8/12/2019 Acord Concepcion Tanada

1/2

Tanada V CuencoConsti tut ional Law Pol i t ical Question

FACTS: After the 1955 elections, members of theSenate were chosen. The Senate was

overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party.The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo. Diosdadoon the other hand was a senatorial candidate who

lost the bid but was contesting it before the SET.But prior to a decision the SET would have to

choose its members. It is provided that the SETshould be composed of 9 members; 3 justices, 3senators from the majority party and 3 senators

from the minority party. But since there is only oneminority senator the other two SET members

supposed to come from the minority were filled inby the NP. Lorenzo assailed this process. So didDiosdado because he deemed that if the SET would

be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member

of the Liberalista will not have any chance in hiselection contest. Cuenco et al (members of the NP)averred that the SC cannot take cognizance of theissue because it is a political question. Cuenco

argued that the power to choose the members of theSET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy

for Lorenzo and Diosdado is not to raise the issuebefore judicial courts but rather to leave it beforethe bar of public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political

question.

HELD: The SC took cognizance of the case and

ruled in favor of Lorenzo and Diosdado. The termPolitical Question connotes what it means in

ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. Itrefers to those questions which, under theConstitution, are to be decided by the people in their

sovereign capacity; or in regard to which fulldiscretionary authority has been delegated to the

legislative or executive branch of the government. It

is concerned with issues dependent upon thewisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR

ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS AND

DEVELOPMENT, INC., VS. ZAMORA

G.R. No. 144256

Subject: Public CorporationDoctrine: Automatic release of IRA

Facts:Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII

mandating the Pres to submit to Congress a budgetof expenditures within 30 days before the openingof every regular session, submitted the National

Expenditures program for FY 2000. The Presidentproposed an IRA of P121,778,000,000. This

became RA 8760, AN ACT APPROPRIATINGFUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO

DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND,AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES also known as

General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year2000. It provides under the headingALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT

UNITS that the IRA for local government units

shall amount to P111,778,000,000.

In another part of the GAA, under the headingUNPROGRAMMED FUND, it is provided that

an amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apartfrom the P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall

be used to fund the IRA, which amount shall bereleased only when the original revenue targetssubmitted by the President to Congress can be

realized based on a quarterly assessment to beconducted by certain committees which the GAA

specifies, namely, the Development BudgetCoordinating Committee, the Committee onFinance of the Senate, and the Committee on

Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

Thus, while the GAA appropriatesP111,778,000,000 of IRA as Programmed Fund, itappropriates a separate amount of P10 Billion of

IRA under the classification of UnprogrammedFund, the latter amount to be released only upon the

occurrence of the condition stated in the GAA.

On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs,

along with 3 barangay officials filed with this Courtthe petition at bar, for Certiorari, Prohibition and

Mandamus With Application for TemporaryRestraining Order, against respondents thenExecutive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, then

Secretary of the Department of Budget andManagement Benjamin Diokno, then National

Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones, and theCommission on Audit, challenging the

constitutionality of provision XXXVII(ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTUNITS) referred to by petitioners as Section 1,

XXXVII (A), and LIV (UNPROGRAMMEDFUND) Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the GAA (theGAA provisions)

Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates

the LGUs autonomy by unlawfully reducing theIRA allotted by 10B and by withholding its releaseby placing the same under Unprogrammed funds.

Although the effectivity of the Year 2000 GAA hasceased, this Court shall nonetheless proceed to

resolve the issues raised in the present case, it beingimpressed with public interest. Petitioners arguethat the GAA violated the constitutional mandate of

automatically releasing the IRAs when it made itsrelease contingent on whether revenue collections

could meet the revenue targets originally submittedby the President, rather than making the releaseautomatic.

8/12/2019 Acord Concepcion Tanada

2/2

ISSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs

fiscal autonomy by not automatically releasing thewhole amount of the allotted IRA.

HELD:Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a

just share, as determined by law, in the nationaltaxes which shall be automatically released to them.

Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this

constitutional mandate when it made the release ofIRA contingent

on whether revenue collections could meet therevenue targets originally submitted by thePresident, rather than making the release automatic.

Respondents counterargue that the aboveconstitutional provision is addressed not to the

legislature but to the executive, hence, the samedoes not prevent the legislature from imposingconditions upon the release of the IRA.

Respondents thus infer that the subject

constitutional provision merely prevents theexecutive branch of the government fromunilaterally withholding the IRA, but not the

legislature from authorizing the executive branch towithhold the same. In the words of respondents,

This essentially means that the President or any

member of the Executive Department cannotunilaterally, i.e., without the backing of statute,

withhold the release of the IRA.

As the Constitution lays upon the executive the dutyto automatically release the just share of localgovernments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the

legislature not to pass laws that might prevent theexecutive from performing this duty. To hold that

the executive branch may disregard constitutionalprovisions which define its duties, provided it has

the backing of statute, is virtually to make theConstitution amendable by statute a propositionwhich is patently absurd. If indeed the framers

intended to allow the enactment of statutes makingthe release of IRA conditional instead of automatic,then Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution would

have been worded differently.

Since, under Article X, Section 6 of theConstitution, only the just share of localgovernments is qualified by the words as

determined by law, and not the release thereof, theplain implication is that Congress is not authorized

by the Constitution to hinder or impede theautomatic release of the IRA.

In another case, the Court held that the onlypossible exception to mandatory automatic release

of the IRA is, as held in Batangas:if the national internal revenue collections for thecurrent fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the

collections of the preceding third fiscal year, inwhich case what should be automatically released

shall be a proportionateamount of the collections for the current fiscal year.

The adjustment may even be made on a quarterlybasis depending on the actual collections of nationalinternal revenue taxes for the quarter of the current

fiscal year.

This Court recognizes that the passage of the GAAprovisions by Congress was motivated by thelaudable intent to lower the budget deficit in linewith prudent fiscal management. The

pronouncement in Pimentel, however, must beechoed: [T]he rule of law requires that even the

best intentions must be carried out within theparameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily,laudable purposes must be carried out by legal

methods.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions 1 and 4 of theYear 2000 GAA are hereby declaredunconstitutional insofar as they set apart a portion

of the IRA, in the amount of P10 Billion, as part ofthe UNPROGRAMMED FUND.

People v. Concepcion

G.R. No. 19190 (November 29, 1922)

FACTS:

Defendant authorized an extension of credit in

favor of Concepcion, a co-partnership. Defendants wife was a

director of this co-partnership. Defendant wasfound guilty of violating Sec. 35 of Act No. 2747

which says that The National Bank shall not,directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of themembers of the Board of Directors of the bank nor

to agents of the branch banks. This Section wasin effect in 1919 but was repealed in Act No. 2938

approved on January 30, 1921.

ISSUE:W/N Defendant can be convicted of

violating Sections of Act No. 2747, which were

repealed by Act No. 2938.

HELD:

In the interpretation and construction, the primaryrule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of

the Legislature. Section 49 in relation to Sec. 25 ofAct No. 2747 provides a punishment for any personwho shall violate any provisions of the

Act. Defendant contends that the repeal of theseSections by Act No. 2938 has served to take away

basis for criminal prosecution. The Court holds thatwhere an act of the Legislature which penalizes anoffense repeals a former act which penalized

the same offense, such repeal does not have theeffect of thereafter depriving the Courts of

jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence offenderscharged with violations of the old law.