaysia, PAS appeals more to certaincategories of Malays, particularly in the statesof Kelantan and Terengganu, characterized byslower economic development compared to otherstates ( J.C.Yong Liow, 2004, 362).Finally inAlgeria FIS found much support within the Arabicspeaking lower middle class and urban poor(Labat,178-185).

Masjid Khadijah 81

Islamic MilitantsIslamic MilitantsIslamic MilitantsIslamic MilitantsIslamic Militants

The fourth component of

Islamist movements is truly

radical in both ideology and

methods of action. Islamists

who belong to this trend do not

accept any compromise with

Western-style parliamentary

systems, as they do not believe

in elections as the way to realize

their ideal of a Muslim society.

They tend to view non-Muslims

as enemies of Islam who should

not be trusted. They believe

that they should be either

eliminated from Muslim

societies or accept an inferior

status. In their ideal Islamic

state, teachings of Islam are

strictly interpreted, with those

who deviate from such

teachings subject to

punishment.

Examples of such groups abound in the fourstates under study. They include several groupsin Egypt, the two most famous ones are theIslamic Group and the Jihad Organization. Theywere preceded by the Technical Military Collegegroup(1975), the Group of Muslims, otherwiseknown as Takfir wa al-Hijrah (1977). They gaverise also either to splinter groups, or groups oftheir members acting under different names. InPakistan, the best known of these groups are themovement of Mujahedeen, Islamic Armed Jihadand Jaish Mohammed who operate mostly inKashmir. Armed Islamist groups in Algeria madetheir presence felt even before the rise of FIS,but they became more active in the 1990’,following cancellation of the legislative electionsof December 1991-January 1992. The most activeof these groups were the Armed IslamicMovement (MIA), the Army of Islamic Salvation(AIS), the Armed Isalmic Group (GIA) and finallythe Salafi Group for Call and Fight. Even inMalaysia, some Islamists took up arms againstother ethnic minorities in the country. MalaysianIslamist radicals of this type were mostlymembers of the Islamic Group which operates inseveral countries in South East Asia and anothergroup known as Al-Ma’unah.

What these groups have in common is theirrelatively small size compared to the mainstreamIslamist organizations in their own countries.Their members are mostly younger than thosewho join the mainstream organizations. The twofeatures are dictated by their involvement in armedstruggle. They are often subject to harassmentby authorities, perhaps with the exception ofPakistani groups that operated in Kashmir untilvery recently when the Pakistani government ofGeneral Musharraf started to restrict theiractivities in the aftermath of its reconciliationwith India.Members of a large organizationinvolved in armed struggle are easily identifiedby security forces. Old people are not usually fitfor the kind of armed activities which areundertaken by members of these organizations.They are also more reluctant to engage in suchactivities. They have more to lose, in terms ofjob, wealth , family support and loss of freedomat an advanced age. The study by Nemat Guenenaof the Jihad members in Egypt of the 1980’sindicated that out of 101 individuals who weretried by Egyptian State Security Tribunal 44.55%were students, and 24.75% were professionals.

82 Masjid Khadijah

Workers accounted for 14.85% and farmers forno more than 1.98%. The three other categoriesincluded shopkeepers(5.96%) Police and military( 3.96%) and unemployed (3.96%). Most of themwere between 20-30 years of age , with 42.57 %being between 20-25 and 34.65% between 25-30. Those who were younger than 20 years wereonly 8.91% while those older than 30 were12.87% ( N.Guenena,1986).

Similarities among these organizations probablyare limited to these two features. An examinationof their social backgrounds and ideological standssuggests more differences than commonalities.The leaders of Egyptian groups tended to comefrom middle class backgrounds, with universityeducation. Their rank and file could come frommore modest backgrounds, with the majority ofthem coming from some of the poorest regions ofUpper Egypt. Accounts of the social backgroundof Algerian militants of MIA,AIS or GIA suggestthat they come from much poorer background, inNorthern Algeria with the latter including not asmall number of former criminals.(MartinStone,1997,189, Olivier Roy, 1994,48-59).

Egyptian militants, as well as their Pakistanifellows were originally influenced by ideas thatwere articulated by both the Pakistani Abul A’alaMaudoodi and Sayyid Qutb. Maudoodi coinedthe term Hakimiyyah-Government of God, whichwas borrowed later by Sayyid Qutb. This conceptmeans that the truly legitimate government inany Muslim country is that of Allah, ruled bythe Islamic Shari’a. A secularist government isthus viewed to be usurping the authority of God,and should therefore be removed, by the force ofarms, in a holy jihad, if necessary. Local influencesand interpretations were added to this basic

notion. Shaikh Omar Abdel-Rahman now inprison in the US and young leaders of Al-Jihadincorporated ideas that had originally beenexpressed in the late 13th century by the Muslimscholar Ibn Taymiya, who was calling on Muslimsto fight the Mogul invasion of their countries,(Sayyid Ahmed,1991, Qutb, 1981) Besides suchideas, Pakistani militants were moved also bynationalism in their fight against the Indian troopsin the Indian controlled part of Kashmir.Traditions of the fight against the Frenchinfluenced Algerian militants in the 1990’s as wellas the will to force the Algerian government torestore the legality of FIS(Stone, 179).Finally,notions of ethno-nationalism inspired actions byMalayan militant groups.( Von Der Mehden, 184-185). It is important also to distinguish severalideological stands within the Islamist militantfaction of the Islamist movement. One strandbelieves that the major thrust of the movementshould be the fight against impious governmentsin Muslim countries, governments that claim torespect Islam, but they do in fact, according tothis strand, deviate from the teachings of religionand even persecute Muslim activists. Anotherstrand would direct its energies against fellowMuslims, who are seen to be disregarding theinstructions of Islam, and who engage in un-Islamic behavior such as drinking alcohol ,gambling , even mixing with girls in public placesor allowing their women to go out into the streetsunveiled. The third trend is to be manifested inMuslim countries with large non-Muslimpopulation or which are ruled by a foreign non-Muslim power. Armed struggle in the latter casewould be directed against members of theminorities or non-Muslim foreigners.

Conclus ionsConclus ionsConclus ionsConclus ionsConclus ionsThis brief analysis of the different components

of the Islamist movement has demonstrated thecomplexity of the movement , in terms of itscomposition, structure, ideology and methodsof action. It makes it abundantly clear that itwould be misleading to assimilate all factions ofthe Islamist movement in any country with themilitant faction that opts for the use of armedstruggle in its quest for power. Such faction doesnot draw large numbers of Muslims. Its viewson religion and its methods are usually abhorredby the majority of Muslims.

Masjid Khadijah 83

The relative importance of each of thesefactions varies from one Muslim country to theother, and even within the same country fromone period to the other. Despite the perceptionconveyed by the world media, it is the activistmainstream faction which is mounting in influencein most Muslim countries at present. The militantfaction has not been able to win power in mostcountries where it has been active. Definitelynot in any of the countries under study. Moreover,it has been engaging in self-critique in some ofthese countries, notably in Egypt, where it hasrenounced its former methods of armed struggle,declaring that adoption of such methods was anerror of judgment( Al-Sayyid, 2002).

The mainstream trend has made electoral gainsin Turkey, Pakistan, Morocco, Bahrain, andKuwait to name only few countries where it hasemerged as the most popular political party orthe second popular. It has not been able to makesimilar gains in other countries, because itsmembers are continually harassed by theirgovernments. Egypt is one of those countrieswhere the government is concerned that onceIslamists are allowed to take part in a fair andfree election , they would increase their presencein legislatures and local elected bodies, if notachieve a landslide electoral victory.

Despite differences in outlook and methods ofaction, each component of the Islamist movementfeeds the others. Apolitical Islamists wouldprobably vote for activist Islamists. Theestablishment discourse on Islam, meant todiscourage people from supporting activist andmilitant Islamists, renders their theses about thecredibility of Islam as a foundation for the social,political ,economic and moral order more popularamong Muslim masses. An activist could becomea militant when peaceful political action byIslamists is banned by the government as wasthe case in Algeria in the aftermath of annulmentof legislative election of 1991-1992. Militantsalso could move in the opposite direction tobecome leaders of mainstream movements, as thecase of former members of the Islamic group inEgypt who became leaders of the mainstreamMuslim Brotherhood adequately demonstrates.

It is not easy to suggest the conditions whichgive rise to each of these factions. EstablishmentIslam is definitely a reaction against the rise ofactivist and militant Islam. Three of the countriesunder study, namely Egypt, Algeria and Pakistan

share a deteriorating socio-economic situation oftheir middle classes, with no prospect of anyappreciable improvement in the near future. Twoof these countries restrict activities of themainstream Islamist movement, while thedemocratic process is on hold in the third countryi.e. namely Pakistan. It is difficult to see how theaccommodating ideology of the mainstream trendof the Islamist movement could gain more groundsunder such circumstances. If the situation of themiddle classes does not improve in thesecountries, their governments would most likelyface a resurgence of the activities of militantIslamist groups in the years to come.

In this respect, it is very interesting that theonly country of the four , where the mainstreamIslamist movement has suffered a setback recently,is Malaysia, which is economically the mostsuccessful of the three four countries.

If the fortunes of the Islamist movement varyfrom one country to the other, it is wishfulthinking to believe that such movement is goingto vanish from the surface of the earth any timesoon. Social scientists have long abandonedtheories which suggested that secularism wouldaccompany or follow modernization. At the timewhen US President is viewed to be newly-bornChristian, and is supported by Evangelical groups,it would not make sense to dream that otherpeoples , who do not enjoy the materialprosperity and post-modernity of US , wouldabandon their religions, or become less attachedto it because this is conceivably the wish of USadministration. An Islamist movement wouldcontinue to exist so long as there are Muslims.The accommodating trend in this movementwould gain ascendance if the domestic and externalconditions that favor the rise of the militant trend,disappear or are alleviated.

Finally, it is true that this paper did not considerone dimension of the Islamist movement , whichsome would quickly acknowledge as an integralcomponent of it , namely its internationalconnections. It is well-known for example thatthe Muslim Brotherhood is an internationalmovement as well, with organizational linksbringing its country chapters together. Osama BinLaden has established in Afghanistan an “IslamicWorldwide Front to Combat Zionism andCrusdaders” and its actions have been tragicallyexperienced in many countries, in Africa, NorthAmerica, the Middle East and Asia. While

84 Masjid Khadijah

recognizing the importance of this dimension ofthe Islamist movement, it has not been possibleto dwell on it in this paper, for the lack of reliableinformation..

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(Footnotes)1 This second post is held by a senior member

of the clergy who is presumed to be an authorityover religious affairs. His name in Arabic is Al-Ostadth al-Akbar , the grand professorr

2 The Law of Political Parties in Egypt.No. 40for 1977 bars the establishment of parties thatdiscriminate among people on the basis ofreligion.. See The Government Printing Authority.Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt. Cairo-1991P.106, Article 4(Third)