15 27 legalethics casedigest dats

8/10/2019 15 27 Legalethics Casedigest Dats

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15. Nepomuceno v. City of Surigao, G.R. No. 146091

CORONA, J.:

Facts:

Civil Case No. 4570 was a complaint for "Recovery of Real Property and/or its Market Value"

filed by petitioner Maria Paz Nepomuceno to recover a 652 sq. m. portion2 of her 50,000 sq. m. lot3

which was occupied, developed and used as a city road by the city government of Surigao. Maria Paz

alleged that the city government neither asked her permission to use the land nor instituted

expropriation proceedings for its acquisition. On October 4, 1994, she and her husband, co-petitioner,

Fermin A. Nepomuceno, wrote respondent (then Surigao City Mayor) Salvador Sering a letter proposing

an amicable settlement for the payment of the portion taken over by the city. They subsequently met

with Mayor Sering to discuss their proposal but the mayor rebuffed them in public and refused to pay

them anything. In a letter dated January 30, 1995, petitioners sought reconsideration of the mayors

stand. But again, the city mayor turned this down in his reply dated January 31, 1995. As a consequence,

petitioners claimed that they suffered mental anguish, embarrassment, disappointment and emotional

distress which entitled them to moral damages.

In their answer, respondents admitted the existence of the road in question but alleged that it

was constructed way back in the 1960s during the administration of former Mayor Pedro Espina. At that

time, the lot was owned by the spouses Vicente and Josefa Fernandez who signed a road right-of-way

agreement in favor of the municipal government. However, a copy of the agreement could no longer be

found because the records were completely destroyed and lost when the Office of the City Engineer was

demolished by typhoon Nitang in 1994.

Issue:

Whether or not the exemplary damages should be award to Nepomuceno

Facts:

Petitioners arguments are without merit.

The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not

intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the

actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way the compensation to be paid can

be truly just; i.e., "just" not only to the individual whose property is taken, "but to the public, which is to

pay for it."

Thus, the value of petitioners property must be ascertained as of 1960 when it was actually

taken. It is as of that time that the real measure of their loss may fairly be adjudged. The value, oncefixed, shall earn interest at the legal rate until full payment is effected, conformably with other

principles laid down by case law.

Finally, we deny petitioners prayer for exemplary damages. Exemplary damages may be

imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.15 The award of these damages is meant

to be a deterrent to socially deleterious actions.16 Exemplary damages would have been appropriate

had it been shown that the city government indeed misused its power of eminent domain.17 In this


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case, both the RTC and the CA found there was no socially deleterious action or misuse of power to

speak of. We see no reason to rule otherwise.


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16. Hipos v. Bay, G.R. Nos. 174813-15

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Facts:

On 15 December 2003, two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the

crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsio, Arthur

Villaruel and two others before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, acting as a Family

Court, presided by respondent Judge Bay. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. Q-03-123284,

No. Q-03-123285 and No. Q-03-123286. The Informations were signed by Assistant City Prosecutor

Ronald C. Torralba.

On 23 February 2004, private complainants AAA and BBB filed a Motion for Reinvestigation

asking Judge Bay to order the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Informations had

been filed against petitioners and their co-accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a

reinvestigation of the cases.

On 19 May 2004, petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case before the CityProsecutor. They claimed that there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged.

On 10 August 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the reinvestigation

affirming the Informations filed against petitioners and their co-accused in Criminal Cases No. Q-03-

123284-86. The Resolution was signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Raniel S. Cruz and approved by City

Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano.

On 3 March 2006, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint

Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an appeal of the 10 August 2004 Resolution, reversed the

Resolution dated 10 August 2004, holding that there was lack of probable cause. On the same date, the

City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay.

Issue:

Can the SUPREME COURT compel Judge Bay to dismiss the case through a writ of mandamus

and subsequently filing a motion to withdraw information?

Held:

Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or

person, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the

respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty

resulting from an office, trust, or station; or when the respondent excludes another from the use and

enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a

ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion

by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to

any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that

of the court.


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In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we compel the trial court to do is to grant

the Office of the City Prosecutors Motion for Withdrawal of Informations against petitioners. In effect,

petitioners seek to curb Judge Bays exercise of judicial discretion.

The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice or inspecial cases by the President of the Philippines. But even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a

person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie

case. The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial decision

to prosecute him.

The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion

that will justify a judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But in such a case the proper

remedy to call for such exception is a petition for mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition.

In the case at bar, the Petition for Mandamus is directed not against the prosecution, but

against the trial court, seeking to compel the trial court to grant the Motion to Withdraw Informations

by the City Prosecutors Office. Once a criminal complaint or an information is filed in court, any

disposition or dismissal of the case or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the jurisdiction,

competence, and discretion of the trial court. The only qualification is that the action of the court must

not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People or the private complainant to

due process of law.

Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an

accused's motion for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and

defers the arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the

investigating prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such

resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken thereon to the Department of Justice.

The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition

thereof, such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion

of the court. While the prosecutor retains the discretion and control of the prosecution of the case, he

cannot impose his opinion on the court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the

case. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor before or after the arraignment,

or after a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records

upon reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the court. The action of the court must

not, however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of

law.

When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of probablecause based on a resolution of the secretary of justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an

independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the

trial court is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with

the trial. While the secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. A trial court, however,

commits reversible error or even grave abuse of discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate such


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recommendation and simply insists on proceeding with the trial on the mere pretext of having already

acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action.

Mandamus is available to compel action on matters involving judgment and discretion when refused, it

is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or

reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.24 The trial court, when confronted with a

Motion to Withdraw an Information on the ground of lack of probable cause, is not bound by the

resolution of the prosecuting arm of the government, but is required to make an independent

assessment of the merits of such motion, a requirement satisfied by the respondent judge in the case at

bar.


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17. Nevada v. Casuda, A.C. No. 7591

VELASCO JR., J.:

Facts:

Nevada is the principal stockholder of C.T. Nevada & Sons, Inc., a family corporation which

operates the Mt. Crest Hotel located at Legarda Road, Baguio City. Complainant alleged that she and

Casuga are members of the One in Jesus Christ Church, a religious group which counts the latter as one

of its elders. According to Nevada, she has allowed the use of one of the Hotels functions rooms for

church services. And in time, Casuga was able to gain her trust and confidence. Nevada further alleged

that unknown to her, Casuga, sometime in 2006, started to represent himself as the administrator of the

Hotel. On March 1, 2006, he entered into a contract of lease with a certain Jung Jong Chul covering an

office space in the Hotel. Casuga signed the lease contract over the printed name of one Edwin T.

Nevada and notarized the document himself. Upon contract signing, the amount of PhP 90,000 as rental

deposit for the office space. The amount thus deposited, so Nevada claims, was never turned over to

her or to C.T. Nevada &Sons, Inc. Nevada adds that, in the course of their acquaintanceship, Casuga was

able to acquire from her several pieces of jewelry with an aggregate value of PhP 300,000 and a solidgold Rolex watch with diamond dials valued at USD 12,000. Casuga took possession of the valuables

purportedly with the obligation of selling them and to remit any proceeds to Nevada. However, despite

repeated demands by Nevada for Casuga to return the valuables or otherwise remit the proceeds of the

sale, no jewelry or money was ever returned. Casuga submitted an Affidavit stating that Nevada

informally instituted him as the administratorof the Hotel in a limited capacity but denied receiving the

PhP 90,000 from Jung Jong Chul. With regard to the pieces of jewelry and the Rolex watch, Casuga

stated that Nevada actually pawned them in a pawnshop and that she later asked his wife to redeem

them using their own money. Thereafter, Nevada asked Casugas wife to sell the valuables and

reimburse herself from the proceeds of the sale. Mandatory conference was set but Casuga never

appeared. Report of the Commission through Nevadas position paper was submitted for resolution and

Casuga was suspended for one (1) year for gross misconduct, violation of the notarial law and infidelity

in the custody of monies, jewelries and a Rolex watch which pertain to the complainant and the family

corporation.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is guilty for the charges detailed or implied in the basic complaint;

and the propriety of the return to Nevada of the items, or their money value, and the amount

subject of the case.

Held:

Casuga is guilty of gross misconduct for misrepresenting himself

The grounds for removal of a judge of first instance under Philippine law are two: (1) Serious

misconduct and (2) inefficiency. The latter ground is not involved in these proceedings. As to the first,

the law provides that sufficient cause must exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court involving

serious misconduct. The word misconduct implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error or


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judgment. For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts

complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were in persistent

disregard of well-known legal rules.

Respondent Casuga represented himself as a duly-authorized representative of Nevada when in fact he

was not. Plainly enough, Casuga is guilty of misrepresentation, when he made it appear that he was

authorized to enter into a contract of lease in behalf of Nevada when, in fact, he was not. Following the

principle laid down in Tan, Casugas misrepresentation properly constitutes gross misconduct for which

he must be disciplined. Notably, in Tan, the respondent lawyer was held guilty of misconduct and

suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.

Casuga also violated Canon 16of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Casugas failure to return such property or remit the proceeds of the sale is a blatant violation of

Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code). The Codes Canon 16 and Rule16.3.

From the records of the case, there is likewise a clear breach of lawyer-client relations. When a lawyer

receives money from a client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to

the client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the moneyfor the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client. Thus, the same

penalty should be imposed upon Casuga.


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18. Fil-Garcia, Inc. v. Hernandez, A.C. No. 7129

PUNO, CJ.:

Facts:

Complainant entered into an agreement with Magdalena T. Villasi (Villasi) for the completion of

the construction of a condominium building owned by the latter located in Quezon City. During the

progress of the construction, controversy arose between complainant and Villasi regarding the billing

and payments. On March 11, 1991, complainant filed an action for recovery of sum of money with

damages against Villasi before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 77. At that stage,

complainant was represented by Atty. Bernardo F. Ligsay (Atty. Ligsay). On June 26, 1996, the RTC

rendered judgment in favor of complainant and against Villasi.

On December 14, 2000, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration. This time, complainant

engaged the legal services of a new counsel in the person of respondent.

In its April 27, 2001 Resolution, the CA denied complainant's motion for reconsideration and

noted the appearance of respondent as counsel for complainant in substitution of Atty. Ligsay.Respondent received a copy of the resolution on May 8, 2001. Thus, he had until May 23, 2001 within

which to file an appeal in accordance with Rule 45 in relation to Rule 56 of the Rules of Court.

However, instead of filing an appeal within the reglementary period, respondent filed three (3)

successive motions for extension of time with the Court.

On May 22, 2001, respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal by Certiorari.

In his motion, he alleged that he was engaged as counsel by a mayoralty candidate and a senatorial

candidate which required his presence in the canvassing of votes. Due to the "enormous time pressure

from these commitments," respondent prayed for an extension of thirty (30) days or until June 21, 2001

to file complainant's appeal.

On June 21, 2001, respondent filed a Second Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal by

Certiorari. He alleged that "[he] fell ill "and that "[h]e sought medical consultation, which revealed that

he needs extended bed rest." He prayed for an extension of twenty (20) days or until July 11, 2001 to file

the appeal.

On July 11, 2001, respondent filed a Third Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal by

Certiorari, alleging that "[he] severely underestimated the time needed to complete the petition

because he had to work on other equally urgent legal matters, which were unattended to during his

illness." He prayed for an extension of ten (10) days or until July 21, 2001 to file the appeal.

Feeling aggrieved by the fate of its appeal, complainant filed a Complaint for disbarment beforethe Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on April 21, 2004. Complainant alleged that respondent's act

of filing three (3) motions for extension of time within which to file the appeal and his wrong choice in

the mode of appeal in the petition that he belatedly filed exemplify gross incompetence and caused

serious prejudice to complainant. Complainant also alleged that the lapse of seven (7) months from the

time the resolution dated October 1, 2001 was received by respondent before he informed complainant

of the same constitutes inexcusable negligence.


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19. Hernandez v. Padilla, A.C. No. 9387 (Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1562)

SERENO, J.:

Facts:

In a Decision dated 28 June 2002, penned by Judge Rosmari D. Carandang (Judge Carandang),

the RTC ordered that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of complainant be cancelled; and that the latter

pay the complainant therein, Elisa Duigan (Duigan), attorney's fees and moral damages.

Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Thereafter, the Court of

Appeals (CA) ordered them to file their Appellants' Brief. They chose respondent to represent them in

the case. On their behalf, he filed a Memorandum on Appeal instead of an Appellants' Brief. Thus,

Duigan filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. The CA granted the Motion in a Resolution dated 16

December 2003.

No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution dismissing the appeal was filed by the

couple. Complainant claims that because respondent ignored the Resolution, he acted with "deceit,

unfaithfulness amounting to malpractice of law." Complainant and her husband failed to file an appeal,because respondent never informed them of the adverse decision. Complainant further claims that she

asked respondent "several times" about the status of the appeal, but "despite inquiries he deliberately

withheld response [sic]," to the damage and prejudice of the spouses.

The Resolution became final and executory on 8 January 2004. Complainant was informed of the

Resolution sometime in July 2005, when the Sheriff of the RTC came to her house and informed her of

the Resolution.

On 9 September 2005, complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint with the Committee on Bar

Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), seeking the disbarment of respondent on the

following grounds: deceit, malpractice, and grave misconduct. Complainant prays for moral damages inthe amount of P350,000.

Issue:

Whether or not the punishment of 1 month suspension to Atty. Padilla by the IBP Discipline

Committee is correct

Held:

We adopt the factual findings of the board of governors of the IBP. This Court, however,

disagrees with its Decision to reduce the penalty to one-month suspension. We thus affirm the six-month suspension the Board originally imposed in its 28 August 2010 Resolution.

The IBP Investigating Commissioner's observation on this matter, in the 5 January 2009 Report,

is correct. Regardless of the particular pleading his client may have believed to be necessary, it was

respondent's duty to know the proper pleading to be filed in appeals from RTC decisions, viz:

Having seen the Decision dated 18 June 2002 of the trial court, respondent should have known

that the mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals for said Decision is by ordinary appeal under Section


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2(a) Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In all such cases, Rule 44 of the said Rules

applies.

When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice of Appeal.

Consequently, what should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed cases or Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil

Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the appellant's brief be filed after the records of the case have been

elevated to the CA. Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know this procedure. Canon 5 of the

Code reads:

CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education

programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of

law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.

Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was given notice of the fact that he filed the wrong

pleading. However, instead of explaining his side by filing a comment, as ordered by the appellate court,

he chose to ignore the CA's Order. He claims that he was under the presumption that complainant and

her husband had already settled the case, because he had not heard from the husband since the filing of

the latter's Memorandum of Appeal.

This explanation does not excuse respondent's actions. First of all, there were several remedies

that respondent could have availed himself of, from the moment he received the Notice from the CA to

the moment he received the disbarment Complaint filed against him. But because of his negligence, He

chose to sit on the case and do nothing. Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to inform his

clients of the status of their case. His failure to do so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code,

which reads:

18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a

reasonable time to the client's request for information.

If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least respondent couldhave done was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel. He could

have thus explained why he was no longer the counsel of complainant and her husband in the case and

informed the court that he could no longer contact them. His failure to take this measure proves his

negligence.

Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on Duigan's Motion

to Dismiss is negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in handling

the client's case, viz:

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection

therewith shall render him liable.

Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their negligence in

fulfilling their duty would render them liable for disciplinary action.

Respondent has failed to live up' to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates his duties to

his client, he engages in unethical and unprofessional conduct for which he should be held accountable.


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20. Arroyo-Posidio v. Viran, A.C. No. 6051

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts:

In August 1996, Atty. Vitan contacted Celia Posidio and showed her documents consisting of tax

declarations of properties purportedly forming part of the estate of Nicolasa S. de Guzman-Arroyo, but

were not included in the Inventory of Properties for distribution in Special Proceeding No. C-525. He

convinced complainant to file another case to recover her share in the alleged undeclared properties

and demanded P100,000.00 as legal fees therefor. After several months, however, Atty. Vitan failed to

institute any action. Celia Posidio decided to forego the filing of the case and asked for the return of the

P100,000.00, but Atty. Vitan refused despite repeated demands.

Consequently, Celia Posidio filed an action for sum of money and damages against Atty. Vitan

before Branch 81, Metropolitan Trial Court, Valenzuela City which was docketed as Civil Case No. 7130.

The judgment of the Branch 81 MTP Valenzuela is rendered in favor of the Celia Posidio and against the

Atty. Vitan.

Atty. Vitan appealed to the Regional Trial Court which affirmed the Metropolitan Trial Court

decision. Thus, Celia Posidio filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution which was granted on

March 19, 2001.

To satisfy the judgment against him, Atty. Vitan issued Prudential Bank check number 03387425

dated May 31, 2001 in the amount of P120,000.00 in favor of Celia Posidio. However, upon presentment

for payment, the check was dishonored for the reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. Despite a written notice of

dishonor and demand dated September 3, 2001, Atty. Vitan. refused to honor his obligation.

Atty. Vitan. denied complainants allegations. He admitted having received the amount of

P100,000.00 but claimed that the same was partial payment for his services in Special Proceeding CaseNo. C-525. Further, he alleged that he had already paid complainant the amount of P150,000.00 as

evidenced by a Receipt & Quitclaim7 dated August 10, 2000.

On March 1, 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for

investigation, report and recommendation. On January 15, 2006, the Investigating Commissioner

submitted his Report8 finding respondent guilty of violating the lawyers oath and the Code of

Professional Responsibility in defrauding his client and issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover

the same.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Vitan should be disbar

Held:

In the instant case, respondent received the amount of P100,000.00 as legal fees for filing

additional claims against the estate of Nicolasa S. de Guzman Arroyo. However, he failed to institute an

action, thus it was imperative that he immediately return the amount to complainant upon demand

therefor. Having received payment for services which were not rendered, respondent was unjustified in

keeping complainants money. His obligation was to immediately return the said amount. His refusal to


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do so despite complainants repeated demands constitutes a violation of his oath where he pledges not

to delay any man for money and swears to conduct himself with good fidelity to his clients.

A lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain, he abuses or

takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. A lawyer should be scrupulously careful

in handling money entrusted to him in his professional capacity, because a high degree of fidelity and

good faith on his part is exacted.

A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that may come to his

possession. He is a trustee to said funds and property. He is to keep the funds of his client separate and

apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose

such as for the registration of a deed with the Register of Deeds and for expenses and fees for the

transfer of title over real property under the name of his client if not utilized, must be returned

immediately to his client upon demand therefor. The lawyers failure to return the money of his client

upon demand gave rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated said money in violation of the

trust reposed on him. The conversion by a lawyer [of] funds entrusted to him by his client is a gross

violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.

It is clear from the foregoing that respondent fell short of the exacting moral and ethical

standards imposed on members of the legal profession. Respondents refusal to return complainants

money upon demand, his failure to comply with the lawful orders of the trial court, as well as the

issuance of a bouncing check, reveal his failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with

the strictures of his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

It cannot be overemphasized that membership in the legal profession is a privilege. Whenever it

is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it

becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave

him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.


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21. Ortiz v. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. Nos. 151983-84

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Facts:

The petitioner in this case, Jose Max S. Ortiz, is a member of the Philippine Bar who represented

the complainants in NLRC Cases No. V-0255-94 (hereinafter referred to as the Aguirre Cases) and No. V-

0068-95 (hereinafter referred to as the Toquero Case) instituted against herein private respondent San

Miguel Corporation sometime in 1992 and 1993. The complainants in NLRC Cases, Aguirre Cases and

Toquero Case were employees at private respondent's Sales Offices in the Province of Negros

Occidental. The complainants of Cases, Aguire and Toquero got a favorable decision in NLRC regarding

their money claims against San Miguel Corporation.

In effect, San Miguel Corporation filed a Petition for Certiorari. While this respondents petitions

were pending before t he Court of Appeals, all but one of the remaining complainants in Aguirre and

Toquero Cases on various dates before two Labor Arbiters and in the presence of two witnesses, signed

separate Deeds of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of private respondent. Based on the Deeds

they executed, complainants agreed to settle their claims against private respondent for amounts less

than what the NLRC actually awarded. Private respondent withheld 10% of the total amount agreed

upon by the parties in the said Deeds as attorney's fees and handed it over to petitioner. Private

respondent then attached the Deeds to its Manifestation and Motion filed before the appellate court.

Then the Court of appeals rendered a decision affirming the NLRC decisions, only in so far as it

concerned complainant Alfredo Gadian, Jr. (complainant Gadian), the only complainant who did not

execute a Deed of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim. With respect to the other complainants in the Aguirre

and Toquero Cases, their complaints were dismissed on account of their duly executed Deeds of

Release, Waiver and Quitclaim. In a Resolution dated 9January 2002, the appellate court denied the

motion of complainant Gadian and his counsel, herein petitioner, that the award of attorney's fees of

10% should be based on the monetary awards adjudged by the NLRC. Thus, this petition filed before theCourt praying to affirm the award of attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the monetary award adjudged

by the NLRC in its Decisions dated 21 July 1995 and 25 July 1995 in Toquero Case and Aguirre Cases

respectively.

Issue:

Whether he is entitled to the amount of attorney's fees as adjudged by the NLRC in its Decisions

in the Aguirre and Toquero Cases or only to the 10% of the amounts actually paid to his clients,the complainants who signed the Deeds of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim.

Held:


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The aforesaid issue evidently involves a question of law. What it needs to do is ascertain and

apply the relevant law and jurisprudence on the award of attorney's fees to the prevailing parties in

labor cases Article 111 of the Labor Code, as amended, specifically provides:

ART. 111. ATTORNEY'S FEES. (a) in cases of unlawful withholding of wages the culpable party may be

assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of wages recovered.

b) It shall be unlawful for any person to demand or accept, in any judicial or administrative proceedings

for the recovery of the wages, attorney's fees which exceed ten percent of the amount of wages

recovered.

In PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission citing Dr. Reyes v. Court

of Appeals, this Court enunciated that there are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees,

the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable

compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services the former has rendered to the latter.

The basis of this compensation is the fact of the attorney's employment by and his agreement with the

client. In its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees are deemed indemnity for damages ordered by the

court to be paid by the losing party in litigation. The instances in which these may be awarded are thoseenumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, specifically paragraph 7 thereof, which pertains to actions

for recovery of wages, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that

the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof. Article 111 of the

Labor Code, as amended, contemplates the extraordinary concept of attorney's fees.

Based on the foregoing, the attorney's fees awarded by the NLRC in its Decisions in the Aguirre

and Toquero Cases pertain to the complainants, petitioner's clients, as indemnity for damages; and not

to petitioner as compensation for his legal services. Records show that the petitioner neither alleged nor

proved that his clients, the complainants, willingly agreed that the award of attorney's fees would

accrue to him asan additional compensation or part thereof. What the complainants explicitly agreed to

in their individual Deeds of Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim was that the 10% attorney's fees of thepetitioner shall be deducted from the amount of the gross settlement.

Thus, this Court has no recourse but to interpret the award of attorney's fees by the NLRC in its

extraordinary concept. And since the attorney's fees pertained to the complainants as indemnity for

damages, it was totally within the complainants' right to waive the amount of said attorney's fees and

settle for a lesser amount thereof in exchange for the immediate end to litigation. Petitioner cannot

prevent complainants from compromising and/or withdrawing their complaints at any stage of the

proceedings just to protect his anticipated attorney's fees. Even assuming arguendo that the

complainants in the Aguirre and Toquero Cases did indeed agree that the attorney's fees awarded by

the NLRC should be considered in their ordinary concept, i.e., as compensation for petitioner's services,

we refer back to Article 111 of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides that the attorney's feesshould be equivalent to 10% of the amount of wages recovered. Since the complainants decided to

settle their complaints against the private respondent, the amounts actually received by them pursuant

to the Deeds of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim are the amounts "recovered" and the proper basis for

determining the 10% attorney's fees. In the case at bar, it is beyond cavil that the petitioner is not the

real party in interest; hence, he cannot file this Petition to recover the attorney's fees as adjudged by

the NLRC in its Decisions dated 21 July 1995 and 25 July 1995 in the Aguirre and Toquero Cases,

respectively. To reiterate, the award of attorney's fees pertain to the prevailing parties in the NLRC


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cases, namely, the complainants, all but one of whom no longer pursued their complaints against

private respondent after executing Deeds of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim. Not being the party to

whom the NLRC awarded the attorney's fees, neither is the petitioner the proper party to question the

non-awarding of the same by the appellate court. This would show that petitioner has been

compensated for the services he rendered the complainants. It may do well for petitioner to remember

that as a lawyer, he is a member of an honorable profession, the primary vision of which is justice. Thepractice of law is a decent profession and not a money-making trade. Compensation should be but a

mere incident. If petitioner earnestly believes that the amounts he already received are grossly

deficient, petitioner's remedy is not against the private respondent, but against his own clients, the

complainants. He should file a separate action for collection of sum of money against complainants to

recover just compensation for his legal services, and not the present Petition for Review to claim from

private respondent the attorney's fees which were adjudged by the NLRC in favor of complainants as the

prevailing parties in the Aguirre and Toquero Cases. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED.


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22. Masmud v. NLRC, G.R. No. 183385

NACHURA, J.:

Facts:

The late Alexander J. Masmud (Alexander), the husband of Evangelina Masmud (Evangelina)

filed a complaint against First Victory Shipping Services and Angelakos (Hellas) S.A. on July 9, 2003 for

non-payment of permanent disability benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowance, moral and

exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Alexander engaged the services of Atty. Rolando B. Go, Jr.

(Atty. Go) as his counsel. In consideration of Atty. Go's legal services, Alexander agreed to pay attorney's

fees on a contingent basis, as follows: twenty percent (20%) of total monetary claims as settled or paid

and an additional ten percent (10%) in case of appeal. On November 21, 2003, the Labor Arbiter (LA)

rendered a Decision granting the monetary claims of Alexander. Alexander's employer filed an appeal

before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). During the pendency of the proceedings before

the NLRC, Alexander died. After explaining the terms of the lawyer's fees to Evangelina, Atty. Go caused

her substitution as complainant. On April 30, 2004, the NLRC rendered a Decision dismissing the appeal

of Alexander's employer. On appeal before the CA, the decision of the LA was affirmed withmodification. Thereafter, Alexanders employer appealed to the Supreme Court. On February 6, 2006,

the Court issued a Resolution dismissing the case for lack of merit.

On January 10, 2005, the LA directed the NLRC Cashier to release the amount of P3,454,079.20

to Evangelina. Out of the said amount, Evangelina paid Atty. Go the sum of P680,000.00. Dissatisfied,

Atty. Go filed a motion to record and enforces the attorney's lien alleging that Evangelina reneged on

their contingent fee agreement. Evangelina paid only the amount of P680,000.00, equivalent to 20% of

the award as attorney's fees, thus, leaving a balance of 10%, plus the award pertaining to the counsel as

attorney's fees. In her comment, Evangelina manifested that Atty. Go's claim for attorney's fees of 40%

of the total monetary award was null and void based on Article 111 of the Labor Code.The Labor Arbiter

issued an Order granting Atty. Go's motion. Then, Evangelina questioned the decision of the LaborArbiter before the NLRC. However, the NLRC dismissed her appeal. Then, she elevated the case to the

Court of Appeals. The CA partially granted the petition with some modification declaring that Atty. Go is

fully compensated by the amount of P1,347,950.11 that he has already received. Dissatisfied, Angelina

filed this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the legal compensation of a lawyer in a labor proceeding should be based on

Article 111 of the Labor Code.

Facts:

There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the

reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services rendered to the latter. On

the other hand, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees may be awarded by the court as indemnity

for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party, such that, in any of the cases provided


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by law where such award can be made, e.g., those authorized in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, the

amount is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall

pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof. Here, we apply the ordinary

concept of attorney's fees, or the compensation that Atty. Go is entitled to receive for representing

Evangelina, in substitution of her husband, before the labor tribunals and before the court. The retainer

contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina provides for a contingent fee. The contract shall control in thedetermination of the amount to be paid, unless found by the court to be unconscionable or

unreasonable. Attorney's fees are unconscionable if they affront one's sense of justice, decency or

reasonableness. The decree of unreasonableness of a stipulated amount in a contingent fee contract will

not preclude recovery. It merely justifies the fixing by the court of a reasonable compensation for the

lawyer's services. Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the court

in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges. The amount of contingent fees agreed upon

by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or

litigation prospers. A much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fees because of the risk that

the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. The Court finds nothing illegal in the contingent fee contract

between Atty. Go and Evangelina's husband. The CA committed no error of law when it awarded the

attorney's fees of Atty. Go and allowed him to receive an equivalent of 39% of the monetary award.

Considering that Atty. Go successfully represented his client, it is only proper that he should receive

adequate compensation for his efforts. With his capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired

at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the

protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his

just compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for his client,

he himself would not get his due. In view of the foregoing, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of

Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.


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23. Catalan, Jr. V. Silvosa, A.C. No. 7360

PER CURIAM:

Facts:

Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in Regional

Trial Court, Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in

the same case for which he previously appeared as prosecutor. Atty. Silvosa appeared as public

prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00 (Esperon Case), for the complex crime of double frustrated

murder and later on November 23, 2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for the accused,

filed a motion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgement of the Esperon Case. Atty. Silvosa made an

attempt to bribe Prosecutor Toribio for 30,000.00php and failed. Prosecutor Toribio excuted her

affidavit on June 14, 1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio

Beltran, then President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. On May 18, 2006, the Sandiganbayan convicted

Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case. 27776 for direct bribery on an NBI set-up entrapment operation, wherein,

Atty. Silvosa demanded15,000.00 php from Lanticse for the dismissal of the case and for the release of

Cadinas who was in detention for more than two years.

Issues:

Whether or not respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Whether or not a delay of the filing for an administrative complaint exonerate a respondent.

Whether or not crime involving moral turpitude can be a ground for disbarment

Held:

Yes, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines.

Atty. Silvosa's attempt to minimize his role in said case would be unavailing. The fact is that he is

presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of the said case. Such would constitute

sufficient intervention in the case.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states "A lawyer shall not, after leaving

government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which

he had intervened while in said service." The Court agree with Commissioner Funa's finding that

Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03, when he entered his appearance in the motion to Post Bail

Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall

not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of concern given after a full

disclosure of facts." Atty. Silvosa's representation of conflicting interests merit at least the

penalty of suspension.

No, delay of filing for an administrative complaint does not exonerate a respondent.


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There is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that occurred more than seven years ago.

In this instance, the conflicting allegations are merely based on the word of one person against

the word of another. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough

that he denies the charges against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree

of morality and integrity which at all times expected of him. Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect.

The Court says, mere delay in filing of an administrative complaint against a member of the bar

does not automatically exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No

matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complaint of and

the time of the institution of the complaint, erring member of the bench and bar cannot escape

the disciplining arm of the Court. Atty. Silvosa's failed attempt at bribing Prosecutor Toribio also

merits at least the penalty of suspension.

Yes, crime involving moral turpitude can be a ground for disbarment.

Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties

which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, or

good morals. There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayans' judgement in Criminal Case No. 27776

is a matter of public record and is already final.

Rule 138, Section 27 provides, A member of the bar may be disbarred by reason of his

conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. The crime of direct bribery is a crime involving

moral turpitude, as ruled, in Magno vs COMELEC. The practice of Law is a privilege, and Atty.

Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise his privilege. Wherefore, respondent Atty. Joselito

M. Silvosa is here by disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.


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24. Baylon v. Almo, A.C. No. 6962

QUISUMBING, J.:

Facts:

Chalres Baylon averred that Pacita Filio, Rodolfo Llantino, Jr. and his late wife, Rosemarie

Baylon, conspired in preparing an SPA authorizing his wife to mortgage his real property located in

Signal Village, Taguig. He said that he was out of the country when the SPA was executed on June 17,

1996, and also when it was notarized by the respondent on June 26, 1996. To support his contention

that he was overseas on those dates, he presented (1) a certification from the Government of Singapore

showing that he was vaccinated in the said country on June 17, 1996; and (2) a certification from the

Philippine Bureau of Immigration showing that he was out of the country from March 21, 1995 to

January 28, 1997. To prove that his signature on the SPA was forged, the complainant presented a

report from the National Bureau of Investigation stating to the effect that the questioned signature on

the SPA was not written by him.

Charles Baylon likewise alleged that because of the SPA, his real property was mortgaged to

Lorna Express Credit Corporation and that it was subsequently foreclosed due to the failure of his wife

to settle her mortgage obligations.

In his answer, Atty. Almo admitted notarizing the SPA, but he argued that he initially refused to

notarize it when the Baylon's wife first came to his office on June 17, 1996, due to the absence of the

supposed affiant thereof. He said that he only notarized the SPA when the Baylon's wife came back to

his office on June 26, 1996, together with a person whom she introduced to him as Charles Baylon. He

further contended that he believed in good faith that the person introduced to him was the complainant

because said person presented to him a Community Tax Certificate bearing the name Charles Baylon. To

corroborate his claims, the respondent attached the affidavit of his secretary, Leonilita de Silva.

Atty. Almo likewise denied having taken part in any scheme to commit fraud, deceit or falsehood.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Almo should be disbar

Held:

We agree with the finding of the IBP that the respondent had indeed been negligent in the

performance of his duties as a notary public in this case.

The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. In Santiago v.

Rafanan, we explained,

. . . Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public

interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization

converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence

without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit

upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the

acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.


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For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their

office. Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They

are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are dictated by public policy

and are impressed with public interest.

Mindful of his duties as a notary public and taking into account the nature of the SPA which in

this case authorized the complainant's wife to mortgage the subject real property, the respondent

should have exercised utmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the person who represented

himself and was represented to be the complainant. He should not have relied on the Community Tax

Certificate presented by the said impostor in view of the ease with which community tax certificates are

obtained these days. As a matter of fact, recognizing the established unreliability of a community tax

certificate in proving the identity of a person who wishes to have his document notarized, we did not

include it in the list of competent evidence of identity that notaries public should use in ascertaining the

identity of persons appearing before them to have their documents notarized.


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25. St. Marys Farm, Inc. v. Prima Real Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 158144

NACHURA, J.:

Facts:

St. Marys was the registered owner of an originally 25,598 sqm of land in Las Pinas under TCT S-

1648.

In compliance with a court decision in another civil case, St. Marys passed and approved in 1988

a board resolution authorizing defendant Rodolfo Agana to cede to T.S. Cruz Subdivision 4,000

sqm of the above mentioned land.

Agana did not return to the plaintiff the said title. Instead, allegedly forged a board resolution of

St. Marys authorizing Agana to sell the remaining 21,598 sqm of land. This board resolution was

duly notarized. Agana was also with a Special Power of Attorney when it dealt with T.S. Cruz and

Prime Real Properties.

Eventually, a deed of absolute sale was signed by Agana and Prime Real Properties transferring

ownership of the land from St. Marys to Prima.

Prima effected the cancellation of TCT S-1648 in the name of St. Marys and another TCT T-6175

in its name was issued by the Registry of Deeds, Villanueva.

Prima purchased from T.S. Cruz Subdivision the 4,000 sqm portion of the land.

St. Marys filed an action for recission of the sale and reconveyance of the property.

According to St. Marys

1. Sale of the realty entered into between Agana and prima is null and void for lack of authority on the

part of Agana to sell the property

2. The board resolution allegedly granting Agana the authority to sell in behalf of the company, ascertified by Corp. Secretary Atty. Agcaoili is forgery as no board meeting was held on June 27, 1988; the

said document was merely presented to the notary public for notarization without Atty. Agcaoili

appearing before him.

3. Consequently, the deed of absolute sale was void for being a result of fraudulent transaction.

Prima contends:

1. It acted in good faith when it relied solely on the face of authorization of Agana and paid in full the

purchase price of P 2,567,759.00 making it a buyer in good faith and for value.

2. Even assuming that the authorization of Agana was forged, St. Marys, through its president, accepted

and received part of the purchase price knowing the same to be the proceeds of the sale of the

property, St. Marys is now estopped from asking recission.

Issue:

Whether or not Agana was authorized to sell the subject property


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Held:

Yes, Agana had the authority to sell the subject property by virtue of the notarized board

resolution and the Special Power of Attorney.

The document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney that is duly notarized. It is a public

document where the notarial acknowledgement is prima facie evidence of the fact of its due execution.

A buyer presented with such document would have no choice between knowing and finding out

whether a forge lurks beneath the signature on it. The notarial acknowledgement has remove that

choice from him replacing it with a presumption sanctioned by law that the affiant appeared before the

notary public and acknowledge that he executed the document, understood its import and signed it. The

buyer is given the luxury to rely on the presumption of regularity of a duly notarized SPA.

Prima also relied on the confirmation and certification of the Register of Deeds of Las Pinas and

Mr. T.S. Cruz. When Agana first sold the 4000 sqm portion to T.S. Cruz, he showed a similarauthorization by the petitioner which was also signed by the corporate secretary, Atty. Agcaoili. Agana

acted as St. Marys authorized agent and had full authority to bind the company in that first transaction

with Cruz.


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26. IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF MR. LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, PETITIONER IN BIRAOGO V. NOGRALES AND

LIMKAICHONG, G.R. No. 179120

PER CURIAM:

The resolution is the Report of the Investigating Committee created under the Resolution dated

December 10, 2008, to investigate the unauthorized release of the unpromulgated ponencia of JusticeRuben T. Reyes in the consolidated cases of Limkaichong v. COMELEC, Villando v. COMELEC, Biraogo v.

Nograles and Limkaichong, and Paras v. Nograles, docketed as G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179240-41, 179120

and 179132-33, respectively, to determine who are responsible for the leakage of a confidential internal

document of the En Banc.

Facts:

July 15, 2008 - the Court En Banc continued its deliberations on the draft of Justice Ruben T.

Reyes in the consolidated (Limkaichong case) which was used by this Court as a working basis

for its deliberations. It having been already printed on Gilbert paper, albeit a number of Justices

manifested that they were concurring "in the result," Justice Reyes immediately circulated the

ponencia during the same session.

July 22, 2008 -the En Banc deliberated on Justice Carpios Reflections which had in the

meantime been circulated to the members of the Court. As a result, the En Banc unanimously

decided to push through and set the date for holding oral arguments on the Limkaichong case

on August 26, 2008. On the request of Justice Reyes, however, the Limkaichong case was

included in the agenda of July 29, 2008 where it was listed as Item No. 66.

December 9, 2008, Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R. No.

179120, held a press conference at the Barrio Fiesta Restaurant in Maria Orosa Street, Ermita,

Manila, and circulated to the media an undated letter signed by him, together with what

appeared to be a xerox copy of the unpromulgated ponencia. In his letter, Biraogo insinuated

that the Court, at the instance of the Chief Justice and with the implied consent of the otherJustices, unlawfully and with improper motives withheld the promulgation of the ponencia.

Noting that the unauthorized release of a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia infringed on the

confidential internal deliberations of the Court and constituted contempt of court, the Court, in

a Resolution dated December 10, 2008, directed:

1.The creation of an Investigating Committee, chaired by Senior Associate Justice Leonardo A.

Quisumbing, with Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Third Division and Associate

Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Working Chairperson, First Division, as Members to investigate the

unauthorized release of the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes to determine who are responsible

for this leakage of a confidential internal document of the En Banc, and to recommend to the En Banc

the appropriate actions thereon;

2. Mr. Louis C. Biraogo to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution, why he

should not be punished for contempt for writing the undated letter and circulating the same together

with the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes.


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As directed, the committee, composed of the aforementioned three senior Justices, conducted initial

hearings on December 15 and 16, 2008.

The following witnesses/resource persons were heard:

1. Armando A. Del Rosario, Court Stenographer III, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes

2. Rodrigo E. Manabat, Jr., PET Judicial Staff Officer II, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes

3. Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista, Judicial Staff Head, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes

4. Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario

5. Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura

6. Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro

7. ACA Jose Midas P. Marquez, Chief, Public Information Office

8. Ramon B. Gatdula, Executive Assistant II, Office of the Chief Justice

9. Atty. Ma. Luisa D. Villarama, Clerk of Court En Banc

10. Major Eduardo V. Escala, Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division, Office of Administrative

Services

11. Atty. Felipa B. Anama, Assistant Clerk of Court

12. Willie Desamero, Records Officer III, Office of the Clerk of Court

13. Glorivy Nysa Tolentino, Executive Assistant I, Office of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura

14. Onofre C. Cuento, Process Server, Office of the Clerk of Court

15. Chester George P. Del Castillo, Utility Worker, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes

16. Conrado B. Bayanin, Jr.,Messenger, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes

17. Fermin L. Segotier, Judicial Staff Assistant II, Office of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura

18. Retired Justice Ruben T. Reyes

Issue:

Whether Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) leaked the unpromulgated ponencia.

Held:

The court finds Justice Reyes, together with Armando A. Del Rosario and Atty. Rosendo B.

Evangelista administratively liable for Grave Misconduct, and Simple Neglect of Duty for the Court

Stenographer and Judicial Staff Head of the said Justice. The Court has emphasized the heavy burden

and responsibility which court officials and employees are mandated to carry. They are constantly

reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official

functions must be avoided. The Court will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part


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of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public

accountability and diminish the peoples faith in the judiciary


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27. Caneda v. Menchavez, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2026

BRION, J.:

Facts:

The complainant is the counsel of one of the defendants, Virginia Borromeo Guzman, in Civil

Case No. CEB-30956, entitled Roberto Borromeo, et al. v. Heirs of Juan Borromeo, for judicial partition,

pending with the respondent's RTC Branch 21. Lawyer Pepito C. Suello is complainant's collaborating

counsel in the case. Both Ms. Guzman and Atty. Suello executed affidavits in connection with the

complaint. It appears from the complaint and the supporting affidavits that the respondent called the

partition case for hearing on December 14, 2005 at 11 o'clock in the morning. Due to be taken up was

the motion to segregate the inheritance shares of one of the plaintiffs, Roberto Borromeo.

Judge Menchavez asked the complainant at the start of the hearing if the defendants he was

representing were amenable to a partition. The complainant answered in the affirmative, subject to the

conditions that the counsel for the plaintiffs would withdraw a pending motion for reconsideration

before the Supreme Court to clear one of the areas subject to partition of squatters, and would secure a

writ of execution.

Atty. Delfin V. Nacua (Atty. Nacua), counsel for the plaintiffs, replied that he could not withdraw

the motion before the Supreme Court. At this point, Judge Menchavez asked the complainant if he was

amenable to segregate only the share of Roberto Borromeo. The complainant expressed reservations

about it. Instead he advanced the idea that the parties talk to each other through mediation. Judge

Menchavez thereupon blurted out "never mind mediation, walay hinundan na (it's useless)."

When Judge Menchavez checked on the progress of the case, the complainant remarked that it

was being delayed because no proper summons (by publication) had been served on the defendants

who were residing outside the country. Judge Menchavez reacted by angrily banging his gavel and

shouting, "I said no publication period." He banged the gavel so hard that it broke, its head flying intothe air and almost hitting complainant. Judge Menchavez then slammed the table with his hand and

then went inside his chambers. After a while, he came back with a holstered handgun and smashed it on

the table, as he angrily shouted at complainant, "Unsay gusto nimo? Yawa! Gahig ulo!" (What do you

want? Devil! Hardheaded!)

A lawyer, also attending the hearing and who was near the respondent's table, moved for a

recess. A member of the respondent's staff then gave him a glass of water. The complainant apologized

for causing the temper of the respondent to rise, but the respondent ignored him and called for the next

case. At that point, the complainant asked for permission to leave.

The complainant regarded the respondent's act of challenging him inside the courtroom in thepresence of many people as an act of impropriety under Section 6(3), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, in

relation with the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 2.01, 3.01 and 3.03. The complainant maintained

that the conduct of the respondent inside the court not only tarnished the name of the judiciary he

represents but constituted an insult to the law profession; that the respondent is not above the law; and

that the gun is not an emblem of authority.


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Issue:

Whether or not Judge Menchavez shoud be discipline

Held:

This case highlights the limits that a judge must observe in responding to situations he perceives to be

abusive in his court.

What appears certain to us is that there were basic disagreements on approaches and issues in

the partition case. In the courtroom, a lawyer makes submissions before a judge whose role is to hear

and consider the submissions, and subsequently rule on the matter. It is not a situation where two

equals, such as the opposing counsels, argue against each other. The respondent apparently had a

misplaced concept of what a courtroom situation should ideally be, so that he was effectively arguing

with counsel as shown by his clearly contentious stance when he made his ruling. This was the

respondent's first error; he should have coolly ruled and allowed counsel to respond to his ruling,

instead of proceeding in a manner that invited further arguments. The complainant, however, also

erred since he continued to argue despite the respondent's ruling. The respondent judge's response,

under this situation, should have been to direct the complainant to wind up his arguments under pain of

direct contempt if this warning would be disregarded. Thereafter, he could have declared the

complainant in direct contempt if he persisted in his arguments. A direct contempt, of course, is not

enforced by a judge's act of bringing out his weapon and asking counsel the direct question "What do

you want?" This confrontational manner - shown usually in the western genre of movies - has no place

in our present justice system. There are agents of the law, specifically, officers of the court and the

police who can be called upon to implement contempt orders and restore order as needed. Since the

alternative recourses available to the respondent did not take place, we share the OCA's observation

that the respondent overreacted in his handling of the situation before his court. Bringing out a gun for

everyone present in the court to see, even for purposes of maintaining order and decorum in the court,

is inexcusable in the absence of overt acts of physical aggression by a party before the court.

As the OCA aptly pointed out, the New Code of Judicial Conduct[8] requires "(Judges) shall

ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a

reasonable observer," and their "behavior and conduct x x x must reaffirm the peoples' faith in the

integrity of the judiciary,The respondent violated this rule when, after a show of anger, he brought and

openly displayed his gun on his courtroom table while hurling a confrontational question at the

offending counsel. While the New Code of Judicial Conduct requires a magistrate to maintain order and

decorum in the court, the Code itself sets limits on how a judge should do this. Section 6, Canon 6 of the

Code provides:

Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignifiedand courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an

official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others

subject to their influence, direction or control.

To reiterate, the judge himself must observe decorum by acting with dignity and courtesy to all

those present in the courtroom. This, the respondent judge failed to do. The severity of his violation is


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not tampered by his allegation that the complainant himself contributed to the events that led to the

respondent's show of temper.

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