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Rationalist Explanations for WarAuthor(s): James D. FearonSource: International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer, 1995), pp. 379-414Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706903Accessed: 09-09-2015 16:40 UTC
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Rationalist xplanations
or
war
James . Fearon
Thecentral uzzle boutwar, ndalso themain eason
we
studyt, s thatwars
are
costly utnonetheless ars
ecur. cholars ave
ttempted
o resolve he
puzzle
with
hree ypes
f
rgument.irst, ne
can
rgue
hat
eople and
state
leaders n
particular)
re
sometimesr always
rrational.
hey
re
subject o
biases and pathologies
hat ead them
o neglect
he
costs
of
war
or
to
misunderstandow
heir
ctions
ill
roduce
t.
econd, necan rgue hat he
leaderswhoorderwarenjoy ts
benefits
utdo notpaythecosts,which re
suffered
y soldiers
nd
citizens. hird, ne can argue
thateven
rational
leaders who consider he risks nd costs of war may end up fighting
nonetheless.
This rticle ocuses n argumentsf he hirdort, hich will allrationalist
explanations.1ationalistxplanationsbound
n the
iteraturen interna-
tionalonflict,ssuminggreat
ariety
f pecificorms. oreover,or t east
two
easonsmanycholars
ave
given ationalistxplanations
certain
ride f
place.First, istoriansnd political cientists ho
have
tudied heorigins f
particular
ars ften
ave
oncluded hat
war an be
a
rationallternativeor
leaderswhoare actingn their tates' nterest-theyind hat heexpected
benefitsfwar ometimesutweighhe xpected osts, owevernfortunate
An earlier
version
f this rticle
was
presented
t the annual
meetings
f the
American
olitical
Science
Association,Washington, .C.,
2-5
September
993.The article raws
n
part
n
chapter
ofJamesD.
Fearon,
Threats o Use
Force:
Costly ignals
nd
Bargaining
n
nternational
rises,
Ph.D.
diss.,University
f
California, erkeley,
992. Financial
support
f
the nstitute
n
Global
Conflict nd
Cooperation
of
the
University
f
California
s
gratefullycknowledged.
or
valuable
comments
thank
ddie
Dekel,
Eric
Gartzke,
Atsushi
shida,
Andrew
Kydd,
David
Laitin,
Andrew
Moravcsik,
James
Morrow,Randolph Siverson,
Daniel
Verdier, Stephen
Walt
and
especially
CharlesGlaser and Jack
evy.
1.
Of course, arguments
f the
second
sort
may
and oftendo
presume
rational
behavior
by
individual eaders; that s,warmay be rationalforcivilian r militaryeaders iftheywillenjoy
various
benefits
f war without
uffering
osts
imposed
on the
population.
While
I
believe that
second-image
mechanisms f this sort are
very mportant mpirically,
do
not
explore
them
here. A
more accurate
label
for the
subject
of
the article
might
be
rational
unitary-actor
explanations,
ut this s
cumbersome.
International
rganization9, 3,
Summer
995,pp.
379-414
r
1995
by
The
10
Foundation nd the Massachusetts nstitute f
Technology
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War 381
length elow, these arguments re given he followingabels: (1) anarchy; 2)
expectedbenefits reater han expected osts; 3) rationalpreventive ar; 4)
rationalmiscalculation ue to lack of nformation;nd (5) rationalmiscalcula-
tion or disagreement bout relative power.
I
argue that the first hree
arguments imply o not address the question of what prevents tate eaders
frombargaining o a settlement hat would avoid the costs of fighting. he
fourth nd fifth
rguments
o address
the
question, holding
that rational
leaders may miss a superiornegotiated ettlement hen lack of information
leads them to miscalculaterelativepower or resolve. However, as typically
stated,neither rgument xplainswhatprevents ational eaders from sing
diplomacy r otherforms f communicationo avoid such costlymiscalcula-
tions.
If these standard rguments o not resolvethe puzzle on rationalist erms,
what does? I propose thatthere re threedefensible nswers,which ake the
form fgeneralmechanisms,r causal logics,
hat
operate
n
a
varietyf more
specific
nternational
ontexts.3
n
thefirst
mechanism,
ational eaders
may
be
unable to locate a mutually referablenegotiated ettlement ue toprivate
informationbout
relative
apabilities r resolve
nd
incentives
o
misrepresent
such information. eaders know things bout theirmilitary apabilities nd
willingness o fight hatother tatesdo not know, nd
in
bargaining ituations
they an have incentives o misrepresentuch private nformation
n
orderto
gain
a
better
deal.
I
show that
given
hese
ncentives,
ommunication
may
not
allow
rational eaders
to clarify
elative
ower
or
resolvewithout enerating
real risk of war. This is not simply matter f miscalculation ue to poor
information ut rather of specific trategicdynamics
hat result
from
the
combination f
asymmetric
nformationnd
incentives
o dissemble.
Second, rationally
ed states
may
be unable
to
arrange
settlementhatboth
wouldprefer o
war due to
commitmentroblems,ituations
n
whichmutually
preferable argains re unattainable ecause one ormore tateswouldhave an
incentive o renegeon theterms.Whileanarchy understood s
the
absence of
an
authorityapable
of
policing greements)
s
routinely
ited
s
a
cause
of
war
in
the
iterature,
t
s
difficult
o
find
xplanations
or
xactlywhy
he
nability
o
make
commitmentshould
mply
hatwar
will
sometimes ccur. That
is,
what
are
thespecific, mpirically
dentifiablemechanisms
y
which
he
inability
o
commitmakes
t
mpossible
or
tates o strike eals thatwould avoid
the
costs
of
war? I
identify
hree
such
specificmechanisms, rguing
n
particular
hat
preventive
war between rational states stems from commitment
roblem
rather hanfrom ifferentialowergrowth erse.
The third
ortof rationalist xplanation
find ess
compelling
han
the
first
two, lthough
t s
logically
enable.
Statesmight
e unable to ocate a
peaceful
3. The sense of mechanism s similar o thatproposedbyElster, lthough omewhat roader.
See JonElster,Political sychologyCambridge:CambridgeUniversity ress, 1993), pp. 1-7; and
JonElster,Nuts nd Bolts or heSocial Sciences Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity ress, 1989),
chap. 1.
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War
383
Second, herationalistrgumentshatdo address hequestion-such s (4)
and 5) above-do notgo far nough
n
answeringt.When ully eveloped,
they rove o be one of thetwomajormechanismseveloped ere,namely,
either commitmentroblem r a problem rising rom rivatenformation
and ncentiveso misrepresent.hese twomechanisms,will rgue, rovide
the oundationsor rationalistrneorealistheoryfwar.
The puzzle
Mosthistoriansndpoliticalcientistsho tudy ardismisss naive he iewthat llwarsmust eunwanted ecause heyntail estructionndsuffering.
Instead,most gree hatwhile fewwarsmayhavebeen unwanted y the
leaderswho brought hem bout-WorldWar I is sometimes iven s an
example-many r perhapsmostwars
were
simply
wanted.The
leaders
involvediewedwar s a costly utworthwhileamble.5
Moreover, any
cholars elieve
hat
wanted ars
re
easily xplained
rom
a
rationalisterspective. antedwars rethoughtobe Pareto-efficient-they
occur
when
o negotiated
ettlementsxist hat
oth
ides
would refer
o the
gamble fmilitaryonflict.onventionalisdom olds hatwhile his ituation
may e tragic,t s entirelyossible etweentates ed by ationaleaderswho
consider
he
costs
and
risks f
fighting.
nwanted
wars,
which ake
place
despite
he existence
f
settlements
oth sides preferred
o
conflict,
re
thoughtoposemore f puzzle, ut ne that s resolvablend lsofairlyare.
The
conventionalistinctionetween anted ndunwanted arsmisunder-
stands he
puzzleposed by
war.
The
reason
s
that he standard
onception
does not
distinguish
etween
wo
ypes
f
efficiency-ex
nteand
ex
ost.
As
long
s
both
ides uffer
ome osts
or
ighting,
hen
war
s
always
nefficientx
post-both
sideswouldhavebeen better fffthey ouldhave chievedhe
same inal
esolution
ithout
uffering
he
osts
orby aying
ower
osts).
his
is true ven
f
he
osts ffighting
re
small, r
f
ne
or both ides iewed
he
potential
enefitss
greater
han he
costs,
ince
here re still osts.Unless
states
njoy
he
ctivity
f
fighting
or
ts
wn
ake,
s
a
consumptionood,
hen
war s
nefficient
xpost.
From
rationalist
erspective,
he entral
uzzle
bout
war s
precisely
his
ex
ost
inefficiency.
efore
ighting,
oth idesknow
hatwarwill ntail
ome
costs,
nd even
f
hey xpect ffsetting
enefits
hey
till ave
n
incentiveo
avoid he osts. hecentraluestion,hen,swhat reventstatesna dispute
5. See, for xamples,
Geoffry lainey,
The
Causes of War New
York: Free
Press,1973);
Michael
Howard, The Causes of Wars Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity
ress, 1983), especially hap.
1; and Arthur tein, WhyNations Cooperate:Circumstancend
Choice n International
elations
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University ress, 1990), pp. 60-64. Even the case of World War
I
is
contested; n important istorical chool argues that this was a
wanted
war. See Fritz
Fisher,
Germany's
ims n the irstWorldWar
New
York:
Norton, 967).
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384 Internationalrganization
from eachingnex nte greementhat voids he osts hey nowwill e paid
expost f hey o to war?Giving rationalistxplanationorwar mountso
answeringhis uestion.
Three f hemost ommon
nd
widelymployedationalistrguments
n
he
literatureo notdirectlyddress r answer he uestion. hese rearguments
fromnarchy,reventivear, ndpositivexpected tility.
Anarchy
SinceKennethWaltz's
nfluential
an,
the
tate,
nd
War,
he
anarchical
nature f the internationalealm s routinelyitedas a root causeof or
explanation
orthe
recurrence
f
war.
Waltz
argued
hatunder
narchy,
without supranationaluthority
o make and enforce
aw,
war
occurs
because
here s
nothing
o
prevent
t....
Among
tates s
among
men
heres
no automaticdjustmentf nterests.
n
theabsence f a supreme uthority
theres then he onstant
ossibility
hat
onflicts
ill e
settled
y
orce. 6
The
argumentocuses
ur attentionn a fundamental
ifference
etween
domestic
nd
international
olitics.
Within
well-ordered
tate, rganized
violence s a
strategy
s ruled
ut-or
at
least
made
very angerous-by
he
potential eprisals f a central overnment.n internationalelations, y
contrast,
o
agency
xists hat an
credibly
hreaten
eprisal
or he
use
of
force
to settle
isputes.7
he claim
s
that
withoutuch credible hreat,
ar
will
sometimes
ppear
he
best
ption
or
tates
hat ave
onflicting
nterests.
While do
not
doubt hat he
condition f
anarchy
ccounts
or
major
differencesetween omestic nd internationalolitics,nd
that
anarchy
encourages
oth
fear f
and
opportunities
or
militaryonflict,
he
tandard
framingf the rgumentsnotenough o explainwhywars ccur ndrecur.
Under
narchy,othingtops
tates
rom
sing
orce
f
hey
ish.
ut
f
using
forcesa costlyption egardlessf he utcome,henwhys t ver mployed?
Howexactlyoes
he
ack
f
centraluthorityreventtates romegotiating
agreements
oth
ides
would
prefer
o
fighting?
s
it
s
typicallytated,
he
argument
hat
narchy rovides
rationalist
xplanation
or
war
does not
address his
uestion
nd so
does not
olve he
problem osedby
war's x
ost
inefficiency.
Neither,
t should
be
added,
do related
rgumentsnvoking
he
security
dilemma,
hefact
hat
nder
narchy
ne
state's ffortso make tself
more
secure an have heundesired
ut
unavoidable
ffectfmakingnothertate
6.
The
quotation s drawn romKennethWaltz,Man, the tate,
nd War:
A TheoreticalAnalysis
(New
York: Columbia
University
ress,
1959),
p.
188.
7. For a careful
nalysis
nd
critique
f this tandard
rgument
n
the
difference
etween
the
international nd domestic renas, see R. HarrisonWagner, The Causes of Peace,
in
Roy A.
Licklider, d., Stopping
he
Killing:
How
Civil
WarsEnd
(New
York: New York
University ress,
1993),pp. 235-68 and especially p. 251-57.
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War
385
less ecure.8 y tselfhis act
ays othingbout he vailabilityrfeasibility
f
peaceful argains
hat
would void he
osts
fwar.More
laborate rguments
arerequired,nd those hat retypicallyiven o not nvision argainingnd
do not ddress hepuzzle f
costs.Consider, ornstance, spiral cenario
n
which n
nsecuretatencreasests rms, endering
nothero nsecurehat t
decides o attack.fthefirst
tate nticipatedhe
eaction roducing ar, hen
by tself
his s a deadlock
rgument;argue gainsthesebelow.
f
the
first
state
id
not nticipate ar nd
did
notwantt, hen he
problem ould eem
to be
miscalculationather han
narchy,nd weneed to knowwhy
ignaling
and
bargainingouldnothave olvedt.AsRobert
ervis as argued,
narchy
and the
ecurityilemmamaywellfosterrms aces nd
territorialompeti-
tion.9 utwith heexceptionf occasional eferencesothepreemptivear
problem,he tandard ecurity
ilemma rguments
o notexplicitlyddress
the
uestion
f
why
he
nability
o
make
ommitmentshould ecessarilyake
for
war
etween ational
tates.10
Below will rgue hat
narchy
s
indeed mplicateds a cause of
specific
sorts f
military
onflict
e.g.,preventive
nd
preemptive
ar
nd
n
ome
ases
warover
trategicerritory).
n
contrasto the
tandardrguments,
owever,
showing ow
anarchy igures
n a
coherent
ationalist
xplanation
ntails
describinghe pecificmechanismywhich tates'nabilityo write nforce-able
contracts akes
eaceful
argains
oth
ideswould
refer
nattainable.
Preventivewar
It
frequentlys argued hat
f
decliningower
xpectstmight e
attacked
by
rising ower
n the
future,
hen
preventive
ar n
the
presentmay e
rational.
Typically, owever,
reventive
ar
arguments
o not consider
whether
he rising
nd
declining owers
ouldconstruct
bargain, erhaps
across ime, hatwould eaveboth idesbetter ff han costlyndrisky
preventivearwould.11
he
ncentives
or uch
deal
surely
xist. he
rising
state hould otwant obe attacked hile t s
relativelyeak,
o what
tops
t
fromfferingoncessions
n
the
present
nd thefuture
hatwould
make he
declining
tate
refer
ot oattack?
lso,
f
war
s nefficient
nd
bargains
oth
sides
prefer
o a
fight
ill
xist,
hy
hould he
decliningower ationally
ear
being
attacked
n
the
future?
he
standard
rgumentupposes
that
an
8.
See John
H.
Herz, Idealist
Internationalismnd the
Security ilemma, World olitics
(January 950), pp. 157-80; and Jervis,Cooperation Underthe Security ilemma. Anarchys
implicated
n
the
security ilemma
xternalityy the followingogic:
but
for
narchy,
tates ould
commit o
use
weapons only ornonthreatening,efensive
urposes.
9. Jervis,
CooperationUnder the
Security ilemma.
10.
For an
analysis
f the
ecurity
ilemma
hat
akes nto ccount ignaling,ee Andrew
Kydd,
The Security
ilemma,Game Theory, nd WorldWar ,
paper presented t the annual meeting
of theAmerican
olitical
cience
Association,Washington, .C.,
2-5
September 993.
11. The mostdeveloped exception
know f s found n StephenVan Evera,
Causes of War,
Ph.D.
diss.,University
f
California,
erkeley,
984,
pp. 61-64.
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386 International
rganization
anticipatedhift
n thebalance fpower an by tselfe enough omakewar
rational,
ut his s not o.
Positive expected
utility
Perhaps he most ommon nformal
ationalistxplanation
ound
n
the
literatures thatwar mayoccurwhen
two states ach estimate
hatthe
expected
enefitsffightingutweigh
he
xpected osts.
As BruceBueno
de
Mesquita rgued
n an influentialormalizationf thisclaim,
war can be
rational
f
both
ideshave
positive xpected
tility
or
ighting;
hat
s,
f
the
expected tilityf war (expected enefitsess costs)is greater hanthe
expected tility
fremaining
t
peace.12
Informalersions
f theexpected tilityrgumentypically
ail o address
the
question f
how
r
under
what
onditions
tcan be
possible
or
wo tates
both o
prefer
he
ostly amble
fwar o
anynegotiated
ettlement.
ormal
versions
avetended o avoid hequestion
ymaking arious estrictive
nd
sometimesonrationalistssumptions.
o
support
hese
laims,
need to be
more recise bout he xpected tilityrgument.
When will there
exist
bargains
both sides prefer o
war?
This ection onsidershequestion f
whetherndwhen wo
ationallyed
states ould
oth
refer
ar o
anynegotiated
ettlement.
Consider
wo tates,
A and
B,who
have
preferencesver
set of ssues
representedy
he nterval
=
[0, 1].
State
A
prefersssueresolutionsloser
to
1,
while
B
prefers
utcomes loser
o 0. Let the states'utilities
or
he
outcome
E X be
uA(x)
nd
UB(1
-
x),
and assume fornow that
UA(-)
and
UB(O)
are continuous,ncreasing,nd weakly oncave that is, risk-neutralr
risk-averse).
ithout
osing nygenerality,
e can set
ui(1)
=
1
and
ui(0)
=
0
for oth tates
i
=
A, B).
Forconcreteness
e
might
hink
f as
representing
the
roportion
f
ll
territory
etween
and
B
that
s controlledy
A.
In
order o say
whetherhe et
X
contains
egotiatedettlementshat oth
sideswould
refer
o
conflict,
tmust e
possible
o
say
how he tates valuate
the
militaryption
ersus
hose
outcomes.
lmost
ll
analysts
f war have
12. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap
New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University ress,
1981), and The War
Trap Revisited: A Revised Expected UtilityModel, American
Political
ScienceReview 9 (March
1985), pp. 157-76.
For a generalization hat ntroduces he idea of a
bargaining ange, see James
D. Morrow, A Continuous-Outcome xpected
Utility heoryof
War, Journal f Conflict
esolution
9
(September
1985), pp. 473-502. Informal ersions
f
the
expectedutility rgument
re
everywhere.
or
example,Waltz's statement
hat
A
statewill use
force o
attain
tsgoals
f,
fter
ssessing
he
prospects
or
uccess,
tvalues those
goals
more han
t
values the
pleasures
of peace appears
n
different ays
n a
greatmany
works n war. See
Waltz,
Man,
the
tate,
nd
War, .
60.
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War
387
As valueforwar
Bargaining
ange
B's valueforwar
A
_ ,.. A.
,
-- -
A
A's
valuefor n outcome
B's valuefor n outcome
/
.
.. ,, ,. . .
A
o
P-CA
X
P
+
CB
1
B's favorite
utcome
A's
favoriteutcome
FIGURE 1.
Thebargainingange
stressed
hatwar s a
gamble
hose utcome
may
e
determined
y
andom r
otherwisenforeseeablevents.13s
Bueno
de
Mesquita rgued,
his
makes
expected
tility
natural andidate.14
uppose
hat
f
the
states
ight
war,
state
A
prevails
ith
robabilityp [0,1],
nd that he
winner
ets
o choose
itsfavorite
utcome
n
the
ssue
pace.
t
follows
hat
A's
expected tility
or
war
spuA(l)
+
(1
-
p)uA(O)
-
CA,
rp
-
CA,
where
A
is
stateA's
utility
or
he
costs
f a
war.
imilarly,
tateB's
expected
tility
orwarwillbe
1
-
p
-
CB.
Sincewe areconsideringationalistheoriesorwar,we assume hat
A
and
CB
areboth
ositive.
War s
thus
epresented
s
a
costlyottery.Note
hat
n
this
formulation
he erms
A
nd
Bcapture
ot
nly
he tates' alues or he
osts
ofwarbut
lso the
alue
hey lace
on
winning
r
osing
n the
ssues
t
stake.
That
s,
CA
eflects
tate
A's costs orwarrelative
o
any ossible
enefits.or
example,
fthetwo tates
ee little
o
gain
from
inning
war
against
ach
other,
hen
A
nd
CB
wouldbe
large
ven f
neitheride
expected
o suffer
much
amage
n
war.)
We
can now nswer he
uestion
osed
bove.The
following
esults
easily
demonstrated:ivenhe ssumptionstatedn the asttwoparagraphs,here
alwaysxists
setof
negotiated
ettlements
hat oth ides
prefer
o
fighting.15
Formally,
here xists subset f
X
such hat or
ach
outcome
in this
et,
UA(X)
>
P
-
CA
and
UB(1 x)
>
1
-
p
-
cB.
For
example,
n the
risk-neutral
case where
uA(x)
=
x and
UB(1
-
x)
=
1
-
x,
bothstateswill
trictlyrefer
ny
peaceful greement
n the
nterval
p
-
CA,
p +
CB)
to
fighting.
his
nterval
representshe
argaining
ange, ithp
CA
ndp
+
CB
s the eservationevels
that
elimitt.A
risk-neutral
ase s
depicted
n
Figure
.
This
simple ut
mportantesult
s
worth
elaboring
ith ome
ntuition.
Suppose hatwo eople or tates) rebargainingver hedivisionf 100-if
they
an
agree
n a
split hey
an
keep
what
hey gree
o.
However,
n
contrast
13.
See, for lassic examples,
hucydides,
he
Peloponnesian
War
New
York:
Modern
Library,
1951),pp.
45 and 48; and Carl von
Clausewitz, n War Princeton, .J.:Princeton
niversityress,
1984), p.
85.
14. Bueno de
Mesquita,
The
War
Trap.
15. A
proof s given n
the
Appendix.
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388 International rganization
to the usual economic scenarios, n this nternational elations xample the
players lso have an outsideoption.16 or
a
priceof $20, they an go to war,
n
which ase each playerhas a 50-percent hanceofwinning hewhole $100. This
implies hat heexpected alue ofthewaroption s $30 0.5- 100
+
0.5 0
-
20)
for
each side,
so that
f
the
players
re
risk-neutral,
hen neither
hould
be
willing
o
accept
ess
than
$30
in
the
bargaining.
ut noticethatthere s still
rangeof peaceful, argained utcomesfrom $31, $69) to ($69, $31) thatmake
both sides strictly
etteroff han the war
option.
Risk
aversionwill tend to
increase herangeyet urther;ndeed, ven f he eaderspayno costsforwar,
set of
agreements
oth sides
prefer
o a
fight
ill still xist
provided
both
are
risk-averse ver the
issues.
n
effect,
he costs
and
risks f
fightingpen up
a
wedge
of
bargained
solutions
that
risk-neutral
r
risk-averse
tates will
prefer
o the
gamble
of
conflict. he existence
f this x ante
bargaining ange
derives rom
he
fact
hatwar s inefficient
xpost.
Three substantive ssumptions
re needed
for
the
result,
none
of
which
seems particularly trong.First,
the states know that there is some true
probabilityp hat ne statewould
win
n
a
military
ontest.As
discussed elow,
itcould be that hestateshave conflictingstimates f the ikelihood fvictory,
and
if
both sides are
optimistic
bout their chances this can
obscure the
bargaining ange.But evenifthe stateshave private nd conflictingstimates
of
whatwould happen
n
a
war,
f
hey
re
rational, hey
houldknow hat
here
can
be only
one
true probability
hat
one
or the otherwill
prevail perhaps
different
rom heir
wn estimate).
Thus rational tates houldknow hat here
must
n
fact
xist
set of
agreements
ll
prefer
o a
fight.
Second,
t
s assumed
that he
states re risk-averse
r
risk-neutralver the
issues.Because risk ttitude s defined elative
o an
underlying etricsuchas
money
n
economics),
he substantive
meaning
f this
ssumption epends
on
the
bargaining
ontext.
oosely,
t
says
hat he states
prefer fifty-fiftyplit
r
shareofwhatevers at issue inwhatevermetrictcomes, fany)to a fifty-fifty
chance at
all or
nothing,
here thisrefers
o
the value of
winning
r
losing
war.
In
effect,
he
assumption
means that eaders do not like
gambling
when
the downside isk
s
losing
t
war,
which eems
plausiblegiven
he
presumption
that tate eadersnormally
ish o retain
erritory
nd
power.
A
risk-acceptant
leader is analogousto a compulsive ambler-willing o accepta sequence of
gambles
that has the
expected
outcome of
eliminating
he
state and
regime.
Evenifwe admitted uch a leader as rational,tseems doubtful hatmanyhave
held suchpreferencesHitlerbeing possibleexception).
16. On the theoryof bargainingwith outside options,
see Martin J. Osborne and
Ariel
Rubinstein, argainingndMarkets New York: Academic
Press,1990), chap. 3; Motty erry, An
Example of Price
Formation n BilateralSituations, conometrica 0 (March 1986), pp. 313-21;
and RobertPowell, Bargaining
n
theShadow
of Power
University
fCalifornia, erkeley,
993,
mimeographed). ee
also
the
analyses
n R. Harrison
Wagner,
Peace, War, and the Balance
of
Power, American olitical
cienceReview 8 (September1994),
pp. 593-607; and Wagner, The
Causes
of
Peace.
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War 389
Finally, t was assumed that a continuousrange of peaceful settlements
(from to 1) exists.
n
otherwords, he ssues
n
dispute
re
perfectly ivisible,
so that here re always easiblebargains etween hestates'reservationevels
p
-
CA
and
p +
CB.
This
third
ssumption mmediately uggests tenable
rationalist xplanation
or
war. Perhaps something bout the natureof some
internationalssues, uch as which uccessorwill iton a throne, oes not admit
finely raded divisions nd compromise.
f
so, then mallcostsforfightingnd
bad luck
may
make for
ationalwar over uch ssues.
But we would immediatelyike to knowwhatabout the natureof an issue
makes it
impossible o divide up. On more thought, his seems empirically
implausible.
n
the first lace, most issues states negotiate
over
are quite
complex-theyhave manydimensions f concern and allow many possible
settlements.
econd,
if states can
simply ay
each
other
sums
of
money
or
goods (which hey an,
in
principle),
r make
linkages
with ther
ssues,
then
this hould have the effect f
making ny
ssues n
disputeperfectly
ivisible.
Before the age of nationalism, rinces oftenbought, old,
and
partitioned
land.17
n
the nineteenth entury he United States purchased he Louisiana
territory
rom
rance, and Alaska fromRussia, and as late as 1898 President
McKinley xplored
he
possibility
f
buying uba from pain
in
order o
avoid
a war over
t.18
Third, fsomethingbout the natureofan issue means that t
can be
settled
n
only, ay,
two
ways,
hen some sortof
random llocation
or
alternation etween the two resolutions ould
in
principle
erve
to
create
intermediate argains.Mafiadons,for xample, pparently ave avoidedcostly
internalwars
by using
lotteries to allocate construction
ontracts mong
families.19
In practice, reating ntermediate ettlements ith cash, with inkagesto
other
issues, or
with randomization r alternation ften seems difficult
r
impossible
or
tates engaged
n
a dispute.
For
example,
he mmediate ssue
thatgave rise to the Franco-Prussianwar was a disputeover whichprince
would take the
Spanish
throne.
t
doubtless ccurred
o no one to
propose
that
the twocandidates lternate
earbyyear,
r three
years
for he
Hapsburg
nd
one
for
he
Hohenzollern,
r whatever.
n this
ase
as
in
many thers,
he ssue
could in
principle
have been made more continuous nd was
not for other
reasons-here, alternating ingswould have
violated o
many onventions
nd
norms
as
to
have been domestically
nworkable.To
give
a more realistic
17. See, for example, Evan Luard, War in International ociety New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University ress,1992), p. 191. Schroedernotes
that
patronage, ribes, nd corruption
ere a
major lement
f
eighteenth-centurynternationalelations. ee Paul Schroeder, he Transforma-
tion fEuropeanPolitics, 763-1848 Oxford:OxfordUniversityress,1994),p. 579.
18. On Cuba, see Ernest May, mperialDemocracy New York: Harper and Row, 1961), pp.
149-50. On the Louisiana purchase,military hreats aised in the U.S. Senate apparentlymade
Napoleon more eager to negotiate he sale. See E. Wilson Lyon,Louisiana in French iplomacy
(Norman:Universityf Oklahoma Press,1934), pp.
179
and
214ff.
19. Diego Gambetta,The SicilianMafia: The Business f Private rotectionCambridge,Mass.:
Harvard
Universityress,1993), p. 214.
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390
International
rganization
example,nineteenth-
nd
twentieth-century
eaderscannotdivide
up
and trade
territoryn international egotiations s easily as could rulers
n
the seven-
teenth ndeighteenthenturies, ue inpart o domestic olitical onsequences
of the rise of
nationalism; ontrast,
or
xample,
he
Congress
f Vienna
with
thenegotiations ollowing
WorldWar
I.
So
in
principle
the
indivisibility
f the issues that
are the
subject of
international argaining an provide
coherent ationalist
xplanation
orwar.
However,
he
real
question
n
suchcases is
what
prevents
eaders from
reating
intermediate ettlements, nd the answer s likely
o
be
other
mechanisms
(often
domestic
political)
rather han the nature of the issues themselves.20
Both the intrinsicomplexitynd richness
f most
matters
ver
which tates
negotiate and the availability
f
linkages
and
side-payments uggest
that
intermediate argains ypically illexist.
It is thusnot sufficiento say thatpositive xpectedutility y
tself
upplies
coherent r
compelling
ationalist
xplanation
or
war.Provided
hat he
ssues
in
dispute are sufficientlyivisible, r that side-paymentsre possible,there
should exist set ofnegotiated greements hathavegreaterutility orboth
sides thanthe
gamble
ofwar does. The reason
s
that he
expost nefficiency
f
war
opens up an exantebargaining ange.
So, to explainhowwarcould occurbetweenrationallyed states,we need to
answer the
following uestion.
Given the existence
of
an ex ante
bargaining
range,whymight tatesfail either o locate or
to
agree on
an
outcome
n
this
range, o avoiding hecostsand risks
f
war?
War
due
to
private
nformation
nd incentives
to
misrepresent
Two commonly mployedrationalist xplanations n the literature irectly
address thepreceding uestion.Both turn
on
the claim
thatwar
can be
and
often s the
product
of
rationalmiscalculation. ne
explanation
holds that a
state's leaders
may rationally
verestimate
heir
chance
of
military ictory
against
an
adversary,
o
producing disagreement
bout
relative
power
that
only
war can resolve. The other
argues
that
rationally
ed
states
may
lack
informationbout an adversary's illingness o fightversome nterest nd so
may hallenge
n the mistaken elief hatwarwillnotfollow.
In
this
section
I
argue
that while these ideas
point
toward a tenable
rationalist xplanation orwar, neither oes farenough and neitherworksby
itself. oth
neglect
he fact hat tates an
in
principle
ommunicate ith ach
other
nd so
avoid a
costly
miscalculation frelative
ower
r
will.The cause of
20. In one of the only articles on
this
problem,
Morrow
proposes
a
private
nformation
explanation
or tates' failures o
link
ssues n
manydisputes.
ee
JamesD.
Morrow, Signaling
Difficulties ithLinkage n CrisisBargaining, nternationaltudies
Quarterly
6
(June 1992), pp.
153-72.
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War 391
war
cannot be
simply ack ofinformation,ut whatever t is
thatprevents ts
disclosure. arguethat hefact hat
tateshave
ncentiveso misrepresent
heir
positions s crucialhere, xplaining nrationalistermswhy iplomacymaynot
allow
rational tates
to
clarify isagreements bout
relative oweror to
avoid
the
miscalculation f resolve.
The
mainstream
nternationalelations
iterature
ecognizes heexistence f
both
private nformationnd
incentives o
misrepresent, ut
typically iews
them
as
background onditions
o
be taken for
grantedrather han
as key
elements f
anexplanation
fhow
rationally
ed
statesmight nd
up
at war.
For
example,JackLevy's mpressive eview f
the iterature n the
causes of war
contains
nothing
on
the
role
of
incentives
o misrepresentnd
discusses
private nformationargely n the context fmisperceptions f otherstates'
intentions
which are
linked to
psychological iases). This
is
an
accurate
reflectionf
where hesefactors tand
n themainstream
iterature.
Disagreements
about relative
power
Geoffrey lainey's
well-known nd often-cited
rgument
s
that
wars
usually
egin
whentwo
nations
disagree
on
their elative
trength. 22
t
is
easy
to see howa disagreementboutrelative trength-understoods conflicting
estimatesof
the
likelihood
of
military
ictory-can
eliminate
any
ex
ante
bargaining ange. Recall the
example givenabove,where two states
bargain
over
the
division f
$100,
and each has
the
outside
option
of
going
to
war. If
each
expects
hat t
surely
would
prevail
t
war,
hen
ach side's
expected
alue
for
the
war option s
$80 (1 *
100
+
0 0
-
20).
So
given
these
expectations,
neither ide will
accept
less
than
$80
in
the
bargaining, mplying
hat no
negotiated
utcome s
mutually referred
o war. More
generally,uppose
that
state
A
expects
o winwith
robabilityp,
tate
B
expects
o win
with
robability
r, and p and r sum to greaterthan one. Such conflictingxpectationswill
certainly
hrink nd could
eliminate
ny
x
ante
bargaining
ange.
But how
could
rationally
ed states
have
conflicting
xpectations bout the
likely
utcomeof
military
onflict?
n
the
extreme
ase,
how could
both
sides
rationally xpect
to
win?
The literature
barely
addresses
this
question
in
21.
See Jack Levy, The Causes of
War: A
Review of Theories and Evidence,
in Philip E.
Tetlock et
al., eds.,
Behavior, ociety,
nd
Nuclear
War,
vol.
1
(Oxford:OxfordUniversity ress,
1989),
pp. 209-333. Recent work
using limited-information
ame theory to
analyze crisis
bargaining laces thestrategic onsequences ofprivate nformationt thecenter f the analysis.
See,
for
xamples,
Bruce Bueno
de
Mesquita
and
David
Lalman,
War nd
Reason
(New Haven,
Conn.: Yale
University
ress, 1992);
James D.
Fearon,
Domestic
Political Audiences
and
the
Escalation
of nternational
isputes, American olitical
cienceReview 8
(September1994), pp.
577-92;JamesD.
Morrow, Capabilities,Uncertainty,nd
Resolve:
A
Limited nformation odel
of
Crisis
Bargaining, merican ournal
fPolitical cience33
(November 989), pp.
941-72; Barry
Nalebuff,
Brinksmanship nd Nuclear Deterrence:
The Neutrality f
Escalation, Conflict
Managementnd
Peace
Science
9
(Spring1986), pp.
19-30;
and
RobertPowell,Nuclear
Deterrence
Theory:he
Problem f Credibility
Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityress,1990).
22. Blainey,The
Causes of War, . 246.
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392
International rganization
explicit
erms.Blainey,
whom the literature iewsas advancing
rationalist
explanation
or
war,
nfactexplainsdisagreements
bout relative
power as a
consequence of human irrationality. e says that mutual optimism bout
victory
n
war
s
the
product
f moods which annot
be groundedn fact nd
which permeate
what appear
to be rational assessments
of the relative
military
trength
f twocontending owers.
Mutualoptimisms
said to result
from
process by
whichnationsevade
reality, which
hardly ounds like
a
rationalistxplanation.23
Conflictingxpectations
bout the
ikely
utcome
of
military
onflict
may
be
explained
n
three
ways. First,
s
Blainey suggests,
motionalcommitments
could irrationally
ias
leaders'
military stimates.
They might,
or nstance,
come to believe nationalistrhetoricholdingthat their soldiersare more
courageous
and
spirited
han those
of
the
adversary.24
econd,the
world s
a
very
complex place,
and for this reason
military
nalysts
n
different
tates
could reach different
onclusions
bout the
ikely mpact
f
different
echnolo-
gies,
doctrines,nd
tactics nthe expected
ourseof
battle.Third, tate eaders
mighthave private
information
bout
militarily
elevantfactors-military
capabilities,
trategy,
nd
tactics;
he
population's
willingness
o
prosecute
a
long war;
or third-statententions.
f
a state has superior and
so private)
informationbout any suchfactor, hen ts estimate fthe probablecourseof
battle
may
differ rom
hat f an
adversary.
Under
a strict ut
standarddefinition
f
rationality,
nly
he third
xplana-
tion
qualifies
s an account
of how
rationally
ed statescould have
conflicting
estimates
f the
probability
f
winning
n
war.
As
arguedby
John
Harsanyi,
f
two rational gentshave the
same
informationbout
an
uncertain vent, hen
they
hould have the same
beliefs bout its ikely
utcome.25he claim s
that
given
dentical nformation,
ruly ational
agents should
reason to the same
conclusions
about the
probability
f
one uncertain
outcome or another.
Conflictingstimates hould occuronly f the agentshave differentand so
necessarily rivate)
nformation.26
23. Ibid., p. 54.
Blainey also blames patriotic
nd nationalistic ervor, eaders' (irrational)
tendency o surround hemselves
ith
yes-men,
nd crowdpsychology.
24. See Ralph K.
White,NobodyWanted
War:Misperceptionn Vietnam nd OtherWars
New
York: Doubleday/Anchor),
hap. 7; Blainey,The Causes of War,p.
54; and RichardNed
Lebow,
BetweenPeace and War: The Nature of
International rises Baltimore,
Md.: Johns Hopkins
Universityress,1981), p.
247.
25. JohnC. Harsanyi, Games with ncompletenformation layed By Bayesian' Players, art
III, Management cience
14
March 1968), pp.
486-502.
26. Aumann observed an interesting
mplication f this doctrine:
genuinely ational agents
cannot agree to disagree,
n the sense that t cannotbe commonly
nown hat hey re
rational
and that theyhold
differentstimates
f the likelihoodof some uncertain
vent. See Robert
Aumann, Agreeing to Disagree,
The Annals of Statistics (November
1976), pp. 1236-39.
Emerson Niou, Peter
Ordeshook, nd GregoryRose note that this
mplies that rational tates
cannot agree
to disagree
about
the probability
hat
one
or
the
otherwould win n a
war
in The
Balance of Power:
Stabilityn the nternational
ystem Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity
ress,
1989), p. 59.
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War 393
It follows that the second explanationfor disagreements bout relative
power isted bove-the complexity
f the
world-is not a rationalist ccount.
Instead, it is an account that explains conflictingmilitary stimates as a
consequence of bounded rationality.
n
this
view,
eaders
or
militarynalysts
with
the
same
information
bout
military echnology, trategy, oliticalwill,
etc.
might
eason to differentonclusions bout
the
likely
ourse
of a
war
because of differentialbility o cope with omplexity f the problem.This is
entirely lausible,
but
t s
a bounded
rationalityxplanation
ather han
fully
rationalist ne.27
The
rationalist ccount of how disagreements
bout
the probability f
winningmight
rise also seems
empirically lausible.
States
certainly
ave
private nformation bout factors ffecting he likelycourse of battle-for
example, they ealously guard military
ecrets
and
often have
superior
informationbout what an ally will or will not fight or. Nonetheless,while
private nformation
bout
militarilyelevant apabilities rovides
first
tep,
t
does notprovide
coherent ationalist
xplanation
orwar.The
problem
s
that
even
f
eaders
have such
private nformation,hey
houldunderstand hat heir
ownestimates ased on this nformationre suspectbecause they o not know
the other
side's private
nformation.n
principle,
oth
sides
could
gain by
sharing nformation,hichwouldyielda consensusmilitarystimate absent
bounded
rationality). nd,
as
shown bove, doing
o could not
help
but reveal
bargains
hatbothwould
prefer
o
a
fight.28
So the
question
f
how
rationally
ed states an
disagree
boutrelative
ower
devolves
o
the questionof whatprevents tates
from
haring rivate nforma-
tion
about
factors
hat
might
ffect
he
course
of battle.
Before
turning
o
this
question,
will
consider
the
second common
explanation
orhow a rational
miscalculation
mayproduce
war.
War due to themiscalculation ofan opponent's willingness
to
fight
Many wars have been given he followingo-called rationalist xplanation:
state A
transgressed
ome
interest f
state B in
the erroneousbelief
that
B
would
not
fight
war over
the matter. hough
rationallyed,
state A lacked
informationbout B's willingnessofightndsimply appenedtoguesswrong,
causing
a war.
Thus,
some
say
that
Germany
miscalculatedRussian
and/or
British
willingness
o
fight
n
1914;
Hitler
miscalculated
Britain nd
France's
27.
On bounded rationality,
ee
Herbert
A.
Simon, A
BehavioralModel
of Rational Choice,
Quarterlyoumal f
Economics 9
(February 955),pp.
99-118.
28. This
analysis
uns
exactly arallel to work
n
law and economicson pretrial argaining
n
legal disputes.Early studies explained costly itigation s resulting romdivergent xpectations
about the likely rialoutcome,while n more recentwork uch expectations erivefrom rivate
informationbout the strengthf one's case. For a review nd references, ee RobertD. Cooter
and
Daniel
L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis f Legal Disputes
and Their
Resolution, ournal f
EconomicLiterature7 (September 989), pp. 1067-97.
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394 International rganization
willingness o resist
his
drive
o the
east; Japanese
eaders in
1941 miscalcu-
lated U.S. willingness o fight long war over
control
n
the South Pacific;
NorthKorea miscalculated .S. willingnessodefend outhKorea; theUnited
States
miscalculated hina's
willingness
o
defend
North
Korea;
and so on. In
each
case,
the
argument
ould hold that
ack
of nformationed
a
more-or-less
rational ctor o guesswrong bout the extent fthebargaining ange.
Blainey has argued that if states agree on
relativepower they are very
unlikely
o
go
to
war
against
ach other.29
t is
worth ointing ut that
n
the
preceding rgument, ar
can
occur despite
complete agreement n relative
power
across states.To show how
and for
ater
use,
I
will ntroduce
simple
model
of
international argaining.
As
in
the empirical xamples ust men-
tioned,
n the model one state
unilaterally
hoosessome revision f thestatus
quo.
The
second state an then
ither
cquiesce
to the
revision
r can
go
to war
to reverse t.
Formally, uppose there
s
a
status
quo
resolution
f the
issuesq
E
X and
that tate
A has
theopportunity
o choose
any
outcome
E
X, presentingtate
B with fait
ccompli.On observing
hat
tate
A did
whichmight
e
nothing,
i.e.,
x
=
q), state
B can choose whether
o
go
to war
or
to
acquiesce to A's
revision
f
the status uo.
If neither tate has anyprivate nformation,o that ll payoffsre common
knowledge, tate
A does best
to
push
the
outcome ust up
to B's reservation
levelp
+
CB,whichmakes
B
justwilling
o
acquiesce
rather hango to war.With
complete nformation,hen,
he
statesavoid the inefficientutcomeof war.30
On the other
hand,
if state
B
has
private
information bout either its
capabilities which
ffect
)
or its value
for
he- ssues at
stake
relative o the
costs
of conflict
CB),
then
state
A
may
not know
whether a
particular
demand x will
yield
war
or
peace. Lacking
this
nformation,
tateA faces a
trade-off
n
deciding
whether nd howmuch
erritory
o
grab :
The
larger
he
grab,the greaterthe risk of war, but the betteroffA will be if state B
acquiesces.
Suppose,
for
example,
hat
A
and
B
share
a commonestimate
f
p-they
agree
about relative
ower-but
thatA is
unsure
bout B's
costs for
fighting.
Under
very
road
conditions,
f
A cannot earn B's
private
nformationnd
if
A's
own
costs
re
not
too
large,
hen tateA's
optimal
grabproduces positive
chance ofwar.31
ntuitively,
f
A is
not
too fearful f the costsofwar relative o
29. Blainey,The Causes of War.
30. This take-it-or-leave-itodel of international argaining s proposed and analyzedunder
conditions f both complete and incomplete nformation
n
James D. Fearon, Threats to Use
Force: The Role of Costly ignals n International rises, Ph.D. diss., University f California,
Berkeley, 992, chap. 1. Similarresults
ormore
elaborate bargaining
tructures
re given
n
my
own work
in
progress. See James
D.
Fearon, Game-Theoretic
Models of International
Bargaining: n Overview, Universityf Chicago, 1995. Powell
has
analyzed n alternativemodel
in whichboth sides must gree
if
the statusquo is
to
be revised. ee Powell, Bargaining
n
the
Shadow of Power.
31. See Claim 2
in
theAppendix.
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War 395
what might
e gained
in
bargaining,
t will run some
riskof war
in
hopes
of
gaining
on
the
ground.
So Blainey's suggestion
hat
a
disagreement
bout
relative ower snecessary orwar s incorrect-allthat s necessary sthat he
states
in
dispute
be unable
to locate
or agree
on
some
outcome in
the
bargaining
ange.
Sincethe bargaining
ange s determined
ot
ust byrelative
power
but also by
states'values
for heissues
at stake
relative o the costs
of
fighting,
ncertainty
bout
the atter an
(and apparently
oes)
producewar.
Once again,
t
s entirely
lausible
hat tate eaders
have private
nformation
about
their
value
forvarious
nternational
nterests elative
o their osts
of
fighting
ver them.32
hus it seems we
have a second
tenable
rationalist
explanation
or
war, gain
based on
the
concept
of
private
nformation.
ut
as
inthecase of disagreementsboutrelative ower, heexplanation ails s given
because
it
does notexplain
why
tatescannot
avoid miscalculating
potential
opponent's
willingness
o fight.
n the model,why
annot state
A simply
sk
state
B whether
t
would
fight ather
han cquiesce
to
a
particular
emand?
To
give
a concrete xample,why
did
German
eaders
n
1914
not
simply
sk their
British nd Russian
counterparts
hat
they
would
do
if
Austriawere
to attack
Serbia?
f
they
ould have
done
so and
if
he answers
ould have
been believed,
the Germansmight
not have miscalculated
oncerning
Russian and,
more
importantly,ritishwillingness o fight. n consequence theymighthave
avoidedthe
horrendous ostsof World
War
I.
To recap,
have
argued hat
n a rationalist
ramework,
isagreements
bout
relative ower
nd uncertainty
bout a potential
pponent's
willingness
o fight
must
have the same source:
eaders' private
nformation
bout factors
ffecting
the ikely
ourse
of a
war
or their esolve
ofightver pecific
nterests.
n
order
to avoid
war's ex post inefficiency,
eaders
have incentives
o share
anysuch
private
information,
hich would
have the
effectof revealing
peaceful
settlements
hat ie within
he
bargaining
ange.So,
to
explain
how war could
occurbetween tates ed byrational eaders whoconsider he costsoffighting,
we need to
explain
what
would
prevent
them
from
sharing
such
private
information.
Incentives
to
misrepresent
n
bargaining
Prewar
bargaining
may
fail
to locate
an outcome
n the
bargaining ange
because
of strategic
ncentives
o withhold
r
misrepresent
rivate
nformation.
While tates
have an incentive
o avoid the
costs
of
war,
hey
lso wish
o obtain
a favorableresolutionof the issues. This latter desire can give them an
incentive
oexaggerate
heir ruewillingness
r
capability
o
fight,
f
by
doing o
they might
deter futurechallenges
or
persuade
the other side
to make
concessions.
tates
can also have an
incentive
o
conceal
their
apabilities
r
resolve,
f
they
re concerned
hatrevelation
would make them
militarilyand
32. For examples
nd discussion
n
thispoint, ee Fearon,
Threats
o Use Force,
chap.
3.
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396
International rganization
hence politically)
ulnerable r would reduce the
chances for successful
irst
strike. imilarly,
tates
may conceal
their ruewillingness o fight
n order to
avoid appearing s the aggressor.
Combinedwiththe factof private nformation,
hese various ncentives o
misrepresent
an explainwhy
ven rational eaders
may
be unable to avoid the
miscalculations
f relative
will and
power
that an cause
war. This
section irst
considers why
this is so
theoretically
nd then discusses two empirical
examples.
A drawback
f the
simple
bargaining
model
given
bove
was that tateB had
no opportunity
o try o communicate
tswillingness
o
fight
o
state
A. It
s easy
to magine hat
f
ommunication
ere possible-say,
if
B
couldannounce
what
interests
n
X it considered
ital
nough
o
fight
ver-this mightt least ower
the chance
of war by miscalculation.
o check this,
we
give
state B an initial
opportunity
o make a
foreignpolicy
announcement
which can be
any
statement bout
ts
foreign olicy
r
what t considers o
be vitalor
peripheral
interests.Assume
as before hatA
is
uncertain
bout B's capabilities
r
costs
for
ighting.)
If
the announcement
tself as no effect
n either ide'spayoffs,hen
t can
be shown hat
n
any equilibrium
n which tate A does
not choose
randomly
amongdemands,A willmake the same demandregardless fwhat tateB says,
and the
ex
ante risk
of war will remain the same as
in
the game
without
communication
y
state
B. To
gain
an intuition
or
hese
results,
uppose
that
A conditioned
ts behavioron
fi
rabbing
more
or less
depending
n
what B
announced.
Then
regardless
fB's true
willingness
o
fight,
does
bestto make
the announcement
hat eads to
the
smallestgrabby
A-that is,
B
has
an
incentive
o misrepresentts actual willingness
o resist.But then A learns
nothing rom he announcement.33
This conclusion
is
slightly
ltered
if
the leaders
of B can render the
announcement costly o make.34 n practice, ive ommonmethods nclude
buildingweapons, mobilizing
troops, signing
alliance
treaties,supporting
troops
n a
foreign and,
and
creating
domesticpolitical
costs thatwould
be
paid
if
the announcement
proves
false. Of
course, signaling
by
means of
domestic
political
audience
costs
lies
outside
a
purelyunitary
ational-actor
framework,
ince this
presumes
staterun
by
an
agent
on behalf
f
a principal
(the audience )
rather
han
unitary
tatewith
perfectly
ecure
eadership.
In
the atter ase, leaders may
be
able to make
foreign olicy nnouncements
33. See theAppendix or roofs fthese
laims.
Cheap
talk nnouncements
an
affect
utcomes
in some bargaining ontexts. or an example from conomics, ee Joseph Farrell
and Robert
Gibbons, Cheap
Talk
Can
Matter n Bargaining, ournal f
Economic Theory
8
(June1989),pp.
221-37. These authors
show
how
cheap
talk might redibly ignal a willingness
o negotiate
seriously hat hen
ffectsubsequent erms f trade.For an example
from nternationalelations,
see JamesD. Morrow,
Modeling the
Forms of International ooperation:
Distribution ersus
Information,
nternational rganization
8 (Summer1994), pp.
387-423.
34. The
conclusion s likewise ltered
f
the
possibility
f
repeated
nteractionsn sufficiently
similar ontexts s
great nough hat eputation
uilding
an be
supported.
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War
397
credible nlyby engaging n
international
eputation, aking inanciallyostly
mobilizationmeasures, or bearing the costs and
risks
of
limited
military
engagements.35
Even when the signal s costly, owever, hiswill not n generalcompletely
eliminate ll risk fwarbymiscalculation-indeed,
t
may
ven ncrease t.
The
reasonconcerns
henature f the
signals
hat tateshave ncentives o send. To
be genuinelynformativebout a state's actualwillingnessr ability
o
fight,
signalmustbe costly
n
such a waythat state
with esser
resolve
r
capability
might otwish o send t.Actions hatgenerate
real risk f
war-for example,
troopmobilizations
hat
ngage a leadership's eputation efore nternational
ordomestic udiences-can easily atisfyhis onstraint,ince stateswithhigh
resolve are less fearful f taking hem. n otherwords, rational tatemay
choose to run real
risk
f
inefficient)
ar
n
order o
signal
hat twill
fight
f
notgiven good
deal in
bargaining.36
The July risis fWorldWar provides everal xamples fhow ncentives o
misrepresent an make miscalculations f resolvehard to dispel. Soon after
German
leaders
secretly
endorsed Austrian
plans
to
crush
Serbia, they
receivedboth direct nd indirect erbal ndications rom t. Petersburg hat
Russia would fight ather than acquiesce.37For example, on 21 July, he
Russian ForeignMinister oldthe German mbassador hat Russia would not
be able
to
tolerateAustria-Hungary'ssingthreateninganguage
to
Serbia
or
takingmilitary
easures. 38
uch
verbal tatements ad
little
ffect
n
German
leaders' beliefs,however, ince they knew Russian leaders had a strategic
incentive o misrepresent. n 18 July n a cable explaining erlin'spolicy o
Ambassador Lichnowsky
n
London, Secretary
of
State Jagow wrote that
there
s certain
o be
some blustering
n St.
Petersburg. 39imilarly,
henon
26
July ichnowsky egan
to
report
hat
Britain
might oin
with
France
and
Russia in the eventofwar, German ChancellorBethmannHollweg
told
his
personalassistant f the dangerthat France and Englandwillcommit heir
support
o
Russia
in order
not to alienate
it,perhaps
without
eallybelieving
35. On signaling osts
n
crises and audience costs n particular,ee Fearon, Threats to Use
Force, and Domestic Political
Audiences
and
the Escalation
of
nternational isputes.
For an
excellent nalysis f international
ignaling
n
general, ee
Robert
Jervis,
he
Logic of mages
n
Intemational
elations Princeton, .J.:
Princeton niversityress,1970).
36. For developed models thatmakethispoint, ee JamesFearon, Deterrenceand theSpiral
Model: The Role of Costly ignals n CrisisBargaining, aper presented t the
annual
meeting f
the AmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation, 0 August-2 September1990,San Francisco,Calif.;
Fearon, Domestic PoliticalAudiences
and the Escalation of International isputes ; Morrow,
Capabilities,Uncertainty,nd Resolve ;
Nalebuff,Brinkmanship
nd Nuclear
Deterrence ;
nd
Powell,NuclearDeterrence heory.
37. Luigi Albertini, heOrigins f theWar
of 1914,
vol.
2
(London: OxfordUniversity ress,
1953), pp. 183-87.
38.
Ibid.,p. 187.
39. Ibid., p. 158. For the fulltextof
the cable, see
Karl
Kautsky, omp., GermanDocuments
Relating
o
theOutbreak f heWorldWar New York: OxfordUniversityress,1924),doc. no. 71, p.
130.
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398
Internationalrganization
that or s mobilization
eans
war, hinkingf tas
a
bluff hich
hey nswer
with counterbluff. 40
At the sametime, heChancellor ad an incentiveomisrepresenthe
strength
nd
natureof German upport
or
Austria's
plans.Bethmann
correctlynticipated
hatrevealing
his nformation
ould
make Germany
appear
he ggressor,
hichmight ndermine
ocialDemocraticupport
or
his policies
n Germany
s well as turn
ritishublic pinion
more olidly
against
is
tate.41
his ncentiveed the
Chancellor
o
avoid
making
irect r
pointed
nquiries
boutEngland's ttitude
n
case
ofwar.The incentivelso
led
him
o pretend
o
go
alongwith he
British oreign ecretary's
roposals
for conference
o mediate
he
dispute.42
n
consequence,
ord
Greymay
ot
have raspedheneedfor strongerarningoGermanyntil airlyate n he
crisis
on
29
July),y
which ime
diplomatic
nd
military
ctions
ad
made
backing
ffmore ifficult
or othAustria
nd
Germany.
In
July 914,
ncentives
o
misrepresentrivate
nformationostered
nd
supported
miscalculations
fwillingness
o
fight.
iscalculations
f
relative
poweran
rise rom
his
ame
ource. n the
ne
hand,
tates
ttimes ave n
incentive
o
exaggerate
heir
apabilities
n an
attempt
o do better
n
bargaining.
nthe ther
and, hey
an
also have hewell-known
ncentiveo
withholdnformationbout apabilitiesndstrategy.resumablyecauseof
the tronglyero-sum
spect
fmilitaryngagements,
state hat
as
uperior
knowledge
f
n
adversary's
ar
plans
may
o
better
n
war
ndthus
n
prewar
bargaining-hence,
tates arely ublicize
war
plans.
While
the theoretical
logic
has not beenworked ut,
t
seems
plausible
hat
tates'
ncentiveso
conceal
nformation
bout
apabilities
nd
strategy
ould
help explain
ome
disagreements
bout
elative
ower.
The
1904
war etween
apan
ndRussia erves
o llustratehis cenario. n
the
eve of the
war,
Russian eaders elieved
hat heir
military
ould
lmost
certainlyefeat apan.43nthis onvictionhey ifferedittle rom heview f
most
uropean
bservers.
y
contrast,
t
the mperial
ouncil
f
4
February
that ecided
or
war,
he
Japanese
hief
f
taffstimated
fifty-fifty
hance f
40. Konrad
Jarausch,
The Illusion
of LimitedWar: ChancellorBethmannHollweg's
Calcu-
lated Risk, Central uropean
History (March
1969), pp. 48-76. The
quotation s drawnfrom .
65.
41. See L. C. F. Turner,Origins f
theFirstWorldWar New
York: Norton, 970), p. 101;
and
Jarausch,
The Illusionof LimitedWar,
p. 63.
Trachtenberg rites hat
one of Bethmann's asic
goals was forGermany o avoid coming cross as the aggressor. ee Marc Trachtenberg, istory
and Strategy
Princeton, .J.:Princeton
niversityress,
1991), p. 90.
42. Albertini oncludes
hat on the evening f the
27th ll the Chancellor ought
o do was to
throw ust
n
the eyes of Grey
and lead himto believe that
Berlinwas
seriously rying
o avert
conflict,
hat
f
war brokeout it
would be Russia's
fault nd thatEngland could therefore
emain
neutral. ee Albertini,
he
Origins f
heWar f1914,
vol.
1, pp.
444-45. See alsoTurner, rigins f
the irstWorld
War, . 99.
43.
See J.
A.
White,
The
Diplomacy
of
the
Russo-Japanese
War
(Princeton,
N.J.:Princeton
University
ress,1964), pp. 142-43;
and
Ian
Nish,
The
Origins f
the
Russo-Japanese
War London:
Longman,
985), pp.
241-42.
This content downloaded from 181.118.149.24 on Wed, 09 Sep 2015 16:40:52 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
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-
8/20/2019 Explicación Racionalista de La Guerra Fearon
22/37
War 399
prevailing,
f
their
ttack
egan mmediately.44hus
Japanese
nd Russian
leaders
disagreed boutrelative ower-their
stimatesf the ikelihood f
victoryummedogreaterhan .
Moreover, istoricalccounts
mplicate
his
isagreement
s a
major ause
of the
war:
Russia's
refusal o compromiseespite
epeated
ffers
y the
Japanese
as motivatedn
argemeasure
y
heir elief hat
Japan
would
not
dare
ttack hem. he Japanese abinet inallyecided
orwar fter heTsar
andhis
dvisersailed omake
ny
eal
ompromises
verKorea rManchuria
in a
series fproposalsxchangedn 1903.The Tsar
nd his op dvisers ere
hardlyager ofight,ot
ecause hey xpectedo ose
butbecause hey aw n
Asianwar
s a
costly
iversionfresources
o thewrongheater.45onethe-
less, hey efusedo make oncessionsrom hat hey iewed s a positionf
great
militarytrength.hey elieved
hat
Japan
wouldhave
o settle
or
ess,
givents elative
ilitary
eakness.46
The
disagreement
rose n substantial
art
rom
apanese rivate
nforma-
tion bout heir
militaryapabilities
nd
how
hey
ompared
ithRussia's.A
far
uperior
ntelligence
ervice ad
provided
he
Japanese
military
ith clear
picture
f
Russian
trengths
nd weaknessesn Northeast
sia
and enabled
them
o
develop
n
effective
ffensive
trategy.ccording
o JohnAlbert
White, ue tothisntelligencetheJapanese overnmentpparentlyaced he
warwith farmore
ccurateonception
f
heir
ask han
heir
nemy
ad. 47
In
addition,ompared ith he
Russians
r
ndeed
with
ny uropean ower,
Japanese eaders
had
muchbetter nowledge
f the
fightingbility
f
the
relativelyntested apanese
rmy
ndof he
ffect
f
he eforms,raining,nd
capital evelopment
f he
previous
ecade.48
If
by ommunicating
his
rivate
nformationhe
Japanese
ouldhave
ed
the
Russians
o
see
that heir hances
f
victoryere
maller han
xpected,hey
might
ave
done
o. Almost ll historiansho
have
arefully
xaminedhe ase
agree hat heJapanese overnmentasnot ent nwar orts wn ake-they
44. J. N. Westwood,Russia AgainstJapan, 1904-5: A New Look at the
Russo-JapaneseWar
(Albany: State University
f
New York Press, 1986),
p.
22.
Estimates
ariedwithin he
Japanese
leadership, utwith heexception f unior-level fficers,ew eem to havebeen
highlyonfident f
victory.
or
example,
s
the decisionforwar
was taken
the Japanese navy equested
a
two-week
delay
to allow it to even the odds at
sea.
See
Nish,
The
Origins f
the
Russo-JapaneseWar,pp.
197-200
and
206-7.
45.
See,
for
example,
David
Walder,
The Short ictorious
War: The
Russo-Japanese onflict,
1904-5 London: Hutchinson, 973),pp. 53-56; and Nish,The Origins f he
Russo-JapaneseWar, .
253.
46. See White,TheDiplomacy ftheRusso-JapaneseWar, haps. 6-8; Nish,The
Origins f the
Russo-JapaneseWar, . 241; and Lebow,Between eace and War, p. 244-46.
47.
White,
The
Diplomacy f
the
Russo-JapaneseWar,p.
139. Nish
writes hat manyRussians
certainly ook viewof theJapanesemilitary] hichwas der
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